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Full text of "Thucydides. With an English translation by Charles Forster Smith"

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|T. E. PAGE, C.H., LITT.D. 

CAPPS, ph.d., ll.d. tW. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d. 

POST, m.a. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.r.hist.soc. 
















First printed 1919 
Revised and Reprinted 1928 
Reprinted 1935, 1951, 1956 


Prinied in Great Britain 







BOOK II 257 






Three ancient biographies 1 of Thucydides have 
come down to us, but they are of little value. They 
are derived from ancient commentaries, and the bio- 
graphical details which they contain, wherever they 
do not rest upon inference from the text of the 
history itself, are often confused and contradictory. 
These are supplemented by scattered statements of 
several ancient writers — Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
who wrote two treatises on Thucydides (Z)<» Thucy- 
didis historia indicium and the Second Letter to Am- 
maeus), Plutarch (Cimon iv), and Pausanias (i. xxxii.). 

The-only authentic facts about the life of Thucy- 
dides are gathered from casual mention in the History. 
He was the son of Olorus (iv. civ. 4) ; commenced 
the compilation of materials for writing the History 
at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (i. i. 1); 
and lived through the whole war, ripe in years and 

1 One of these, compiled in three distinct portions u from 
the commentaries," passed under the name of Marcellinm, 
who is probably to be identified with the author of Scholia 
on Hermogenes wep\ araotwr, who seems to have lived in the 
fifth century A.D. ; another was by an anonymous gram- 
marian ; and the third is a short notice in* Suidas, a.v. 

A 2 vii 


judgment, following it with close attention, that he 
might acquire accurate information (v. xxvi. 5). He 
suffered from the plague of 429 b.c. (ii. xlviii. 3), of 
which he wrote his famous account (ii. xlvii-liv). 
Elected one of the ten generals in 424 b.c, he was 
sent to the coast of Thrace (where he enjoyed the 
right of working certain gold mines) to operate 
against Brasidas. Failing to relieve Amphipolis, he 
was exiled in 424 b.c, and remained in banishment 
for twenty years, and thus was able to become ac- 
quainted with affairs on both sides (v. xxvi. 5). 

For other facts we are dependent largely upon 
inference ; some are reasonably certain, others less 
so. The name of his father was identical with that 
of the Thracian prince Olorus, whose daughter He- 
gesipyle was married to Miltiades, and his tomb, 
having the inscription ©ovkvSiS^s 'OAopov 'AkifxovaLos, 
was in the suburb of Athens known as K01A.17 MeAe- 
TtScs, adjoining those of Cimon and Miltiades (Plut. 
Cim. iv). We may therefore assume that Olorus, 
the father of Thucydides, was a near kinsman of the 
Thracian prince Olorus. If, as Marcellinus says (§ 2), 
Thucydides' mother was named Hegesipyle, like 
Cimon's mother, that would be confirmation of the 
relationship ; but Plutarch makes no mention of this. 
It seems likely, then, that Thucydides was of near 
kin to Cimon, younger perhaps by one generation. 
His father Olorus was probably a full citizen of 
Athens, as is indicated by the fact that, mentioning 



himself as o-rpaTrjyos (iv. civ. 4), he writes ®ovKv&fir)v 
rbv 'OAdpov ; for only as an Athenian citizen could 
his father be mentioned in this official style. 

As to the date of Thucydides' birth, the only 
ancient statement that seems worthy of credence 
was made by Pamphila, a woman writer who in the 
time of Nero made a great compilation of the results 
of learning. Aulus Gellius (N.A. xv. 23) quotes 
from Pamphila that, at the beginning of the Pelo- 
ponnesian War, Hellanicus was sixty-five years of 
age, Herodotus fifty-three, Thucydides forty. Pam- 
phila's dates were probably taken from the chrono- 
logical handbook of Apollodorus (second century B.C.), 
which was generally accepted among the Greeks and 
Romans. The term forty years used by Pamphila 
doubtless meant the d/c/x^ or prime of Thucydides, 
and may have been fixed on the basis of his own 
assertion that he began to collect material at the 
opening of the war (i. i. 1) and was then in full 
maturity of mind (v. xxvi. 5). At any rate his own 
statement, taken with Pamphila's date, has led to 
the general assumption that the historian was born 
somewhere about 472 b.c 

It is indicated by Marcellinus (§ 46), and is prob- 
able in itself, that the decree for Thucydides' ban- 
ishment was adopted on the motion of Cleon, who 
was then at the height of his power ; and it is 
probable that the charge brought against him was 
treachery (Ttpo&ocria), as stated by Marcellinus (§ 55) 



and the anonymous biographer (§ 2), and apparently 
implied by Aristophanes (Vesp. 288). His own words, 
£wefir) fjLOL favyeiv, admit of this interpretation ; and 
the statement of Pausanias (i. xxiii. 9) that he was 
later recalled from exile on the motion of Oenobius r 
is best understood on this basis. If he had been 
banished by a simple decree of the people, the 
general amnesty that followed the capture of Athens 
by Lysander would have been sufficient for him as 
for other exiles ; if the sentence was more severe, 
a special decree would be necessary. But it is 
possible, of course, that the motion of Oenobius 
antedated the amnesty of Lysander's peace by a 
few months. ^ 

As to Thucydides' death, there was a persistent 
tradition thatjie was assassinated, and the fact that 
the History breaks off suddenly in the midst of ex- 
citing events of the Decelean War seems to support 
the tradition. Plutarch (Cim. iv. 3) says that it was 
commonly reported that he died a violent death at 
Scapte Hyle ; Pausanias (i. xxiii. 9), that he was 
murdered on his journey home from exile ; Marcel- 
linus (§ 10), that after his return from exile he died 
and was buried in Athens. But whether he died in 

1 The name, which is a rare one in the fifth century, is 
found as that of a general commanding in the neighbourhood 
of Thasos in 410-9 b.o. and we hear somewhat later of one 
Eucles, son of Oenobius ; hence it has been conjectured that 
the father of Oenobius was Eucles, who was Thucydidea' 
colleague in Thrace in 424 b.o. (lv. civ). 


Thrace or in Athens, it seems clear from his own 
words that he outlived the term of his banishment 
(v. xxvi. 5, £vvitirj fxot <f>evyeiv rrjv ifxavrov errj €iko<ti) 
and that he returned to Athens, since his description 
of the wall of Themistocles, whose remains "may 
still be seen at the Peiraeus " (i. xciii. 5), shows that 
he was there after the destruction of the walls by 
Lysander. If he had lived to see the restoration of 
the walls by Conon in 395 B.C., it seems he would 
certainly have mentioned it. There is another reason, 
too, for supposing that he did not live to this year : 
in in. cxvi. 2 he says that the eruption of Aetna, 
which occurred in the spring of 425 b.c, was the 
third on record ; hence the one mentioned by Dio- 
dorus (xiv. lix. 3) for 396 b.c. could not have been 
known to him. It seems reasonable, then, to assume 
that he was not alive in 396 I3.c. 

There is a pretty and oft-repeated story J that 
Thucydides, as a boy, heard Herodotus recite a 
portion of his History at Olympia and was moved 
thereby to tears, whereupon Herodotus said, " Olo- 
rus, your son's spirit is aflame with a passion for 
learning." But Lucian, when telling of the powerful 
effect of Herodotus' recitation at Olympia, 2 would 
surely have mentioned this circumstance had he 
known of it ; besides, chronology is in the way, if 

1 Suidas s.v. opyav and ©ou«i/5/5rjj ; Photius, Bibl. 60; 
Marcellinua, § 54. 
" Htrod. i. 


we hold to Pamphila's testimony. But if he did 
not as a boy hear Herodotus recite at Olympia, he 
must have known him later as a man at Athens. 
The period of his youth and early manhood fell in 
the time when Athens was most prolific in great 
men. It is clear that he had heard and admired Pe- 
ricles, and he must have seen Aeschylus and known 
Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Anaxagoras, So- 
crates, Gorgias, Antiphon, Pheidias, Polygnotus, 
Mnesicles, Ictinus, Callicrates, and Hippocrates. 
Association with such men and the atmosphere of 
Athens at such a time best explain the development 
of his genius ; but the limits of his subject, as he 
conceived it, precluded any mention of any of these 
except Pericles, so that for any personal influence ot 
theirs upon him we are left to inference. The first 
seven years of the war, before his banishment, were 
doubtless spent in large part at Athens, where he 
must have heard the speeches of Pericles, the dis- 
cussions about Mytilene and about Pylos, as well as 
about other matters of which we have accounts in 
this History. But the twenty years of his exile he 
probably passed largely on his properties in Thrace, 1 
engaged in the task of compiling materials for his 
work about the war, as indeed we are told that he 

1 It was his family connection with Thrace which led to 
his acquiring the right of working gold mines in that region 
(iv. cv. 1), which is all that he himself says, though his 
biographers state that he was the owner of gold mines at 
Scapte Hyle. 



did by Plutarch (De Exil. xiv.) and Marcellinus (§§ 25 
and 47). 

From Thucydides' opening statement, that he 
began the composition of his History at the out- 
break of the war, expecting it to be a great one 
and more noteworthy than any that had gone before, 
we should naturally infer that he continued the 
compilation and composition throughout the war, 
and in fact — as it is clearly unfinished — until his 
death. Again, as it was never completed, so it was 
never completely revised, and it is natural that one 
can find traces of the different dates at which the 
several portions were composed. Evidence of this 
kind has been brought forward in support of differ- 
ent hypotheses as to the composition of the work. 
The most famous of these was that put forth by 
F. W. Ullrich in his Beitr'dge zur Erklarung des Thu- 
kydides, Hamburg, 1845, in which it is maintained 
that Books I-V. xxvi, which contain the history of 
the Archidamian War (432-421 b.c), formed a sepa- 
rate treatise composed between the Peace of Nicias 
and the Sicilian Expedition, and that the phrase 
"this war" in the earlier books refers to the Ten 
Years' War only. 

In v. xxvi Thucydides does make a fresh start with 
the words, " The same Thucydides recorded the 
events in order, reckoning by summers and winters, 1 

1 His division of the year corresponds to the actual con- 
ditions of the carrying on of war in ancient times : summer 



until the fall of Athens." But he adds, "The 
war lasted for twenty -seven years, and anyone 
who declines to count the interval of truce as war 
is mistaken ; " which sounds very much like the 
opening of a second volume of a work that falls 
into natural divisions. It is quite likely, as Ullrich 
maintains, that the account of the Archidamian War 
(i.-v. xxvi.) was composed mainly in the interval 
between 421 and 416 b.c. ; but that it received im- 
portant additions after the fall of Athens seems 
certain, e.g. 11. lxv. on the career of Pericles. So 
much may well be admitted for Ullrich's hypothesis, 
but it is not necessary to admit more. Even the 
story of the Sicilian expedition, the finest part of 
the whole work, need not be considered to have 
been originally a separate treatise, but only to have 
received especial care. As for the rest, a paragraph 
from Classen's introduction to Book V outlines a 
probable order for the growth of the history which 
seems reasonable : "Though I am convinced thai 
the whole work was written in the shape in which 
we have it after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian 
War, and that Thucydides was called away from life 
when engaged in the last revision and combination 
of the portions which he had noted down and 
sketched in outline from the beginning of the war, 

— the larger half, including both spring and autumn — cover- 
ing the time approximately from March to October, winter 
from November to February. 



yet I do not believe that all parts of the work re- 
ceived an equally thorough review. I think that the 
masterly introduction, which makes our First Book, 
was completed with the full knowledge of the disas- 
trous result of the twenty-seven years' war; that 
then the history of the ten years' war and the Si- 
cilian Expedition, for which it is likely that the 
results of laborious inquiry were already at hand 
more or less perfectly worked out, received their 
final touches ; and that after this, before the thread 
of the narrative was taken up again with the Ionic- 
Decelean War, the intervening period of the elprjvrj 
vttovXos was described." 

The most interesting testimony as to the recog- 
nition of the power of Thucydides in ancient times 
is Lucian's statement (adv. Indoct. 102) that Demo- 
sthenes copied out the history eight times. Dio 
Cassius constantly imitated and borrowed from him, 
and among others of the later historians who emu- 
lated him were Philistus, Arrian, and Procopius. 
There is internal evidence that Tacitus was influ- 
enced by him, and Sallust often imitated him. Quin- 
tilian's oft-quoted characterization, Densus et brevis el 
semper instans sibi Thucydides, shows his appreciation. 
In modern times his greatest panegyrist is Macaulay : 
" There is no prose composition, not even the De 
Corona, which I place so high as the Seventh Book 
of Thucydides. It is the ne plus ultra of human 
art"; again, "The retreat from Syracuse — Is it or 



is it not the finest thing you ever read in your life?" ; 
and still again, "He is the greatest historian that 
ever lived." John Stuart Mill said, "The most 
powerful and affecting piece of narrative perhaps 
in all literature is the account of the Sicilian cata- 
strophe in his Seventh Book." The Earl of Chatham, 
on sending his son William Pitt to Cambridge, "left 
to professional teachers the legitimate routine in the 
classic authors, but made it his particular desire that 
Thucydides, the eternal manual of statesmen, should 
be the first Greek which his son read after coming 
to college." And the Earl of Chatham's estimate is 
well supported by Sir G. Cornwall Lewis : " For 
close, cogent, and appropriate reasoning on political 
questions, the speeches of Thucydides have never 
been surpassed ; and indeed they may be considered 
as having reached the highest excellence of which 
the human mind is capable in that department." 

In the ordinary narration of events the style of 
Thucydides is clear, direct, graphic. In strong con- 
trast with this generally simple and lucid form of 
statement is his style in describing battles and other 
critical events, in generalizations, and especially in 
the speeches ; here the statement is often so concise 
and condensed as to become very difficult. Thucy- 
dides was not the first to use speeches as a means 
of vivid presentation of important crises and the 
actors in them ; for that he had the precedent of 
Homer and the Attic drama. But he used this 



means with such impressive effect and success as to 
induce frequent imitation in later historical writing 
in ancient times. He does not pretend to give the 
exact words of the speakers, but says frankly in the 
Introduction (i. xxii. 1): "As to the speeches that 
were made by different men, either when they were 
about to begin the war or when they were already 
engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with 
strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for 
me as regards that which I myself heard, and for 
those who from various other sources have brought 
me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the 
language in which, as it seemed to me, the several 
speakers would express, on the subjects under con- 
sideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, 
though at the same time 1 have adhered as closely as 
possible to the general sense of what was actually 
said." As a natural result the language of the 
speeches has a uniform character, both in the struc- 
ture of the sentences and in particular expressions — 
in other words it is that of Thucydides himself; but 
at the same time the character and mode of thought 
of the assumed speaker are clearly manifest in each 
speech. In the hands of Thucydides such a means 
of presenting to us a critical situation is extraordin- 
arily effective ; here, as in his most striking narra- 
tions, his readers become spectators, as Plutarch 
expressed it. Or as Classen said, " Without our own 
choice we find ourselves involved in the conflict of 



interests, and are put in the position to form judg- 
ment for ourselves from the situation and the feeling 
of parties. Very seldom does the historian himself 
add a word of comment." 

We are accustomed to admire among Thucydides' 
great qualities as historian, his impartiality, his 
trustworthiness, vivid description, sense of contrast, 
conciseness, epigrammatic sententiousness, reserve, 
pathos. We come to approve heartily his way of 
leaving facts clearly stated and skilfully grouped to 
carry their own judgments. He is never a partisan, 
and the unsophisticated reader might at times wonder 
what his nationality was did he not frequently sub- 
scribe himself "Thucydides the Athenian." Histo- 
rians sometimes criticise his attitude, but they all 
accept his statements of fact. His descriptions of 
battles read as if he himself had been present. He 
dramatises history by placing events in such juxta- 
position that a world of moral is conveyed without 
a word of comment ; for example, when the funeral 
oration with its splendid eulogy of Athens is followed 
by the description of the plague, the disgraceful 
Melian episode is succeeded by the Sicilian disaster, 
the holiday-like departure from Athens is set over 
against the distressful flight from Syracuse. He 
packs his language so full of meaning that at times 
a sentence does duty for a paragraph, a word for a 
sentence. "Of all manifestations of power, restraint 
impresses men most," and however much we regret 


his reserve, since for much that he might have told 
us we have no other witnesses, we come more and 
more to regard this as great art. As for pathos, no 
historian ever excelled such passages as those where 
the utter defeat of a hitherto invincible navy is por- 
trayed (vn. lxxi), or the misery and dejection of the 
departing Athenian host is described (vn. lxxv), or 
where the final catastrophe in the river Assinarus 
seems to occur before our eyes, preparing us for the 
final sentence : " Fleet and army perished from the 
face of the earth, nothing was saved, and of the 
many who went forth few returned home." 



Of Thucydidean manuscripts the following are, according 
to Hade, the most important : — 

A Cisalpinus sive Italus, now in Paris (suppl. Gr. 255), 

parchment, 11th or 12th century. 
B Vaticanus, Vatican Library at Rome (126), parchment, 

11th century. 
C Laurentianus, Laurentian Library at Florence (69, 2), 

parchment, 11th century. 
E Palalinus, Library at Heidelberg (252), parchment, 11th 

F Augustanus, Library at Munich (430), parchment, 11th 

G Monacensis, Library at Munich (228), paper, 13th century. 
M Britannicus, British Museum (11727), parchment, 11th 


No one of these manuscripts is of such age or excellence as 
to deserve preference before all others ; but of the two 
families which may be distinguished, Laurentianus leads the 
one, namely, C and G, Vaticanus the other, namely, ABEF. 
Britannicus holds a sort of middle ground between the two. 
Hude's preference is for Laurentianus; Classen's, following 
Bekker, for Vaticanus. From vi. xciv on Vaticanus has a 
special value as coming perhaps from a different copy. 

Complete Editions 

Aldus : Editio Princeps, Venice, 1502, folio ; scholia 1503. 
Stephanus : Paris, 1564, folio ; with scholia and Valla's Latin 

version made in 1452. The second edition (1688) is the 

source of the Vulgate. 
I. Bekker: Oxford, 1821, 4 vols., with scholia and Uuker's 

Latin version. Also Ed. ster. altera, Berlin, 1832 

('46, '68). 



Poppo : Leipzig, 1821-40, 11 vols, (prolegomena, commen- 
tary, etc.). 

Poppo : Minor edition, Leipzig, 1843-51, 4 vols. ; revised 
1875-85 by Stahl. 

Goeller : Leipzig, 1826 and 1836, 2 vols., annotated. 

Arnold : London and Oxford. 1830-39, 3 vols., annotated. 

Didot : Paris, 1840, text with Latin version by Haase. 

Bloomfield : London, 1842-43, 2 vols., annotated. 

Kriiger : Berlin, 1846-7 and 1858-61, 2 vols., annotated. 

Boehme : Leipzig, 1856 and 1871-75, annotated ; new edition 
revised by Widmann. 

Classen : Berlin, 1862-76 and 1875-85, 8 vols., annotated ; 
revised by Steup. 

Stahl: Editio ster. Leipzig, 1873-74, 2 vols., introduction, 
text and adnotatio critica. 

Van Herwerden : Utrecht, 1877-82, 5 vols., text with critical 

Jones : Oxford, 1898, 2 vols., text. 

Hude : Leipzig, 1898-1901, text with critical notes. 

Editions of Single Books 

Shilleto : Books I and II, London, 1872-3, with critical 

and explanatory notes. 
Schoene : Books I and II, Berlin, 1874, text and critical 

Croiset : Books I and II, Paris, 1886, annotated. 
Rutherford : Book IV, London, 1889. 
American " College Series," Boston, based on Classen-Steup : 

Morris, Book I, 1887 ; Fowler, V, 1888 ; Smith, III, 

1894; VI, 1913; VII, 1886. 
Lamberton : Books VI and VII, New York, 1886 ; II and 

III, 1905. 
Holden : Book VII, Cambridge, 1891. 
Ooodhart : Book VIII. London, 1893. 

Marchant : Book II, London, 1893 ; VI, 1905 ; VII, 1910. 
Spratt: Book III, Cambridge, 1896; IV, 1912; VI, 1905. 
Fox: Book IH, Oxford, 1901. 
Tucker: Book VIII, London, 1908. 
Mills : Book II, Oxford, 1913. 




I. Sov/cvBiBr]? 'Adrjvaio? gvveypa-yfre rbv iro- 
Xepiov twv Yie\oirovvriai(ov /ecu *K6r)vaiwv a>? 
eiroXepbrjaav 777)09 aWrfkovs, dpfjdpievos evOvs 
KaOtarapevov kcu eXiriaas peyav re eaeaOca /cat 
dgioXoycorarov rwv irpoyeyevqpievcov, re/cpaipo- 
fievos on a/cp,d£ovT€<; re ycrav e? avrbv dpu^orepoi 
TTapacrKevf) rfj iraey teal to aXXo 'EXXtjvlkov 
opejv %vvi(TTap,evov 777)09 efcarepov?, to pep ev6v<;, 

2 to Be teal Biavoovpuevov. kivt)cti^ yap avrrj Br) 
/xeyio-TT} Tot? "JLXXrjcriv eyevero teal pepei nvl rcov 
j3ap/3dpcov, ox? Be elirelv /cal eVl nXelarov dvOpco- 
ttcov. ra yap irpb avr&v teal ra en TraXalrepa 
aacfiojs /JL6V evpelv Bed y^pbvov irXr)9o<; dBvvarov 
r)v, e/e Be Te/ep,r}pia)v wv errl pa/cporarov aKOirovvrl 
poi TTiaTevcrai £v/j,j3aivei, ov pueydXa vopi'C.w 
yevkaOai ovre Kara tou? iroXep^ov^ ovre e? ra 

II. Qaivejai yap r) vvv 'EXXa? KaXovpuemj ov 
irdXat j3e/3aL(os ol/covp,evr), dXXa peravaardae^ 
re ovcrai ra irporepa /cal paBlox; e/cao~roi rr)v 

1 The Greek text used for this translation of Thucydides 
is that of Hude. Variations from his text are indicated in 



I. Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history 
of the war waged by the Peloponnesians and the 
Athenians against one another. He began the task 
at the very outset of the war, in the belief that 
it would be great and noteworthy above all the 
wars that had gone before, inferring this from the 
fact that both powers were then at their best in 
preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the 
rest of the Hellenic race taking sides with one state 
or the other, some at once, others planning to do so. 
For this was the greatest movement that had ever 
stirred the Hellenes, extending also to some of the 
Barbarians, one might say even to a very large part 
of mankind. Indeed, as to the events of the period 
just preceding this, and those of a still earlier date, 
it was impossible to get clear information on account 
of lapse of time ; but from evidence which, on pushing 
my inquiries to the furthest point, I find that I can 
trust, I think that they were not really great either as 
regards the wars then waged or in other particulars. 

II. For it is plain that what is now called Hellas 
was not of old settled with fixed habitations, but 
that migrations were frequent in former times, each 
tribe readily leaving its own land whenever they were 


eavrwv aTToke'nrovTes, j3ia%6fjL€voi vw6 Tivmv alel 

2 rrXeiovcov. tt)? ydp ifjuropla? ovk ovarf? ovB' 
€7rifjLiyvvvT€<; dBea? dXXrjXot,? ovre Kara yfjv ovre 
Bid daXaaaris, vepLo/jLevol re ra eavr&v eKacrroi 
oaov airo^rjv Kal rrepiovaiav %p7]fj,drcov ovk e^ovres 
ovBe yr\v (frvrevovres, dBrfkov bv oirore ri$ eireX- 
Ocov, Kal dreiyicrrwv dfia ovrcov, dXXo<; d(f>aipi]- 
cerai, T779 Te KaO* rjfiepav dvayKaiov rpo<f)r)s 
iravraypv dv 7jy ov/ievoi, eiriKparelv ov ^aXeiTa)? 
diravicrravro, Kal Bl avrb ovre fieyeOei iroXetov 

3 layyov ovre rfj aXXy irapaaKevfj. fidXiara Be 
rjqs yr)<; rj dplarrj alel Ta? /jbera/3oXa<; rcov oIktj- 
ropo)i> elyev, rj re vvv SeaaaXla KaXov pLevri Kal 
Boirorla TleXoTrovvrjcrov re ra iroXXa irXrjv 'Ap- 

4 KaBlas tt}? re aXXr)*; oaa r)v Kpdrtara. Sea yap 
dperrjv yr/s at re Bwdpueis rccrl /xet^bf? eyyiyvo- 
fievat ardo-eis iveirolovv e'f a>v efydeipovro, Kal 

5 dfia V7T0 dXXocftvXcov pdXXov iireftovXevovro. rr)v 
yovv 'ArriKijv ck rov eVt irXelo-rov Bid ro Xeirro- 
yeoiv daraalacrrov ovcrav dvQpwnoi (pKovv ol 

6 ovrol alel. Kal irapdheiyfia roBe rov Xoyov ovk 
eXu^iarov eari Bid rd<; /xeroLKjjaeL^ra aXXa fit) 
OfAolcos av^T)0t]var €K yap tT/9 aXXr/s 'EXXdBo? ol 
7roXe/JL(p rj ardaei eKirlirrovre^ reap ' 'Adrjvalov? 
ol Bvvarcorarot a>9 (3e(3aiov bv dveyyapovv, Kal 
nroXlrau ytyvo/xevoi evOvs dirb iraXaiov fxei^w en 

1 So Ullrich : fieroiKias is Mn. 

BOOK I. ii. 1-6 

forced to do so by any people that was more numer- 
ous. For there was no mercantile traffic and the 
people did not mingle with one another without fear, 
either on land or by sea, and they each tilled their 
own land only enough to obtain a livelihood from it, 
having no surplus of wealth and not planting orchards, 
since it was uncertain, especially as they were yet 
without walls, when some invader might come and 
despoil them. And so, thinking that they could ob- 
tain anywhere the sustenance required for their daily 
needs, they found it easy to change their abodes, and 
for this reason were not strong as regards either the 
size of their cities or their resources in general. And 
it was always the best of the land that was most 
subject to these changes of inhabitants — the districts 
now called Thessaly and Boeotia, most of the Pelo- 
ponnesus except Arcadia, and the most fertile regions 
in the rest of Hellas. For the greater power that 
accrued to some communities on account of the 
fertility of their land occasioned internal quarrels 
whereby they were ruined, and at the same time 
these were more exposed to plots from outside tribes. 
Attica, at any rate, was free from internal quarrels 
from the earliest times by reason of the thinness of 
its soil, and therefore was inhabited by the same 
people always. And here is an excellent illustration 
of the truth of my statement that it was owing to 
these migrations that the other parts of Hellas did 
not increase in the same way as Attica ; for the most 
influential men of the other parts of Hellas, when 
they were driven out of their own countries by war 
or sedition, resorted to Athens as being a firmly 
settled community, and, becoming citizens, from the 
very earliest times made the city still greater in the 


iiroirjcrav irXr)Oei, avO pdyrrwv ryv ttoXlv, ware 
teal e? 'Icoviav vcrrepov &)? ow% iKavrj? overt]? rr)? 
y Am kt)? aiTOi/ctas i^eirefMyjrav. 

III. AtjXol Be yLtoi zeal rode rwv rraXaiwv da9e- 
vetav ovx rjKLcrra' irpb yap rcov TpooiKwv ovBev 
<f>aiverai rrporepov tcoLvfj epyacrafievrj r) EWa?* 

2 BoKel Be pot, ovBe rovvo/jua rovro ^v/Jbiraaa 7Tft> 
eZ%ei>, <*XXa rd p,ev Trpo r/ EXXr)vo? rod AevKaXico- 
vo? real irdw ovBe elvat, r) eTTLKXrjai? avrrj, Kara 
eOvy] Be aXXa re teal rb TleXacryiKOV irrl irXelarov 
a$) eavrwv rr)v eiroovvfiiav rrape^o'OaL, "EXXtjvo? 
Be teal rcov iraiBwv avrov ev rrj <t>dtooriBc io~yy- 
advrwv, Kal eirayofievwv avrov? eir oocpeXia, e? 
ra? aXXa? iroXei?, teat? ifedarovs fiev i]Brj rfj 
opaXia puaXXov KaXelaOai "EXXrjva?, ov fievroi 
7roXXov ye %p6vov eBvvaro teal airacnv etcPLtefjcrai. 

3 retcfirjpiol Be fidXccrra "Ofirjpo?. ttoXXo) yap 
varepov en teal rcov Tpcoirecov yevofievo? ovBafiov 
ovrco x roi)? ^vpuiravra? wvofiaaev ovB* aXXov? 
r) rov? fierd 'A^iWea? etc rrj? <£>0icor{,Bo?, oXirep 
Kal irpcoroi "EXXrjve? r/aav, Aavaov? Be ev rol? 
eirecn teal ' Apyeuov? teal 'A^atou? dvateaXel. ov 
/jbrjv ovBe ftapfidpov? eiprjtce Bid ro /xr)Be "EX- 
Xtivd? 7ra), &)? e/jLol Botcel, dvrirraXov e? ev 6vop.a 

4 aTroteeKpicrOai^ oi B' ovv ft)? eteaaroi "EXXrjve? 
Kara iroXeL? re oaoi dXXrfXwv %vvieo~av Kal %v/jl- 
iravre? varepov fc\rjdevT€$ ovBev irpb rdv TpcoL- 
kcov Bi dadeveiav Kal d/ieiljlav dXXrjXoov dOpoot, 

» Added by Reiske, 

BOOK I. ii. 6-m. 4 

number of its inhabitants ; so that Attica proved too 
small to hold them, and therefore the Athenians 
eventually sent out colonies even to Ionia. 

III. The weakness of the olden times is further 
proved to me chiefly by this circumstance, that before 
the Trojan war, Hellas, as it appears, engaged in no 
enterprise in common. Indeed, it seems to me that 
as a whole it did not yet have this name, either, but 
that before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, 
this title did not even exist, and that the several 
tribes, the Pelasgian most extensively, gave their 
own names to the several districts ; but when Hellen 
and his sons became strong in Phthiotis and were 
called in to the aid of the other cities, the clans 
thenceforth came more and more, by reason of this 
intercourse, to be called Hellenes, though it was a 
long time before the name could prevail among them 
all. The best evidence of this is given by Homer; 
for, though his time was much later even than the 
Trojan war, he nowhere uses this name of all, or 
indeed of any of them except the followers of 
Achilles of Phthiotis, who were in fact the first 
Hellenes, but designates them in his poems as 
Danaans and Argives and Achaeans. And he has 
not used the term Barbarians, either, for the reason, 
as it seems to me, that the Hellenes on their part 
had not yet been separated off so as to acquire one 
common name by way of contrast. However this 
may be, those who then received the name of 
Hellenes, whether severally and in succession, city 
by city, according as they understood one another's 
speech, or in a body at a later time, engaged 
together in no enterprise before the Trojan war, 
on account of weakness and lack of intercourse 


errpa^av. dXXa Kal ravrrjv rrjv arpareiav 9 a- 
\d(j(jrj rjhr) rrXeico ^pcofievoi %vvrj\6ov. 

IV. Mlvcos yap iraXairaro^ cov ciKofj tcr/xev 
vavriKov €KT7](raT0 Kal tt)<s vvv 'EWrjvLfcr)*; 9a- 
Xdao-rjs eirl irXelarov ifcpdrrjcre Kal rcov Kv/c\d- 
Bcov vijacov r)p%e re teal oiKiari)*; irpcoros rcov 
irXeiarcov eyevero, YLdpas efeXacra? Kal rovs 
eavrov iralBas rjye/iovas eyKaraarrjcras' ro re 
XrjcrriKov, a>9 et/co?, KaOrjpei i/c rr}$ 9aXdao~7]<; €(£' 
octov iBvvaro, rov rds irpocrohovs fxdXXov Ikvai 

V. 01 yap "KXXrjves rb irdXat, Kal rcov ftap- 
(Bdpcov oi re ev rfj rjirelpco irapaOaXdaaioi, Kal 
oaoi v^aovs el^ov, eireiBr) rjp^avro fidXXov ire- 
paiovaQai vavalv eV dXXi'iXovs, erpdirovro rrpb^ 
Xrjareiav, ^yovfievcov dvBpcov ov rcov dBvvarcord- 
rcov KepBovs rod o~cf>erepov avrcov eveKa Kal Tot? 
dadevecri rpocpijs, Kal Trpoairiirrovre^ iroXecnv 
dreLylaroi^ Kal Kara Kcopua^ oiKovfievais rjpira^ov 
Kal rov uXelarov rov (Biov evrevOev eiroiovvro, 
ovk €%ovr6<; rrco alcr^vvtiv rovrov rod epyov, 

2 cfrepovros Be re Kal B6%r)<; fiaXXov BrjXovai Be rcov 
re r)ireipcorcov rives en Kal vvv, oU k6o~/ao<; KaXcos 
rovro Bpdv, Kal oi iraXaiol rcov Troiijrcov rac 
TTvareL? rcov KarairXeovrcov iravraypv 6/j.olcos 
epcorcovres el XyaraL eicriv, a>? ovre cov irvvOdvov- 
rac diratJLovvrcov to epyov, oi? re tTU/xeXe? eirj 


BOOK I. m. 4-v. 2 

with one another. And they united even for this 
expedition only when they were now making con- 
siderable use of the sea. 

IV. Minos is the earliest of all those known to us 
by tradition who acquired a navy. He made himself 
master of a very great part of what is now called 
the Hellenic Sea, and became lord of the Cyclades 
islands and first colonizer of most of them, driving 
out the Carians and establishing his own sons in 
them as governors. Piracy, too, he naturally tried 
to clear from the sea, as far as he could, desiring 
that his revenues should come to him more readily. 

V. It should be explained that in early times both 
the Hellenes and the Barbarians who dwell on the 
mainland near the sea, 1 as well as those on the islands, 
when once they began more frequently to cross over 
in ships to one another, turned to piracy, under the 
lead of their most powerful men, whose motive was 
their own private gain and the support of their 
weaker followers, and falling upon cities that were 
unprovided with walls and consisted of groups of 
villages, they pillaged them and got most of their 
living from that source. For this occupation did not 
as yet involve disgrace, but rather conferred some- 
thing even of glory. This is shown by the practice, 
even at the present day, of some of the peoples on 
the mainland, who still hold it an honour to be suc- 
cessful in this business, as well as by the words of 
the early poets, who invariably ask the question of 
all who put in to shore, whether they are pirates, 2 
the inference being that neither those whom they 
ask ever disavow that occupation, nor those ever 

1 e.g. Phoenicians, Carians, and probably Epirots. 
* cf. Homer, y 73 ; « 252. 

VOL. I. t, 9 


3 elhevcu ovk ovelBi^ovtcov. eXrj^ovro Be kcu kclt 
rjireipov dX\ijXov$. Kal p-eypL rov ^ e iroWa tt?? 
'EWaSo? rco TraXaico rpoircp vefxerat irepi re 
AoKpovs tou? O£o\a? ical AltcoXovs Kal 'A/cap- 
vdvas kcu rrjv ravrrj i)ireipov to re aihipofyopel- 
adai tovtols roU rjireLpunai? cltto t?}? TraXaids 
XrjCFTeias ifi/j,e/i€V7]Kev. 

VI. TIacra yap rj 'EAAa? icri8i]po(f)6pei, Bid ra? 
dcfydp/cTOvs re ol/ajaeis Kal ovk dacpaXeU Trap 1 
aXXyXovs icpoBovs, kcu ^vv^Orj rr/v Biatrav fieO' 

2 oirXcov 67TOit]aavro cocnrep ol ftdpftapoi. arj/jbelov 
8' iarl\ravrctr\rj(; 'EWaSo? en ovrte i vefiofieva 

3 rcov wore kcu e? irdvra^ 6/jlolcov BiaiTrj/jLarcov. iv 
rot? irpcoroi Be W.9 rjvalot top re alBrjpov Kare- 
devro kcu dveifxevr) rfj Siclltt} e? to rpvcpepcorepov 
fxereart-jaav. kcu ol irpea^vTepoi avrols rcov ev- 
haifJLovwv Bid to dftpoBLanov ov ttoXik; xpovos 
eTretBrj yiTtovds re Xirov<; eiravaavro cfiopovvres 
Kal ypvacov rerTLycov evepaei Kpco/SvXov dvaBov- 
fievoi rcov iv rf) KecpaXfj rpiycov d<§> ov Kal 
'lcovcov tou? 7rpea/3vrepov<; Kara to fjvyyeve? iirl 

4 ttoXv avTT] 7] cTKevrj Karevyev. fierpla S' av 
iadrjrc Kal e? rov vvv rpowov irpcoroi AaKeBat- 
/iovlol e\py]aavro Kal e? rd aX\a irpbs tov$ ttoX- 
Xou? ol rd pel^co KeKTrj/xevoi laoBiairou /idXicrra 

5 KaTeaT7)aav. iyv/xvcodt]adv re irpcoroi Kal e? to 


BOOK I. v. 2-vi. 5 

censure it who are concerned to have the informa- 
tion. On the mainland also men plundered one 
another ; and even to-day in many parts of Hellas 
life goes on under the old conditions, as in the region 
of the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and 
the mainland thereabout. And these mainlanders' 
habit of carrying arms is a survival of their old 
freebooting life. 

VI. Indeed, all the Hellenes used to carry arms 
because the places where they dwelt were unpro- 
tected, and intercourse with each other was unsafe ; 
and in their everyday life they regularly went armed 
just as the Barbarians did. And the fact that these 
districts of Hellas still retain this custom is an evi- 
dence that at one time similar modes of life pre- 
vailed everywhere. But the Athenians were among 
the very first to lay aside their arms and, adopting an 
easier mode of life, to change to more luxurious 
ways. And indeed, owing to this fastidiousness, it 
was only recently that their older men of the wealthier 
class gave up wearing tunics of linen and fastening 
up their hair in a knot held by a golden grasshopper 
as a brooch ; l and this same dress obtained for a 
long time among the elderly men of the Ionians 
also, owing to their kinship with the Athenians. 
An unpretentious costume after the present fashion 
was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, and in 
general their wealthier men took up a style of living 
that brought them as far as possible into equality 
with the masses. And they were the first to bare 
their bodies and, after stripping openly, to anoint 

1 The mode of wearing the hair in a knot on the top of 
the head with the insertion of a pin in the form of a cicada 
seems to have persisted long at Athens, a mark of antiquated 
manners as characteristic as the queue or pig-tail with us. 



<f>avepbv aTroBvvres Xiira fiera rov yv\xvd^ecrOai 
rjXei^ravTO. to Be irdXai Kal ev to> 'OXv/ittlkw 
dycovi Bia^cofiara e*%ovre<; ire pi ra alBola ol dOXrj- 
ral rjycovl^ovro, Kal ov iroXXa €tt) eTreiBrj ireTravv- 
rar en Be real ev roh ftapftdpoi? eariv oh vvv, 
teal p,d\i(TTa rot? 'Aaiavois, Trvyfirjs kclI irdXrjs 
6 dOXa rlOerai, teal Bie^cofievoc rovro Bpwaiv. iroXXa 
B* dv kclI aXXa ti$ aTroBeitjeie to TraXaibv 'E\- 
\t)vlkov ofioiOTpoira ra> vvv fiapfiapitca) Biairon- 

VII. Twv Be TToXecov ocrai fiev vecorara (pKiadrj- 
crav Kal tfBrj TrXcoificorepcov ovrcov Trepiovcrias p,dX- 
Xov eyovaai ^prj/idrcov, eV avrols rols alyiaXols 
e/cTL&vTO Kal relyecri tou? la6p,ov<; aTreXdfi/Savov 
ifjLTropias re evefca Kal r*)? irpb<i tou? irpoaoiKov^ 
eKaaroi tcr^uo?* at Be iraXaial Bid rrjv Xrjareiav 
eirl iroXi) dvrla^ovaav dirb daXdcrarj^ fidXXov 
coKtadrjaav, a'i re ev rats vrjcroi<; Kal ev rats 
rjirelpois (efapov yap dXXrjXovs re Kal rcov aXXcov 
ocroi ovres ov daXdacnoi Karco ojkovv), Kal ^%pi 
rovBe en dv(pKLa/j.evoi elaiv. 

VIII. Kal ovx rjo-aov Xyaral rjaav ol vrjcricorai, 
Kape? re ovres Kal <$>oiviKe<;. ovroi yap Br] tc? 
irXeiara^ rcov vijacov (pKtjcrav. fiaprvpiov Be' 
At'jXov yap Ka0aipop.evr)<; vtto AOrjvaLcov ev ra>Be 
TO) TroXe/jLO) Kal twv $i]kcov dvaipeOeiacov, ocrai 
r/crav ra)V T€0ved)TU)v ev rfj vijaw, virep r\pnav 


BOOK I. vi. 5-vm. i 

themselves with oil when they engaged in athletic 
exercise ; for in early times, even in the Olympic 
games, the athletes wore girdles about their loins in 
the contests, and it is not many years since the 
practice has ceased. Indeed, even now among some 
of the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where 
prizes for wrestling and boxing are offered, the con- 
testants wear loin-cloths. And one could show that 
the early Hellenes had many other customs similar 
to those of the Barbarians of the present day. 

VII. However, the cities which were founded in 
more recent times, when navigation had at length 
become safer, and were consequently beginning to 
have surplus resources, were built right on the sea- 
shore, and the isthmuses 1 were occupied and walled 
off with a view to commerce and to the protection of 
the several peoples against their neighbours. But 
the older cities, both on the islands and on the main- 
land, were built more at a distance from the sea on 
account of the piracy that long prevailed — for the 
pirates were wont to plunder not only one another, 
but also any others who dwelt on the coast but were 
not sea-faring folk — and even to the present day 
they lie inland. 

VIII. Still more addicted to piracy were the 
islanders. These included Carians as well as Phoe- 
nicians, for Carians inhabited most of the islands, as 
may be inferred from the fact that, when Delos was 
purified by the Athenians in this war - and the graves 
of all who had ever died on the island were re- 
moved, over half were discovered to be Carians, 

1 i.e. fortified cities were established on peninsulas, con- 
nected with the mainland by an isthmus, which was then 
walled off as Epidamnus(ch. xxvi. 5) and Potidaea (iv. cxx. 3). 

■ In the sixth year of the war, 426 B.C. cf. in. civ. 



Ka/)69 i(j)dvr]aav, yvcoafievTes rfj re o-fcevf) tcov 

07r\(0V ^VVT€0a/l/jL€Vr] Kdl Tft) TpOTTCp CO VVV €TL 

2 KaracrTdpTOS Se tov Mlvco vclvtikov TrXcoifico- 
repa iyevero Trap aKXr)Xov<s {pi yap i/c tcov vrjacov 
rccLKOvpyoL dvecrrrjaav vtt avrov, oreirep Kal ra? 

3 ttoWcls avTcov KaTcoKi^e), Kal oi irapd OdXaaaav 
avOpcDiroi fiaXXov r/Sr} rrjv KTrjaiv tcov XP r l^ TCOV 


TrepiefiaWovTO * a>? irXovcncoTepoi, eavTCOv yiyvo- 
fievor ecpiefievoi yap tcov KepBcov oi re r?<7o-ou? 
vTrifievov tcov Kpeiaaovcov hovXeiav, oX re Bvva- 
rd)T€poL irepiovGia<; e'vo^T69 TrpoaeirocovvTO viri]- 

4 koovs tcls iXdaaov<; 7ro\ei?. fcal iv tovtco tw 
Tpoircp fiaXXov rj&r] ovres varepov XP° V( P ^ 
Tpoiav earpdievaav. 

IX. 'At a \xkpuvcov re /jloi $ok€l tcov tots Buvdfiei 


KaT6i\7][i[ievov<; tou? 'EXevrj^ fivTjarripa^ dycov tov 
2 cttoXov dyelpat. Xeyovai he teal oi tcl aacpecrTaTa 
HeKoTTOVVi-iaicov ^v^firj irapd tcov irpoTepov Se- 
Seyfiivo'i TleXoird t€ irpcoTOV 7r~\ij6ei xPV^ TCOl '> a 
rjkdev iic tt}? 'Acrta? ex^v e? dvOpcoirovs dizopovs, 
hvvap.iv irepLTTOiricrdpLevov ttjv iircovvfiiav rf}<; %co- 
pas €7T7]\vv ovTa o/jlcos <rx*w> Kal vcrTepov Toh 
1 Hude reads irepte/3aA.ovTo with C r . 

1 According to the post-Homeric legend, all who paid 
their court to Helen engaged to defend the man of her 


BOOK I. vm. i-ix. 2 

being recognized by the fashion of the armour found 
buried with them, and by the mode of burial, which 
is that still in use among them. 

But when the navy of Minos had been established, 
navigation between various peoples became safer — 
for the evil-doers on the islands were expelled by him, 
and then he proceeded to colonize most of them 
— and the dwellers on the sea-coast now began to 
acquire property more than before and to become 
more settled in their homes, and some, seeing that 
they were growing richer than before, began also 
to put walls around their cities. Their more settled 
life was due to their desire for gain ; actuated by 
this, the weaker citizens were willing to submit to 
dependence on the stronger, and the more powerful 
men, with their enlarged resources, were able to 
make the lesser cities their subjects. And later on, 
when they had at length more completely reached 
this condition of affairs, they made the expedition 
against Troy. 

IX. And it was, as I think, because Agamemnon 
surpassed in power the princes of his time that he 
was able to assemble his fleet, and not so much 
because Helen's suitors, whom he led, were bound 
by oath to Tyndareus. 1 It is said, furthermore, by 
those of the Peloponnesians who have received the 
clearest traditional accounts from men of former 
times, that it was by means of the great wealth 
which he brought with him from Asia into the midst 
of a poor people that Pelops first acquired power, 
and, consequently, stranger though he was, gave his 
name to the country, and that yet greater things 

choice against all wrong, cf. Isoc. x. 40 ; Paus. in. xx. 9 ; 
Apollod. in. x. 9. 



eKyovois en fJL€L%(o ^vveve\6r}vai, JLvpvaOecos /nev 
ev rfj 'ArriKrj virb 'HpaKXechoov arc oQ avow os, 
'Arpecos he fjur/Tphs dheX(f)ov ovros avra> Kal ern- 
rpeyfravro? EvpuaOecos, 6V iarpdreve, Mv/crfva? 
re teal tt]v ap^v Kara rb oIkclov 'Arpel {jv^ya- 
veiv he avrbv <f>evyovra rbv irarepa hid rbv 
XpvaLTnrov Odvarov), Kal o>? ov/ceri dveyd)pr\aev 
JLvpvadevs, {3ovXop,ev(ov /cal roiv MvKrjvalayv (pofia) 
rwv 'HpaKXeihwv teal dfia hvvarbv hoKovvra elvat 
Kal rb TrXrjOos reOepairevKora ra>v M.VK7]val(ov re 
/cal oawv QvpvaOevs ypx € rrjv ^aaiXeuav Wrpea 
irapaXafielv teal rebv Ylepaeihcov tou? UeXoTrihas 

3 fji€L^ov<; KaraaTrjvai. d pot So/cel ' A7 a pue p,vcov 
irapaXa/3a)v Kal vavriKw he dpa errl rrXeov rwv 
dXXcov la^vo-as rrjv arpareiav ov ydpiri to rrXeov 
rj (f)6/3(p ^vvayaycbv iroirjcraaOai. tyaiverai yap 
vavai re irXeicrrais avrb<; dcfyiKopuevos Kal ApKaai 
TTpOGirapao-ydyv, a>? "Ofirjpos rovro hehijXcoKev, el 

4 Tco l/cavo? reK/irjpicoo-aL. Kal ev rod GKrjirrpov 
ap,a rfj Trapahbaei eipr)Kev avrbv " 7roXXfjaL vq- 
aoiGi Kal "Apyei iravrl dvdaaeiv "• ovk dv ovv 
vr)o~wv e^co ru>v TrepioiKiheov (avrai he ovk dv 
iroXXal elev) lyTreipoorr)? cov eKpdrei, el fir} ri Kal 

5 vavriKov elyev. eiKa^eiv he ^PV KaL ravT V T fl 
irparela ola r)v rd irpb avrr)<;. 

1 Chrysippus, his half-brother, son of Pelops and Axioche, 
was killed by Atreus and Thyestes at the instance of their 
mother Hippodameia. 


BOOK I. ix. 2-5 

fell to the lot of his descendants. For when Eu- 
rystheus set out on the expedition that resulted in 
his death in Attica at the hands of the Heracleidae, 
Atreus, his mother's brother, who chanced to have 
been banished by his father for the death of Chry- 
sippus, 1 was intrusted by Eurystheus witli Mycenae 
and the sovereignty because he was a kinsman ; and 
when Eurystheus did not return, Atreus, in accord- 
ance with the wish of the Mycenaeans, who feared 
the Heracleidae, and because he seemed to be a 
man of power and had won the favour of the mul- 
titude, received the sovereignty over the Mycenaeans 
and all who were under the sway of Eurystheus. And 
so the house of Pelops became greater than the house 
of Perseus. And it was, I think, because Agamemnon 
had inherited all this, and at the same time had be- 
come strong in naval power beyond the rest, that he 
was able to collect his armament, not so much by 
favour as by fear, and so to make the expedition. 
For it is clear that he himself brought the greatest 
number of ships, and that he had others with which 
to supply the Arcadians, 2 as Homer testifies, if he is 
sufficient witness for anyone. And he says, in the 
account of the delivery of the sceptre, 3 that Aga- 
memnon "ruled over many islands and all Argos." 
Now, if he had not had something of a fleet, he 
could not, as he lived on the mainland, have been 
lord of any islands except those on the coast, and 
these would not be "many." And it is from this 
expedition that we must judge by conjecture what 
the situation was before that time. 

8 cf. Homer, B 576 and 612. 
3 cf. Homor, B 101-109. 



X. Kal on fiev MvKTJvai paKpbv r/v, r/ et ri rcov 
Tore iroXiafia vvv fit] d^ibxpewv BoKel eivai, ovk 
aKpifiei av Tt? a^fieiw XP ( * ) f jL€V0 ^ aTriaroirj fir) 
yeveaOai rbv aroXov rocrovrov oaov ol re iroirjrai 

2 elprjKacn Kal 6 A.070? KaTeyei. AaKeBaifiovicov 
fiev 1 yap el 77 7roXi? eprjpLwO eiT], \ei(f)6elr) Be rd 
re lepa Kal tt}? KaraaKevi)^ ra iSdcpr], nroWrjv av 
olfiai diTLGTLav t% Bvvd/jLecos 7rpot\06vTO<; iroWov 
ypbvov rot? eirena Ttpbs to /e\eo9 avrwv etvat, 
(icaiToi He\o7rovv7]aov tcov irevre ra<; Bvo fioipas 
vefiovrat, t?}? re ^vfnrdo"rj^ yyovvrai Kal twv e%(o 
gvfjLfidxcov ttoWcov o/xft>? Be, ovre %vvoiKio-6eiar)<$ 
r?}? 2 7roXe&)? ovre iepols Kal KaraaKevah ttoXv- 
reXeai xprfaa/xeviis, Kara Koifias he. t&> nraXaiw 
rrj? 'EXXaSos Tpoirw olKiaOeiar)*;, fyaivon av vtto- 
Beecnepa), ' 'Adrjvaieov he rb avrb rovro iraOovrcov 
SnrXao-iav av Tt)v Bvvafiiv eUd^eaOac dirb tt;? 

3 (bavepcis cn^ea>? t?)? 7ro\ea)? tj eariv. ovkovv aiti- 
arelv et/co? ovBe ras 6\jrei<; rcov iroXecov fiaXXov 
(TKOirelv rj Ta9 BvvdfieiS, vofii^eiv Be rrjv crrparelav 
eKeivifv p.eyiarr]v fiev yeveaOat, twv irpb avrrj?, 
\€i7ro[i€V7]v Be twv vvv, ttj 'Ofitjpov av iroujaei el 
tl yp-q KavraiiOa inaTeveiv, rjv etVo? eVt to fiel^ov 
aev ttol^ttjv ovra KO<jfir\(jai, Oficos Be tyalverai 

4 Kal outo)? ivBeecrrepa. ireTroifiKe yap %4?uW Kal 
BiaKoaiuv vecov ra? fiev Bolcotcov e?Koai Kal 
eKarbv dvBpcov, ra<; Be <PiXoKTrjrov irevrrjKOVTa, 

1 Added by Hude. f Added by Stephanus. 

BOOK I. x. 1-4 

X. And because Mycenae was only a small place, 
or if any particular town of that time seems now to 
be insignificant, it would not be right for me to treat 
this as an exact piece of evidence and refuse to 
believe that the expedition against Troy was as great 
as the poets have asserted and as tradition still main- 
tains. For if the city of the Lacedaemonians should 
be deserted, and nothing should be left of it but its 
temples and the foundations of its other buildings, 
posterity would, I think, after a long lapse of time, 
be very loath to believe that their power was as great 
as their renown. (And yet they occupy two-fifths 
of the Peloponnesus and have the hegemony of the 
whole, as well as of their many allies outside ; but 
still, as Sparta is not compactly built as a city and 
has not provided itself with costly temples and other 
edifices, but is inhabited village-fashion in the old 
Hellenic style, its power would appear less than it 
is.) Whereas, if Athens should suffer the same fate, 
its power would, I think, from what appeared of the 
city's ruins, be conjectured double what it is. The 
reasonable course, therefore, is not to be incredulous 
or to regard the appearance of cities rather than 
their power, but to believe that expedition to have 
been greater than any that preceded it, though 
falling below those of the present time, if here 
again one may put any trust in the poetry of Homer; 
for though it is natural to suppose that he as a poet 
adorned and magnified the expedition, still even on 
his showing it was evidently comparatively small. 
For in the fleet of twelve hundred vessels he has 
represented the ships of the Boeotians as having 
one hundred and twenty men each, and those of 



By]Xa)v, o)? ifiol Bokgl, rd? peyiara^ kcu e\a')(L- 
<TTa<$' aXXoov yovv peyeOow; irepi iv vecov fcara- 
Xoyco ovk i/nvijcrOr). avreperai Be ore rjaav /cal 
p,dyj-P>oi irdvres, iv rals ^lXokttJtov vaval BeBrf- 
Xwtcev to^otcls yap irdvra^ ireTroir^Ke tou? Trpoa- 
kw-ttovS' TrepLvecos Be ovk etVo? ttoXXovs ^vpurXelv 
etjeo twv /3aaiXea)v ko\ roov pdXtara ev reXei, 
aXXco? re kol peXXovras ireXayos TrepaLooaeaOai 
perd (TKevoov rroXepLiKcov ovB* av rd irXola Kard- 
<fiapKTa e^ovra^, dXXd rw iraXatco rpoirw Xyjcftl- 

5 KOurepov irapecFKevaapeva. 7r/?o? Ta? peyiaia^ 6" 
ovv kcu e'Xa^iCTTa? vavs to pbeaov gkottovvti ov 
ttoXXoI (paLvovTai eXOovres, &)? dmo irdarj^ rrj<; 
'EWaSo? Koivfj irepuropevot. 

XL Altlov 5' f)v ovx V oXiyavOpanua toctovtov 
ocrov rj dxprjparia. ttjs yap rpo(pr)<; diropia top 
re crrparbv iXdaaco ifyayov Kal oaov ifXiri^ov 
avrodev iroXepovvra fiiOTevceiv, iireiBr) Be dc/u- 
Kop-evoi fiaxy cKpaTrjaav (BrjXov Be' to yap epvpta 
to) arparoTreBu) ovk av iretx^avro), (paivovraL B' 
ovB' evravOa irdarr) rfj Suvdfiei xprjcrdfievoi, dXXd 
7T/70? yecopyiav tt}? ^epo~cvi]o~ov rparropievoL koX 
Xyarelav tP/s rpo<f>r}<; diropia. fj Kal paXXov oi 
Tpcoe? avrcov Bieairappevwv rd BeKa err) dvrelyov 
f3ia, toZ? alel viroXeiTropevois avrliraXoL 6We?. 

2 Trepiovalav Be el yXOov fyovTe? Tpo<j>y<i Kal ovres 


BOOK I. x. 4-X1. 2 

Philoctetes as having fifty, 1 indicating, it seems to 
me, the largest and the smallest ships ; at any rate, 
no mention as to the size of any others is made in 
the Catalogue of Ships. But that all on board were 
at once rowers and fighting men he has shown in 
the case of the ships of Philoctetes ; for he repre- 
sents all the oarsmen as archers. And it is not likely 
that many supernumeraries sailed with the expedi- 
tion, apart from the kings and those highest in office, 
especially as they were to cross the open sea with all 
the equipment of war, and, furthermore, had boats 
which were not provided with decks, but were built 
after the early style, more like pirate-boats. In any 
event, if one takes the mean between the largest 
ships and the smallest, it is clear that not a large 
number of men went on the expedition, considering 
that they were sent out from all Hellas in common. 2 

XI. The cause was not so much lack of men as 
lack of money. For it was a want of supplies that 
caused them to take out a comparatively small 
force, only so large as could be expected to live on 
the country while at war. And when they arrived 
and had prevailed in battle — as evidently they did, 
for otherwise they could not have built the defence 
around their camp — even then they seem not to 
have used their whole force, but to have resorted to 
farming in the Chersonese and to pillaging, through 
lack of supplies. Wherefore, since they were scat- 
tered, the Trojans found it easier to hold the field 
against them during those ten years, being a match 
for those who from time to time were left in camp. 
But if they had taken with them an abundant 

1 Horn. B 510, 710. 

- The number would be 102,000, i.e. 1,200 ships at 85 men 



dOpooi dvev XyaTeLas real yecopylas Ijvvexcos top 
iroXe/Jiov Siecpepov, pahlccs av p-dxj) ^pciTovvre^ 
elXov, oIl ye teal ov% ad pool, dXXa fie pel tw alel 
irapovri avrel^ov, rroXioptela 5' av irpocr/eaOe^o- 
fievoi ev eXaaerovi re XP° V( P Kai dirovcorepov tt)v 
Tpoiav etXov. dXXa oV d^py fiariav (rd re irpb 
tovtcov daOevr) rjv teal avrd ye St) Tavra, ovofia- 
o-rorara tcov irplv yevo/ieva, SrfXovTai rot? epyois 
v7ToSeearepa ovra tt)? (p7]/jLr)<; teal rov vvv ire pi 
avrcov Sid tovs TroiTjra*; Xoyov /caTeo-xrjteoTO^ 

XII. 'E7rel teal pierd ra Tpcoitca r) 'EXXd? en 
fieraviaTaro re teal tear cote i^ero, ware fir) r)av)(d- 

2 eraaa av^)]di)vai. r) re yap avayu>pt]o~iS tcov 'EX- 
Xiivcov if; 'IXiov xP ovla ysvofievr) jroXXa eVeo^- 
ficoae, koX aTaaeis ev Tafc iroXeaiv a>? eVt to 
ttoXv eyiyvovro, deft* cov eteiTiiTTOVTe<; Ta? TroXeis 

3 etcTL^ov. Botwrot re yap 01 vvv e^rjKoaTco erei 
fieTa 'IXlov dXcoaiv e'f "Apvr]$ dvao~TavT€<; vtto 
QeaaaXcov tt)v vvv fiev HoicoTiav, irpoTepov 8e 
K.aS/irjiSa y yrjv teaXovfievrfv cp/ei-jcrav (r)v Se avTcov 
teal aTTohaafio^ ev rrj yfj TavTy irporepov, deft cov 
teal e? "iXtov earpaTevaav), Acopirjs Te 6y8o7]/eoo~Tcp 

4 erei %vv 'YipateXeLhais UeXoTrovvrjaov eayov. fio- 
Xt? T€ ev TToXXcp xpovco r)av%do~aaa r) 'E\\a? 
Beftaicos teal ovteeri dviarafievi) diroitelas efe- 


BOOK I. xi. 2-xn. 4 

supply of food, and, in a body, without resorting to 
foraging and agriculture, had carried on the war 
continuously, they would easily have prevailed in 
battle and taken the city, since even with their 
forces not united, but with only such part as was 
from time to time on the spot, they yet held out ; 
whereas, if they could have sat down and laid siege 
to Troy, they would have taken it in less time and 
with less trouble. But because of lack of money not 
only were the undertakings before the Trojan war 
insignificant, but even this expedition itself, though 
far more noteworthy than any before, is shown by 
the facts to have been inferior to its fame and to the 
tradition about it that now, through the influence 
of the poets, obtains. 

XII. Indeed, even after the Trojan war Hellas 
was still subject to migrations _and in process of 
settlement, and hence did not get rest and wax 
stronger. For not only did the return of the Hel- 
lenes from Ilium, occurring as it did after a long 
time, cause many changes ; but factions also began 
to spring up very generally in the cities, and, in con- 
sequence of these, men were driven into exile and 
founded new cities. The present Boeotians, for 
example, were driven from Arne by the Thessalians 
in the sixtieth year after the capture of Ilium and 
settled in the district now called Boeotia, but formerly 
Cadmeis ; only a portion of these had been in that 
land before, and it was some of these who took part in 
the expedition against Ilium. The Dorians, too, in the 
eightieth year after the war, together with the Hera- 
cleidae occupied the Peloponnesus. And so when 
painfully and after a long course of time Hellas 
became permanently tranquil and its population was 
no longer subject to expulsion from their homes, it 



7re/x7re, real *Icova<; puev 'AOtivclloi kcu vrjcncoroov 
tovs ttoXXovs cpKLcrav, 'lTa\ta? he teal Zi/ceXias 
rb irXeov YieXoirovvrjaiOL tt}<? re aWrjs 'EXXdhos 
eariv a ywp'ia. irdvra he ravra varepov roov 
Tpwitccov eKTiaOr). 

XIII. Avvarcorepas he yiyvofievr]*; rr}$ 'EXXdhos 
teal roov Xprj/jLarcov rrjv ktyjctlv en fidXXov rj rrpo- 
repov 7roiovp,evr)<$ rd rroXXa rvpavvihes ev rah 
iroXecTi KaOiaravro, roov irpoaohoov fiei^ovoov yi- 
yvofievoov (rrporepov he r)aav eirl prjrols yepaai 
Trarpi/cal ftaaiXelaL), vavri/cd re efyprvero r) 
'EXXa9 teal t^? OaXaaaris fiaXXov dvreixovro. 

2 rrpooroi he KopivOcot Xeyovrai eyyvrara rov vvv 
rpoTrov p,e7ayeipi(jai rd irepl Ta? vavs koX rpir)- 
peis rrpoorov ev KopivOoo T?)? 'EXXdhos evvavirr)- 

3 yr)6r}vai. fyaiverai he ical Xafiioi<; 'A/iewo/cXr}*; 
KopLv0LO<? vavirrjybs vavs Troir)o-a<; reaaapas' err) 
h" earl pbdXiara rpiaKoaia e\ rrjv reXevrrjv rovhe 
rov TroXepLOv, ore 'A/iewo/cXr)? %a/AioL<; r)X9ev. 

4 vavp,ayia re iraXairdrr] oov l<t/jl€v yiyverai Ko- 
pivdioov 7ryoo? KepKvpaiovs' err) he fidXiara zeal 
ravrrj e^rjKovra teal hiaicbaid eari p-eypi rov 

5 avrov ypbvov. olteovvres yap ttjv ttoXlv oi Ko- 
pivQioi eirl rov laO/iov at el hrj irore epLirbpiov 
elyov, roov ' 'EXXijvoov rb rrdXai Kara yrjv rd irXeioo 
i) Kara OdXaaaav, roov re eWo? UeXo7rovvrjaov 
/cal roov e^oo, hid tt)? i/ceivcov rrap dXXrjXovs 
eTrifiiayovrcov, xptjfiaaL re hvvarol r)aav, co? kcu 


BOOK I. xii. 4-xm. 5 

began to send out colonies. ^The Athenians colonized 
Ionia and most 5f ~the""fslands ; the Peloponnesians, 
the greater part of Italy and Sicily and some portions 
of the rest of Hellas. And all these colonies were 
planted after the Trojan war. 

XIII. As Hellas grew more powerful and con- 
tinued to acquire still more wealth than before, 
along with the increase of their revenue tyrannies 
began to be established in most of the cities, whereas 
before that there had been hereditary kingships 
based on fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes began to 
fit out navies, too, and to apply themselves more to 
the sea. And the Corinthians are said to have been 
the first of all to adopt what was very nearly the 
modern plan as regards ships and shipping, 1 and 
Corinth was the first place in all Hellas, we are told, 
where triremes were built. And it appears that 
Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships 
for the Samians, also ; and it was about three hundred 
years before the end of the Peloponnesian war that 
Ameinocles came to the Samians. 2 The earliest sea- 
fight, too, of which we know, was fought by the 
Corinthians against the Corcyraeans ; 3 and this was 
two hundred and sixty years before the same date. 
For as the Corinthians had their city on the Isthmus, 
from the very earliest times they maintained there 
a market for the exchange of goods, because the 
Hellenes within and without the Peloponnesus, in 
olden times communicating with one another more by 
land than by sea, had to pass through their terri- 
tory; and so they were powerful and rich, as has 

1 The reference seems to be to the construction of har- 
bours and docks as well as to the structure of the ships, 
e.g. providing them with decks (ch. x. 4). 

8 704 b.o. s 664 B.C. 



roU iraXaiols jroiTirals SeSrjXcorar d(pvei6v yap 
eircovopacfav to ywplov. iireiSy] re ol 'EXXrjves 
paXXov errXw^ov, rd<; vavs Krrjcrdpevoi ro Xrjart- 
kov Kadypovv, /cal ipLiroptov irapkyovre^ dpcfeorepa 
hvvar^v ecrypv yprjpLarcov irpoaohw riiv ttoXlv. 
6 real "lwaiv varepov ttoXv ylyverai vavri/cbv eirl 
Kvpov TLepacov irpcarov ftaoriXevovros /cal Kap- 
fivaov rod f/eo? avrov, rP)<; re /caO* iavrovs 
daXdaa^s Kvp(p iroXepovvres i/epdrrjadv rtva 
ypovov. /cal TloXv/cpdrys, ^dpuov rvpavvodv eirl 
Kapj3vcrov, vavrucch iayywv aXXas re rojv vijaayv 
vtdikoovs erroiiiaaro /cal *¥i)veLav eXcov dveOifKe 
ra> * A7r6XXa>v i tw A^Xtft). <I>a)/ca% re ^laacraXiav 
oLKi^ovres KapX7]BoviOv<; ivi/ccov vavpayovvre^. 

XIV. Avvaroorara yap ravra rwv vavri/cwv 
7}v. (tbaiverai 5e /cal ravra, iroXXaU yeveals 
varepa yevopueva rcov Tpaiifccov, rpu'ipeai pev oXi- 
<yat? ypcopeva, Trevrrj/covrepois 8' en /cal ttXoLols 

2 pa/cpols efyiprvpeva toenrep e/celva. oXiyov re irpo 
rdv WLtjSlkcop teal rov Aapeiov Oavdrov, o? p,erd 
Kapftvarjv Uepacov l(3aaiXevcre, rpn'-jpe^; irepi re 
^i/ceXiav rot? rvpdvvoLs e? ttXtjOos eyevovro /cal 
Keo/cupatoi?' ravra yap reXevrala rrpo rrjq £.ep- 
£ov crrpareias vavri/ch d^ioXoya ev rrj 'EXXdSi 

3 Karearr). Alyivrjrai yap teal WOiivaloi, /cal 

1 cf. Horn. B 570 ; Pind. 01. xiii. 4. 

* 559-529 B.C. 3 532-522 B.C. * cf. in. civ. 

6 Marseilles, founded 600 B.C. 


BOOK I. xiii. 5-xiv. 3 

been shown even by the early poets, who called the 
place " Wealthy Corinth." l And when navigation 
grew more prevalent among the Hellenes, the 
Corinthians acquired ships and swept the sea of 
piracy, and offering a market by sea as well as by 
land, raised their city to great power by means of 
their revenues. The Ionians, too, acquired a power- 
ful navy later, in the time of Cyrus, 2 the first king of 
the Persians, and of Cambyses his son ; and waging 
war with Cyrus they maintained control of the sea 
about their own coasts for some time. Poly crates, 
also, who was tyrant of Samos in the time of Cam- 
byses, 3 was strong in sea-power and subdued a num- 
ber of the islands, Rhenea among them, which he 
captured and consecrated to the Delian Apollo. 4 
Finally the Phocaeans, when they were colonizing 
Massalia, 5 conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight. 
XIV. These were the most powerful of the fleets ; 
and even these, we learn, though they were formed 
many generations later than the Trojan war, were 
provided with only a few triremes, but were still 
fitted out with fifty-oared galleys and the ordinary 
long boats, 6 like the navies of that earlier time. In- 
deed, it was only a little before the Persian war and 
the death of Darius, 7 who became king of the Per- 
sians after Cambyses, that triremes were acquired in 
large numbers, namely by the tyrants in various parts 
of Sicily and by the Corcyraeans ; and these were the 
last navies worthy of note that were established in 
Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes. As for the 
Athenians and Aeginetans and any other maritime 

6 irAoTa, usually contrasted with war-ships {rpi^ptis), but 
here marked as ships of war by the epithet paxpa., though 
probahlv differing little except in size from trading- vessels. 

^ 485Vo, 



o'lTives aXXot, fipayka e/ee/cTrjvTo ical rovrcov ra 
iroXXa TrevTij/covTepovs- d\jre re d<£' ov 'AOyvalovs 
®€fALaTOfc\rj<i eireiaev AlyivrjraLs TroXefiovvTa^^ 

KCLL afJLCL T0V j3dp/3dpOV TT pOcBoKL/JLOV 6Wo?, TCL% 

vav<; TroojcracrOai, alarrep teal evav}iayr\<jav' kcli 
avrai ovttco elyov Bia 7rdar)<; fcaracrrpco/jLaTa. 

XV. Ta fxev ovv vclwtikcl twv 'JLXXrjvcop tol- 
clvtcl rjv, rd re iraXaia teal ra varepov yevofieva. 
Icr^vv Be 7r€pL€7ron]aavTo ofuos ovtc eXa^iar-qv ol 
7rpoaGx6vTe<; avroU xprj/jbdrcov re irpoaoBco teal 
aXXcov dpyji' eTrnrXeovres jap ra? vrjaovs tcare- 
<Trpe(f)0VT0, teal fidXiara oaoi fx^ Biaptcfj eiyov 

2 xcopav. Kara yrjv Be iroXe/JLOS, odev ™? tcav Bvva- 
fjLis irepieyevero, ovBsls fjvvecTTT)' irdvre^ Be rjaav, 
oaot teal eyevovro, irpbs ofiopovs tovs a^erepov^ 
e/cdaToi 1 ;, teal €k$i]/jLov<; arparela^ 7roXv\i7rb rrjs 
eavrcov eir aXXcov Karaarpo(f)7J ovtc i^fjaav ol 
"EXXy]V€S. ov yap %vveicrTj']fcecrav irpbs tcls fieyi- 
crra? 7roXei? vtti^kool, ovB' av avrol drrb rrj<; lo-7]<; 
tcowds arpaiela^ Iitoiovvto, tear dXXi'fXovs Be 
fiaXXov co? etcaaroi ol dcrrvyeiroves eiroXe fxovv . 

3 fidXiara Be e? rbv irdXai irore yevo/ievov TroXe/nov 
^iaXtciBecov teal 'Eperpiwv teal rb ciXXo 'EXX^vlkop 
e? ^vpL/jLa)(iav etcarepwv Biearr). 

1 Referring to Xerxes' invasion. This Aeginetan war is 
referred to in ch. xli. 2. 


BOOK I. xiv. 3-xv. 3 

powers, the fleets they had acquired were incon- 
siderable, consisting mostly of fifty-oared galleys ; 
and it was only quite recently that the Athenians, 
when they were at war with the Aeginetans and 
were also expecting the Barbarians, 1 built their fleet, 
at the instance of Themistocles — the very ships 
with which they fought at Salamis. And these 
vessels were still without decks throughout their 

XV. Such were the navies of the Hellenes, both 
those of early and those of later times ; nevertheless 
those who gave attention to such matters acquired 
not a little strength by reason both of revenue of 
money and of sway over others. For they — and 
especially the peoples whose own territory was insuffi- 
cient — made expeditions against the islands and sub- 
jugated them. But by land no wars arose from which 
any considerable accession of power resulted ; on the 
contrary, all that did occur were border wars with 
their several neighbours, and foreign expeditions far 
from their own country for the subjugation of others 
were not undertaken by the Hellenes. For they 
had not yet been brought into union as subjects of 
the most powerful states, nor, on the other hand, 
did they of their own accord make expeditions in 
common as equal allies ; it was rather against one 
another that the neighbouring peoples severally 
made war. But it was chiefly in the war that arose 
a long time ago between the Chalcidians and the 
Eretrians, 2 that all the rest of Hellas took sides in 
alliance with the one side or the other. 

2 The war for the Lelantine Plain [tf. Hdt. v. xcix. ; Btrabo, 
x. i. 11) ; usually placed in the seventh century, but by 
Curtius in the eighth (see Herme-t, x. pp. 220 ff.). 



XVI. 'Eireyevero Be aXXot<; re aXXoOi kcoXv- 
fjtara fiyj av^rjOrjvai, real "\wcri fTpoywpi^advTaiv 
eVl fiiya rcov Trpayfidrcov KOpo? /cal r) Uepai/cr) 
e^ovaia Kpolaov fcaQeXovcra real oaa eWo?'AA.uo? 
TTora/iov 7T/?09 6dXao~o~av, iirearpdrevo-e koX t<z? 
Iv rfj rjireipw iroXeLS eBovXwae, Aapelos re varepov 
tc5 QoLvlfcoov vauTLfCw Kparoiv real Ta? mjaovs. 

XVII. Tvpavvoi re ogoi r)aav iv rah 'EXXrjvi- 
*at? TroXecri, to €(/>' eavrcov povov irpoopcofievoi e? 
re to acofxa koli e? to tov lBiov oIkov av^etv oY 
da^aXeia^ ocrov iBvvavro /idXiara Ta? 7roA,et? 
ojkovv, €7rpdx&V T€ ovBev an avrdv epyov dgio- 
Xoyov, el fir) eX tl 717)0? Trepioiicov<; toi>? avrcov 
e/cacrTot?. 1 ovrco iravrayoOev r) 'EWa? eVl iroXiiv 
%povov Kcne'iyero firjre Kotvy cfravepbv firjBev Kar- 
epyd^eoOcu, Kara TroXeis re droXfiorepa elvai. 

XVIII. 'EireiBr) Be oX re 'AOrjvaicov rvpavvoi 
real oi i/c t?}? aXXrjs 'EXXdBos eirl iroXv /ecu irplv 
TvpavvevOeiar]^ oi irXelcnoL teal reXevraloi irXr)v 
rci)v iv XifceXla viro AaKeBaifiovicov KareXvOrjaav^ 
r) yap AafceBaificov [fierd ry)v ktiglv \jrtbv vvv 
ivoiKovvrcov avTTjv 2 Acopicov eVt TrXelarov a>v 
Xapev yjpovov araaidaaaa o,aa>? etc TraXairdrov 
teal ijvvopLijdr/ koX alel drvpdvvevTOS r)v err) yap 

1 After end(TTois theMSS. have oi -yap iv 'S.iKeXia lirl irXe'io'Tov 
ix^P r ) (Tav Swd/xcws, for those in Sicily advanced to a very 
great degree of power, which Wex deletes, followed by most 
editors. 2 Hude omits with E. 


BOOK I. xvi.-xviii. i 

XVI. But different Hellenic peoples in different 
localities met with obstacles to their continuous 
growth ; for example, after the Ionians had attained 
great prosperity, Cyrus and the Persian empire, after 
subduing Croesus l and all the territory between the 
river Halys and the sea, made war against them and 
enslaved the cities on the mainland, and later on 
Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician 
fleet, enslaved the islands also. 2 

XVII. The tyrants, moreover — whenever there 
were tyrants in the Hellenic cities — since they had 
regard for their own interests only, both as to the safety 
of their own persons and as to the aggrandizement 
of their own families, in the administration of their 
cities made security, so far as they possibly could, 
their chief aim, and so no achievement worthy ot 
mention was accomplished by them, except per- 
chance by individuals in conflict with their own 
neighbours. So on all sides Hellas was for a long 
time kept from carrying out in common any notable 
undertaking, and also its several states from being 
more enterprising. 

XVIII. But finally the tyrants, not only of Athens 
but also of the rest of Hellas (which, for a long time 
before Athens, had been dominated by tyrants) — at 
least most of them and the last that ever ruled, 
if we except those in Sicily — were put down by the 
Lacedaemonians. For although Lacedaemon, after 
the settlement there of the Dorians who now inhabit 
it, was, for the longest period of all the places of 
which we know, in a state of sedition, still it obtained 
good laws at an earlier time than any other land, 
and has always been free from tyrants ; for the 

1 546 b.g. 8 493 b.c. 



€<TTL fjL(i\l(TTa T€TpafCO(Tia Kal oXiyW TrXeiO) 6? TT)V 

reXevrrjv rovBe rov iroXe/iov, a<£' ov Aa/ce&ai- 
fiovioi rfj avrfj iroXireia xpoivrai' Kal Si avro 
Svvdfievoi Kal ra ev rat? aXXais TroXeau KaOiara- 
aav. fierd Be rr)v rcov rvpdvvcov KardXvacv €K 
tt)? 'EWaSo? ov ttoXXois ereatv varepov Kal /; ev 
MapaOcovL p-d^rj MrfScov 7T/30? 'AOrjvaLov*; iyevero. 

2 Sefcdra) Be erei puer avrrjv avdts 6 fidpftapos tw 
fieydXco crroXw eirl rrjv 'EXXdSa BovXwaop,evo^ 
rjXdev. teal peydXov klvSvvov eTriKpepxtaOevros 
oi re Aa/cehaifiovioi rwv ^vpuroXepL^aavrcov 'KX- 
Xijvcov rjyyjcravTO Svvdfiei Trpov^ovre^, Kal oi Wdrj- 
valoi eiriovrcov rcov MtjScov Siavo^Qevres e/cXiirelv 
rrjv ttoXlv Kal dvaaKevaadjievoL e? rds vavs 
ecrftavres vavriKol eyevovro. kolvj} re dircoad- 
fjuevot rov fidpftapov varepov ov iroXXw SieKpidr)- 
aav irpos re *Adr]vaLovs /ecu ActfceBatfiovLovs oX re 
d7roo-Tdvre<?>/3aaiXeco<; "RXXyves Kal oi ^vpurroXe- 
pnf)aaire<;' Svvdfiei yap ravra fieyiara Biecpdvry 

3 \cf\vov yap oi p-ev Kara yrjv, oi he vavaiv. koX 
oXiyov fiev \povov %vve/j,eivev rj 6pLaL\p.ia, erreira 
Bieve~)(6evTe<s oi AaKeSai/iovioi Kal oi Wdrjvaloi 
erroXepurjaav puerd rcov ^vp,p.d^(ov Trpbs dXXi')Xov<;, 
Kal rcov akXcov 'JLXXrjvcov el nves irov Biaaralev, 
7rpo? rovrov<; jjBrj excopovv. &are*airo rcov M?/6V 
kcov e? rovBe aiel rov TroXepuov ra puev airevBofjievoi, 

1 The legislation of Lycurgus, thus placed by Thucydides 
at four hundred years or more before 404 B.C., would be about 
804 B.C. (Eratosthenes gives 884). 


BOOK I. xviti. 1-3 

period during which the Lacedaemonians have been 
enjoying the same constitution J covers about four 
hundred years or a little more down to the end of 
the Peloponnesian war. And it is for this reason 
that they became powerful and regulated the affairs 
of other states as well. Not many years after the 
overthrow of the tyrants in Hellas by the Lace- 
daemonians the battle of Marathon 2 was fought 
between the Athenians and the Persians; and ten 
years after that the Barbarian came again with his 
great host against Hellas to enslave it. In the face 
of the great danger that threatened, the Lacedae- 
monians, because they were the most powerful, 
assumed the leadership of the Hellenes that joined 
in the war ; and the Athenians, when the Persians 
came on, resolved to abandon their city, and pack- 
ing up their goods embarked on their ships, and 
so became sailors. By a common effort the Bar- 
barian was repelled ; but not long afterwards the 
other Hellenes, both those who had revolted from 
the King and those who had joined the first con- 
federacy against him, parted company and aligned 
themselves with either the Athenians or the Lace- 
daemonians ; for these states had shown themselves 
the most powerful, the one strong by land and the 
other on the sea. The defensive alliance lasted only 
a little while ; then the Lacedaemonians and the 
Athenians quarrelled and, with their respective 
allies, made war upon one another, and any of the rest 
of the Hellenes, if they chanced to be at variance, 
from now on resorted to one or the other. So that 
from the Persian invasion continually, to this present 
war, making peace at one time, at another time 

8 490 b.o. 



ra Be TroXepLovvres r) dXXyjXoLS r) rois eavrtoi 
gv/jL/jidxoLS a^fcrTa/xeVot? ev irapea Kevdaavro ra 
iroXepua /cal epLTreiporepoi eyevovro fiera kivBvvwv 
ra9 fMeXera^ 7roiovp,evoi. 

XIX. Kat ol /jlcv Aa/ceSai/jLovLoi ov% vrroreXeU 
e)(OVT€<i <j)6pov tovs ^v/i/jLa^ov; rjyovvro, /car oXi- 
yapyiav Be afyiaiv avrols fiovov eTnrrjBelco^ ottcos 
iroXirevaovcn Oepairevovre^ 'AOqvaZoi Be vavs T€ 
tcov iroXewv tw XP° V( P TrapaXajSovTes, irXrjV Xlcov 
Kal Aeafilwv, Kal xpjjfiara Tot? Tract, rdf;avT€<; 
(f>epeiv. Kal eyevero auTocs e? rovBe rbv TroXe/xov 
7] IB'ia Trapaa/ceuT] puei^oov r) &)<? ra Kpariard ttotg 
fierd dfcpaMpvovs Ttjs fuyii/za^a? rjv0T]crav. 

XX. Ta fiev ovv TraXaid rocavra ijvpov, ^aXeird 
ovra iravTi e£r}? TeKpaipicp TTLarevaai. ol yap 
avOpwirov rds aKods tcov Trpoyeyevt]pLevoov, Kal r)v 
enriyoipia aQbicnv fj, op.oioo<; dftacravLGTCos Trap' 

2 dXXrjXoov Be^ovTaL. ' Adrjvaloov youv to ttXtjOo^ 
''Xirirapypv otovrai ixfi ' App.oBLov Kal 'Apiaroyel- 
tovos Tvpavvov ovra diroOavelv Kal ovk laacriv 

OTL 'l7T7Tta5 flkv 7T^€Cr/9uTaTO? OOV r)p\ e T ^ v HeHTL- 

arpdrov vleaov,' I tt Trapes Be Kal (deao-aXbs dBeX- 
<f)ol rjaav avrov, v7roT07rrjaavre<; Be tl eKeivrj rfj 
rjfiepa Kal irapa^pripLa 'Ap/LLoBios Kal 'Apiaroyei- 
toov €K tcov tjuvecBoTcov a(f)L(TlP '\lTlTLa /jL€p,7]VV<J0ai, 

1 cf. vi. lxxxv. 2 ; VII. lvii. 4. 

* Lost its independence after the revolt of 427 B.C. 
cf. in. L * i.e. as if they took place in some distant land. 


BOOK I. xviii. 3-xx. 2 

fighting with each other or with their own revolted 
allies, these two states prepared themselves well in 
matters of war, and became more experienced, 
taking their training amid actual dangers. 

XIX. The Lacedaemonians maintained their hege- 
mony without keeping their allies tributary to them, 
but took care that these should have an oligarchical 
form of government conformably to the sole interest 
of Sparta ; the Athenians, on the other hand, main- 
tained theirs by taking over in course of time the 
ships of the allied cities, with the exception of 
Chios l and Lesbos, 2 and by imposing on them all a 
tax of money. And so the individual resources of 
the vVtheniansjivailable for this war became greater 
than those of themselves and their allies when that 
alliance was still unimpaired and strongest. 

XX. Now the state of affairs in early times I 
have found to have been such as I have described, 
although it is difficult in such matters to credit 
any and every piece of testimony. For men accept 
from one another hearsay reports of former events, 
neglecting to test them just the same, 3 even though 
these events belong to the history of their own 
country. Take the Athenians, for example ; most of 
them think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he 
was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton. 4 They 
do not know that it was Hippias, as the eldest of 
the sons of Peisistratus, who was ruler, and that 
Hipparchus and Thessalus were merely his brothers; 
further, that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspect- 
ing, on that very day and at the very moment of 
executing their plan, that information had been con- 
veyed to Hippias by one of their fellow-conspirators, 

4 51-4 B.C. On this digression, cf. Hdt. v. lv. ; vi. cxxiii. ; 
Ariat. *A0. Uo\. 17 £. 



tov /jl€v dixeaypvTO &>? TrpoeiSoros, ftovXo/xevoi Be 
irplv £vWr)<f)0f}vai BpdaavTes tl Kal KtvBvvevaai, 
tw ( l7T7rdp)^(p Tr€pcTV%6vT€<; irapa to AecoKopeiov 
tcaXov/jLevov t/;i> YlavaOr/vaiKr^v iro/jL7rr)v BiaKo- 

3 a/iovvTi direKTeivav. 7roXXd Be Kal dXXa en koX 
vvv ovra Kal ov \povw dfivqaTovfieva Kal ol 
aXXoi " EAA,?;^? ovk 6p9w<; olovrcu, axrirep tou? 
T€ Aa/ce&cu/jLOvicov fiaaiXeas p,r) yua tyr)<f)(p irpoa- 
TiOeaOca e/cdrepov, dXXa Bvolv, Kal tov HiTavaTrjv 
Xo^ov avTols elvai, 09 ovB' eyeveTo irdnroTe. ovtcds 
aTaXaiirwpos T<n? ttoXXols tj f^T^tn? tt)? dXrj- 
Oeias Kal eirl to, eTol/xa /naXXov TpeirovTai. 

XXI. 'E/c Be twv elprjpevcov T€K/j.^picov Oyaax? 
TOiavTa dv Tt? vop-L^cov p.dXio~Ta a BirjXOov ov% 
dpLapTavoi, Kal ovt€ a>? iroiy]Tal vfxvrjKao-L irepi 
avTwv iirl to fiel^ov tcoo~p,ovvT€<; /xaXXov TiaTevwv, 
ovt€ a>9 Xoyoypd<f>oc gvveOeaav eirl to irpoaayw- 
yoTepov Tr) dfepodaei rj aXijOecrTepov, ovtcl dve^e- 
XeyfCTa Kal to. iroXXa vito ^povov avT(ov dirio-Tco^ 
iirl to pvOwBes eKvevcKrjKOTa, rjupijadai Be rjyrjad- 
pevos eK tcov eirKpaveaTaTcov crrj/jLelcov eo? iraXaid 

2 elvai diro^poovTw^. Kal 6 iroXefio^ ovtos, Kaiirep 

1 In the inner Ceramicus near the temple of Apollo 

2 Herodotus is doubtless one of the Hellenes here criti- 
cised, cf. VI. lvii., referring to the two votes; ix. liii., 
where he seems to have applied a term belonging to a deme 
(cf. Hdt. in. lv. ) to a division of the army. 


BOOK I. xx. 2-xxi. 2 

held off from him as forewarned, but wishing to do 
something before they were seized and then take 
their chances, fell in with Hipparchus, who was mar- 
shalling the Panathenaic procession near the sanc- 
tuary called Leocorium, 1 and killed him. There 
are many other matters, too, belonging to the 
present and not forgotten through lapse of time, 
regarding which the other Hellenes 2 as well hold 
mistaken opinions, for example, that at Lacedaemon 
the kings cast not one but two votes each, and that 
the Lacedaemonians have the " Pitana company " in 
their army, which never at any time existed. So 
averse to taking pains are most men in the search 
for the truth, and so prone are they to turn to what 
lies ready at hand. 

XXI. Still, from the evidence that has been given, 
any one would not err who should hold the view 
that the state of affairs in antiquity was pretty 
nearly such as I have described it, not giving greater 
credence to the accounts, on the one hand, which 
the poets have put into song, adorning and amplify- 
ing their theme, and, on the other, which the 
chroniclers have composed with a view rather of 
pleasing the ear 3 than of telling the truth, since 
their stories cannot be tested and most of them 
have from lapse of time won their way into the 
region of the fabulous so as to be incredible. He 
should regard the facts as having been made out 
with sufficient accuracy, on the basis of the clearest 
indications, considering that they have to do with 
early times. And so, even though men are always 

8 Public recitation was the ordinary mode of getting 
the works of the poets and early logographers before the 




alel jieyiGTov KptvovTcov, iravaap,evcov he ra ap- 
X a ^ a ficiWov Oavpa^ovTcov, air* avTcov tcov ep- 
ycov gkottovgi hrjXcoaeL o/aco? jiel^cov yeyev^/xevo^ 


XXII. Kal oaa fiev Xoyco elirov efcacrroi r) fieX- 

X0VT€<? 7ro\€{jL7]<J€LV Yj 6V CLVTQ) Tjhl] 6Wc?, ^akeiTOV 

rr)v a/cpi/3eiav avTr\v tcov Xcx^^vtcov Sta/xvy]fxovev- 
crai r)v ifioi re cov auTO? r)KOvaa Kal tch? aXXoOev 
iroOev epol dirayyeXXovaiv' <i? 8' av ehoKOvv /xoi 
€KCKttol irepl tcov alel irapovTcov tcl Seovra pbaXiar 
elirelvy eyopbevw ore iyyvrara rf/? ^vfiTrdarjs yvoo- 

2 p.rj<; tcov a\7]6cj<; Xe)(,6evTcov, outgo? etpTjrar ra 
h' epya tcov irpaxdevTcov ev tco 7roXep,'o ov/c etc 
tov irapaTvyovTO? irvvOavopLevos rjfJLcooa ypafyeiv 
ovh' a)? epol ehoKei, dXX ol? re avTOS iraprjv Kal 
irapd tcov aXXcov oaov hvvaTov iLKpifieia irepl 

3 €K(iaT0v eire^eXdoov. einirovco^ he r^vpicrKeTo, hiorc 
ol TrapovTes tcu? epyois e/facrTOi? ov TavTa irepl 
tcov avTcov eXeyov, dXX &>? eKaTepcov tis evvoias 

4 rj pvrjfJLrj^ €){0i. Kal e? fiev ciKpoaaiv tocos to 
fill pv6cohe<; avTcov aTepireaTepov cfcavelTai' oaoi 


BOOK I. xxi. 2-xxn. 4 

inclined, while they are engaged in a war, to judge 
the present one the greatest, but when it is over 
to regard ancient events with greater wonder, yet 
this war will prove, for men who judge from the 
actual facts, to have been more important than any 
that went before. .■■■ , 

XXII. As to the speeches that were made by 
different men, either when thev were about to begin 
the war or when they were already engaged therein, 
it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy 
the words actually spoken, both for me as regards 
that which I myself heard, and for those who 
from various other sources have brought me re- 
ports. Therefore the speeches are given in the 
language in which, as it seemed to me, the several 
speakers would express, on the subjects under con- 
sideration, the sentiments most befitting the occa- 
sion, though at the same time I have adhered as 
closely as possible to the general sense of what 
was actually said. But as to the facts of the 
occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty 
to give them, not as ascertained from any chance 
informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only 
after investigating with the greatest possible ac- 
curacy each detail, in the case both of the events in 
which I myself participated and of those regarding 
which I got my information from others. And the en- 
deavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, 
because those who were eye-witnesses of the several 
events did not give the same reports about the same 
things, but reports varying according to their cham- 
pionship of one side or the other, or according to 
their recollection. And it may well be that the 
absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem 




&€ (3ovkr]<TOVTCU T03V T€ yeVOfjLeVWV TO (Ta(f)€<; 

aKOiretv Kal rcov /xeXXovrcov irore av0i<; Kara rb 
dvOpcoirivov roiovrcov teal TrapaTrXrjo-Lcov ecreaOat, 
axf)e\i/J.a Kpiveiv avrd apKOvvrcos e^ei. KTrj/id 
re 65 alel /xaXXov rj dyayvta/jia e? to TTapa^prfpLa 
dfcoveiv £vytc€LTai. 

XXTII. Toiv he irporepov epycov fieyiarov eirpd- 
yQr) 10 ^ItjSikov, teal rovro 6fiw<s hvolv vav pbayjiaiv 
Kal ire^opaylaiv rayelav rrjv Kplaiv eayev. i ov- 
rou Be rod TroXe/xov /atjkos re peya irpovftr), 
TraOrj/xard re ^vviivkyQi) yeveaOai ev avrw rfj 

2 'fLXXdhc oca ou^ erepa ev Xcrw ^popo). ovre yap 
iroXeis roaaiBe Xrj^detcraL rjprjLiQyOijaav, al Liev 
V7TO jSapfidpoiv, al 8' viro acpcov avrcov dvwroXe- 
llovvtcdv (elal 6" at Kal oLKyropas LLereftaXov 
aXLaKo/ievat), ovre (f)vyal roaalBe avOpcorrcov Kal 
(povos, 6 fxev Kar avrbv rbv rroXeLiov, 6 Be Bed rb 

3 o-raaid^eiv. rd re Trporepov aKofj yiev Xeyofieva, 
epy<p Be airavioarepov /3e/3aLovp,eva ovk drncrra 
Kariarrj, aeio~Lia)v re wepi, ol eirl rrXelarov dp,a 
fiepo? 7?)? Kal la^yporaroi ol avrol eirea^ov, 
rjXlov re eVXen/ra?, at irvKvorepat rrapd rd eK rov 
irplv xpovov fxvr}/jiovev6/jLeva jjvve/3r]o~ai', av^fioi re 
earl nrap ol? LieydXoi Kal drr avrcov Kal XllloI 

1 Artemisium and Salamia. 

* Thermopylae and Plataca. 

* As Colophon (in. xxxiv.), Mycaleasua (vn. xxix.). 


BOOK I. xxn. 4-xxm. 3 

less pleasing to the ear ; but whoever shall wish to 
have a clear view both of the events which have 
happened and of those which will some day, in all 
human probability, happen again in the same or a 
similar way — for these to adjudge my history profit- 
able will be enough for me. And, indeed, it has 
been composed, not as a prize-essay to be heard for 
the moment, but as a possession for all time. 

XXIII. The greatest achievement of former times 
was the Persian war, and yet this was quickly 
decided in two sea-fights 1 and two land-battles. 2 
But the Peloponnesian war was protracted to a 
great length, and in the course of it disasters be- 
fell Hellas the like of which had never occurred 
in any equal space of time. Never had so many 
cities been taken and left desolate, some by the 
Barbarians, 3 and others by Hellenes 4 themselves 
warring against one another ; while several, after 
their capture, underwent a change of inhabitants. 5 
Never had so many human beings been exiled, or 
so much human blood been shed, whether in the 
course of the war itself or as the result of civil 
dissensions. And so the stories of former times, 
handed down by oral tradition, but very rarely 
confirmed by fact, ceased to be incredible : about 
earthquakes, for instance, for they prevailed over a 
very large part of the earth and were likewise of 
the greatest violence ; eclipses of the sun, which 
occurred at more frequent intervals than we find 
recorded of all former times ; great droughts also in 
some quarters with resultant famines ; and lastly — 

* e.g. Plataea (in. lxviii. 3), Thyrea (iv. Ivii.). 

* e.ff. Sollium (n. xxx.), Potidaea (n. Ixx.), Anactorium 
(iv. xlix.), Scione (v. xxxii.), Melos (v. cxvi.). 

▼OL. I. 4 1 


Kal r) ov% tffcicrTa (3Xdyfrao~a Kal pApo? ri (fiOeipaaa 
rj XotpLcoBrjs voaos' ravra yap iravra fiera rovBe 

4 tov iroXepuov afxa ^vveireOeTO. i)p%avTO Be avrov 
'AOrjvaLOi Kal YieXoTrovvrjcrioi Xvaavres ra<; rpia- 
kovtovt€i<; cnroi'Bds at avrols iyevovro fiera Ev- 

5 ftoias aXcocriv. oV 6 ti 8' eXvaav, ra? atria? 
Trpovypayjra irptorov Kal ra<? Biatpopds, tov fiyj 
Tiva ^rjTTjcraL irore e£ otov togovtos 7r6Xep,o<; Tot? 

6 "EXXrjai Kareo-Ti], t^v fiev yap dXrjdeaTaTrjv 
7rp6(f)acrLV, d<f)av€GTaTr)V Be Xoyco tou? 'Adrjvacovs 
rjyovfiai (xeyaXovs yiyvop,evovs Kal cfio/Sov irape- 
yovras toZ? AaKeSatfiovLois avayKaaai €9 to tto- 
Xefxeiv al £' e? to cpavepbv Xeybfievai atrial aXK 
rjaav eKarepcov, d(f) tov Xvcravres rds cnrovBd? e? 
rov irbXepuov Karecrrrjaav. 

XXIV. 'EiriBafivbs eari ttoXis iv 8e%ia iarrXe- 
ovri rov 'loviov koXttov irpoaoiKovai 8* avT^v 

2 TavXdvTioi ftdpjSapoL, 'IXXvpiKOv eOvos. ravTrjv 
dirwKiaav fxev KepKvpaioi, ot/acrTr/? 8' iyevero 
(fraXios 'EparoKXeiBov, KopivOios yevos, tcov deft 
^paKXeovs, Kara Brj tov iraXatov vo/aov ck t?}? 
fjbrjTpoTroXecos KaraKXyOei^j ^wcpKiaav Be Kal 
Kopivdicov TLve<? Kal rod aXXov AcoptKOv yevovs. 

3 irpoeXOovTO? Be tov y^povov iyevero i) tcov 'Etti- 
Bafivicov Bvva/ALS fieyaXif Kal iroXvdvOpcoiros. 

4 GTaaidaavTes Be iv dXXijXois errj iroXXd, a>? 
Xeyerai, dirb iroXepuov twos tcov rrpoaoiKcov /3ap- 
ftdpcov icpddp^aav Kal ttj? Bwdfieco? ttjs ttoXXtjs 

5 eaTeprjdrjo-av. rd Be reXevrala irpb rovBe tov 
TToXefiov 6 Br/fios avrcov i^ebico^e tovs Bwarovs, 
oi Be iireXOovres fierd tcov fiapfidpcov iXrj^ovTO 


To face page 43 

Wm. Heinemann, Ltd. 

Jidward Stanford Ltd. London 

BOOK I. xxm. 3-xxiv. 5 

the disaster which wrought most harm to Hellas and 
destroyed a considerable part of the people — the 
noisome pestilence. For all these disasters fell upon 
them simultaneously with this war. And the war 
began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke 
the thirty years' truce, 1 concluded between them 
after the capture of Euboea.' The reasons why they 
broke it and the grounds of their quarrel I have first 
set forth, that no one may ever have to inquire for 
what cause the Hellenes became involved in so great 
a war. The truest explanation, although it has been 
the least often advanced, I believe to have been 
the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which 
brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced 
them to war. But the reasons publicly alleged on 
either side which led them to break the truce and 
involved them in the war were as follows. 

XXIV. There is a city called Epidamnus on the 
right hand as one sails into the Ionian gulf, and its 
next-door neighbours are a barbarian tribe, the Tau- 
lantians, of Illyrian race. The city was colonized 
by the Corcyraeans, and its founder was Phalius, son 
of Eratocleides, of Corinthian stock and a descendant 
of Heracles, who was invited from the mother-city 
according to the ancient custom ; but some Corinth- 
ians and other Dorians joined the Corcyraeans in 
establishing the colony. As time passed the city of 
the Epidamnians became great and populous ; but 
civil wars ensued, lasting, it is said, for many years, 
and in consequence of a war with the neighbouring 
barbarians they were crippled and stripped of most 
of their power. Finally, just before the Peloponne- 
sian war, the populace expelled the aristocrats, and 
they, making common cause with the barbarians and 

1 445 B.C.; cf. ch. cxv. 1. 



roix; iv rfj iroXei Kara re yr)v Kal Kara QdXaa- 

6 crav. oi Be iv rfj TroXei 6We? ^EmodpLVLOL 
€7T€(Ej) ime^ovro, 7r e flit ov <o iv e? rrjv KepKvpav 
7rpea/3ei$ &)? prjr port oXiv ovaav, te6[xevoi /xrj <r<£a? 
rrepiopdv (pOeipopLevovs, dXXa rov$ re cftevyovras 
ZvvaXXdtai crcfiicri Kal rov row {3ap/3dpcov rrb- 

7 Xep.ov fcaraXvaai. ravra Be iKerac KaOe^ofievoi 
69 rb ''Hpaiov iceovro. oi Be KepKvpaloi rrjv l/ee- 
reiav ovk iBe^avro, aXX' dirpaKrovs direrrefi^av. 

XXV. Tvovres Be oi ^mcdp.vioi oltepLiav 
acbiaiv dirb YLepKvpas ripcopiav ovaav ev diropw 
el^ovro OeaOau rb rrapbv, Kal rre^avre^ e? 
AeXcpovs rov Oeov hnjpatranf el rrapaholev Kopiv- 
6101$ rrjv rroXiv <i? oUiaraU Kal rtficopiav riva 
rreipwvr aw avrcov iroielaOai. 6 6' auTOt? 
dveTXe napaBovvai Kal rjyepbbvas iroielaOai. 

2 iXOovres he oi 'Ettlccl/avlol es rrjv KopivOov Kara 
rb jxavrelov irapecoaav rrjv diroLKiav, rov re 
oiKiarrjv diroteiKvyvres acpojv Ik KopivOov ovra 
Kal rb yjirjarrjpiov BrjXovvres, iBeovrb re prj 
acfcd? irepLopdv (fiOecpopLevovs, a\V iirapLVvai. 

3 KopivOioi Be Kara re rb BiKaiov virece^avro rrjv 
ripoipiav, vop.i'Covre^ ovy^ rjaaov eavrojv elvai 
rrjv diroiKiav fj KepKvpaicov, apxi Be Kal fiiaei 
roiv KepKvpaicov, on avrcov rraprjp,eXovv 6vre<; 

4 ciTTOiKOi, ovre yap iv rravrjyvpeci raU KoivaU 
Biibvres yepa ra vopLi£op,eva ovre KopivOico dvhpl 

1 The Koiva\ iravn;vpeis are the four great games, here 
doubtless referring especially to the Isthmian Games held at 
Corinth. The "privileges" would be places of honour 
{xpofSplmi), animals for sacrifice presented by the colonies of 


BOOK I. xxiv. 5-xxv. 4 

attacking Epidamnus, plundered those who were in the 
city both by land and sea. These, when they were 
being hard pressed, sent envoys to Corcyra, as being 
their mother-city, begging them not to look on and 
see them destroyed, but to reconcile them with 
the exiles and to put a stop to the war with the 
barbarians. This petition they made, sitting as 
suppliants in the temple of Hera. But the Corcy- 
raeans denied their supplication, and sent them 
back unsuccessful. 

XXV. The Epidamnians, recognizing that no aid 
was to be had from Corcyra, were at a loss how to 
settle their present difficulty ; so they sent to Delphi 
and asked the god whether they should deliver up 
their city to the Corinthians as founders and try to 
procure some aid from them. The god answered that 
they should deliver it up to them and make them 
leaders. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and 435 b.c 
delivered up the city as a Corinthian colony, in 
accordance with the oracle, showing that their founder 
was from Corinth and stating the response of the 
oracle ; and they begged the Corinthians not to look 
on and see them utterly destroyed, but to come to 
their rescue. The Corinthians undertook the task, 
partly on the ground of right, because they con- 
sidered that the colony belonged to them quite as 
much as to the Corcyraeans, partly also through hatred 
of the Corcyraeans, for the reason that these, though 
Corinthian colonists, neglected the mother-city. For 
neither at their common festival gatherings x would 
they concede the customary privileges to Corinthians, 
nor would they begin with a representative of 

the mother-city, sending of delegates (dfwpol) to Corinthian 
festivals, etc. 



7rporcaTapxo/ J ' €VOL T ™ v izp&v, warrep at aXXai 
diroitciai, Trepufrpovovvres Be avrovs kclv xprjfid- 
tcov Bvvdfiei 6We? tear' etcelvov rov xpovov ofiola 
row r K\Xy]va)V TrXovauoTarois teal rfj t? iroXefiov 
irapaateevfj Bvvarcorepoi, vclvtucw Be teal iroXv 
irpovyeiv eariv ore erraipojxevoi teal Kara rr)v 
(fraidfccov TTpoevoL/ctjaLv rrjs Kep/cvpas kXcos e^oy- 
rcov rd irepl Ta? vavs" fj teal /jl&XXov e^rjprvovro 
to vavTiicov /cal r/crav ov/c dBvvaror rpirjpet,^ yap 
eUocrL koX e/carbv virr]pyov avroU ore rjpxovro 

XXVI. Hdvrcov ovv rovrcov eyKXrjfiara e%oy- 

T€? ol KopivOlOl eire/JLTTOV 69 TTjV 'ETTLBa/JLVOV 

da^ievoi r-qv oocpeXiav, ol/cijropd re rov ftovXo- 
fievov levat rceXevovres real 'AfiirpaKtoyrcov teal 

2 AevfcaBLcov teal eavrwv (ppovpovs. eiropevQ-qaav 
Be ire^f) e? ' ' AiroXXcoviav KopivOicov ovaav dircu- 
tciav, Beet rcov Keptcvpaicov fir] KcoXvcovrai, wrr 

3 avrwv Kara OdXaaaav irepai^jfievoi. Keptcvpaioi 
Be eVetSr/ ijaOovro 7W9 re oltcrjTopas teal (fipov- 
povs rjtcovras e'9 rrjv 'EiriBajivov rijv re dnroiKiav 
KopivdLois BeBo/jLevrjv, eyaXeTraivov teal irXev- 
aavres evOvs irevre teal eltcocri vaval teal varepov 
erepa) crroXw tou9 t€ (pevyovra? etceXevov tear 
eirrjpeiav Se^eo-tfat avrov? {rjXOov yap e'9 rrjv 
Keptcupav ol roiv 'ETriBafivicov (fivydBes rd<pov<; re 
drroBeiKvvvres teal tjvyyeveiav, r)v irpolaxo^voi 
eBeovro crcfids tcardyeiv) tol>9 re cfipovpovs 0U9 

1 According to the custom obtaining in Hellenic cities, 
whereby a stranger could offer sacrifice only through a 
citizen who acted for h'on. irpoKa.TapxoiJ.evoi, as the Schol. 
explains, hihovrts trporepov (sc. % roti a\\oh) ras Karaix**, *•«• 
giving the hair cut from the victim's forehead to a repre- 


BOOK I. xxv, 4-xxvi. 3 

Corinth the initial rites at sacrifices/ as the rest of 
the colonies did, but they treated them with contempt. 
For at that time they were in point of wealth equal 
to the richest of the Hellenes, and in preparation 
for war even stronger, while in sea-power they some- 
times boasted that they were greatly superior, just 
because of the former occupation of the island by 
the Phaeacians, 2 whose glory was in their ships. It 
was for this reason that they kept on developing 
their navy, and they were in fact powerful ; for they 
had on hand one hundred and twenty triremes when 
the war began. 

XXVI. So the Corinthians, having all these grounds 
of complaint, gladly sent the desired aid to Epidam- 
nus, inviting whoever wished to go along as settlers 
and despatching as a garrison some Ambraciots and 
Leucadians and a detachment of themselves. They 
proceeded to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians, 
going by land through fear of the Corcyraeans, lest 
they might be prevented by them if they should at- 
tempt to cross the sea. But when the Corcyraeans 
perceived that the settlers and the garrison had 
arrived at Epidamnus, and that their colony had been 
given up to the Corinthians, they we re ind l^^nt. So 
they sailed immediately with twenty-five ships, and 
later with a second fleet, and insolently bade the Epi- 
damnians dismiss the garrison sent by the Corinthians 
and the settlers, and also receive back their exiles; for 
the exiled Epidamnians had gone to Corcyra, and 
pointing to the sepulchres of common ancestors and 

sentative of Corinth, that he might throw it on the fire 

a cf. in. lxx., where a sacred precinct of Alcinous in Corcyra 
is mentioned. The ancient balief that Corcyra was the 
Homeric Scheria has no support in the Odymey. 



Y^opivQ 101 eTTe/nyjrav /ecu tou? oiKr\ropa^ airoirefi- 

4 iretv. ol Be 'E7riBdfivL0i ovBev avrcov virij/covaav, 
dXXa aipa-revovaiv eV avrovs ol Kep/cvpaloi 
reaaapaKOvra vaval p.erd rcov cpvydBcov cos 
Kard^ovT€<;, Kal tovs 'IXXvpiovs TTpoaXajSovres. 

5 TrpoaKaOe^ofievot Be ttjv ttoXiv irpoelirov 'Rttl- 
Bafivicov re top fiovXo/Jievov kcu toi>? i;evov<; dira- 
Qel<$ dirikvat,' el Be firj, go? iroXefiLois y^pijaeaQai. 
o)«? S' ovk eireiOovTO, ol fiev KepKvpaloi (eari & 
la6 p,o<z to ywpiov) eiroXiopKovv ttjv ttoXlv. 

XXVII. Y^oplvOioi B\ a>9 avTols Ik t?)? ^Etti,- 
Bdfivov rjXOov dyyeXoi on TroXiopKovvjcu, irape- 
o/cevd^oi'TO arparelav, kcu d/ia diroiKiav e? tt)v 
'FiTrlSafjLVOV €K7]pvacrov eVl rfj iarj kcu ofiola tov 
ftovXo/jievov levar el Be ris to irapavriKa fiev 
/xr) iOeXec ^vparXelv, iiereyeiv Be fiovXercu t% 
diroiKia^, TrevTrjKovTa Bpa^fxas Karadevra Kopiv- 
6ia<> fxeveiv. r)aav Be kcll ol irXeovres iroXXol 
2 kcu ol rdpyvpiov Karaj3dXXovTe<;. eBer]6i]aav Be 
kcu rcov "Meyapecov vaval acf)ci<; %v jjlit poire ntyai, 
el dpa kcoXvoivto itiro KepKvpalcov irXelv ol Be 
TrapecrKevd^ovTO avroZs oktco vaval gv/xirXelv, 
Kal UaXi}? KecpaXXrjvcov reaaapaiv. Kal 'Ett^- 
Bavpicov eBei]6r)aav, ot irapeayov irevre, r Ep/j,iovr)<; 
Be filav Kal Tpoifyjvioi, Bvo, AevKaBtoi Be BeKa Kal 
'A/jLTTpaKuoTai oktco. Sr)/3aiov<; Be xpij/iara fjrr}- 
aav Kal QXecaaiovs, 'HXelovs Be vavs re Keva? 


BOOK I. xxvi. 3-xxvii. 2 

invoking the tie of kinship had begged the Corcy- 
raeans to restore them. As the Epidamnians paid no 
heed to them the Corcyraeans proceeded against them 
with forty ships, accompanied by the exiles whom 
they intended to restore, and taking along the Il- 
ly rians also. And sitting down before the city they 
proclaimed that the foreigners and any Epidamnians 
who wished might go away in safety ; otherwise they 
would treat them as enemies. But when the Epidam- 
nians would not comply, the Corcyraeans laid siege to 
the city, which is connected with the shore by an 

XXV 1 1. But the Corinthians, when messengers 
came from Epidamnus announcing the siege, pre- 
pared an expedition and proclaimed at the same 
time a colony to Epidamnus, saying that any who 
wished might go there on a basis of equal rights for 
all, and that if anyone was not inclined to sail at 
once, j^ut wished to have part in the colony, he 
might make a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae l 
and remain at home. The number that sailed was 
large, as also of those who deposited the money. 
Request was also made of the Megarians to convoy 
them with ships, in case an attempt should be made 
by the Corcyraeans to prevent their sailing; and 
these were preparing to accompany them with eight 
ships, and the Paleans, from Cephallenia, with four. 
The Epidaurians, of whom a like request was made, 
furnished five ships, the Hermionians one, the Troe- 
zenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots 
eight. Upon the Thebans and the Phliasians a 
demand was made for money, and upon the Eleans 

1 The Corinthian drachma was about equivalent to 6d., 
but of course had greater purchasing power. The Attic 
drachma = 9£ii. 



Kal xptj/jLara. avrcov Be KopivOlcov vrje<; irapt- 
<T/cevd£ovTO Tpidtcovra Kal rpLaj^LXiOc ottXltcli,. 

XXVIII. y ~E7reiBr) Be iirvdovro oi Kep/cvpaloi 
rrjv irapaax€Vi]V, iXdovres e? KopLvOov /lerd 
AafceBaijjLOVLcov Kal ^ikvcovlcdv irpeajSewv, ou? 
TTape\a(3ov, iKeXevov KopivOlov? toix; iv 'EiriBd- 
jjbvw <ppovpov<; re Kal oiKijropas dirdyeiv, o>? ov 
w 2 fierbv avrols 'EiriBdfivov. el Be tl avTiiroiovvTai, 
BiKas rjOeXov Bovvai iv TLeXoTrovv^aoj irapa tto- 
Xecriv al? av dfifyorepoi, tjvp,/3(ocnv OTrorepcov B' 
dv BiKaaOfj elvai rrjv diroiKiav, tovtovs Kparecv 
■qdeXov Be Kal tw iv AeXcpols fiavrelcp eiriTpfyai. 

3 TroXepov Be ovk etwv iroielv el Be fir), Kal avrol 
dvayKacr6?]crecr0ai ecfraaav, JKeivwv fiia^opevcov, 
(piXovs TTOLeladai ov<; ov /3ovXovTat, erepovs rcov 

4 vvv ovtwv fiaXXov, uxpeXla^ eveKa. ol Be Kopiv- 
Oioi direKpivavTO avrols, tjv rd<; re vavs Kal tovs 
fiapfidpovs cltto ^TTiBdfjLVov dirjaydycocn, ftovXev- 
aeadar irporepov S' ov tfa\<w? ^X eLV T0V< * ^ ev 

5 TToXiopKelcrdai, eavrov<; Be BiKa£ea9ai. KepKv- 
paloi Be dvreXeyov, rjv Kal iKetvoc toi>? iv 'ETriBd- 
pLV(p ditaydywcri, Troirjaeiv ravra' erolpboi Be 
elvau Kal coare d/Mporepovs fieveiv Kara yj&pav 
GTTovBds Be 1 TToitjaaaOat ecu? av rj Blkt] yevrjrai. 

1 Hude deletes 8e, after Poppo. 

1 A threat of an alliance with the Athenians, ruv vvv 
tvTwv referring to the Lacedaemonians and other Pelopon- 
nesians, not to the Illyrians (cf. ch. xxvi. 7), as Poppo 


BOOK I. xxvii. 2-xxviii. 5 

for unma nned sh ips as well as for money. And the 
Corinthians themselves, for their part, made ready 
thirty ships and three thousand hoplites. 

XXVIII. When the Corcyraeans learned of these 
preparations they went to Corinth, with Lacedae- 
monian and Sicyonian envoys whom they took with 
them, and bade the Corinthians withdraw the gar- 
rison and settlers at Epidamnus, on the ground that 
they had no part in Epidamnus. But if they made any 
claim to it they were willing, they said, to submit the 
matter for arbitration to any states in the Pelopon- 
nesus that both should agree upon, and to whichever 
party the colony should be adjudged to belong, these 
should have it ; and they were willing also to submit 
the matter to the oracle at Delphi. War, however, 
they warned them not to bring on ; but if it must be, 
they too would be compelled, if the Corinthians forced 
the issue, to make friends with those for whom they 
had no wish, others beyond their present ones, in order 
to secure assistance. 1 The Corinthians answered that 
if the Corcyraeans would withdraw their ships and 
the barbarians from Epidamnus they would consider 
the matter, but that meanwhile it was not proper 
for them 2 to be discussing arbitration while the 
Epidamnians were undergoing siege. Whereupon 
the Corcyraeans replied that they would do this if 
the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their 
forces at Epidamnus ; but they were also ready to 
arbitrate on condition that both parties should re- 
main where they were and that they should make a 
truce until the decision should be given. 8 

8 i.e. the envoys and the Corinthians. 

8 Or, omitting 5e, "that they were also ready to make a 
truce until the decision should be given, on condition that 
both parties should remain where they were." 

5 1 


XXIX. KoplvOioi Be ovBev rovrcov vtttJkovov, 
aX)C €7r€i&r] rrXrj^et^ avrols rjaav al vi)es Kal ol 
^v\Hxayoi rrap^aav, 7rp07re/iyjravre<; K^pvKa irpo- 
repov 7r6\e/iov irpoepovvra KepKvpalois, apavres 
6i3Sofii]KOvra vaval teal rrevre Blct^lXlol^ re ottXl- 
tcu? eirXeov eirl ri]V 'EttlScl/jlvov, KepKvpaiOLS 

2 evavrla iroXefirjaovre^' ear par i)yei Be rtov fiev 
vetov 'Apcarev^ 6 UeXXlxov Kal KaXXi/c parr) 9 
KaXXlov Kal Tifidvcop 6 Ti/idv6ov<;, rov Be ire^ov 
'A/j^eri/io? re 6 EvpvTifAOv Kal 'laapxlBas 6 

3 ^Gapyov. eweiS!] B' eyevovro ev 'Aktlw t?)? 
' AvaKTopLas 7779, ov ro lepov rov ' AiroXXcovos 
eariv, eirl rco arofiarc rov 'AfiTrpaxiKov ko^ttov, 
ol KepKvpaloc KijpvKa re rrpovire\x^fav avrols ev 
ciKaricp direpovvra /jlt) irXelv eirl cr<£av, /ecu t<z? 
vavs dfia errXrjpovv, feufaz^Te? re ra? TraXaias 
ojare irX tolji ovs elvai Kal t«? aXXa<; eirio~Keya- 

4 aavre^. go? Be 6 Krjpvt; re dir^yyetXev ovBev 
elp-qvalov rrapa rcov Kopiv0icov Kal al vf/es avrols 
e7re7rXi]po)i'TO ovaai 6yBor)Kovra (reaaapaKovra 
yap 'EiriSa/jLvov iiroXiopKOw), avravayayo/xevoL 

5 Kal Trapara^a/ievoi ivav/id^rjo-ap' Kal eviKtjaav 
ol KepKvpalou irapa ttoXv Kal vav<; rrevre Kal 
BeKa BtecpOetpav rcov Kopcvdlcov. rfj Se avrrj 
i)/xepa aurot? ^vvefiii Kal roix; ri)v ''KiriBafivov 
TToXiopKOvvTas irapaarrjcraaOaL 6/JioXoyia coo-re 
rov<; fxev eiTrjXvhas diroBooOai, Kopivdiovs Be 
Brjaavra^ eyeiv eco? av aXXo ri Bo^rj. 

XXX. Me-ra Be rijv vavp.ayiav ol KepKVpaloi 
rpoiralov o-ri')aavre<; eirl rfj AevKLfxvy rr)$ Kep- 
Kvpaias aKpcorrjpLco rov? fxev aXXov? ovs ekaftov 


BOOK I. xxix. i-xxx. i 

XXIX. The Corinthians, however, would not listen 
to any of these proposals, but, as soon as their ships 
were manned and their allies were at hand, they 

sent a herald in advance to declare war against the 434 b.o 
Corcyraeans ; then, setting off with seventy-five ships 
and two thousand hoplites, they sailed for Epidamnus 
to give battle to the Corcyraeans. Their ships were 
under the command of Aristeus son of Pellichus, 
Callicrates son of Callias, and Timanor son of Ti- 
manthes ; the infantry under that of Archetimus 
son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son of Isarchus. 
But when they reached Actium in the territory of 
Anactorium, where is the sanctuary of Apollo at the 
mouth of the Ambracian gulf, the Corcyraeans sent 
out a herald in a small boat to forbid their advance, 
and at the same time proceeded to man their ships, 
having previously strengthened the old vessels with 
cross-beams so as to make them seaworthy, and 
having put the rest in repair. When *tKeir herald 
brought back no message of peace from the Corin- 
thians and their ships were now fully manned, being 
eighty in number (for forty were besieging Epidam- 
nus), they sailed out against the enemy and, dra win g 
up in line, engaged in battle ; and they won a 
complete" victory and destroyed fifteen ships of the 
Corinthians. On the same day it happened that 
their troops which were engaged in the siege of 
Epidamnus forced it to a capitulation, on condition 
that the other immigrants 1 should be sold into 
slavery but the Corinthians kept in bonds until 
something else should be agreed upon. 

XXX. After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans set up 
a trophy of their victory at Leucimne, a promontory 
in the territory of Corcyra, and put to death the 

1 i.e. the Ambraciots and Leucadians ; cf. ch. xxvi. 1. 



al\i.ta\corov^ direfcreLvav, Kopivdiovs Be Brjcravre^ 

2 el^ov. varepov Be, €7T€lBt] ol Koplvdioi Kal ol 
^vfjLfxa^OL rjaarj/xevoL raU vavalv dve^coprjaav eir 
oI'kov, tt}? Qa\daar\<; drrdar]^ ifcpdrovv tt}? K Kar 
i/ceiva rd ywpla } ol K.epKvpaioi, teal TrXevaavres 
e? AevKaBa rrjv Kopivdlcov drroiKiav rr}<; 7779 ere- 
fiov Kal KvXkrfvrjv to 'HXelcov eitlveiov eveirprjaav, 

3 on vavs Kal ^prj/jbara rrapeayov KopivOlois. rod 
re yjibvov rbv nXelarov fxerd rr\v vavpaylav 
eiretcpdrovv ttjs BaXdaarjs kcu tovs tcov Kopiv- 

OiCOV ^Vfl/ld^OV^ e7wr\eovre<; €(j)0€LpOVj/JL6Xpt, ov 

Kopivdiot, irepiovrt tw d epei irefi'^ravre<; vavs teal 
arpandv, eirel acpcov ol ^ufifia^oL eirovpvv, earpa- 
roireBevovTo eVl 'Aktico Kal irepl to Xeifiepcov 
rf)<; ©eairpcorlBo^, cpv\aKr)<; eveica tt}? re AevKaBos 
koX rcov dWcov rroXecov oaai acf>lai <f)LXiai rjaav. 

A dvrearparoireBevovro Be kcu ol KepKvpalot eVt 
rfj AevKL/jLi>T) vaval re kcu ire^co. eireiTXeov re 
ov&erepoi dXXijXois, d\Xa rb Oepos rovro avri- 
KaOe^o/ievoL ^eipicbvo^ rjBrj dveyjjdpr\aav en oikou 

XXXI. Tbv Be evtavrbv irdvra rbv p,erd rr)v 
vavjia^iav Kal rbv varepov ol Y^oplvdioi opyy 
cpepovres rbv irpbs KepKvpaiovs rroXe/xov evawiTT)- 
yovvro Kal it apecr Kevd^ovro rd Kpdriara vecov 
aroXov, €K re avrr}<; TleXoirovvrjaov dyeipovres 
Kal t?}? dXXrjs 'EWuSo? eperas /jLiaOw ireiOovres. 

2 TTVvdavopevot, Be ol KepKvpaiot. rrjv irapaaKevrjv 
avrcov e<f)o/3ovvro, Kal (rjaav yap ovBevb? 'EXXrj- 


BOOK I. xxx. i-xxxi. 2 

prisoners they had taken, with the exception of the 
Corinthians, whom they kept in fetters. But after- 
wards, when the Corinthians and their allies had 
gone back home with their ships after their defeat, 
the Corcyraeans were masters of the whole seajji 
that quarter, and sailing to Leucas, the colony of the 
Corinthians, they ravaged the country and burned 
Cyllene, the naval arsenal of the Eleans, because they 
had furnished ships and money to the Corinthians. 
And so for most of the time after the sea-fight they 
had control over the sea ; and sailing against the 
allies of the Corinthians they kept harrying them, 
until the Corinthians, as the summer was drawing 
to an end, 1 seeing that their allies were suffering, 
sent ships and an army and encamped at Actium 
and near the promontory of Cheinierium in Thes- 
protis, as a protection for Leucas and the other 
cities that were friendly to themselves. And the 
Corcyraeans encamped on the opposite coast at Leu- 
cimne with both ships and infantry. Neither side 
sailed against the other, but they faced each other 
for the rest of this summer ; it was not until winter 
had come that they each went back home. 

XXXI. During the whole year after the sea-fight 
and the next year the Corinthians, being angrily in- 
dignant about their war with the Corcyraeans, kept 
building ships and preparing a naval armament with 
all their might, and collected oarsmen from both 
the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas by the in- 
ducement of pay. The Corcyraeans, on the other 
hand, were alarmed when they learned of their pre- 
parations, and since they were without an ally among 

1 ireptSvTi (as the MSS. read) = TV€pu6vri. But Ullrich 
{Beitr. z. Kr. iii. p. 5) explains = lv r<$ irepi6vTi rov Bipovs, 
"in what remained of the summer." So Boehme. 



vcov evarrovhot ovhe ecreypd^avro eavrov<; ovre e? 
Ta? ' AQ^vaLcov cnrovhds ovre e? Ta? Aateehat- 
/jlovlcov) eho^ev avrols eXOovcriv &>? rov$ AOrjvai- 
ou? ^v/j,/ud^ov<; yevecQai teal chcpeXlav rivd rreipd- 

3 aOai an' avrcov evptatceaOaL. oi he Kopivdioi 
TTv66p,evoi ravra rjX6ov teal avrol e'9 Ta? 'AOrjvas 
irpeafievGOfxevoi, oVa)? /irj acj>icn irpos rco Ke/9- 
Kvpaicov vavriteco teal rb avrcov rrpocryevbpevov 
i/jLTTo&iov yevnrai OeaOai rbv iroXepov y ftov- 

4 Xovrai. Karaardarj^ he eteteXrjcria*; e? avriXoyiav 
r/XOov. teal oi puev Keptevpaloi e\e%av roidheJ 

XXXII. " Aiteaiov, ai 'Adrjvaloi, tou? fitjre 
evepyeaia<; fieydXr}^ [n']Te ^vfifMa^ia^ 7rpovcpeiXo- 
ixevrj^ jjtcovras irapd rovs ireXas emteovpia*;, cocr- 
rrep teal rjfiels vvv, her)crop.evov<; dvahihd^ai irpco- 
tov, pdXiara fiev &)? teal £vp,cf)opa heovrai, el he 
fjL7], oil ye ovte enri^pua, erreira he ax? teal rrjv 
\dpiv fieftaiov e^ovaiv el he rovrcov p,7jhev cratch 

2 tear acm] a overt, fjut} opyi^ecrOaL rjv aTvywcnv. Kep- 
Kvpaloi he fxerd rrjs %viipayia<; rr)<; alrrjcrecos teal 
ravra marevovre^ exvpd vpZv Trape£eo~6ai dire- 

3 aretXav 77/xa?. reri>xv Ke &£ T0 avrb iircrijhev/Ma 
7rpo? re vfi&s 69 ttjv XP eiav W*^' dXoyov teal e\ 
rd ijperepa avrcov ev rco rr-apovri d^vp,cj)opov. 

4 fu/x/za^ot re yap ovhevos irco ev rco rrpb rov 
eteovcrioi yevojxevoi vvv aXXcov rovro herjo~6p,evoi 
yjteo/jLev, teal dfia e? rbv rrapovra iroXe/iov Koptv- 
Olcov eprjfiot hi avrb KaOe.o-rap.ev. teal rrepie- 
arrjKev 1) hoteovaa tj/jlcov rrpbrepov acoeppocrvvrj, to 


BOOK I. xxxi. 2-xxxn. 4 

the Hellenes and had not enrolled themselves in 
the alliance either of the Athenians or of the Lace- 
daemonians, they decided to go to the Athenians, 
become their allies, and try to procure some aid 
from them. But the Corinthians also, hearing of 
this, themselves sent envoys to Athens to prevent 
the accession of the Athenian fleet to that of the 
Corcyraeans, as this would hamper them in settling 
the war as they wished. And when an assembly «8ar 
was held opposing speeches were made, and the 
Corcyraeans spoke as follows : 

XXXII. "It is but fair, citizens of Athens, that 
those who, without any previous claim on the score 
of important service rendered or of an existing al- 
liance, come to their neighbours to ask aid, as we 
do now, should show in the first place, if possible, 
that what they ask is advantageous, or at least that 
it is not hurtful, and, in the second place, that their 
gratitude can be depended on; but in case they 
establish neither of these things clearly, they should 
not be angry if unsuccessful. Now the Corcyraeans 
have sent us to ask for an alliance, and in full con- 
fidence that they will be able to give you guarantees 
on just these points. But it so happens tHaVour 
policy has been at one and the same time incon- 
sistent, as it must seem to you, with our petition, 
and is also disadvantageous under present circum- 
stances to ourselves ; for although heretofore we 
have freely chosen to be allies of no one, we have 
now come to ask others for an alliance, and at the 
same time, in the face of the present war with the 
Corinthians, we are, because of this very policy, 
isolated. And so what was formerly fondly imagined 
to be wise discretion on our part — to enter into no 



fjL-q ev aXXorpla %vppayia rfj rov ireXas yvoo/ir] 
^vytewBvveveiv, vvv aftovXia teal dadeveia <bai- 

5 vopevrj. t^ pev ovv yevopuevrjv vavp,a%lav avrol 
teard povas aureus a aped a KopivOiov;' eireiBri Be 
puei^ovi irapaateevfj airo YleXoTcovvrjcrov teal tt)? 
aXXrj<; 'EWaSo? e^' T^aa? wpprjvrai teal rjpels 
ahvvcLTOL opwpev ovre? ry oiiceLa povov Bvvdpuei 
irepLyeveaOai, teal dpa peya<; telvBvvos, €l eo~6- 
pCeOa V7T avrois, dvdyterj teal vp,wv teal aXXov 
iravTO? eiriKOVpias BelaOai, teal %vyyvd)p,r), el prj 
perd tea/etas, So £779 Be pdXXov dfiapria rfj rrpo- 
repov airpaypLoavvr] evavrla roXpcopiev. 

XXXIII. " TevTJaerai Be vplv TTeiBopuevoi^ 
KaXr) 7] ^WTV^la Kara rroXXa tt}<? r)perepa<; 
^peia^;, irpwrov p,ev on dBiteovpevoi<; teal ov% 
erepovs fiXdirrovat, rrjv eiriteovpiav TroirjaeaOe, 
eireLTa irepl rosv peylarcov teLvBvvevovras Be%d- 
pevoi a)? av pdXiara per aleipvqaTov puaprvpiov 
T7)v \dpiv KaraOrjaeade, vavriteov re teetcrr/petta 

2 ttXtjv rov Trap 1 vplv irXelarov. teal aiee-^raade 
Tt? evirpa^ia airavLcorepa 17 Tt? Tot? TroXepioL? 
Xvirriporepa, el rjv vpeU av irpb ttoXXcjv ^prjpd- 
rtov teal %dpiTO<; erip^aaade Bvvapiv vplv irpocr- 
yevecrOai, avrrj irdpeariv avTeTrdyyeXros, dvev 
teivBuvcov teal BaTrdvr)? BcBovaa eavrrjv teal irpoa-- 
€TL (pepovaa e'9 pev tou? ttoXXovs dperr/v, oh Be 
eirapwelre ydpiv, vplv V auTot? layyv a iv t&J 


BOOK I. xxxii. 4-xxxiii. 2 

foreign alliance, with the possibility of having to 
take our share of the danger of our neighbour's 
policy — has now, in the event, proved want of 
wisdom and a source of weakness. It is true that, 
in the sea-fight we have had, we repulsed the Co- 
rinthians single-handed ; but now that they have set 
out to attack us with a greater force, drawn from the 
Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, and we see 
that we are unable to prevail with our own strength 
alone, and since, further, our peril will be serious if 
we come into their power, we are constrained to ask 
help of you and of everyone else ; and it is pardon- 
able if we now, actuated by no baseness, but rather 
acknowledging an error of judgment, venture upon 
a course that runs counter to our former policy of 
avoiding foreign entanglements. 

XXXIII. " For yourselves, if you concede what we 
ask, by a happy concurrence of events Athens can 
get both honour and advantage in many ways : first, 
you will be giving your aid to those who are wronged 
and not to those who injure others ; next, by taking 
into alliance men whose most vital interests are at 
stake, you will lay up for yourselves a claim for grati- 
tude with a record which will abide in our memories 
for ever ; and, lastly, we have a navy greater than any 
but your own. Think of it now, what good fortune 
could be rarer, more vexatious to your foes, than 
this — that the power which you would have ac- 
counted it worth much money and gratitude to 
acquire should become yours unbidden, offering itselt 
to you without danger or expense, and bringing you, 
besides, a good name before the world, gratitude 
from those avIio are to receive your help, and en- 
hanced strength for yourselves? To few in all 



iravrl ypovco oXiyois Brj dfia irdvra £vi>e/3r}, Kal 
oXiyoL ^vpLfiayia^ BeofievoL ol? eTUKakovvraL 
dcrcbdXeiav Kal koo-/xov ovy r t aaov hihovres r) 
\7]\jr6fi€VOL irapayiyvovrai. 

3 "Tov 8e TToXefiov, Sl ovirep y^prjaifJiOL av eljiev, 
el tis bjxoiv /at) ol'erai ecrecrOai, yvcoprj^ dpaprdvei 
Kal ovk aio-Odvercu tou? AaKeZaLpovLovs <$>6(B<o 
t<m vperepw TroXepLrjcreiovTas Kal tou? Kopiv- 
OLovs, 8vvajjL€vov<; Trap' avrois Kal vplv e^Opoi)^ 
ovras, 1 7rpoKaTa\a/j,/3dvovTa<? 77/xa? vvv e? ttjv 
vjjLerepav eirLyeip^cnv, 'Iva fir) tw kolvw e^Oec 
Kar avrov<z fier dXXrjXcov arwp.ev fir)Se Svolv 
(f)0dcraL d/jLaprcocTLV, r) KaKwaat i)fxa<$ rj a(pd<; av- 

4 tovs /3e/3aid)(racrdai. rj/xerepov Be y av epyov 
irporeprjaai, twv fiev SiSovtcov, v/jlcov Se Sefa/^e- 
vcov rrjv %v ^aylav ; Kal TrpoeinfiovXeveiv avrols 
/xaXXov r) dvTeTTtfiovXeveLv . 

XXXIV. "*Hi> Se Xeywaiv co? ov BiKaiov rovs 
cr<f)€Tepovs aTTOLKOvs u/xd? SeyeaOat, fiaOovrcov 
co? irdaa diroiKia ev puev irda^ovaa rifia rrjv 
fir)Tpo7ro\ip, dhiKOvpevr) he dXXorpiovrar ov yap 
eirl ru> SovXoi, a\V eirl rw 6/jloIol to£<? Xear pie- 

2 vols elvai eKirepirovTai. a>? he t/Slkovv cra^e? 
eo~TLV TrpoKkrjOevTes yap irepl ^TTihdpvov e? 
Kp'iGiv 7ro\e/j,(p fJbdWov r) tw iaa) e/3ov^ rjdrjaav tcl 

3 eyKXrjpara pLereXOelv. Kal vplv earto ti reKixr)- 

1 Kai, before irpoKaTaXafx^avovTas in the MSS., deleted by 

1 This allegation is denied in the speech of the Corinthians, 
ch. xli. 1. 

2 Or, retaining Kai before irpoKaTaKa/uL&avovTax, "and fails 
to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, 


BOOK I. xxxm. 2-xxxiv. 3 

history have such opportunities fallen all at the 
same time, and few are they who, when they beg for 
an alliance, come offering to those to whom they 
make their appeal as large a degree of security and 
honour as they expect to receive. 

" Now as to the war which would give us occasion 
to be of service, if anyone of you thinks it will not 
occur he errs in judgment, and fails to perceive that 
the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are eager 
for war, and that the Corinthians, who have great 
influence with them and are enemies of yours, 1 are 
making a beginning with us now 2 with a view to a 
subsequent attack upon you, in order that we may 
not be led by our common hatred to take our stand 
together against them, and that they may not fail, 
before we unite, to attain their two objects — to 
harm us and to strengthen themselves. It is our 
business, on the other hand, to get the start of 
them — m& offering and your accepting the alliance 
— and to forestall their schemes rather than to 
counteract them. 

XXXIV. " But if they say that it is not right for 
you to receive their colonists, let them know that 
while every colony honours the mother-city so long 
as it is well treated, yet that if wronged it becomes 
alienated ; for colonists are not sent out to be slaves 
to those who are left behind, but to be their equals. 
And that they were in the wrong is manifest ; for 
when challenged to arbitrate the case of Epidamnus 
they preferred to prosecute their charges by war 
rather than by equity. And let their present treat- 
are eager for war, and that the Corinthians have great in- 
fluence with them and are enemies of yours, and are making 
a beginning with us with a view to a subsequent attack upon 
you ..." 



piov a 7T/00? r)fia<; rovs fjvyyevels Bpcoeiv, ghtt€ 
aTTary re fir) irapdyeadai vir avrcov Beofievois re 
ete rod ev6eo<; fir) virovpyelv 6 yap eXaxlcnas Ta? 
fierafieXeias ete rod yapi^eaQai roU evavriois 
Xafifidvwv da(f)a\e(TTaTO<; av BiareXoLr). 

XXXV. " Avaere Be ovBe rd<; AateeBaifiovLoov 
airovBds Bexofievoi r)fia<; /irjBerepcov ovras gvfifid- 

2 %ou9. etprjrai yap iv avrals, tcov 'FiXXrjviBoov 
iroXecov tJtls fx-qBafiov ^vfifiayel, igeivai Trap* 

3 OTToripovs av dpeate^rat, eXOelv. teal Beivbv el 
rolaBe {lev airo re reov evcnrovBwv carat irXrjpovv 
ra? vav<i teal irpoaeri teal ite tt)<; aXXr)? 'EAAaSo? 
teal ov% rjfCKTTa airo rcov vfierepcov virrj/eocov, r)fias 
Be airo t% irpoKeifievr)^ re %VfifiayLa<$ etpgovcrt, 
teal airo tt}9 aXXodev iroQev axfieXias, elra 1 iv 
dBiterjfiarL 6i]<jovrai ireiaOevTwv vficov a BeofieOa^ 

4 ttoXv Be iv irXeiovi alria rjfiels fir) ireiaavre^ 
bfids e^ofiev r)iid<; fikv yap teivBvvevovras teal ovte 
e^Opovs 6Wa? dircoaeaOe, rcovBe Be ov% oirax; 
tecoXvral i^Opwv ovrcov teal iiriovrcov yevrfcreaOe, 
dXXa real airo rrj<; vfierepas cip^r)^ Bvvafiiv irpoa- 
Xaftelv 7repio^ea0e' y)v ov Bitcaiov, dXX 1 r) tedteei- 
vcov tewXveiv tou? ere rrj<; vfierepas fiicrdo(f)6pov^ rj 
zeal r)iuv irefiireiv teaO' 6 re av 7reLcr0r)re axfreXiav 
fidXtara Be airo rod irpotyavovs Be^afievov; j3orj- 

5 6elv. iroXXa Be, wairep iv dp\fj vireiirofiev, ra 
%vti(f)€povTa aTToBeiKvufiev, teal fieyiarov on oi re 

1 With the MSS. ; Kruger conjectures eJf re, followed by 


BOOK I. xxxiv. 3-xxxv. 5 

ment of us, who are their kinsmen, be a warning to 
you, that you be not misled by their deceit, or, if 
they seek aid from you directly, that you may refuse 
it. For whoever finds fewest occasions to regret 
doing favours to his opponents will ever remain 
most secure. 

XXXV. " Neither will you be breaking your treaty 
with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, who are 
allies of neither party. For in this treaty it is stipu- 
lated that if any of the Hellenic cities is a member 
of no alliance, it is at liberty to join whichever side it 
pleases. And it is monstrous if they are to be al- 
lowed to recruit their navy, not only from their own 
allies, but also from the rest of Hellas besides, and 
particularly from your subjects, but are to debar us 
from the alliance that should naturally be open to us 
as well as from aid from any other quarter, and then 
shall count it a crime if you are persuaded to con- 
cede what we ask. Far more shall we hold you at 
fault if we fail to win your consent ; for you will be 
repulsing us who are in peril and are not your enemies, 
while as regards these men, who are enemies and ag- 
gressors, you will not only not be thwarting them, 
but will even be allowing them to get fresh forces 
from your own dominions. To that they have no 
right ; but it is right that you should either prevent 
them from raising mercenaries in places under your 
control, or else send aid to us also, on whatever 
terms you may be induced to make ; but it would be 
best of all for you openly to receive and help us. 
And many, as we suggested at the outset, 1 are the 
advantages which we can show you, and the most 
important of all is this, that the enemies of both of 

1 Ch. xixiii. X. 



avTol TroXe/jLioL rj/itv rjaav (oirep cra^eardrrj 
tticttis) Kal ovtol ovk dadevels, dXX Itcavol tovs 
fieraardvra^ fiXdyjrai. Kal vavTi/crjs real ovk 
rjiretpcoTiBos tt}? ^vpujiaylas BcBo/jLem^ ovx ofioia 
7) dWorpLcoais, dXXa /idXiaTa fiev, el BvvaaOe, 
lATjheva aXXov eav KeKTijaOaL ray?, el Be firj, 
ogtis i)(vpa)TaTO<;, tovtov (fiuXov eyeiv. 

XXXVI. " Kal otw rdhe ^v/xepepovra fiev BoKel 
XeyecrOai, <po/3elrai Be /jltj Bi avrd ireiOofievos tcls 
airovBds Xvarj, yvooTco to fiev BeBihs avrov Icr^vv 
eyov tovs evavTiovs fidXXov §o$r\Gov y to Be 6ap- 
aovv pL7) Be^afievov daOeves ov irpos la^vovTas 
tou? i%0povs dBeeaTepov eaofievov, Kal djia ov 
Trepl T7J9 KepKvpas vvv to irXeov rj Kal tcov 'AOrj- 
vtov fiovXevofievos, Kal ov tcl KpaTiaTa avTais 
irpovocov, oTav e? tov fieXXovTa Kal oaov ov 
irapovTa iroXe/jLOV to avTiKa irepiaKOTrcov iv- 
Bo'.d^rj yuiplov irpocrXaBelv o /xeTa /jbeylaTcov 
2 Kaiptov olfceiovTal Te Kal iroXe/jiovTai^ tt)<; re 
yap 'iTaXta? Kal ^iKeXias KaXcos irapdirXov 
KCLTai, coaTe firjTe eKeWev vavTiKov edaai IleXo- 
nowr) viols eireXdelv to T€ evTevdev irpos tukcl 
irapaTrejji^raii Kal e? TaXXa ^vficpopcoTaTov eaTiv. 

1 So ^oav seems to mean here, where elai was to be ex- 
pected ; cf. ch. xxxiii. 3. 

2 h(1 or Zu/Atiepei seems to be implied. 

* The thirty-years' truce with Sparta ; cf. oh. xxiii. 4. 


BOOK I. xxxv. 5— xxxvi. 2 

us are, as we see, 1 the same — which is the surest 
guarantee of fidelity — and these are not weak, but 
able to injure those who withdraw from them. And 
furthermore, when the alliance that is offered is with 
a maritime and not with a continental power, the 
alienation of such an ally is not a matter of indif- 
ference ; on the contrary, you should * 2 by all means, 
if possible, permit no one else to possess ships ; but 
if that is impossible, you should have as your friend 
him who is strongest therein. 

XXXVI. " If anyone thinks that this course is in- 
deed expedient, but fears that if he yields to this con- 
sideration he will be breaking off the truce, 3 he should 
understand that his fear, if backed by strength, will 
make his enemies more afraid ; 4 whereas, if he re- 
ject our alliance, his confidence 5 will be unsupported 
by might and will therefore be less formidable against 
enemies that are strong. He should understand, 
furthermore, that he is deliberating upon the in- 
terests, not so much of Corcyra, as of Athens, and 
that he is not making the best provision for her 
when, in the face of the war that is impending and 
all but present, he hesitates, through cautious con- 
sideration of the immediate chances, to attach to 
himself a country which is not made a friend or a 
foe except with the most momentous consequences. 
For Corcyra is favourably situated for a coasting 
voyage either to Italy or Sicily, 6 so that you could 
prevent a fleet from coming thence to join the Pelo- 
ponnesians, or could convoy thither a fleet from here; 
and in other respects it is a most advantageous 

* i.e. of themselves breaking the truce. 

5 i.e. in the security of the truce. 

6 Ancient mariners preferred to hug the coast rather than 
sail through the open sea. 



3 ftpa^vTCLTM 8' av KefyaXa'up, to£? re ^vpuraat teal 
fcaO' e/cao-Tov, two" av /xr; TrpoeaOai 77/xa? /jbdOoire' 
rpla /lev ovra Xoyov d^ia tch? e 'EXXr)cri vavritcd, 
to Trap* v/ilv Ka\ to rj/jbirepov Kal to Kopivdlcov 
rovrcov Be el irepioyjreaOe ra Bvo e? ravrbv eXOelv 
real KoplvOtoc rj/JLa? irpoKaTaX^ovTaL, Kep/cv- 
paiois re Kal UeXoTTovvyjcrLois a/ia vavfia^aere' 
Be^dpLevot, Be ?^aa? egere 77750? avrovs TrXeiocri 
vaval Tat? rj/Aerepai? dycDvi^ecrOai" 

4 Tolclvtcl /xev 01 Kep/cvpaloi elirov ol Be Kopiv- 
Olol /jl6t avTovs roidBe. 

XXXVII. " 'Avayfcalov Kep/cvpaicov rcbvBe ov 
fjbovov nrepl rov Be^aaOai crc£a? rov Xoyov Troirjcra- 
fievcov, aU' go? koI r)fi€i<; re dBiKov p^ev Kal avrol 

OVK 6tVoT&)? TToXe/ULOVVTdL, iivrjo-Oevras TTpOdTOV Kal 
77/ia? rrepl d/Kporepcov ovrco Kal eirl rov aXXov 
Xoyov levai, Xva rrjv d(j) rjpucov re dfjiGOcriv dacf>a- 
Xearepov TrpoetBrjre Kal rrjv rcovBe ^peiav fit) 
aXoyLcrroos dircoarjaOe. 

2 " ^>acrt Be ^vp/jLa^lav Blcl to aa)(ppov ovBevos 
7Tco Be^aadar to B" eirl KaKOvpyla Kal ovk apery 
eTrerrjBevo-av, ^yppuayov T€ ovBeva /3ovX6fievoL 
7roo? rdBcKijpara oure 1 /xaprupa k\eiv ovBe irapa- 

3 KaXovvres aivxyvecdai, Kal rj ttoXls avrcov djia 
avrdpKrj Oecriv Ketfxevrj Trapeyei, avrovs BiKaaras 
oiv fiXdiTTOval riva fiaXXov rj Kara %vvdr)Ka<; 

1 For ovSe of the MSS., Dobree's conjecture. Hude reads 

oi'Se . . . ovb«. 


BOOK I. xxxvi. 3-xxxvn. 3 

place. And by one briefest concluding word, which 
embraces both the whole issue and all separate facts, 
you will be convinced that you should not abandon 
us : The Hellenes have only three fleets that are 
worthy of mention, yours, ours, and that of the 
Corinthians ; if, now, the Corinthians shall seize us 
first and you thus let two of these fleets become 
united, you will have to fight on the sea against 
both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians at once ; but 
if you accept us, you will be able to contend 
against them with your navy augmented by our 

Thus spoke the Corcyraeans, and after them the 
Corinthians as follows : 

XXXVII. "Since these Corcyraeans have not con- J., 
fined themselves to the question of their admission 
into your alliance, but have gone further and urged 
that we are the wrong-doers and they are unfairly 
attacked, we too must of necessity touch upon both 
these points before we proceed to our general argu- 
ment, in order that you may be more definitely 
forewarned of the nature of the demand we have 
to make, and may have good grounds for rejecting 
their petition. 

"They say that 'a. wise discretion* has hitherto 
kept them from accepting an alliance with anyone ; 
but the fact is that they adopted this policy with a 
view to villainy and not from virtuous motives, and 
because they wished in their misdeeds not to have 
any ally as witness, or to be put to shame if they 
invited his presence. Moreover, the insular and in- 
dependent position of this state causes them to be 
arbitrary judges of the injuries they do to others 
instead of being judges appointed by mutual agree- 



yiyveaOai, Bid rb rj/ciara eirl tou? ireXa? e/crrXe- 
ovras fMciXiara tovs aXXov? dvdyfcrj Karaipovra*; 

4 Behead a i.\ tcai rovro to ev <tt penes dairovBov ov\ 
Xva fir) ^vvaBucwaiv erepots Trpo^e^X^vrac, ak\ y 
07T&)? Kara fiovas dBiKwav kclI oVa)? ev <w fiev av 
tcparcocn (Bid^wvraL, ov S' av XdOwai irXeov e^a)- 
aiv, rjv Be ttov tl TrpoXdfiwcriv dvaca^vvTwaiv 

5 KaiTOi el r/aav avBpes, coarrep cfjaaiv, dyaOol, Saw 
akrjTTTorepoL r/o~av to?? irekas, roaqy Be (fiavepw- 
repav etjrjv avrois rr)v dperrjv Bi&ovcri koX Beyp- 
fievois rd BUaia Beucvvvai. 

XXXVIII. " 'A\V ovre iTpb<; tou? aXXov? ovre 
e? r)fia<$ roiolBe elaiv, clttoikol 6" ovres dcpeardal 
re Sid rravrbs Koi vvv iroXefiova l, Xeyovre? tt)? 

2 ovk eirl rq> fca/ccos irdayeiv etcnejx^Oelev. rjfiels 
Be ovB' avroi (fia/mev eVt tw .vtto rovrcov vftpl^e- 
gOcll KaroLKucraL, a\V eirl tw rjye/uLoves re elvat, 

3 koX rd el/cora 6avfid^ea6at. al yovv aXXai 
divoiKiai TLfjiwcriv r)/ids fcal fidXiara virb uttolkcov 

4 arepyofieOa' real BrjXov on, el to?? irXeocnv dpe- 
a/covTes iafiev, Tolao* av fiovois ovk opdax; dirape- 
o-fcoi/jiev, ovB J emar par evo fiev efcrrpeircos fir) real 

D BiacpepovTco? ri dBiKovfievoi. KaXbv $ r)v, el teal 
rjfiaprdvofiev, roicr&e fiev el%at rfj r)fierepa opyrj, 
r)filv Be alo~xpbv /3t,do~ao-6ai rr)v rovrcov fierpi- 

BOOK I. xxxvii. 3-xxxvm. 5 

ment; owing to the fact that they resort very 
little to the ports of their neighbours, but to a 
very large extent receive into their ports others 
who are compelled to put in there. And mean- 
while they have used as a cloak their specious policy 
of avoiding alliances, adopted not in order to avoid 
joining others in wrong-doing, but that they may do 
wrong all alone ; that wherever they have power 
they may use violence, and wherever they can escape 
detection they may overreach someone ; and if, per- 
chance, they can steal a march on anyone, that they 
may brazen it out. And yet, if they were really honest 
men, as they pretend to be, the less liable they were 
to attack by their neighbours the more clearly they 
might have demonstrated their virtuous motives by 
offering and accepting proposals of arbitration. 

XXXVIII. "But neither toward others nor to- 
ward us have they shown themselves honest men ; on 
the contrary, although they are colonists of ours, they 
have constantly stood aloof from us, and now they 
are at war with us, claiming that they were not sent 
out to be ill treated. But neither did we colonize 
them to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders 
and to receive from them all due reverence. The 
rest of our colonies, at any rate, honour us, and 
by our colonists we are beloved more than is any 
other mother-city. And it is clear that, if we are 
acceptable to the majority, it cannot be on good 
grounds that we are unacceptable to these alone ; 
nor are we making war upon them in a way so 
unusual without being also signally wronged. And 
even if we were at fault, the honourable course for 
them would have been to make allowance for our 
temper, in which case it would have been shameful 



6 0T?/Ta* v{3pei Be Kal i^ovaia TrXovrov iroXXa e? 
fj/ias dXXa re rj/jLapTrjfcaai Kal ^rrLBafxvov rj/xere- 
pav ovaav KaKOv\xkvr\v fiev ov irpoaeiroiovvTO, 
eXOovrcov Be r]fJLO)v eirl rLjJLwpia eXovres ftia 

XXXIX. " Kal cfracrl Bt) Blktj irpbrepov ide- 
Xrjaac KpiveaOai, rjv ye ov rbv irpov^ovra Kai €fC 
rod acr(f)a\ov<; irpoKaXovfievov Xeyeiv ri Bokciv 
Bel, dXXa rbv e? icrov rd re epya ofioLcos Kal tou? 

2 Xoyovs irp\v Btaycovi^eaOai KaOiardvra. ovroi 
Be ov irplv iroXiopfcelv rb yoaplov, aA,V eireiBr) rjyrj- 
aavro ^yua? ov Trepio^jreo-dai, rore Kal rb evirpeTres 
r% BiKrjs rrapecryovr 0' Kal Bevpo tfKovcriv, ov 
raKel fiovov avrol dfiaprovres, dXXa Kal uyLta? 
vvv d^iovvre^ ov ^v/x/ia)^eLV, dXXa ^vvaBiKeiv Kal 

3 Biacpopow; ovras 7]/jllv Bexeadat er(/>a?- ou? yjpr\v t 
ore dacpaXecrraroL rjcrav, rore irpocrievaL, Kal fir] 
ev (h libels fiev rjBiKij/jieda, ovroi Be KivBvvevovai, 
firjB' ev w vfiels tj}<? re Bvvd/iecos avroiv rore ov 
/AeraXaj36vre<; rr}? ax^eXia? vvv /xeraBcoaere Kal 
ra)v dfiaprri/ndrcov diro yevo/xevoi t?;? a<£' rjfiwv 
alrLas rb Xaov e^ere, rrdXai Be Koivayaavras rr]v 
Bvvap.iv KOivd Kal rd diro(3aivovra e^e^. 1 

XL. " f f2? fxev ovv avrol re fierd TTpocrrjKovrayv 
eyKXrj/jidrcov ep^b/xeOa Kal o'iBe fiiaioi Kal irXeo- 

1 iyK\T)ixa.T<jov 8e /xovcov cl/j.€t6xovs ovtws rS>v fitra ras Trpd^ets 
tovtwv /x^i Koivuvelv, "As, however, you have had no share in 
the accusations, you should not share in the consequences." 
This clause is omitted by all good MSS. except G, and by all 
recent editors except Bloomfield. 


BOOK I. xxxviii. 5-xi,. 1 

for us to outrage their moderation ; but in the 
insolence and arrogance of wealth they have wronged 
us in many other ways, and particularly in the case 
of Epidamnus, our colony, which they made no claim 
to when it was in distress, but seized by force the 
moment we came to its relief, and continue to hold. 

XXXIX. " They pretend, forsooth, that they were 
the first to agree to an arbitration of the issue ; 
but surely it is not the proposals of the one who has 
the advantage, and occupies a safe position when he 
invites arbitration, that ought to have weight, but 
rather those of the one who has made his actions tally 
with his professions before appealing to arms. These 
men, however, bring forward their specious offer of a 
court of arbitration, not before laying siege to the 
place, but only after they had concluded that we 
would not permit it. And now, not satisfied with the 
blunders they have committed themselves at Epi- 
damnus, they have come here demanding that you 
too at this juncture, shall be, not their allies, but 
their accomplices in crime, and that you shall receive 
them, now that they are at variance with us. But 
they ought to have come to you when they were 
in no peril at all, and not at a time when we are 
victims of their injustice and they are consequently 
in danger, nor when you, without having had the 
benefit of their power before, will now have to give 
them a share of your aid, and, though you had nothing 
to do with their blunders, will have to bear an equal 
part of the blame we shall bestow. For only if you 
from the first had shared their power ought you to 
share the consequences also now of their acts. 

XL. " Now it has been clearly shown that we have 
come with proper grounds of complaint against 



veKTcci elal BeBrjXcorar co? Be ovk av BiKaiws 

2 clvtovs Be-^oiade fiaOelv XP 1 !' 6L 7<*p etprjTai ev 
tcu? cnrovBals, ifjeivai- irap birorepov^ rt? (3ov- 
Xerai rtov dypdcftoov iroXewv eXOelv, ov Tot? eirl 
/S\a/3?7 erepcov lovaiv r) %vvdr)icq eariv, dX\! 
oaris firj a\Xov eavjov airocnepoiv dcrtpaXela^ 
Becrac Kal octtls firj toIs Se^afievois, el aaxfipo- 
vovcri, rroXefiov avr elp>jvi]<; iroitjaef b vvv vfieis 

3 fir) ireiObfxevoi riplv irdOoire av. ov yap rolaBe 
fiovov eiriKovpoi av yevoiaBe, dXXa teal i)fiiv clvt\ 
evcnrovBcov TToXepbioi. avdy/ci] yap, el tre fier 

4 avrcov, Kal d/ivveaOai /x/; avev bfiow tovtovs. icai- 
tol BiKaiOL y eo~re fxaXiG-ra fiev IkitoBcov arrival 
dlMporepois, el Be fir], rovvavrlov eirl tovtovs fieO' 
r)/jLcov levai (yLopivdiois fiev ye evairovBoi iare, 
KepKvpaioi<; Be ovBe Bl avoKQ)%i}<; ttuhtot* eye- 
veade), Kal top vbfiov fir) KaOiardvai ware toi)? 

5 erepwv d^iarafiivov; Be^ecrdaL. ovBe yap r)fiels 
?Lafii(DV d-TToaravTcov y]rrj(f)ov irpoaeOefieOa evav- 
riav vfiiv, rtov aXXcov HeXo7rovvrjaiO)V Bi^a eyjrrj- 
(pLG-fiei'WV el xpr) auTot? dfivveiv, (f>avepco<; Be 
dvreiirofiev tou? TrpoatjicovTas lt;vfifidypv<$ avrov 

6 riva KoXd^etv. el yap tol>? Katcbv tl Bpcovras 
Bexb/ievoi TLficoprjaere, fyavel-rai Kal a twv vfiere- 

1 i.e. "who will permit peace to be maintained by their 
new friends if they exercise ordinary discretion." No new 
allies should be received who will render ordinary discretion 


BOOK I. xl. 1-6 

them and that they are violent and overreaching ; 
but you have still to learn that you haye no right to 
receive them into your alliance. For even though it 
is stipulated in the treaty that any unenrolled city 
may join whichever party it pleases, the provision is 
not intended for those who apply to one side for 
admission with a view to the injury of the other, 
but for any one who, without defrauding another 
state of his services, asks for protection, and any 
one who to those who received him will not — if 
they are prudent — bring war instead of peace. 1 
But this is precisely what will be your fate if you 
do not listen to us. For you will not merely be- 
come allies to them, but also enemies to us instead 
of being at truce with us. For it will be necessary 
for us, if you go with them, to include you when we 
proceed to take vengeance upon them. And yet the 
right course for you would be, preferably, to stand 
aloof from us both, — or else to go with us against 
them, remembering that you are under treaty with 
the Corinthians, but have never had with the 
Corcyraeans even an arrangement to refrain from 
hostilities for a time, — and not to establish the 
precedent of admitting into your alliance those who 
revolt from the other side. Why, when the Samians 2 
revolted from you, and the other Peloponnesians were 
divided in their votes on the question of aiding them, 
we on our part did not vote against you ; on the 
contrary, we openly maintained that each one should 
discipline his own allies without interference. If you 
receive and assist evil-doers, you will surely find that 

unavailing to prevent war, as the Corcyraeans are sure 
to do. 
2 440 B.C. c/. ch. cxv. 

VOL. I. i) '3 


pwv ovk eXaaaw i)plv irpoaetcn, kcu tov vofiov e<£' 
v/jllv avTois fiaXkov r) €(/>' rj/xlv Quaere. 

XLI. " kifccuaificLTa fiev ovv rdBe 77736? vfia$ 
eyop-ev, iKava Kara tou? 'RXXrfvcov vofiovs, rrapal- 
veaiv Be teal d^Lcoatv xapiros roidvBe, r)v ovk 
i^Opol 6We? coare /SXdirTeiv ovB' av (fiiXoc ojctt' 
e-TTi-^prjaOaL, dvriBoOqvai r)fjblv iv to> irapovri 

2 cfiafiev xprjvcu. vewv yap fiatpoov airavlaavre^; 

7TOT6 7T/SO? TOV AlyLV>]TCOV V7T€p TCL NrfBlKO, 1 

iroXefiov irapa K.opiv6l(ov e'lKoai vavs iXdj3ere' 
Koi t) evepyeaia avrrj re koX t) e? Xafilovs, to 
oV 77/xasr YleXoirovvrjaiovs avTols fii] fiorjOrfo-ai, 
irapea^ev vfilv AlyivrjTcov fiev €7riKpdTr)o~iv, 2a- 
/jllwv Be KoXaaiv, kcu, iv Ktupols toiovtols eyevero, 
0I5 fiaXiara av6 pMiroi eV e)(Q povs rov<; crcpere- 
povs lovres rcov aTrdvrwv direpioirroi elen irapa, 

3 to vlkclv fylXov re yap i)yovvrat rbv virovpyovvra, 

YjV KOI 7TpOT€pOV 6^^/009 f), IToXeflLOV T6 TOV UVTl- 

crrdvra, r)v kcu tv^JJ (piXos cov, iirel koi tci oUela 
*%eLpov TiOevrcu (fuXoviKias eveKa tj)s avrUa. 

XLII. "*£lv evOvfirjOevres kcll vetorepos rt? 

irapa irpeo-/3vT€pov avid fiaOoav d^tovTto Tot? 

Ofioiois rjfids dfivveaOai, kcl\ fir) vofilo~y BUaia 

fiev rdBe XeyeaOai, %vfi<f)opa Be, el iroXefitjaei, 

2 aXXa eivai. to re yap i;Vfi<pepov iv g5 av tj? 

1 virep t a M7j3iKa Kriiger deletes, followed by Hade. 

BOOK I. xl. 6-xui. 2 

full as many of your allies will come over to us, and 
the precedent you establish will be against yourselves 
rather than against us. 

XLI. " These, then, are the considerations of right 
which we urge upon you — and they are adequate ac- 
cording to the institutions of the Hellenes ; but we 
have also to remind you of a favour and to urge a 
claim based upon it ; and since we are not your 
enemies so as to want to injure you, nor yet your 
friends so that we could make use of you, we think 
this favour should be repaid us at the present time. 
It is this : when once, before the Persian war, you 
were deficient in battle-ships for the war you were 
waging with the Aeginetans, you borrowed twenty 
from the Corinthians. And this service and that we 
rendered in connection with the Samians — our pre- 
venting the Peloponnesians from aiding them — 
enabled you to prevail over the Aeginetans and to 
chastise the Samians. Both incidents happened, too, 
at a critical time, when men, engaged in assailing 
their enemies, are most indifferent to every con- 
sideration except victory, regarding any one who 
assists them as a friend, even if he was an enemy be- 
fore, and any one who stands in their way as an 
enemy, even if he happen to be a friend ; for thev 
even mismanage their Qwnmterests in the eager 
rivalry of the moment. r ^rwtfn n 

XLII. "Bearing these favours in mind — let everv 
young man here be told of them by one who is 
older — do you consider it your duty to requite us 
with the like. And do not think that this course 
is indeed equitable to urge in a speech, but that 
another course is advantageous if you come to war. 
For advantage is most likely to result when one 



iXd^Lara djiapTavr) i±dXio~Ta eirerat, /cat ro 
fiiWov rou TToXe/iov oj (froftovvres u/za? Kep/cv- 
paloi KeXevovaiv doiKelv ev dcfravel eri Kelrat^ icai 
ovk a%iov e-TTapOevTCLs avTw (pavepdv e\dpav rjBr] 
teal ov fieXXovaav Trpbs Kopivdiovs KTrjaaaOai, 
tt)? Be vTTapxovarjs irporepov Bid Meyapeas viro- 

3 -vja'a? aco(f)pov vcpeXeiv puaXXov (r) yap TeXevraia 
yapis Kaipov c^ovcra, tcav eXdaacov rj, BvvaTai 

4 p,el£ov eytcXTjfia Xvaai), /jajB' ort vavri/cov %v/j,- 
fiayiav /j.eydXr}v BiBoaai, tovto) efyeXfcecrOai' to 
yap fir) dBiKeiv rou? ofiolovs ixvp^Tepa Bvvafiis r) 
tco avTLKa (pavepco eirapOevTas Sid kivBtjvwv to 
TrXeov exeiv. 

XLIII. " 'HfieU Be it € pLTreir too /cores oh ev rfj 
Aa/ceBaifiovi aurol irpoeiirofiev, tovs acperepov^ 
gv/JLfjidxovs avjov riva KoXd^eiv, vvv irap vfitov 
to avTO d^iovfiev KOfii^eaOai, Kal fir) tt} rjfieTepa 
yfrifyq* dxpeXrjOevTa? tt) vfieTepa r)fid<; fiXdyfrai. 

2 to Be taov dvTairoBoTe, yvovres tovtov eicelvov 
elvau tov Kaipov, ev co 6 re vTrovpycov <£t\o? fia- 

3 XiaTa ical 6 dvTiards e%#/30?. /cal Keprcvpaiovs 
ye TouaBe firjTe ^vfifidxovs Bex^crOe fiLa yfiuv 

4 fiijre dfivvere avrols dBitcovaiv. teal TaBe ttoi- 
ovvTes Ta TTpoo-yjfcovTd re Bpdaere Kal ra dpiara 
/3ovXevo-ea0e vfilv auroZ?." 

XLTV. ToiavTa Be Kal ol Kopivdioi elirov. 
'A0y]vaioi Be aKovaavTes d/KpoTepcov, yevofievrjs 



errs least, and the contingency of the war, with which 
the Corcyraeans would frighten you into wrong- 
doing, is still uncertain ; and it is not worth while 
for you to be so carried away by it as to acquire 
an enmity with the Corinthians that will be from 
that moment on a manifest fact and no longer a 
contingency. It would be, rather, the prudent course 
to remove something of the suspicion which has 
heretofore existed on account of the Megarians l ; 
for the favour which comes last, if conferred at the 
right moment, even though a small one, can cancel a 
greater offence. Nor ought you to be tempted by 
their offer of a great naval alliance ; for to refrain 
from wronging equals is a surer strength than to be 
carried away by present appearances and seek an 
advantage by incurring dangers. 

XLIII. "But we, since events have brought us 
under the rule which we ourselves proclaimed at 
Sparta, that each should discipline his own allies, now 
claim from you in return the same treatment — that 
you who were then aided by our vote should not in- 
jure us by yours. Pay back like with like, determining 
that this is the supreme moment when assistance is 
the truest friendship — opposition the worst hostility. 
We beg you neither to accept the Corcyraeans as 
your allies in despite of us, nor to aid them in their 
wrong-doing. And if you do this, you will not only be 
taking the fitting course, but will also be consulting 
your own best interests." 

XLIV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the 
Athenians, having heard both sides, held a second 

1 Referring apparently to the exclusion of the Megarians 
from all harbours within the Athenian dominion and from 
the market at Athens, ch. lxvii. i. 



/cal SU e/c/cXrjaLas, rfj fiev irporepq, ou% r)craov 
rcov KoptvOiwv direhe^avTo tol>9 Xoyou?, ev he rfj 
varepaia fiereyvcoaav Kep/cvpaiois ^Vfifiayiav fiev 
fir) irotijaaaOat ware toi>? avrovs i^0pov<; /cal 
(f)i\ov<> vojJLi^eiv (el yap eVl KopivQov e/ceXevov 
acfriaiv oi Kep/cvpaloi ^vfiirXelv, eXvovr dv avrols 
ai Trpbs Ue\o7rovvr)(TLOv<; cnrovhai), errifiayiav he 
eironjaavro rfj dXXrjXcov ftorjOelv, edv ris errl 
Kep/cvpav ltj 77 ' Adrjvas r) tovs rovrcov ^vfifidyov^. 

2 ihoxet, yap 6 rrpos YieXoTrovvrjaiov^ iroXefios fcal 
&>9 eaeaOat avrols, /cal rr)v Kep/cvpav i/3ovXovro 
fir) irpoecrOai roh Kopiv6loi<; vavn/cbv e\ovaav 
roaovrov, ^vy/cpoveiv he on fidXiara avrous 
dXXrjXois, I'va acOevearepoL^ ovatv, r\v ri her], 
Kopivdlois re /cal Tot? aXXois rocs x vavri/cbv 

3 eyovGiv e? rroXefiov /caOiarayvraL. dfia he rr)<s re 
'IraXias /cal Hi/ceXias /caXws icfraivero avrot<; r) 
vr/aos ev TrapdrrXw /celaQai. 

XLV. Toiavry fiev yvcofirj oi 'AOrjvaloi tol»? 
Kep/cvpaLovs irpoaehe^avro, /cal rcov KopivOicov 
aireXdbvrwv ov ttoXv varepov hetca vavs avrols 

2 direaretXav /3or)6ovs' earparrjyeL he avrwv Aa/ce- 
hai/iovios re 6 Klfiwvos /cal Aiori/io<; 6 iLrpoji- 

3 /3i%ov K( * L n/3WTea? 6 'Eiu/cXeovs. irpoelirov he 
avrols fir) vavfiayelv KopLvOLois, r/v fir) eVt 
Kep/cvpav rrXewat /cal fteXX(oaiv dirofiaiveiv r) e? 
rwv e/ceivwv ri ywpiwv ovrco he /ccoXveiv /card 
hvvafiiv. TTpoelirov he ravra rod fir) Xveiv eve/ca 
rh airovBd*. t Added by Bekker . 


BOOK I. xi. iv. i-xlv. 3 

session of the Ecclesia ; and although at the earlier 
one they were rather inclined to agree with the words 
of the Corinthians, on the second day they changed 
their minds in favour of the Corcyraeans, and decided, 
not, indeed, to make an offensive and defensive 
alliance with them, for in that case, if the Corcyraeans 
then asked them to join in an expedition against 
Corinth, they would have to break, on their own re- 
sponsibility, the treaty with the Lacedaemonians — 
but they made a defensive alliance, namely to aid 
one another in case anyone should attack Corey ra or 

Athens or the allies of either. For they believed that . * 

in any event the war with the Peloponnesians would 
have to be faced, and they did not wish to give up 
Corcyra, which had so large a fleet, to the Corinthians, 
but hoped to wear them out upon one another as 
much as possible, in order that the Corinthians as 
well as other naval powers x might be found weaker 
in case they had to go to war with them. Besides, 
the island seemed to them admirably situated for a 
coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily. 2 

XLV. With these motives the Athenians received 
the Corcyraeans into alliance and sent to their 
aid, soon after the departure of the Corinthians, ten 
ships commanded by Lacedaemonius son of Cimon, 
Diotimus son of Strombichus, and Proteas son of 
Epicles. Orders were given to these not to engage 
with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against 
Corcyra and attempt to land there, or to some place 
belonging to the Corcyraeans ; but in that case they 
were to thwart them if possible. The object of these 
orders was to avoid breaking the treaty. 

1 Referring especially to those mentioned ch. xxvii. 2. 

2 cf. ch. xxxvi. 2. 



XLVL At nev Br) vt)e<; dfyiKVOvvrai €? rrjv 
Keprcvpav. ol Be Kopivdioi, eiretBrj avrols irape- 
aKevaaro, eirXeov eirl rrjv Kep/cvpav vaval Trevrrj- 
Kovra Kal efcarov. r)<rav Be 'HXelcov /iev BeKa, 
Meyapecov Be BcoBeKa Kal AevKaBLwv BeKa, 'Ajjl- 
irpaicLWTwv he eirrd real eiKoai Kal AvaKTopiwv 

2 fiLd, avjoiv Be KopLvOUov evevrjKOVTa,' arpari]yol 
Be tovtcov r)aav fiev Kal Kara iroXei*; etcaarcov, 
Kopivdlwv Be B.evoK\eiBrj<; 6 EvdvKXeovs irepurTO^ 

3 <zvto?. eireiBr] Be irpoaepei^av rfj Kara KepKvpav 
rjireipw dirb Aeu/caSo? irXeovres, opfiL&vrat, e? 

4 i^eifiepiov tt}? (deairpwTiBos 77}?. earl Be Xip.r)v, 
Kal 7roXi? iiirep avrov Kelrai cltto 0aXdaar)<; ev 
rfj 'RXaidriBi rrjs QecnrpwriBos 'Ecfrvprj. iljirjai Be 
irap avrr)v 'A^epoutu'a Xifivrj e? OdXaaaav Bid 
Be t^? tyeairpwTLBos 'Ax^pcov irorapib^ pecov 
ea/3dXXei e? avrrjv, d(j> ov Kal rrjv eirwvvpiiav 
e%6t, pel Be Kal (dva/Ms TrorapLos bpi^wv rrjv 
(deair pcorlBa Kal Kearptv^v, a)v evrbs r) aKpa 

5 dvex €i r0 Xei/xepiov. ol piev ovv KoplvOioi tt}? 
r)ireipov evravOa bppi^ovial re Kal arparoireBov 

XLVII. Ot Be KepKVpaloi &)<? rjaOovro avrovs 
irpoo-rrXeovTa^, TrX^pcocravTes BeKa Kal eKarbv 
vavs, wv r)pX e Mz/ctaS^? Kal AlaifiiSr)*; Kal Evpv- 
/3aTO?, ecTTparoireBevcravTo ev pua ra)v vrjacov a'l 
KaXovvrai ^vftora, Kal al 'Attlko-1 BeKa iraprjaav. 

2 eirl Be Tfj AevKipLvrj avrols t&> aKpu>Ti}pi(p 7re£o? 
tjv Kal ZaKuvdlwv x^ L0L birXlrai ^e/3or]0i]K6re(:. 

3 rjaav Be Kal rot? KopivOiocs ev rfj rjirdpa iroXXol 
rebv f3ap/3dpo)v TTapafteftorjOrjKOTes' ol yap ravrrj 
rjireipwrai alei irore $1X01 avroU ecacv. 


BOOK I. xLvi. i-xlvii. 3 

XLVI. These ships arrived at Corey ra, and the 
Corinthians, when their preparations had been made, 
sailed against Corey ra with one hundred and fifty 
ships. Of these ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve 
to the Megarians, ten to the Leucadians, sgranfteten 
to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and ninety 
to the Corinthians themselves. The several cities 
had each its own general, but Xenocleides son of 
Euthycles and four others commanded the Corin- 
thians. They sailed from Leucas, and when they drew 
near the mainland over against Corcyra, anchored at 
Cheimerium in the territory of Thesprotia. It is a 
harbour, and above it lies a city away from the sea in 
the Eleatic district of Thesprotia, Ephyra by name. 
Near it is the outlet into the sea of the Acherusian 
lake ; and the river Acheron runs through Thesprotia 
and empties into the lake, to which it gives its name. 
There is also the river Thyamis, which separates 
Thesprotia and Cestrine, and between these rivers 
rises the promontory of Cheimerium. It was at this 
point of the mainland then that the Corinthians cast 
anchor and made a camp. 

XLVI I. The Corcyraeans, when they became 
aware of their approach, manned a hundred and ten 
ships under the command of Miciades, Aesimides, 
and Eurybatus, and encamped on one of the islands 
which are called Sybota, the ten Attic ships being 
also present. Their land-forces were at the promon- 
tory of Leucimne, and also a thousand hoplites of 
the Zacynthians who had come to aid the Corcy- 
raeans. The Corinthians, also, had the aid of many 
barbarians who had assembled on the mainland ad- 
jacent ; for the dwellers on the mainland in that 
region have always been friendly to them. 



XLVIII. 'Eitt€i8>j he irapeaKevaaro rols Kopiv- 
Oiois, Xafibvres rptwv ^fiepcov airia dviqyovro 

2 &)? eVl vavpLa^ia drrb rov- Xeifiepiov vv zeros, Kal 
afia eco rrXeovres Kadopcocri ra<? rtov KepKupaicov 

3 vavs p,erecopov<; re Kal errl crcpd<; TrXeovcra^. fc>9 
he Karelhov dXXrjXovs, avrtiraperdcraovro, errl 
fiev rb he^ibv /cepas KepKvpaicov ai 'Am/cal 
vrjes, rb he. ciXXo avrol errelyov rpia reXrj iroir)- 
aavres rtov vecov, cov ?]px € Tpicov arpar^ycov 
eKciarov el?, ovtco pev Kep/cvpatoL ird^avro. 

4 KopivOiois Be rb p.ev he^ibv /cepa<; ai Meyapihes 
vrjes elyov Kal ai 'ApLTrpa/acorihes, Kara he to 
pLeaov oi aXXot ^vpLfia^oi a>? e/caaroi, evcovvfiov 
he. Kepa<$ avrol oi KoplvOioi Tea? dptara rcov vecov 
rrXeovaaLS Kara tou? ' A0i]vaiov<; Kal rb he^cbv 
rcov KepKvpaicov ely^ov. 

XLIX. B.vppei^avre<; he, eTrechr) ra aijpeta 
eKarepois ^pOrj, evavjidyovv, rroXXovs pev OTrXiras 
e%ovre<> dp^cporepot eVl rcov Karaarpco/xdrcov, rroX- 
Xovs he TofoTa? re Kal aKovricrrds, tw rraXaitp 

2 rponrco drreipbrepov en rrapeGKevao-jxevoi. r)v re 
t) vavpa\ia Kaprepd, rfj fiev re^vy ov% opoicos, 

3 rretopia\ia he rb rrXeov irpoac^epi^ ovtra. eireLhr) 
yap rrpocr/3dXoiev dXXjjXois, ov /3oc7a>? direXvovro 
vrrb re rod ttXi]6ovs Kal o^Xov rcov vecov Kal p,dX- 
Xov ri irio-revovres rots eirl rod Karaarpcop,aro<; 
oirXirais e'? rtjv vlktjv, ol Karaardvre<; ep.dyovro 
rjav^a^ovacov rcov vecov hieKirXoi he ovk rjaav, 
dXXd Ov/jLco Kal pco/irj rb 7rXeov evavpdyovv r\ 

BOOK I. xlviii. i-xlix. 3 

XLVIII. When their preparations had been made, 
the Corinthians, taking provisions for three days, 
put off by night from Cheimerium with the intention 
of giving battle, and at daybreak as they sailed along 
they descried the ships of the Corcyraeans out at sea 
and sailing to meet them. And as soon as they saw 
one another, they drew up in opposing battle lines, 
the Attic ships on the right wing of the Corcyraeans, 
who themselves held the rest of the line forming 
three divisions, each under the command of one of 
the three generals. So the Corcyraeans arrayed them- 
selves ; but the right wing of the Corinthian fleet 
was held by the Megarian ships and the Ambracian, 
in the centre were the other allies with their several 
contingents, while the left was held by the Corinth- 
ians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed 
to the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcy- 

XLIX. When the standards were raised on either 
side they joined battle and fought, both having many 
hoplites on the decks as well as many archers and 
javelin-men, for they were still equipped rather 
rudely in the ancient fashion. And so the sea-fight was 
hotly contested, not so much by reason of the skill 
displayed as because it was more like a battle on land. 
For when they dashed against one another they could 
not easily get clear, partly by reason of the number 
and throng of the ships, still more because they 
trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks, 
who stood and fought while the ships remained 
motionless ; and there was no cutting of the line, 1 but 
they fought with fury and brute strength rather than 

1 SitxirAovs was a breaking of the line so as to ram the 
enemy's ship in the flank or astern. 



4 en car r] fir), iravraxfj fiev ovv ttoXvs OopvjSos 
/ecu rapax^V^ V v V vavpiayla' ev f) al 'AttucciI 
vr)e<; irapayiyvofievat to?? Kepfcvpalois, el tttj 
TTie^oivro, (po/3ov p.ev irapelyov to£? evavjiois, 
puiyris Be. ov/c r\pyov BeBiore^ ol crrpar^yol rr)v 

5 Trpopprjaiv tcov ^ AO^vaicov. pbaXicrTa Be to Betjibv 
Kepas tcov KopivOucov eirovei. ol yap Kep/cvpaloi 
eUoai vavalv avrovs Tpetydfievoi ical KaraBico- 
^avre<; airopaBas e? ttjv ijireipov /cal ps-XP 1 T0 ^ 
arparoTreSov irXevaavTes avTcov zeal e7reKJ3dvT6<; 
eveTrprjadv re t<x? o-/cr}vd<; eprjfJLovs /cal tcl xP 1 ')P' a ' Ta 

6 hiripiraaav. ravrt) fiev ovv ol Y^opivdioi /cal ol 
^vfifxaxoi rjarcrwvTo re ical ol Kep/cvpaloL eVe- 
Kpdrovv f) Be ai/Tol rjcrav ol KoplvOiOL, eirl rq> 


ei/cocri vecov dirb iXdaaovos TrXrjOovs i/c tt}? Bico- 

7 few? ov irapovacov. ol Be 'Adrivaloi 6pcovTe<; tovs 
Kep/cvpaiovs Tue^ofAevovs fxaXXov rjBrj dirpocpa- 
ctlcttcos errefcovpovv, to fiev irpcoTOV drrexop-evoL 

COO~T€ /AT) iflftdWeLV TLv'f €7T€lBt] Be JJ TpOTTT) 

iyiyvero XapLirpcos /cal ive/ceiVTO ol KoplvOcoi, rore 
Br) epyov 7ra? elx eT0 V&V Kai Biexe/cpiTO ovBev 
en, dXXa ^vveireaev e? tovto dvdy/ct)^ ware 
iTrixeip^aaL dXXtfXoL? tou? KopivOiovs /cal 'Adrj- 

L. Tt}? Be t/)07tt}9 yevopLev>i<s ol KopivOtot tcl 
o~/cd(f)7] fxev oi>x elXtcov dvaBov/ievoL tcov vecov a? 
KdTaBvaetav, Trpbs Be tovs dvQpcoirov^ erpdirovro 
(poveveiv Bie/cirXeovTes fiaXXov t) ^coypelv, rov<i re 
avTcov (piXov;, ov/c rjaOrfpLevoi on yacnjvro ol eirl 
2 tco Be^ico icepa, dyvoovvre<i e/cretvov. ttoXXcov yap 


BOOK I. xlix. 3-l. 2 

with skill. Accordingly there was everywhere much 
tumult and confusion in the sea-fight. The Attic 
ships, if they saw the Corcyraeans pressed at any 
point, came up and kept the enemy in awe ; but 
their generals would not begin fighting, fearing to 
disobey the instructions of the Athenians. The right 
wing of the Corinthians suffered most ; for the 
Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them and pur- 
sued them in disorder to the mainland, and then, 
sailing right up to their camp and disembarking, 
burned the deserted tents and plundered their 
property. In that quarter, then, the Corinthians and 
their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans pre- 
vailed ; but on the left wing where the Corinthians 
themselves were, they were decidedly superior, for 
the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were fewer to begin 
with, had the twenty ships away in the pursuit. But 
the moment the Athenians saw that the Corcyraeans 
were being hard pressed, they began to help them 
more unreservedly, and though they at first refrained 
from actually attacking an enemy ship, yet when it 
was conspicuously clear that they were being put to 
flight and the Corinthians were close in pursuit, then 
at length every man put his hand to work, and fine 
distinctions were no longer made ; matters had come 
to such a pass that Corinthians and Athenians of 
necessity had to attack one another. 

L. After the rout of the Corcyraeans the Corinth- 
ians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the 
ships which had been disabled, but turned their 
attention to the men, cruising up and down and 
killing them in preference to taking them alive ; and 
they unwittingly slew their own friends, not being 
aware that their right wing had been worsted. For 



vecov ovacov dficporepcov koX eirl ttoXv rrjs 6 a- 
Xdacrrjs eire^ovacov, eireiBr) ^vve/nei^av dXXrjXois, 
ov paBico<; rrjv Bidyvcotriv iiroiovvro ottolol etcpd- 
tovv rj ifcparovvro' vavfia-)(ia yap avrrj r 'EXXi]CTL 
7T/90? "RWijvas vecov TrXtjOei fieylarr) Br) tcov irpb 

3 auT/}? yeyevrjrai. erreiBr) Be KareBlco^av tovs 
YLeptcvpalovs ol KoplvOioi e? rrjv yf]v> 7rpo? rd 
vavdyia xal toi>? vetcpovs tovs a<f)erepov<; irpd- 
ttovto, teal tcov irXeiaTcov eKpdrrjaav coare 
TTpoafcofiicraL 73736? rd Xv/3oTa }[ ov clvtols 6 Kara 
yr)v o-Tparb? tcov ftapftdpcov it poaefleftorjO ] rjicer 
ean Be rd ^Zvftora rrjs ®eo~7rpcoriBo<; Xijjliiv 
eprjfios. tovto Be Troiijaavres av6i<> dOpoiaBevres 

4 eireirXeov rois Kep/cvpalois. ol Be rats irXcoifiOL^ 
real oaai rjcrav Xoiiral p,erd tcov 'Attikcov vecov 
real avrol avTeireirXeov, Beiaavje^ fir) e? rijv yqv 

5 acfrcov rreipcoaiv diroj3aiveLV. rjBr) Be r)v oyjre ical 
eireTratdvLCTTO avrols &>? e? eiriirXovv, real ol 
KopLvOiOL e^airiv^ Trpv/jLvav €KpovovTo,tcaTiB6vTe<; 
eiKoari vavs Adr/vaicov irpoaTrXeovaa^, a? varepov 
tcov Be/ca (3oi~i9ov<; e^eirepi^rav ol ' AOijvalot, Bei- 
crames, oirep eyevero, fir) vlk^6coctlv ol Kep/cvpaiot 
real at acperepau Be/to, vfjes oXuycu dfivveiv cocriv) 
LI. Taura? ovv irrolB6vTe<; ol KopivOtOi real 
v7roT07n]cravTe<; air' 'A6}jvcov elvai, ov^ Boas 

2 ecopcov dXXd 7rXeLov<;, viraveydipovv. rots Be Kep- 
fevpaiois (eireirXeov yap fxdWov etc tou dfiavovs) 

1 Thncydides makes allowance for Salamis, for example, 
where Greeks had fought against Persians. 


BOOK I. L. 2-I.I. 2 

since the ships or the two fleets were many and 
covered a great stretch of sea, it was not easy, when 
they joined in combat, for the Corinthians to 
determine just who were conquering and who were 
being conquered ; for this sea-fight was in number of 
ships engaged greater than any that Hellenes had 
ever before fought against Hellenes. 1 But as soon 
as the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the 
shore, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead, 2 
and they were able to recover most of them and to 
fetch them to Sybota, an unused harbour of Thes- 
protia, whither the land forces of the barbarians had 
come to their aid. When they had accomplished 
this, they got their forces together and sailed once 
more against the Corcyraeans. And they, with such 
of their vessels as were seaworthy and all the rest that 
had not been engaged, together with the Attic ships, 
on their part also sailed to meet them, fearing that 
they would attempt to disembark on their territory. 
It was now late and the paean had been sounded for 
the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to 
back water ; for they sighted twenty Attic ships 
approaching, which the Athenians had sent out after 
the ten as a reinforcement, fearing just what 
happened, namely that the Corcyraeans would be de- 
feated and their own ten ships would be too few to 
help them. LI. So when the Corinthians sighted 
these ships before the Corcyraeans did, suspecting that 
they were from Athens and that there were more of 
them than they saw, they began to withdraw. For the 
Corcyraeans, however, the Athenian ships were sailing 
up more out of view and could not be seen by them, 

d The bodies of the dead which were on the disabled 


ovx ecopcovro, teal i0avp,a£ov tovs KopivOiovs 
irpvavav /cpovouevovs, irplv rives IBovres elirov 
on vries eiceivcu eir irrXeov a iv . Tore or) Kai avroi 
aveyodpovv (PvveaKora^e yap ij&y), teal ol KoplvOioi 

3 dirorpairo/ievoi rrjv BidXvaiv eiroirjcravro. ovrco 
fiev i) diraXXayr] eyevero dXXtjXajv, Kal r) vavfiaxla 

4 ereXevra e? vvktci. toIs Be KepKvpalois arparo- 
TreBevofievois eirl rfj AevKipvr) a I et/coat, vr)e<$ at 
etc T(bv 'AOiivcov avrai, a)v r/px € TXavKwv re 6 
Aedypov Kal 'AvBoklBtjs 6 Aecoyopov, Bid rcov 
veKptov Kal vavaylwv irpoaKopnaOelaai KareirXeov 
e? to arparoireBov ov iroXXcp varepov r\ axpOrjaav. 

5 ol be Keptcvpaioi (rjv yap vvg) i(po^r]0i]aav firj 
iroXefiiai waiv, eireira Be eyvcoaav fcal d>pfiiaavro. 

LII. Tfj Be varepaia dvayayo/nevai a'i re 'Atti- 
fcal rpid/covra vr)e<$ Kal rcov KepKvpaiwv ocrai 
7rXd)ifioi rjaav eireirXevaav eirl rbv ev rois Sf/3o- 
rois Xifieva, ev cJ ol Koplvdioi cbpuovv, fiovXo- 

2 pLevoi elBevai el vav/iax^crovaiv. ol Be Ta? fiev 
vavs dpavre? dirb rf)<; 7779 Kal irapara^dfievoi 
fiereojpovs rjo-vxa^ov, vavpiayias ov Biavoovfievoi 
dpxeiv exovres, opoovres irpoayeyevrifievas re vavs 
€K to)v ' A0r]V(x)v aKpaiobveis Kal acf)iai jroXXa ra 
airopa gvfifieprjKOTa, alxf^aXcorcov re irepl (j>vXa- 
Krjs, ou? ev rals vavalv etyov, Kal eirio-Kevriv ovk 

3 ouaav rcov vecov ev yw?' 1 *? ^P'lW T0 ^ ^ oiKaBe 
ttXov fidXXov BieaKOTrovv oitij KOfiiadijo-ovrai, Be- 
BioTes fiii ol Wdrjvaloi vo filer avres XeXvaOai Ta? 
airovBas, Bioti e? ^etpa9 r)X0ov, ovk eoyai crc/ja? 

LIII. "EBogev ovv avroh avBpas e? KeXrjriov 


and so they wondered that the Corinthians were 
backing water, until some of them caught sight of the 
ships and said, ri Yonder are ships sailing up." Then 
they too retreated — for it was already getting dark ; 
whereupon the Corinthians put their ships about and 
broke off the action. Thus they separated, the sea-fight 
ending at nightfall. And while the Corcyraeans were 
encamping at Leucimne, the twenty ships from 
Athens, under the command of Glaucon son of 
Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, having made 
their way through the corpses and the wrecks, sailed 
down to the camp not long after they were sighted. 
And the Corcyraeans — for it was night — were afraid 
they were enemies; but afterwards they recognized 
them and the ships came to anchor. 

LI I. On the next day the thirty Attic ships and 
as many of the Corcyraean as were seaworthy put 
to sea and advanced against the harbour at Sybota, 
where the Corinthians lay at anchor, wishing to see 
whether they would fight. But the Corinthians, 
although they put out from shore and drew up in 
line in the open sea, kept quiet : for they had no 
thought of beginning a fight if they could avoid it, 
as they saw that fresh ships had arrived from 
Athens and that they themselves were involved 
in many perplexities, both as regards guarding the 
captives whom they had in their ships and the im- 
possibility of refitting their ships in a desert place. 
What they were more concerned about was the 
voyage home, how they should get back, for they 
were afraid that the Athenians would consider that 
the treaty had^een broken, since they had come to 
blows, and would not let them sail away. 

LIII. Accordingly they determined to put some 

g 9 


€/jL/3i/3daavTa<; dvev /crjpv/celov rrpoGTrep^rai rol<; 

2 'AOtjvcllols /cal irelpav iroL^aacrOai. irepL-tyavres 
re eXeyov rocdBe' " ' ABi/celre, co avSpes 'AOrjvaloi, 
rroXepiov dpyovre^ /cal cnrovBds Xvovres' yap 
iroXepiiovs rov<; rjfieripovs npLcopovpLevois epLiroBcov 
'iarauQe oirXa dvraLpop.evoi. el £' yvcbp.i] 
earl /ccoXveiv re r)p,d<; e7rl KepKvpav r) dXXoae el 
Try fiovXopieOa irXelv teal Ta? airovBds Xvere, 
fjpLcis rovaBe irpcorovs Xa/36vre<; y^pr\aaaQe &)9 

3 7roXe/xtoi9." ol p,ev Brj roiavra elirov rcov Be 
Kep/cvpalcov to p,ev arparoneBov oaov eirrj/covaev 
dveftorjaev evOvs Xafielv re avrovs /cal diro/crelvai, 

4 ol Be ' AOrjvaloi roidBe dire/cplvavro' "Ovre ap- 
X°/ JL€l ' TroXepov, co dvBpes YieXo7rovvi)cnot, ovre 
rds airovBds Xvoimev, Kep/cvpaiois Be rolaBe %vp,- 
pdyois ovai fiorjOol 7]Xdop,ev. el p.ev ovv dXXoae 
ttoi ftovXeaOe irXelv, ov KcoXvop,ev el Be eirl 
Kep/cvpav rrXevaelaOe r) e? rcov e/ceivcov ri ^coplcov, 
ov Trepcoyp-o/ieOa /card rb Bvvarov." 

LIV. Toiavra rcov Adr/valcov d7ro/cpivap,evcov 
ol pAv K.opLvdioi rov re rr~Sovv rbv eir 01/cov irape- 
a/cevd^ovro /cal rpoiralov earrjaav iv roc? ev rfj 
r)irelpco Si'/3oto6?" ol Be Kep/cvpalot, rd re vavdyia 
koX ve/cpovs dveiXovro rd Kara acpas, e^eveyfi ev - 
rcov virb re rov pov /cat dvep,ov, 09 yevop,evo<; rr}<; 
vv/crbs Bcea/ceBaaev avrd iravra^fj, /cal rpoiralov 
dvrear^aav ev rols ev rj} vi]acp 2l»/Soto£9 &>9 
2 veviK7)/core<$. yvcofirj Be rotaBe e/cdrepoL rrjv vi/crjv 
irpoaeiroDJaavro' Y^opLvQioi pev /cpar)jaavre<; rfj 

1 To bear a herald's wand would have been a recognition 
of a state of war, whereas the Corinthians were anxious not 
to be regarded as enemies by the Athenians. 


BOOK I. LIU. I-L1V. 2 

men, without a herald's wand, 1 into a boat and send 
them to the Athenians, to test their intentions. 
And these men bore the following message : " You 
do wrong, men of Athens, to begin war and break a 
treaty ; for by taking up arms against us you inter- 
fere with us when we are but punishing our enemies. 
But if it is your intention to hinder us from sailing 
against Corcyra or anywhere else we may wish, and 
you thus break the treaty, first take us who are here 
and treat us as enemies." Thus they spoke ; and 
all the host of the Corey raeans that was within 
hearing shouted : " Take them and kill them ! " But 
the Athenians made answer as follows : " We are not 
beginning war, men of the Peloponnesus, nor are we 
breaking the treaty, but we have come to aid the 
Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If, then, you 
wish to sail anywhere else, we do not hinder you ; 
but if you ever sail against Corcyra or any place of 
theirs, we shall not permit it, if we are able to 
prevent it." 

LIV. When the Athenians had given this answer, 
the Corinthians began preparations for the voyage 
homeward and set up a trophy at Sybota on the 
mainland ; and the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks 
and dead bodies 2 that had been carried in their 
direction by the current and by the wind, which had 
arisen in the night and scattered them in every 
direction, and set up, as being the victors, a rival 
trophy at Sybota on the island. Each side claimed 
the victory on the following grounds : The Corinth- 
fans "set up a trophy because they had prevailed in 

2 Taking up the dead bodies without asking permission of 
the enemy indicated that the held was maintained, and was 
therefore a claim of victory. 


vavfxa-^ia jiky^pi vvktos, ware Kal vavdyia TrXeicrra 
teal veicpovs TrpoaKopilaaaOai, Kal avBpas e%ovTe<; 
al-^fia\(i)Tov^ ovrc eXdaaovs ^i\iwv vavs re Kara- 
Bvaavres rcepl e/3Bo/i7]KOvra karrjerav rpoiralov l 
Kep/cvpaloi Be rpiaKovra vavs fidXiara 8ia<fi0el- 
pavres, teal eireiBrj ^ A0r\valoi r]X0ov, dveXopievoi 
ra Kara crcbas avrovs vavdyia Kal ve/cpovs, koX 
otl avrois rfi re irporepala irpvfivav Kpovo/xevoi 
vire-^dipriaav ol KopivOioi iBovres rds 'Arr^a? 
vavs, Kal eireihr) rjXOov ol ' A0ip>aloi, ovtc avreire- 
nXeov i/c rcov %v/36tg)i>, Sea raura rpoiralov earrj- 
crav. ovtco fxev e/cdrepoi vikciv rj^lovvj 

LV. Oi Be K.opn0toi diroirXeovTes eV oikov 
Avarcropiov, b eanv eirl ra> arofiarL rov 'Ayu.- 
irpaKiKov koXitov, elXov dirdrrj (rjv Be koivov 
Kepfcvpaicov /cal eKeivcov), /cal Karacrrrjaavres 
ev avrco KopivOiovs ol/cijropas dveyd>pi)aav err 
oikov Kai rcov K.epKvpalcov oKTaKocrLovs /iev oi 
rjaav BovXoi drreBovro, rrevrijKovra Be Kai Bia- 
Koaiovs Brjcravres ecpvXao-aov Kal ev 0eparrela 
e\\ov TroXXfj, 07r&>9 avrois rrjv KepKvpav dva- 
X(op)jcravTe<; rrpoo-7roi7]aeiav ervy\avov Be [Kal 
Bvvdfiei avrcov ol rrXelov? rrpcoroi ovres r?i^ 
2 rroXeco*;. rj piev ovv YLepKvpa ovtco Trepiyiyverai 
rco TToXe/xw rcov Kopiv0lcov, Kal al vijes rCOV 
'AOrjvalcov dvexd>prjcrav e'f avrrj<;. atria Be avrt] 
rrpcorr) eyevero rov rroXefiov rols KopivOlois e\ 
tou? Wdrjvaiov;, on acplaiv ev airovBals fierd 
KepKvpalcov evavfid^ovv. 

LVL Mfira ravra 8* ev0u<; Kal rdBe gvveftr) 

1 earriaav rooiralov bracketed by Hude, following Kriiger. 


the sea-fight up to nightfall, and had thus been able 
to carry off a greater number of wrecks and dead 
bodies, and because they held as prisoners not less 
than a thousand men and had disabled about seventy 
ships ; and the Corcyraeans, because they had de- 
stroyed about thirty ships, and, after the Athenians 
came, had taken up the wrecks that came their way 
and the dead bodies, whereas the Corinthians on the 
day before had backed water and retreated at sight 
of the Attic ships, and after the Athenians came 
would not sail out from Sybota and give battle — 
for these reasons set up a trophy. So each side t 
claimed the victory. 

LV. The Corinthians, as they sailed homeward, 
took by stratagem Anactorium, which is at the mouth 
of the Ambracian Gulf, a place held by the Corcy- 
raeans and themselves in common, and establishing 
there some Corinthian colonists returned home. Of 
their Corcyraean prisoners they sold eight hundred 
who were slaves, but two hundred and fifty they 
kept in custody and treated them with much con- 
sideration, their motive being that when they re- 
turned to Corcyra they might win it over to their 
side ; l and it so happened that most of these were 
among the most influential men of the city. In this 
way, then, Corcyra had the advantage in the war 
with the Corinthians, and the ships of the Athenians 
withdrew from it. And this was the first groun 
which the Corinthians had for the war against the' 
Athenians, because they had fought with the Corcy- 
raeans against them in time of truce. 

LVI. Immediately after this the following events 

1 cf. in. lxx. 1, where the carrying out of this plan of the 
Corinthians leads to the bloody feud at Corcyra. 



yeieaOai TOi? 'AOrjvaiois /cal UeXoTrovvrfaloi^ 
2 hidepopa e? to rroXe/ielv. rwv yap KopivOloov 
irpaaaovrwv oVo)? TifiwprjcrovTai civtoik;, vrroro- 
irrjaavres rrjv eyQpav avrow ol 'AOrjvalot Uorei- 
Sedras, ot oikovgiv liri ra> laOfiq) tt)? II a\\ 771/779, 
KopivOloov diroLKov^, eavrcov he ^v/jL/id^ov<; cf)6pov 
viroreXeU, e/ceXevov to e? HaXXijvrjv rel^o? Kade- 
\elv /cal ofjirfpovs Bovvai, T01J9 re €7uhr]p,iovpyov<; 
i/cTT€jjL7reiv /cal to Xolttov fia) hex^o-Oac 0D9 Kara 

€T09 €K(lO~TOV Y^OpivQlOl 67T € fJLIT OV ', heiGaVTeS /AT) 

dirodTOiaiv vtto re Ylephl/CKOV ireiOofxevoi real 
K.opiv@La>v, tou? re aXXovs tov? eirl Spa/crj*; 
%vvaTTO(TTi'-)<JO)ai ^v/jL/jid^ov<;. 

LVII. Tavra he Trepl rovs UorecSedra^ ol 
'AOrjvaloL irpoTrapeafcevd^ovTO evdix; /jbera rrjv ev 

2 Kep/cvpa vavjia^iav' o'l re yap YLopivOioi (fiavepws 
rjhrj hidcpopoi rjcrav, Tlephl/c/cas re 6 ' AXe^dvhpov, 
Maxehovayv ftaaiXevs, eTreiroXeficoTO ^v/ifia^o<; 

3 rrporepov /cal (f)iXo<> a>v. eiroXefioiOri he, on 
*\>iX'nnr(£> ra> eavrov dheX(f)<p koX Aepha, koivt} 
7T/0O? avTov evavTiovfievois ol AOrjvaloi ^Vjijiayiav 

4 eiroirjaavTO. hehuos re eirpaaaev e? re tt)v Aa/ce- 
haifMova irepnrwv ottcos 7r6Xe/j.o<; yevrjraL avTois 
■77/369 UeXoTTOvv^a tot/9 , /cal toi/9 KopivOloix; irpoa- 
eiroLelro ttj<; HoreiSalas eveica diroardaecof;' 

5 Trpoaefyepe he Xoyovs /cal tols eirl ®o 0^779 \aXtcc- 
hevac ko\ BoTT/atoi? %vvairoGTr)vai, vojxi^wv, el 
^\jp,\iaya Tavra e^ot, Sfiopa ovra, ra ywp'ia, 

1 Son of Alexander, who had been a friend of the Hellenes 
in the Persian war. Perdiccaa, who originally possessed 
only Lower Macedonia, had deprived his brother Philip of 


BOOK I. lvi. i-lvii. 5 

also occurred, which caused differences between the 
Athenians and the Peloponnesians and led to the 
war. While the Corinthians were devising how they 
should take vengeance on the Athenians, the latter, 
suspecting their enmity, required of the Potidaeans 
(who dwell on the isthmus of Pallene and are 
colonists of the Corinthians but tributary allies of the 
Athenians), to pull down their wall on the side of 
Pallene and give hostages, and, furthermore, to send 
away and not receive in the future the magistrates 
whom the Corinthians were accustomed to send 
every year. For they were afraid that the Poti- 
daeans, persuaded by Perdiccas 1 and the Corinthians, 
would revolt and cause the rest of the allies in 
Thrace to revolt with them. 

LVII. These precautions the Athenians took with 
regard to the Potidaeans immediately after the sea- 
fight at Corcyra ; for the Corinthians were now openly 
at variance with them, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, 
king of the Macedonians, who had before been an 
ally and friend, had now become hostile. And he 
had become hostile because the Athenians had made 
an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, 
who were making common cause against himself. 
Alarmed at this he kept sending envoys to Lace- 
daemon, trying to bring about a war between Athens 
and the Peloponnesians. He sought also to win 
over the Corinthians, with a view to the revolt of 
Potidaea ; and, furthermore, he made overtures to 
the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join 
in the revolt, thinking that if he had as allies these 
countries, which bordered on his own, it would be 

Upper Macedonia, and now was king of all Macedonia. 
See, further, n. xcix. ff. 



6 pdov av rov iroXefiov per a^rcov nroielaOai. u>v 
ol 'KdrjvaioL alaOojievoi real tfovXofievoi irpofcara- 
Xa/x/3dveiv rcov iroXecov t<z? aTroardaeis (erv^ov 
yap rpidtcovra vavs dirocrreXXovre^ teal ){iXlov<; 
oirXiras eirl rrjv <yr)v avrov ' Appear pdrov rov 
AvKOfiij&ovs fier dXXcov recrcrdpeov arparrjyovv- 
ros), eTncrreXXovaL rol$ dpyovai rcov vecov Tiorei- 
Searcbv re ofirjpov^ Xaftelv kclI to rel^o? /caOeXelv, 
rcov re ttX^ctlov iroXecov cpvXa/cijv eyeiv oVco? jxtj 

LYIII. Uoreihedrai he irefx^avre? fiev kclI 
Trap 1 ' ' AOrivaLovs 7rp€o~/3eis, el 7rcos rreiaeiav fir/ 
crepcov rrepi vecorepi^eiv purjhev, iXOovres he /cal 
e? rr/v AarcehalpLova per a ^KoptvOicov, 1 07Tft>? 
eroifidaaivro rificopiav, r\v hey, eireihr) etc re 
'AOrjvcov etc ttoXXov Trpdaaovre? ovhev rjvpovro 
erririjheiov, a\\' al vrjes at eirl ^laKehoviav koi 
eiTi <7<£a? 6/jLolcos eirXeov icai rd reXrj rcov Aa/ce- 
haLfxovicov virecryero avrols, tjv iirl Uorethaiav 
lcoctlv ' ' AOrjvcuoi, e\ ri]V 'Am/cr/v eo-jSaXetv, rore 
hr\ Kara rov icaipov rovrov dc\>iaravrai fierd 
XaX/cihecov icai Borriaccov rcoivf} ^vvo/xoaavre^. 

2 Ka\ TlephiKKas ireLQei Xa\/a8ea? ra? eir\ OaXdaarj 
7roXei? eKXiTTovras real /cara/3aXovra<; dvoifci- 
aaaOac e? "OXvvOov p.lav reiroXiv ravryv lo~xypdv 
7TOL?]aaa0ar rol<; r efcXnrovcn rovrov; rr/s eavrov 
<yf/9 tt}? MirySo^ta? irepl T)yi> TSoXftrjv Xl/avtjv 
ehcorce ve/iecrOai, eco? av 6 irpbs 'AOrjvaLovs iroXe- 

1 Znpaacrov, before oirccs in all MSS., deleted by Poppo. 

9 6 

BOOK I. lvii. 5-LV111. 2 

easier, in conjunction with them, to carry on the 
war. But the Athenians became aware of these 
designs, and wishing to forestall the revolt of the 
cities, ordered the commanders of their fleet (since 
they happened to be sending against the country oi 
Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under 
the command of Archestratus son of Lycomedes 
and four others) to take hostages of the Potidaeans 
and pull down their wall, and also to keep a watch 
upon the neighbouring towns and prevent them 
from revolting. 

LVII I. The Potidaeans, on the other hand, sent 
envoys to Athens, to see if they could persuade 
them not to take any harsh measures with reference to 
themselves ; but envoys of theirs went also to Lace- 
daemon in the company of the Corinthians, with 
the object of having assistance ready to hand in 
case of need. From the Athenians, with whom they 
carried on protracted negotiation, they obtained no 
satisfactory result, but on the contrary the ships 
destined to attack Macedonia proceeded to sail 
against themselves as well, whereas the magis- 
trates of the Lacedaemonians promised them to 
invade Attica if the Athenians went against Poti- 
daea ; so they seized this opportunity and revolted, 
entering into a formal alliance with the Chalcidians t 
and Bottiaeans. Perdiccas at the same time per 
suaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull down 
their cities on the sea-coast and settle inland at 
Olynthus, making there a single strong city ; and 
he gave them, when they abandoned their cities, a 
part of his own territory of Mygdonia around Lake 
Bolbe to cultivate as long as they should be at war 
: i.e. the Chalcidians of Thrace. 



/xo? 77. Ka\ oi pev avcpKi^ovTo re /ca0aipovvT€<s 
to? 7roXei? Kal e'9 7r6Xep,ov irapeaKevd^ovro' 
LIX. ai he rpid/covra vf}€<; tcop ^AOrjvalcov d(pi- 
Kvovvrai e'9 rd eirl SpaKrjs Kal KaraXapL^dvovai 
2 rrjv re Uoreihaiav teal rdXXa d^earrjKoTa. vopi- 
aavres he oi o~rpaTrjyol dhvvara eivai irpos re 
Uep&Lfctcav iroXepelv rfj irapovcrr) hwdptei Kal rd 
^vva^earcbra ywpia, rpeirovTcu eirl ttjv Maxe- 
hoviav, i(f> y birep Kal to irpwrov e^eirepbirovTo, teal 
KaTao~TdvT6<; eiroXepovv fierd QiXiirirov Kal rcov 
Aephov dheX(f)(ov avwOev arpana iafiefiXriKOTCov. 
LX. Kal ev tovtw 01 KoplvOioi, T779 Horethaias 
d<f)€aTT)KVLa<; teal rwv 'Attikcov vecov irepl Mo*e- 
hoviav ovacov, hehiores irepl ra> ywp'up Kal oIksIov 
rbv Kivhvvov rjyovfxevoi ire par over lv eavrcov re 
eQeXovrds Kal twv aXXcov UeXoTrowtjaLcov ptaOw 
ireLcravTes e^aKoaiovs Kal \i\iovs tou? iravras 

2 birXira^ Kal -tyCXovs rerpaKoaiov^. ear parity ei 
Be ai)TO)V 'Apia-revs 6 ^ Aheipbdvrov, Kara $>i\Lav 
re avrov ov^ rjKiara oi TrXelaroc e.K KopivOov 
o-TpaTioorai eOeXovral ^vvearrovro' rjv yap rol<; 

3 IToTetSeaTat? ale'i 7roTe€7rLT?j&€io<>. Kal dcpi/cvovv- 
rai recraapaKoarfj rjpepa varepov eirl ®paKT)<$ rj 
TLorelhaia direarrj, 

LXT. *H\de Be Kal Tot? AO-qvalois eu0i><; r\ 
dyyeXia rwv iroXecov ore d(peaTacri, Kal irep- 
irovcnv, &)? rjaOovro Kal rovs fieid Apia-Tews 
e-rrnrapiovTas, hio-yCkiovs eavrayv o-rrXira^ Kal 
recraapaKOVTa pads Trpb* ra d(f)eaTcora, Kal KaX- 
Xiav rov KaXXidhov irepLirrov avrbv arpaT^yov' 
2 dl a<f)LKopevoL e'9 MaKehoviav irpcorov KaraXapL^d- 


BOOK I. lviii. 2-lxi. 2 

with the Athenians. And so they proceeded to 
dismantle their cities, move inland, and prepare for 
war. LIX. But when the thirty ships of the 
Athenians reached the coast of Thrace, they found 
Potidaea and the other places already in revolt. 
Whereupon the generals, thinking it impossible with 
their present force to wage war with both Perdiccas 
and the places which had revolted, turned their 
attention to Macedonia, which was their destination 
at the start, and when they had got a foothold 
carried on war in concert with Philip and the 
brothers of Derdas, who had already invaded Mace- 
donia from the interior with an army. 

LX. Thereupon the Corinthians, seeing that 
Potidaea had revolted and the Attic ships were in 
the neighbourhood of Macedonia, were alarmed 
about the place and thinking that the danger came 
home to them, dispatched volunteers of their own 
and such other Peloponnesians as they induced 
by pay, in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four 
hundred light-armed troops. The general in com- 
mand was Aristeus son of Adimantus ; and it was 
chiefly because of friendship for him that most of the 
soldiers from Corinth went along as volunteers ; for 
he had always been on friendly terms with the Poti- 
daeans. And they arrived on the coast of Thrace 
on the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidaea. 

LXI. The news of the revolt of the cities quickly 
reached the Athenians also ; and when they learned 
that troops under Aristeus were also on the way to 
support the rebels, they sent against the places in 
revolt two thousand of their own hoplites and forty 
ships, under Callias son of Calliades with four other 
generals. These first came to Macedonia and found 



vovai tov? TTporepovs xiXiovs (depfnjv dpri rjpy- 

3 Kora<; zeal TlvBvav TroXiopKovvras, irpoaKade- 
^ofievoi Be koI avrol rrjv TlvBvav iTroXiop/CTjcrav 
fxev, eireira Be %v{i/3acriv iroi^crdfxevoL teal %v/jl- 
p.ayLav dvaytcaiav irpbs rbv UepBifctcav, &>9 avrov? 
KarrjTTeiyev r) UoreiBaia teal 6 'Apto-Teu? irape\rj- 

4 XvOcos, ci7ravi<JTavTcu etc rr}<; ^laKeBovias, teal 
d(\)LK6p.evoL €? Bepoiav fcdtceWev eirl Xrpeyjrav 1 teal 
ireipdaavre^ rrpwrov rov ^copiov teal ov% eXovres 
iiropevovro Kara yi)v irpos rrjv TloTeiBcuav 
TpLa^ikioL^ /lev ottXltclis eavrcov, %&)/?i? Be ra>v 
^VjJLfid-^aiv ttoXXoIs, lirirevcri Be e!;a/cocriOL<; Ma/ce- 
Bovcov Tot? fjuerd <£>iXlttttov teal Tiavaaviov dpa 

5 Be vr/e? irapeirXeov e/3Bo/jLi]fcovra. tear bXlyov Be 
Trpoibvres rpiraloi dcpLKOvro e? Tlycovov tcai 

LXII. UoreiBearaL Be icai ol fiera 'Apio-reco? 
HeXoTTovvijaiov irpoaBe-^ofievoL tou? ' AOiivaiovs 
iarparoTreBevovro irpbs 'OXvvQov iv rw IcrOfAw 

2 teal dyopdv e%w rr}s TToXew; eireirolrivTO. arpa- 
rrjybv [lev ovv rov rre^ov ttclvtos ol ^vppayoi 
yprjVTO ' Apiarea, rrjs Be lttttov UepBiK/cav aTrearr) 
yap evOvs irdXiv raiv ' AOrjvaicov /cal ^vvepudyei 
Tot? UoreiBedraLS ^loXaov dvO' avrov Karaarijaa^ 

3 dp\ovra. r)v Be r) yvco/irj rov 'Aptcrrea)?, to fiev 
fied' eavrov arparoTreBov eyovri 2 iv ra> laO/xu) 
eTTiTTjpelv rov$ ' ' AOrjraiovs, r)v iTTLcocn, Xa\/a£ea? 
Be teal tou? efa) laOfiov ^v^fid^ov^ teal rrjv irapa 
HepBiKfcov BicLKoaiav 'lttttov iv 'OXvvOa) fieveLV, 

1 M Sxpevfov, Pluygers' certain emendation for iiriaTpe- 
ipavrcs of the MSS. 
3 Madvig deletes, followed by Hude. 


BOOK I. lxi. 2-lxii. 3 

that the former thousand had just taken Therme 
and were besieging Pydna ; so they also took part 
in the siege of Pydna. But afterwards they con- 
cluded an agreement and an alliance with Per- 
diccas, being forced thereto by the situation of 
Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus, which compelled 
them to hasten, and then they withdrew from Mace- 
donia. On their way they came to Beroea and 
thence to Strepsa, 1 and after an unsuccessful at- 
tempt upon this place proceeded overland to Poti- 
daea with three thousand hoplites of their own and 
with many of their allies besides, and with six 
hundred Macedonian cavalry, who were under the 
command of Philip and Pausanias ; and at the same 
time their ships, seventy in number, sailed along the 
coast. And marching leisurely they arrived on the 
third day at Gigonus, and went into camp. 

LXII. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians 
under Aristeus were awaiting the Athenians, en- 
camped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus ; and 
they had established a market outside of the city. 
The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the 
infantry, and Perdiccas of the cavalry ; for Perdiccas 
had immediately deserted the Athenians again 2 and 
was now in alliance with the Potidaeans, having 
appointed Iolaus as his administrator at home. The 
plan of Aristeus was as follows : he was to hold his 
own army on the isthmus and watch for the approach 
of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians and the 
other allies from outside of the isthmus 3 and the 
two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were to 

1 In Mygrlonia, north of Therme. 

2 For his first desertion of the Athenians, see ch. lvii. 

8 i.e. the Bottiaeans, who, like the Chalcidians, lived out- 
side the icthmus. 



/cal orav 'Adijvaloi eirl o-(pa<; yjuspfacri, Kara vgotov 
j3or)dovvras ev fxeaw iroielv avrcov rovs iroXefxiov?. 

4 KaXXta? B av 6 tcov AOtjvcucov gt parrjyo^ /cal oi 
£vvdpxovT€<; rovf fiev ^.lafceSovas 'nnreas real tcov 
£v iijxaywv oXiyovs iirl ^OXvvOov diro'rrep.'Trovrnv, 
6V&J9 etpycoai tovs i/celOev €7ri/3or}0eiv, avrol Be 
ava<jTr)<ravT6<; to crTpaToireBov e^copovv iirl ttjv 

5 UoTeiBaiav. /cal tTretBi] Trpos tw laO/ico eyevovTo 
ical elBov tou? evavTiovs 7rapaa/ceva£op,evov<; a>? 

6? fld^-qV, dvTLKCL0L(TTaVTO /cal aVTOL, KCU OV TToXv 

6 vaTepov ^vvep-iayov. /cal clvto puev to tov 'Api- 
crrea)9 /cepas /cal ocronrepi e/ceivov rjaav KopivOicov 
T€ teal tcov aXXcov Xoyd8e<; eTpe\jrav to /ca6 y 
eavTOvs /cal eire^rfxO ov Bico/covre*; eVl iroXv- to 
Be dXXo crTpaToireSov UoTetBeaTcov ical IIeX,o- 
7roi>v?]cri(i)v rjTcraTO virb tcov AOrjvaicov /cal e? to 
Telxos KaTecpvyev. 

LXIII. 'E7r avayu) pcov Be 6 'ApiaTevs diro ttjs 
Bico^ecos, co? opa to dXXo crTpaTev/ia i]<jo-j]/j,£vov, 
rj7ropi]ae fiev 6-7roTepwo~e BiaKivBvvevarj ^copi]aa^, 
r) eVl t^5 'OXvvOov rj 69 tijv UoTeiBatav eBoge 
c7 ovv ^vvayayovTi tovs fieB* eavTov &>? t'9 
iXd)(io-TOV ywpiov Bp6\xco /3ido~ao-0ai e? tijv 
WoTeiBaiav, /cal irap?)X9e irapd tvjv X 7 f^h v & l a 
tt}? OaXdacrr}^ fiaXXo/ievos Te /cal -%aX€irco<;, 0X1- 
yovs /sev Tiva<s diro/BaXcov, toik; Be TrXelovs crcocra?. 
2 oi o° diro t/)? 'QXvvdov tois YloTeiBedrais (3or)6oL 


BOOK I. lxii. 3-LX111. 2 

remain at Olynthus ; then when the Athenians 
should move against the forces of Aristeus, the 
others were to come up and attack them in the rear, 
and thus place the enemy between their two divi- 
sions. But Callias, the commander of the Athenians, 
and his colleagues sent the Macedonian cavalry and 
a few of the allies toward Olynthus, to shut off aid 
from that quarter, while they themselves broke 
camp and advanced against Potidaea. And when 
they arrived at the isthmus and saw the enemy pre- 
paring for battle, they took up their position facing 
them ; and soon the two sides joined battle. And 
the wing led by Aristeus himself, which included 
the picked Corinthian and other troops, routed the 
forces opposed to them and pressed on a long dis- 
tance in pursuit ; but the rest of the army of the 
Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians was worsted by 
the Athenians and took refuge within the walls of 

LXIII. When Aristeus returned from the pursuit 
and saw that the rest of the army was defeated, he 
was at a loss whether he should try to fight his way 
through towards Olynthus or into Potidaea. He 
determined, however, to bring his own troops to- 
gether into as compact a body as possible and to force 
his way into Potidaea on a run. And he succeeded 
in getting in by way of the breakwater through the 
sea, with difficulty, indeed, and harassed by missiles ; 
but though he lost a few men, he saved the greater 
number of them. Now when the battle began and 
the standards had been raised, 1 the auxiliaries of 

1 These signals were not for battle, but for the Olynthian 
auxiliaries to come, and as soon as it became clear, through 
the speedy success of the Athenians, that their object could 
not be accomplished, they were lowered. 



{aireyei hk e^rjieovra fiakiara arahlov^ zeal can 
/ear agaves), &>9 r) fid^l eylypero icai ra aij/iela 
rjpOrj, /3pa^v fiev rv irporfkdov a>? fiorjQrja-ovTes, 
zeal ol Ma/ceSoVe? liriTr}*; avTiiraperd^avTO a>? 
KcoX.vaovre's' eTreihrj he hta rd)(ov<; rj vlzer) roov 
*A6-r)vaicov eylyveio /ecu ra arj/ieta Kareairdadrj, 
irdXiv eiraveyd>povv e? to Tet^o? zeal ol Mazeehove<; 
irapa tou? * A0-r}vaiov<;' limrj^ &' ovherepois rrape- 

3 ykvovio. fiera he rr)v \idyr\v rpoiralov earrjaav 
ol 'AO^vaioL /eat toi>? vezepovs vTrocnTOvhovs dire- 
hoaav tol<; HoTeihedrais' dirWavov he UoTeihea- 
T<hv /iev zeal rtov \;vp,pidywv 6\iy(p eXdaaou^ 
TpiaKoaiwv, 'AOijvcllcov he avrcov irevTrjKovra zeal 
ezearbv zeal KaXAia? 6 aTparyiyo^. 

LXIV. To he eze rod lo~0/iov Tet^o? 1 evOus ol 
'AOiiraioi diroreiXLO avres i(f>povpovv to S' e? rr)v 
J\a\\i)v7]v aTeixiaTov fpr ov yap Izeavol ivbpu^ov 
eivai ev T€ t<w IctO/mm (f)povpelv zeal e? rr)V TlaX- 
\i]vi]v hia(3dv76<; reiyl'C.uv, hehioTes /jltj a(j)laLv ol 
UoTeihearac zeal ol fu/zyiia%ot yevopevois hl^a 

2 eiriOoyvrai. zeal irvvOavopiei ot ol iv rfj iro\ei 
'Adt]pacoi T7]v TIaWijvrjv dreL)(iaTOv ovo-av,xpoi'q) 
hcrrepov ire par ova lv e^azeoalovf; zeal %i\lov<; 
oirX'iras eavTMv zeal <Popp.Lcova rbv 'Agcdttlov 
arTpary-jyov o? ac/u/co/xe^o? e? rrjv UaWijvijv zeal ef 
'AipvTios 6pfid>fJLevo<; irpocnqyaye rfj lioreihaia top 
1 Classen deletes, followed by Hude. 

1 On the Athenian side were 600 Macedonian cavalry 
(ch. lxi. 4), on the Potidaean side 200 Macedonian cavalry 
under Perdiccas (ch. lxii. 3). 

2 Thucydides omits the loss of the allies of the Athenians. 
8 The wall on the isthmus side of the Potidaeans is the 


BOOK I. lxiii. 2-lxiv. a 

the Potidaeans in Olynthus — which is only about 
sixty stadia distant and can be seen from Potidaea — 
advanced a short distance to give aid, and the Mace- 
donian cavalry drew up in line against them to 
prevent it. But since the Athenians were soon 
proving the victors and the standards were pulled 
down, the auxiliaries retired again within the walls 
of Olynthus and the Macedonians rejoined the 
Athenians. And so no cavalry got into action 
on either side. 1 After the battle the Athenians set 
up a trophy and gave up their dead under a truce to 
the Potidaeans. There were slain, of the Potidaeans 
and their allies a little less than three hundred, and 
of the Athenians alone 2 about a hundred and fifty, 
and also their general Callias. 

LXIV. The city wall on the isthmus side 3 the 
Athenians immediately cut off by a transverse wall 
and set a guard there, but the wall toward Pallene 
was not shut off. 4 For they thought their numbers 
were insufficient to maintain a garrison on the isthmus 
and also to cross over to Pallene and build a wall 
there too, fearing that, if they divided their forces, 
the Potidaeans and their allies would attack them. 
Afterwards, when the Athenians at home learned 
that Pallene was not blockaded, they sent sixteen 
hundred of their own hoplites under the command 
of Phormio son of Asopius ; and he, when he arrived 
at Pallene, making Aphytis his base, brought his 
army to Potidaea, marching leisurely and ravaging 

Tetx os °f c h» lxii. 6 ; the wall to Pallene is that mentioned 
in ch. lvi. 2 as rb h Ua\\i\vnv reixos. 

* The investment of Potidaea was effected by walling off 
first the northern and then also the southern city wall by a 
blockading wall ; on the west and east, where the city ex- 
tended to the sea, the blockade was made with ships. 

VOL. I. F * 


arparov, Kara fipa^v irpoiaiv /cal /ceipwv apa tt)i 
3 yrjv co? he ovBels eire^rjei e? pdyrjv, dnreTeiyi(i> 
to 6K t?)? UaXXijvrjs Tet^o?* teal o{/to>? rjSi] Kan 
tcpaTOS r) UoTeiSaia dp(f)orep(o0ev iiroXLopKetT 
koX etc OaXaacrr]^ vavalv dpa icfroppovaais. 

LXV. 'ApuTTevs he dTroreiytGdeiay}*; avrfj? kc\ 
eXiriha ovhepiav eywv acoT7)p[a<;, rjv pur) ri am 
YleXoirovvijcrov rj aXXo irapa Xoyov yiyvrjra 
gvveftovXeve p,ev irXriv irevraKoaiwv avep,ov r. 
prjaaat, to£? aXkois eKirXevaai, otto)? eVl 7r\e 
6 (jZtos avrio-^rj, fcal avrbs f)0eXe rwv pevovrtl 
elvar &><? 8' ovk eirei6e ) ftovXopevos ra iirl tovti 
irapacTKeva^eiv real 07tg)? ra etjwOev e%ei oj? apiai 
€/C7tXovv TTOLelrai XaOow rr)V cj)vXaKr)v rwv 'A£ 

2 valcov tcaX irapapievcov ev XaX/ctSevcri rd re aXl 
%vveiroXepei real *£epp,vXi(ov Xo%^o*a9 Trpbs I . 

TToXei TTOXXOVS 8l€(f)0€ip€P, I? T€ Tt)v HeXOTTOV (■ 

3 crop eirpaaaev oirrj to(f)€Xia Tt<? yevrjaerai. /xp 
$e TTJ? Yloreihaias rr)v aTrorei^o'iv Qoppiwv p 
eywv rovs eijateoaLOV 1 ; ical xiXlovs ttjv XoXkl&i p 
teal ^ottlkiiv iSrjov koX eariv a /cal iroXiafiw 

LXVI. Tot? 8' 'AOrjvalois /cal HeXoTrovvrjow 
alriav pev avrai irpoayeyevr^vro 1 e? dXXrjXk : 
rot? /xei> KopivOLois 2 on ri]p UoreiSaiau eaitn I 
ovaav dwouciav real dvSpas KopivOLwv re k 

1 Hiule reads irpovy^yivt^vro, with BCE. 

2 Hade inserts, after Kopivdiois, the words ^$ tovs 'AdTjf^s 
following Reiske 



the country at the same time. And as no one came 
out against him to give battle he built a wall to 
blockade the Pallene wall. And so Potidaea was at 
length in a state of siege, which was prosecuted 
vigorously on both sides of it as well as by sea, 
where a fleet blockaded it. 

LXV. As for Aristeus, now that Potidaea was cut 
off by the blockade and he had no hope of saving it 
unless help should come from the Peloponnesus or 
something else should happen beyond his expecta- 
tion, he advised all the garrison except five hundred 
men to wait for a wind and sail out of the harbour, 
that the food might hold out longer, and he himself 
was ready to be one of those who should remain. But 
since he could not gain their consent, wishing to do 
the next best thing and to provide that their affairs 
outside should be put into the best possible con- 
dition, he sailed out, unobserved by the Athenian 
guard. He then remained among the Chalcidians, 
whom he assisted generally in carrying on the war, 
and especially by destroying a large force of Ser- 
mylians, whom he ambushed near their city ; and 
meanwhile he kept up negotiations with the Pelo- 
ponnesians to see if some aid could not be obtained. 
Phormio, however, after the investment of Potidaea 
was complete, took his sixteen hundred troops and 
ravaged Chalcidice and Bottice ; and he also cap- 
tured some towns. 

LXVI. As between the Athenians and the Pelo- 
ponnesians, then, these additional grounds of com- 
plaint had arisen on either side, the Corinthians 
being aggrieved because the Athenians were besieg- 
ing Potidaea, a colony of theirs with men in it from 



HeXoTrovvrjaicov iv avrfj ovras eiroXiopKOW, tol<; 
Be ' A6r]vaioL<i e? tovs UeXoTrovvrjo-iovs ore eavrcov 
re ttoXlv %vpp,ayiBa ical cpopov vTroreXrj dire- 
<TTT)(Tav ical iXOovres acf)L(TLV dirb rod 7rpo<fcavov<; 
ifjbd^ovTO fierd YloreiBearcov. ov fievroi 6 ye 
TToXe/jios irco gvveppcoyet, dXX* en dvo/ccoxv V v ' 
IBia yap ravra ol Y^oplvQioi eirpa^av. 

LXVII. TloXLopicovpLev7)<$ Be t?)? TloTeiSaias 
ovx r)crvx a % 0v > dvBpcov re crfylaiv ivovrcov ical 
apLa irepl Tftj ^copto) SeSioTes. IT ape/cdXovv re 
evOvs e? ttjv Aa/ceSal/Jiova toi)? £i//^u,a%ou? teal 
fcareftocov eXOovres tcov ' AOrjvaicov on airovhd<; 
re XeXvicores elev ical dBueolev rrjv UeXoTrovvrjaov. 

2 Alyivr)Tai re cfiavepcos p,ev ov irpea^evopevot, 
BeBwre^ tou? ^AO^vaiov^, tepvepa Si, ovx rjtciara 
per avrcov ivrjyov rbv iroXepov, Xiyovre? ovk 

3 elvac avrovofMoc Kara Ta? cnrovSds. oi Be AaKe- 
Baipovioi TrpoairapaKaXecravTes tcov %vp,pdxo)v 
/cal 1 el rts re ciXXos ecprf i]BiKr\aQai virb AOrjvaicov, 
gvXXoyov acpcov avrcov iroL^aavre^ rbv elcoOora 

4 Xiyeiv e/ceXevov. teal aXXoi re irapiovres eyfeXy- 
para irroiovvro a>9 €fcao~Toi /cal Meyaprjs, Brj- 
XovvTes p,ev nal erepa ovk oklya Sidcpopa, pdXiara 
Be Xip,ivcov re eipyeaQai tcov iv rfj 'AOrjvaicov 
dpxfj ko\ tt}<? 'Atti/c/j? dyopd<; irapa rds crirovBd^. 

5 irapeXdovTes Be reXevraloi, KopuvOiOL ical tovs 
dXXov<; idcravTe? nrpcorov irapo^vvai tovs Aaice- 
Saipiovlovs eirelirov roidSe. 

LXVIII. " To TTtarbv vpid^, co AaKeSatp,ovLoi, 
tt}? /caO' vp,ds auTou? TroXireias teal opuXias 

1 Hude reads re ical with C and some inferior MSS. 

BOOK I. lxvi. i-lxviii. i 

Corinth and the Peloponnesus, the Athenians, because 
the Peloponnesians had brought about the revolt of 
a city that was an ally and tributary of theirs, and 
then had come and openly fought with the Potidaeans 
against themselves. As yet, however, the war had 
not openly broken out, but there was still a truce 
for in these things the Corinthians had acted only on 
their own authority. 

LXVI I. But when siege was laid to Potidaea they 
did not take it quietly, not only because Corinthians 
were in the town, but also because they were in fear 
about the place ; and they immediately summoned 
the allies to Lacedaemon and, once there, they pro- 
ceeded to inveigh against the Athenians on the 
ground that they had broken the treaty and were 
wronging the Peloponnesus. The Aeginetans also 
sent delegates — not openly, to be sure, for they 
feared the Athenians, but secretly — and, acting with 
the Corinthians, took a leading part in fomenting 
the war, saying that they were not autonomous as 
stipulated in the treaty. Then the Lacedaemonians 
sent out a summons to all the other allies who 
claimed to have suffered any wrong at the hands ot 
the Athenians, and calling their own customary 
assembly bade them speak. Others came forward 
and stated their several complaints, and particularly 
the Megarians, who presented a great many other 
grievances, and chiefly this, that they were ex- 
cluded from the harbours throughout the Athenian 
dominions and from the Athenian market, contrary 
to the treaty. Lastly the Corinthians, after they 
had first allowed the others to exasperate the Lace- 
daemonians, spoke as follows : — 

LXVI1I. "That spirit of trust which marks your 
domestic policy, O Lacedaemonians, and your relations 



a7ri<TTOT€pov<; t e? toi><? aXXov? J r\v ri Xeyoo/iev, 
fcaOLarriGiv' zeal air avrov craxfipoavvrjv /iev 
e^ere, afiaOia Be irXeovi 73730? ra k^co irpdyfiara 

2 xprjaOe. 7ToXXd/ci<z yap TTpoayopevbvrwv rj/xcov 

a ifieXXofiev inrb *A0i)val&v ftXdirTeaOai, ov irepl 

a)v eBiBdaKOfiev eKaarore ttjv fidOrjaiv eiroielade, 

dXXa tcop Xeyovrcov jiaXXov virevoelre <w? evexa 

TOiv aurot? IBla Bcacbopcov Xeyovcnv teal oY avrb 

... * 
ov irpiv irdo-%eiv, dXX' eireiB-r) ev ra> epyw ea/iev, 

tol»? ^v[i[xd)^ov<; rovaBe irapeKaXeaare, ev ol? 

TrpoarjKei 77/xa? ov'^rjKio'TaelTrelv ocro) teal fieyiara 

iyfcXrfaaTa exo/jiev, vtto p.ev 'Adrjvaioov vftpt,%6- 

3 fjLevoi, V7rb Be vjJLcov d/ieXovfievoi. teal el jxev 
depaveis ttov oWe? f)Bltcovv Trjv 'KXXdBa, BiBaatca- 
Xta? av *o? ovtc elBocn TrpoaeBer vvv Be ri Bel 
ILCLKprjyopelv, wv tou? fiev BeBovXco/ievovs opdre, 
to£? B' eirif3ovXevovTa<; avrov?, teal ov% ijtciara 
rot? jjjLLeTepocs ^u/i/xd^oL^, teal etc ttoXXov irpo- 

4 irapea tcevaa fievovs, eX irore TroXepLrjaovrai,; ov yap 
av Keptcvpdv re vTroXajSovres $La fjfiwv elyov /cal 
UoreiBaiav eTroXioptcovv <ov rb fiev eirLtcaipbraTov 
yjuapiov Trpb? rd eVl ®patc7)? aTro^pfjaOai, rj Be 
vavritcbv av /xeyiarov irapea^e rot? TLeXoirovvr]' 

LXIX. " Kat rcovBe bfxel? alrioi, to re irpoyrov 
idaavre? avrov? ri)v ttoXlv fierd rd MrjBitcd 


BOOK I. lxviii. i-lxix. i 

with one another, renders you more mistrustful 
if we bring any charge against others, and thus 
while this quality gives you sobriety, yet because 
of it you betray a want of understanding in dealing 
with affairs abroad. For example, although we 
warned you time and again of the injury the 
Athenians were intending to do us, you refused to 
accept the information we kept giving you, but pre- 
ferred to direct your suspicions against the speakers, 
feeling that they were actuated by their own private 
interests. And this is the reason why you did not act 
before we got into trouble, but it is only when we 
are in the midst of it that you have summoned these 
allies, among whom it is especially fitting that we 
should speak, inasmuch as we have the gravest accu- 
sations to bring, insulted as we have long been by the 
Athenians and neglected by you. And if they were 
wronging Hellas in some underhand way, you might 
have needed additional information on the ground 
of your ignorance ; but as the case stands, what need 
is there of a long harangue, when you see that they 
have enslaved some of us \ and are plotting against 
others, notably against your own allies, and that 
they have long been making their preparations with 
a view to the contingency of war ? For otherwise 
they would not have purloined Corcyra, which they 
still hold in despite of us, and would not be besieg- 
ing Potidaea — one of these being a most strategic 
point for operations on the Thracian coast, while the 
other would have furnished a very large fleet to the 

LXIX. " And the blame for all this belongs to 
you, for you permitted them in the first instance to 

1 Referring especially to the Aeginetans, in the other 
cases to the Megarians and Potidaeana. 



tcparvvat teal varepov ra pa/cpd gti)o~cu retx 7 ]* & 
roBe re alel airoarepovvre^ ov povov toi>? vir 
i/celvcov SeSov\(op,evovs i\ev0epias, dWd real rovs 
vpLerepovs rjSr) ^vfifMa^ov^ ov yap 6 BovXwad- 
pevos, aKX* 6 Bvvdp,evo<; p.ev iravaat, irepiopcov Be 
d\r)de<JT€pov avrb Spa, elirep /cal tyjv d^uoGLV rfj<$ 

2 aperr)*; co? eXevOepcJv ttjv 'JLWdSa (freperai. p,6\i<; 
Be vvv ye %vvr)\6op.ev Ka\ ovBe vvv eiil (pavepois. 
XPV V J^p ovk el d8ifcovp,€0a en o~KOirelv, dXka 
tcaO' o tl dpvvovpLeOa' oi jap 1 Bpcovres f3e/3ov\ev- 
pevoi 7T/0O? ov BieyvcoKoras ijSrj teal ov p,e\\ovT€<; 

3 eirepyovrai. real eirLo-rdpieOa o'ia cBw oi 'AOtj- 
valoi fcal 07i tear 6\iyov ywpovcriv eVl rov<; 
7reX<z?. real Xavddveiv pev olbpuevoi Bid to 
dvala07]TOV v/xaiv rjaaov Oapaovau, yvovres Be 

4 elBora*; Trepiopav la)(vpco<; eyKeiaovrai. rjav^d- 
%ere yap puovoc 'EWrjvcov, a) AaKeSaip,6viOL, ov rfj 
Bvvdp,ei nvd, dWd rrj p,eX\j]crei dpuvvopLevoc, real 
pLovoi ovk dpyop,evr)v ttjv av^rjaiv ra>v e-^OpoJv, 

5 BnrXacr iov p,kvi]v Be /caraXvovres. tcairoi eXeyeaOe 
dacjiaXeZs elvai, a>v cipa 6 \6yo$ rov epyov etcpdrei. 
tov T€ yap ^IrjSov avrol ia/iev eic rrepdrcov 77)9 
irpo-repov eirl ttjv YleXoirovvrjaov eXOovra r\ ra 

1 oi yap, so MSS. : Hude reads oi 7? after Classen. 

1 See ch. xc. ff. a See ch. cvii. 1. 

3 Referring to the recent increase of the Athenian navy by 
the accession of the Corcyraean fleet. 


BOOK I. lxix. 1-5 

strengthen their city after the Persian war, 1 and 
afterwards to build their Long Walls/ 2 while up to 
this very hour you are perpetually defrauding of their 
freedom not only those who have been enslaved by 
them, but now even your own allies also. For the 
state which has reduced others to slavery does not 
in a more real fashion enslave them than the state 
which has power to prevent it, and yet looks care- 
lessly on, although claiming as its preeminent dis- 
tinction that it is the liberator of Hellas. And now 
at last we have with difficulty managed to come 
together, though even now without a clearly defined 
purpose. For we ought no longer to be considering 
whether we are wronged, but how we are to avenge 
our wrongs. For where men are men of action, it is 
with resolved plans against those who have come to no 
decision, it is at once and without waiting, that they 
advance. We know too by what method the Athen- 
ians move against their neighbours — that it is here 
a little and there a little. And as long as they think 
that, owing to your want of perception, they are 
undetected, they are less bold ; but once let them 
learn that you are aware but complaisant, and they 
will press on with vigour. For indeed, O Lacedae- 
monians, you alone of the Hellenes pursue a passive 
policy, defending yourselves against aggression, not 
by the use of your power, but by your intention to 
use it ; and you alone propose to destroy your 
enemies' power, not at its inception, but when it is 
doubling itself. 3 And yet you had the reputation of 
running no risks ; but with you, it would seem, repute 
goes beyond reality. For example, the Persian, as 
we ourselves know, came from the ends of the earth 
as far as the Peloponnesus before your forces went 



irap vfiwv d^icos irpoarravrrjaai, koI vvv rovs 
'A.dr]vaiov<; ov-% eicds, coenrep eicelvov, dU' 6771)9 
6Wa? rrepiopdre, ical dvr\ rov iireXOeiv avrol 
d/ivveaOai fiovXeaOe puaXXov eiriovras /cal e? 
Tir^a? 7ryoo? ttoXXw Svvarcorepovs dywvi^opevot, 
Karaarr/vai, eTriard/xevoi Kal rbv fidpftapov avrbv 
irepl avrw rd TrXeico crfyaXevra /cal irpbs avrovs 
tou? 'AOrjvaiovs 7roXXa r)p,a<; ijSrj to?? dfiaprrj- 
fiacnv avTOiv pidXXov rj rfj d<f) v/jLcop ripicopia 
irepiyeyevrjpevovs' eirel ai ye vfierepai eKiri&es 
i]8r) rivds ttov Kal dirapaaKevovs hid rb iriarev- 

6 aai e(j)@€Lpav. Kal pbrjSeh v/icov eV eyOpa, to 
rrXeov r) atria, vop.iarj rdBe XeyeaOar aWia \iev 
yap <f>iX(ov dvSpcov eariv d/iapravovrcov, Karrj- 
yopia Be eyQposv dSiKr/cravroov. 

LXX. "Kal dfia, elirep rives Kal aXXoi, vofii- 
fyfjiev agwi elvai roi? rreXas \froyov eireveyKelv, 
aX\a>? re Kal jieydXwv rwv Sia(pep6vrcov KaOearco- 
twv, irepl ayv ovk alaOdveaOai rjpuv ye SoKeire ovb* 
€KXoyicraa0ai irdnrore irpbs olovs vpuv 'A0i]vaiov<; 
ovras Kal oaov v/xcov koi a>? rrdv hiafyepovras 6 

2 dycov earai. 01 fiev ye vecoreporroiol Kal eiri- 
vorjaai Orel's Kal eirireXeaai epyw a av yvwaiv, 
v/iels Be rd virdpyovrd re au>^eiv /cal eiriyvcovai 
fitj&ev Kal epy<p ovBe rdvayKala i£iKea@ai. 


forth to withstand him in a manner worthy of your 
power ; and now you regard with indifference the 
Athenians who are not afar off, as the Persian was, but 
near at hand, and instead of attacking them your- 
selves, you prefer to ward them off when they 
attack, and incur hazard by joining in a struggle 
with opponents who have become far more powerful. 
Yet you know that the Barbarian failed mostly by 
his own fault, and that in our struggles with the 
Athenians themselves we have so far often owed 
our successes rather to their own errors than to any 
aid received from you ; indeed, it is the hopes they 
have placed in you that have already ruined more 
than one state 1 that was unprepared just because 
of trust in you. And let no one of you think that 
these things are said more out of hostile feeling 
than by way of complaint ; for complaint is against 
friends that err, but accusation against enemies that 
have inflicted an injury. 

LXX. " And besides, we have the right, we think, 
if any men have, to find fault with our neighbours, 
especially since the interests at stake for us are im- 
portant. To these interests it seems to us at least 
that you are insensible, and that you have never even 
fully considered what sort of men the Athenians are 
with whom you will have to fight, and how very, how 
utterly, different they are from you. For they are 
given to innovation and quick to form plans and to 
put their decisions into execution, whereas you are 
disposed merely to keep what you have, to devise 
nothing new, and, when you do take action, not to 
carry to completion even what is indispensable. 

1 Alluding perhaps to the Thasiana (ch. ci.) and the 
Euboeans (ch. cxiv.). 



3 avOis Be ol piev /cal irapd Bvvafiiv toX/jltjtclI teal 
irapd yvco/i^v /civBvvevral icai ev Tot? Beivols 
eueArrtSe?* to Be v/iirepov r/j? re Bvvdp,eo)<; ivSed 
irpd^ai t?}? re yvGQfirjs /xrjBe roU f3e/3ai,oi<; TuaTev- 
acu tcov re Becvcov jjL7]BeiTore oietrQai airokvdrj- 

4 aeaOac. /cal firjv /cal clokvoi 777)09 u/^a? yaeW^Ta? 
/cal aTroBt] yu]7 al 7roo? ivBrj/jLordrovs' olovrai yap 
ol fiev rfj airovala av tl KraaOac, vfiels Be tco 

5 e%e\6elv /cal ra eroipa av fiXdyjrai. Kparovvrh 
re rcov exOpcbv eirl 7r\elcTT0V e^ep-^ovrai /cal 

6 viKcojxevQi iir ekd^iGTOv dvairiTnovcrLV. ere Be 
Tot? pev cToo/jLacnv dWorpicordroi 1 ; virep tt}<? 
7roXea)5 xpcovrai, rfj Be jvcojjltj ol/ceioTarrj e? to 

7 irpdaaeiv ri imep avTTjV icai a fiev av eirivorj- 
travTes /nrj eire^ekOcoo-iv, ol/celcov cnepeaOai rjyovv- 
rai, a B' av eireXOovres /crrjcrctiVTai, oklya irpbs 
ra jxeWovTa Tu%etj> Trpdgavres, rjv B' dpa rov /cal 
irelpa crcfraXtoo-LV, dvre\TTiaavre<; dWa eirX^pcocrav 
ttjv xpeiav jjlovol yap e^oval re 6/jLolcos /cal 
eKizi^ovGiv a av iirivoyjacoai Bid to ra^elav ttjv 

8 eTTi\elpi)Giv iroielaOai tov av yvcocriv. /cal ravra 
p,erd ttovcov irdvra /cal /ctvBvvcov Bi o\ov rov 
alcbvo? fjbox^ovai, /cal diroXavovaiv eXd^o-ra rcov 
V7rapxovrcov Bid to alel KrdaOac /cal pLijre eoprrjv 
aWo tl rjyelaOai r) to ra Beovra irpd^ai %vp.- 
<popdv re oi>x fjao-ov fjo-vxiav dirpdy/jiova rj 


BOOK I. lxx. 3-8 

Again, they are bold beyond their strength, venture- 
some beyond their better judgment, and sanguine in 
the face of dangers ; while your way is to do less 
than your strength warrants, to distrust even what 
your judgment is sure of, and when dangers come 
to despair of deliverance. Nay more, they are 
prompt in decision, while you are dilatory ; they 
stir abroad, while you are perfect stay-at-homes ; 
for they expect by absence from home to gain 
something, while you are afraid that, if you go out 
after something, you may imperil even what you have. 
If victorious over their enemies, they pursue their 
advantage to the utmost ; if beaten, they fall back 
as little as possible. Moreover, they use their bodies 
in the service of their country as though they were 
the bodies of quite other men, but their minds as 
though they were wholly their own, so as to accom- 
plish anything on her behalf. And whenever they 
have conceived a plan but fail to carry it to fulfil- 
ment, they think themselves robbed of a possession 
of their own ; and whenever they go after a thing 
and obtain it, they consider that they have accom- 
plished but little in comparison with what the future 
has in store for them ; but if it so happens that they 
try a thing and fail, they form new hopes instead and 
thus make up the loss. For with them alone is it 
the same thing to hope for and to attain when once 
they conceive a plan, for the reason that they swiftly 
undertake whatever they determine upon. In this 
way they toil, with hardships and dangers, all their 
life long ; and least of all men they enjoy what they 
have because they are always seeking more, because 
they think their only holiday is to do their duty, 
and because they regard untroubled peace as a far 



9 dayoXiav iirlirovov ware el tj? avrovs %vveXwv 
(pair) irefyvicevai eirl tw fJLrjre avrovs eyeiv i)°~ v X iav 
fAijre tovs aXXovs dvdpdnrov^ eav, opOcos av 


LXXI. "TavTrjs fievroL roiavrr)^ dvrtKadearTj- 
kvlcl<; 7ro\ea)?, w AafceBaifiovioi, BiafieXXere real 
olecOe tt]v r)Gvyiav ov tovtols toiv dv0pco7rcov eVi 
irXelaTOv dpKelv, ol av rrj fiev irapaaKevfj Bl/caia 
TrpdacraxTL, ttj Be yvcofirj, rjv dBitccovTai, Bi]Xoi 
wgl /jlt) 67rLrpiyjrovT€<;, dXX' eirl t&> fir) Xvirelv re 
tovs dXXovs kcu avrol dpjvvo\xevoi /xr) ^Xdirreo~6ai 

2 to "gov vifiere. fioXis S' av iroXei 6/jloIcl irapoi- 
kovvt€<; ervyxdvere rovrov vvv B\ oirep koX dpTi 
ehrfKooaafxev, dpyaiorpoira v/iwv ra eircTr)Bev/iara 

3 irpbs avrovs €<ttiv. dvdyKr] Be wairep Te^i/779 
alel rd eiriyiyvofieva /cparelv koX riGvy^a^ovar} 
fiev iroXei, rd aKLvrjra vofiifia apiara, 777)0? 
iroXXa Be dvayfca%op,evoi<; levai iroXXrjs koX 
tt}? eiriTe'xyrjaewf; Bel. 6Y oirep teal rd tcov 
* Adr\vaiwv dirb tt}? iroXvireipias eirl irXeov vfiwv 

4 " We\pi puev ovv rovBe ayplaOco vficov rj ftpaBv- 
ttJ?" vvv Be toU re aXXois fcal UoreiBedra^, toairep 
vireBe^aaOe, /SoyOijaare Kara raxos ecrfiaXovTes 
e? rr)v 'AttlkjJv, ha firj dv&pas re $t\ou? teal 
£vyyevei<; toc? e%#tcrTO£? irporjade xal rjfids roue. 
aXXovs ddvfiia 7rpo? erepav rwd tjvp,/jLa%Lav 

1 i.e. you attempt to be fair on the principle that it is wise 
not to offend others and so run the risk of injury which may 


BOOK I. lxx. 8-lxxi. 4 

greater calamity than laborious activity. Therefore 
if a man should sum up and say that they were born 
neither to have peace themselves nor to let other 
men have it, he would simply speak the truth. 

LXXI. " And yet, although you have such a state 
ranged against you, O Lacedaemonians, you go on 
delaying and forget that a peaceful policy suffices 
long only for those who, while they employ their 
military strength only for just ends, yet by their 
spirit show plainly that they will not put up with 
it if they are treated with injustice ; whereas you 
practise fair dealing on the principle of neither giving 
offence to others nor exposing yourselves to injury 
in self-defence. 1 But it would be difficult to carry ' 
out such a policy successfully if you had as neighbour 
a state just like yourselves; whereas now, as we have 
just shown, your practices are old-fashioned as com- 
pared with theirs. But in politics, as in the arts, the 
new must always prevail over the old. It is true „ 
that when a state is at peace the established practices 
are best left unmodified, but when men are compelled 
to enter into many undertakings there is need of 
much improvement in method. It is for this reason 
that the government of the Athenians, because they 
have undertaken many things, has undergone greater 
change than yours. 

" Here, then, let your dilatoriness end ; at this 
moment succour both the Potidaeans and the rest 
of your allies, as you promised to do, by invading 
Attica without delay, that you may not betray your 
friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and 
drive the rest of us in despair to seek some other 

arise in defending yourselves against the attacks you have 

Il 9 


5 Tpiyjrrjre. Bpco/iev B* av aBiKov ovBev ovre 717)0? 
Oecov rcov bpKicov ovre 7roo? avOpcoircov rcov alcrOa- 
vo/ievcov Xvovai yap cmovBa<; ov% ol cV eprjfiiav 
aXXoi<i Trpoaiovres, a\V ol /xr/ (Sor)6ovvres ol? av 

6 ^VVOflOaCOCTlV. /3ov\OfjL€V(DV 8k VpLCOV TTpoOvflCOV 

elvai /jL€vov/jl€v ovre yap oaia av Troiolfiev fiera- 
ftaXXo/nevoi ovre gwrjOecrrepov? av aXXovs evpoi- 

7 fiev. 77730? rdBe (SovXeveo~6e ev /cal rr)v IleXo- 
TTovvrjaov rreipaaOe fir) eXdaaco e%r)yelo~6at rj ol 
rrarepes irapeBoaav" 

LXXIL Toiavra fiev ol KopuvOioL elirov. rcov 
Be ' 'Adrjvalcov erv^e yap irpea^eia rrpbrepov ev 
rfj AafceBai/jLOVi irepl dXXcov irapovaa, ica\ &)9 
yn-QovTO rcov Xoycov, eBo^ev avroU Trapirrjrea e? 
toi>? AafceBai/iovLovs elvat, rcov fiev eyKXrjfidrcov 
irepi firjBev diroXoy^aofievov^, cov al iroXeis eVe- 
tcaXovv, BrjXcoaat Be irepl rod iravrbs a>? ov Ta^ew? 
avrols fiovXevreov elr), a\V ev irXeovi aKerrreov. 
Kal cifia rr)v crc\>erepav ttoXiv i/3ovXovro arjfifjvai 
oat] etr) Bvva/iiv, Kal virofivqcnv Trocrjcracrdai Tot? 
re rrpeo-^vrepoL^ cov rjBeaav Kal Tot? vecorepoi? 
i£rjyr)o~iv cov aireipoi r)o~av, vofil^ovre^ fiaXXov av 
avrovs eK rcov Xoycov 777)0? to i)av^d^et,v rparre- 
2 adai rj 7r^o? to iroXe/ielv. irpoaeXOovre^ ovv roU 
AaKeBaipiovioLS ecpaaav /SovXeaOai Kal avrol e? 
to ttXtjOos avrcov elirelv, el ri fir) clttokcoXvol. ol 
Be eKeXevov re irapievai, Kal irapeXOovre? ol 
'Adrjvaloi eXeyov roidBe. 


alliance. If we took such a course we should be 
committing no wrong either in the sight of the gods 
we have sworn by or of men of understanding ; for 
treaties are broken not by those who when left un- 
supported join others, but by those who fail to 
succour allies they have sworn to aid. But if you 
mean to be zealous allies we will stay ; for in that 
case we should be guilty of impiety if we changed 
our friends, nor should we find others more congenial. 
In view of these things, be well advised, and make 
it your endeavour that the Peloponnesian league shall 
be no weaker under your leadership than when you 
inherited it from your fathers." / ^-"-*""' 

LXXII. Thus spoke the Corinthians. But there 
happened to be present at Lacedaemon an embassy 
of the Athenians that had come on other business, 
and when they heard the various speeches they 
deemed it advisable to appear before the Lacedae- 
monians, not indeed to make any defence on the 
charges brought by the cities, but to make clear with 
regard to the whole question at issue that the Lace- 
daemonians should not decide it hastily but should 
take more time to consider it. At the same time 
they wished to show how great was the power of 
their own city, reminding the older men of what 
they already knew, and recounting to the younger 
things of which they were ignorant, in the belief 
that under the influence of their arguments the 
Lacedaemonians would be inclined to peace rather 
than war. Accordingly they approached the Lace- 
daemonians and said that they also wished, if there 
was nothing to hinder, to address their assembly. The 
Lacedaemonians invited them to present themselves, 
and the Athenians came forward and spoke as follows : 


LXXIIT. " 'H fiev it pea /Sevens tj/jlcov ovk e? 
dvriXoyiav rols vfierepois ^vixpudyoi^ eyevero, 
dXXa irepl o)v 7) ttoXls eirefx^rev alaOavofievoc Be 
Kara/3or)v ovk oXljtjv ovaav r)p,a)v TTapi'fKOofJLev, 
ov rot? iyKXrj/iaat, rcov rroXewv dvrepovvres (ov 
yap irapd hiKaarais ovre tj/jlwv ovre rovrcov 
01 Xoyoi dv ylyvoivro), dXX' oVw? fir) paZUos irepl 
fieydXwv irpayfidrwv tols %vp.fidyoi$ ireiQofievoi 
X^pov /3ovXevar)ade, Kal dfia /3ovXo/ievoL irepl 
rov iravros Xoyov rov e? r) fids Ka6eara)ros hrjXco- 
aai co? ovre direiKorays eyo/iev a KeKri')peQa, r) re 
iroXts t)/jlu)v a%ia Xoyov early. 

2 " Kal ra fiev irdvv iraXaid ri Set Xeyeiv, ayv 
d/coal fiaXXov Xoycov fidprvpes rj 6-^ris rcov d/cov- 
aofievcov; ra he. ^AtjSlko, Kal oaa avrol ^vvtare, 
el Kal hi o)(Xov fiaXXov earai alel irpo/3aXXo- 
/jLevois, dvdyKTj Xeyeiv. Kal yap ore ehpcopev, eir* 
tocfreXLq eKLvSvvevero, 77? rov fiev epyov fiepos 
fierea^ere, rov he Xoyov firj iravros, el n wcfieXel, 1 

3 arepiaKco/ieda. pr)9i)aerai he ov rrapairtjaecos 
fidXXov ei'€Ka r) paprvplov Kal hifXaoaeoos irpos 
oiav vplv iroXiv fir) ev fiovXevofievois 6 dyaiv 

4 " Qapev yap MapaOcovl re fibvoi irpoKtvhv- 
vevaai ra> jBapfBapU) Kal ore ro varepov rjXdev, 

1 w(pt\u E. 

BOOK I. lxxiii. 1-4 

LXXIII. "Our embassy did not come here to 
enter into a dispute with your allies, but on the 
business for which our city sent us. Perceiving, 
however, that no small outcry is being made against 
us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges 
of the cities (for it can hardlybe that either they or 
we are addressing you as judges), but in order that 
you may not, yielding to the persuasion of your 
allies, lightly make a wrong decision about matters 
of great importance. And at the same time we wish, 
as regards the whole outcry that has been raised 
against us, to show that we are rightfully in posses- 
sion of what we have acquired, and that our city is 
not to be despised. 

" Now, what need is there to speak about matters 
quite remote, 1 whose only witnesses are the stories 
men hear rather than the eyes of those who 
will hear them told? But concerning the Persian 
War and all the other events of which you have 
personal knowledge, we needs must speak, even 
though it will be rather irksome to mention them, 
since they are always being paraded. For when we 
were performing those deeds the risk was taken for 
a common benefit, and since you got a share of the 
actual results of that benefit, we should not be wholly 
deprived of the credit, if there is any benefit in that. 
And our aim in the recital of the facts will be, not 
so much to deprecate censure, as to show by evidence 
with what sort of city you will be involved in war 
if you are not well advised. 

" For we affirm that at Marathon we alone bore 
the first brunt of the Barbarian's attack, and that 

1 The Schol. remarks ra Kara 'Ajm^ovar xal QpqKas *al 
'HpaKAei'Saj, favourite themes in eulogies, panegyric speeches, 



oi>x licavoX ovres Kara yr}v dfivvecrOai, iafidvres 
65 Ta? z;av? TravBrjfiel iv XaXafilvi gvvvav fiaxr/' 
aai, oirep ecr^e fir] Kara 7roXei<; avrbv iir LirXeovr a 
tt)v YlekoTTOvvrjcrov rropOelv, dBvvdrcov dv ovrcov 

5 rrpb<; vav$ 7ro\Xa? dXXijXois iirLporjdelv. reKfi-q- 
pLOV Be pueyiarov avrbs iiroCrjaev pi/crjdel? yap 
rail vavcriv ax? ovKeri avrco o/jlolcls 01/0*779 tt)<? 
Bvvdfiecos /card Tayos tw irXeovi rov arparov 

LXXIV. " Tolovtov fievTOi rovrov %vp,$dvro$ 
Ka\ <ja$m SrjXcodivTO? ore iv rah vaval rcov 
'EXXyjvcov ra irpdjfiara iyevero, rpia ra cocpeXi- 
fitorara e? avro irapeaxb^eOa, dpiO/xov re vecov 
irXelarov zeal dvBpa arparrjybv ^vvercorarov tcai 
irpoOvfiiav doKvordrrjv vavs pev ye e? ra9 
rerpaKoaias oXiyw iXaacrovs rcov Bvo fioipcov, 
Oe/iiaroKXea Be apxovra, 6? alricoraro^ iv rco 
arevco vavfiaxficai iyevero, oirep aacpearara 
eacocre ra irpdyp^ara, /cal avrbv Bid rovro v/xeU 
eriprjaare pudXiara Brj dvBpa %evov rcov a>9 v/ids 

2 iXObvrcov irpoOvpiav Be /cal ttoXv roXpirjpordr-qv 
ibei^apbev, oi ye, iireiBr) rj/ilv Kara yrjv ovBeU 
iporjOei, row aXXcov rjBrj p<expi rjp-wv BovXevbv- 
rcov, yj^icoaa/iev iKXtrrovres rrjv ttoXiv Kal ra ol- 
Kela BiafyOelpavres /a>?S' a>? to rcov rrepiXolircov 
gvfifidxw kolvov irpoXiTTelv fxrjBe o-KeBacr6evr€<; 
dxpeloc avrols yeveaOai, dXX' icrftdvres e? ras 
vavs KivBvvevaai Kal firj bpytcrOrjvaL on r\plv oh 

1 Probably a round number for 378 given by Hdt. viii. 
xiviii., of which the Athenian contingent (200, i.e. 180 + 20 
lent to the Chalcidians, Hdt. vm. i.) could be spoken of as 


BOOK I. lxxiii. 4-Lxxiv. 2 

when he came again, not being able to defend our- 
selves by land, we embarked in a body on our ships 
and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis. This prevented 
his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the 
Peloponnesus, for you would have been unable to 
aid one another against a fleet so numerous. And 
the weightiest testimony to the truth of what we 
say was afforded by the enemy himself; for when 
his fleet was defeated, as if aware that his power 
was no longer a match for that of the Hellenes, he 
hastily withdrew with the greater part of his army. 

LXXIV. "Such, then, was the issue of that battle, 
and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation 
of the Hellenes depended upon their ships. To that 
issue we contributed the three most serviceable ele- 
ments, namely, the largest number of ships, the 
shrewdest general, and the most unfaltering zeal. 
Of the four hundred l ships our quota was a little 
less than two-thirds. The commander was Themis- 
tocles, who more than any other was responsible for 
our fighting the battle in the strait, which most 
surely was our salvation ; and on this account you 
yourselves honoured him above any stranger who 
ever visited you. 2 And the zeal we displayed was 
that of utmost daring, for* when there was no one to 
help us on land, since all the rest up to our very 
borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon 
our city and sacrifice all our possessions ; yet not even 
in that extremity to desert the common cause of the 
allies who remained, or by dispersing to render our- 
selves useless to them, but to embark on our ships 
and fight, an d not to be a fl flry be cause you failed to 

icXeiovs twc T)/j.i<reu>v or with slight exaggeration as 6\iycf 
4\dcraovs twv 5vo fxoipwv. 
2 See Hdt. vin. cxxiv.; Plut. Them. xvii. 3. 



3 irpovTifiwp^aaTe. ware <p>ap,ev ovx rjaaov avroi 
d)(f)6\f)crai, upas rj rvx^lv tovtov. vfiels p,ev yap 
diro re oiKovp,ev<ov twv ttoXccov kcli eiri tw to 
Xolttov vepeadaiy eirecBr] eBeiaare virep vficov koX 
ovx ripuv to ir\eov, i/3oy]0ijaare (ore yovv r/p,ev 
en aw, ov irapeyeveaOe), rjfieU Be drro re tt?? ovk 
01/0-77? en 6ppd)p,evoi kcli virep t?}? ev fipaxeia 
cXttlBi ovo-rj? KLvhwevovres ^vveadiaapev u/za? re 

4 to pepos fcal rjpas avrovs. el Be 7rpoaexo)pi]o~apev 
irporepov rw M.rjBa) Beuaavre^, cbairep kcu aWoi, 
rrepl rfj %oSpa, r) firj ero\p.rjo-apLev varepov ea/3r)vai 
e? ra<; vavs &>? Bie<$>6appievoi, ovBev av eBei en 
ijpLas l p,rj e\ovra^ vavs iKavds vavp.axeiv, dXkd 
kcl6' -qavx^av av aura) 7rpovx^p r J°' € Ta irpdypara 
f) e/3ov\ero. 

LXXV. "'A/?' a^toi ecrpbev, co AaKeBaipuovioi, 
teal irpoQvpLas eveica t?}? totc koX yvu)p,r)<; %vve- 
creax; dpxv? 7 6 fa ^X°^ ev tow "EWi/fft p>r) ovrcos 

2 dyav imcpdovcDS SiatceZ<rdai; teal yap avrr)V ryjvBe 
iXdftopLev ov fiiaadpevoi, d\\* vpLCov puev ovk 
eQe\r\advT(x)v irapapelvav 7roo? ra viroXoiira rod 
fiapfidpov, rjpLLV Be irpoae\66vrcov revv gvppidxov 

3 Kal avrcov Berjdevrcov yyepovas Karaarr}vai. ef 
avroi) Be rov epyov KarrjvayKaadrjfiev to rrpcorov 

1 {/pas : Hude inserts irpbs before vpas. 

1 cf. the taunt of Adimantns (Hdt. vin. lvii. 7), -rrepl ovSe- 
pais tri TrarplSos vavpaxfaeis, " You will fight for a country 
that is no more," and the famous answer of Themistoclea 



help us earlier. We therefore maintain that we on 
our part conferred upon you a benefit at least as 
great as w e received ; for whereas the population o f 
the cities from which you brought aid was still un- 
disturbed and you could hope to possess them in the 
future, and your motive was fgajr fo_r_ yourselves rather 
t han for us — at any rate you did not come near so 
long as we were still unharmed — we on our part, 
setting forth from a city that was no more/ and 
risking our lives in behalf of one whose future hung 
upon but a slender hope, bore our part in saving 
both you and ourselves. But if we had acted as 
others did, and through fear of losing our territory 
had gone over to the Persians earlier in the war, or 
afterwards ha d lacked the courag e to embark on 
our ships, in the conviction that we were already 
ruined, it would from that moment have been use- 
less for you, with your inadequate fleet, to fight at 
sea, but the Persian's plans would have moved on 
quietly just as he wished. 

LXXV. " Considering, then, Lacedaemonians, the 
zeal and sagacity of j udgmen t which we displayed 
at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this 
exc essive jealousy by the Hellenes just on account 
of "the empire we possess ? And indeed we did not 
acquire this empire by force, but only after you had 
refused to continue to op pose what was left of the 
barbarian for ces, and the allies came to us and of 
their own accord a sked us to assume the leadership. 
It was under the compulsion ~ol circumstances that 

(Hdt. VIII. lxi. 8), is tfv kcl\ tt6Kls Ka\ 77? /xe(u>v fjirep tcelpotcri 
ear' kv 8n)K6(Tiat vees <r<pi tvMTi iren\r}pu)utvai, " We have a city 
and a country greater than yours as long as we have two 
hundred ships fully manned." 



irpoayayelv avTrjv e? ToSe, fiaXicrra fiev vtto 
Biovs, eireLTa Kai n/j,*]?, varepov /ecu ox/>e\ta?, 

4 zeal ovk dacpaXes en iSotcei elvai,, roc? 7ro\\o2<; 
aTni^O r] fjbivov^ Kai tlvwv zeal rjSr) airoaTavTWV 
Karearpa/xfjiivcov, v/jlcov re r)pXv ovKeri oyLtota)? 

(j)l\C0V, a\V VTTOTTTWV KoX 8ld(f)6pC0V OVTCQV, dvkv- 

Ta? KivBvveveiv (/cal yap av at airoaTaaei^ 777309 

5 v/jlcis iylyvovTo)' iroLcri Be. dveiri^dovov ra ^v/i- 
(fripovTCt twv pueyiarcov irepl klvBvvcov ev tl- 

LXXYI. " f T/xet9 yovv, a> AaKeBaifiovioi, ra? 
ev rfj Ue\o7rovv7]<rq) iroXeis eVl to v/jllv w^ekifjuov 
Karao-rrjadfievoi igrjyeicrOe' Kai el rore viro- 
fjLeLvavres Bia, 7raz/T0? dir^Oeade ev rf} r)yefiovia, 
wcrirep rjfiels, ev tafiev fir) av rjaaov v/j,a<; Xvtttj- 
poi><; yevo/ievovs rot? fL'/z/xa^oi? Kai dvayxaadev- 
ras -av r) apyeiv eytcpaT&s r) avroix; KivBvveveiv. 
2 ovtcos ovK rjfjLecs Oav/iaarbv ovBev ireTTOirjKafiev 
ouS' diro rov dvdpcoireiov rpoirov, el apx^v T€ 
BiBofievrjv eSetjdfieOa Kai ravrrjv /jlt) dvelfiev 
vtto 1 rcov fieyiaroov viKrjOevres, TLfirj^ Kai Beov<; 
Kai ax£e\/a?, ovB 1 av irpCaTOi rov roiovrov vrrdp- 
%avre$, a\\' alel KaOearcoros rov rjaaco vtto rov 
Bvvarcorepov KaretpyeaOai, a%ioi re dfjua vo/il- 
%ovt€$ elvai Kai vpXv BoKovvres, ^X? 1 °v Tc * 
%vfjL(f)epovTa Xoyi^ofxevoL tw BtKalco \6ya> vvv 

1 Hude inserts rpiStv before ruv fj.eyicTu>v t with van 
Herwerden and Weil. 


BOOK I. lxxv. 3-Lxxvi. 2 

we were driven at first to advance our empire to its 
present state, influenced chiefly by,. fear, then by 
honour also, and lastly by self-intere st as well ; and 
after we had once incurred the hatred of most of 
our allies, and several of them had already revolted 
and been reduced to subjection, and when you were I 
no longer friendly as before but suspicious and at 
variance with us, it no longer seemed safe to risk 
relaxing our hold. For all seceders would have gone 
over to you. And no man is to be blamed for making 
the most of his advantages when it is a question of 
the gravest dangers. 

LXXVI. " At any rate you, Lacedaemonians, in 
the exercise of your leadership over the Pelopon- 
nesian states regulate their polities x according to 
your own advantage ; and if in the Persian war 
you had held out to the end in the hegemony 
and had become unpopular in its exercise, as we 
did, you would certainly have become not less ob- 
noxious to the allies than we are, and would have 
been compelled either to rule them with a stron g 
hand or_ JPjy;s^lyjis__to_risk losing the hegemony. 
Thus there is nothing remarkable or inconsistent with 
human nature in what we also have done, just because 
we accepted an empire when it was offered us, and 
then, yielding to the strongest motives — honour, 
fear, and Aelf-interest — declined to give it up. Nor, 
again, are we the first who have entered upon such a 
course, but it has ever been an established rule that 
the weake r is kept dow n by the stronger . And at 
the same time we thought we were worthy to rule, 
and used to be so regarded by you also, until you fell 
to calculating what your interests were and resorted, 

1 i.e. by setting up oligarchies in them, cf. ch. xix. 



XpyjaOe, ov ouSet? iron rraparvybv iayyi ri Krr]~ 
aaaOai irpoOeU rov firj irXeov e^eiv direrpdirero. 

3 eiraivelaQal re agioi, o'irive% XPV cr ^/ JLev0i r V 
dvOpwireia (frvaei ware erepcov dpyeiv hucaio- 
repot r) Kara rrjv virdpyovaav Svva/uv yevwvrai. 

4 aWovs y av ovv ol6/j,e@a ra rj/xirepa Xaftovras 
Bel^ai av /idXiara et ri jierpid^ofiev, r)filv Se Kal 
etc rov iwieiKovs dSoijia rb rrXeov r) eiraivos ovk 
eiKorcos irepiearr]. 

LXXVII. " Kal eXaaaovpuevoi yap iv raU 
^vfAftoXaiais 717509 rovs %vn\xdyov<; hifcai<; Kal 
rrap' rjficv avrols iv rols bfioiois vbfiois rvoiijaavre^ 

2 rd<; Kpiaeis <f)iXo&iK€iv SoKov/iev. Kal ov&eU 
aKorrel avrcov, roU Kal aXXoOi itov eypvaiv dpyr)v 
Kal rjaaov tj/jlcov Trpbs row vtttjkoovs fierpiois 
ovai hi 6 ri rovro ovk oveihi^erar (3id^ea6ai 
yap oh av i^fj, BiKa^eaOai ovhev rrpoaBeovrai. 

3 01 he eW 1a fievoi TTpbs r)/j,a<; dirb rov taov o/iiXeiv, 
yjv ri rrapa rb fir) oXeaOai XP*l vaL V l V( ^^ r ) V 
hvvdfxei rfj Bid rrjv dp^-qv Kal birwaovv eXaaaw- 
Ocoaiv, ov rov TrXeovos firj arepiaKo/ievoi ydpiv 
eyovaiv, dXXd rod ivheovs xaXeirdirepov cfrepovaiv 
r) el dirb irpwrtj^ diroOefxevoi rbv vbfiov (fiavepcbs 

1 These seem to have been disputes in matters of trade 
tried before federal courts elsewhere than in Athens ; whereas 
tcls Kpio-tis refers to compulsory jurisdiction which Athens 
enforced upon her allies in her own courts. 



as you do now, to the plea of justice — which no one, 
when opportunity offered of securing something by 
main strength, ever yet put before force and ab- 
stained from taking advantage. And they are to be 
commended who, yielding to the instinct of human 
nature to rule over others, have been more observant 
of justice than they might have been, considering 
their power. At least, if others should seize our 
power, they would, we think, exhibit the best proof 
that we show some moderation ; but in our case the 
result of our very reasonableness is, perversely enough, 
obloquy rather than commendation. 

LXXVII. " For although we are at a disadvantage 
in suits 1 with our allies arising out of commercial 
agreements, and although in our own courts in 
Athens, where we have established tribunals, the 
same laws ap ply to us as to them, we are thought 
to insist too much upon our legal rights. And 
none of our allies observes why it is that those 
who hold dominion elsewhere, and are less mode- 
rate than we are toward their subjects, are not 
reproached on this account. It is because those 
who may use might have no need to appeal to right. 
But if ever our allies, accustomed as they are to 
associate with us on the basis of equality, come off 
second best in any matter, however trivial, contrary 
to their own notion that it ought to be otherwise, 
whether their discomfiture is due to a legal decision 
or to the exercise of our imperial power, instead of 
being grateful that they have not been deprived of 
what is of greater moment, 2 they are more deeply 
offended because of their trifling inequality than if 
we had from the first put aside all legal restraints 

8 Namely, their equality before the law. 


eirXeoveKrov/iev. ifcelvox; Be ovB' av avrol dvre- 
Xeyov ft)? ov XP € ^ V T ° v V ~°~ 0) T $ Kpaiovvri 

4 viroywpelv. dBifcov/ievoi re, go? eoi/cev, oi dvOpw- 
ttoi fidXXov opyi^ovrai t) f3ia%6{ievor to /lev yap 
airo rov caov Bo/cel irXeoveKrelaOai, to £P drrb 

5 rod Kpeiacrovos /caravayKa^ecrOai. virb yovv rov 
"MtjBov Betvorepa tovtcov irda^ovre^ ^vei^ovro, 
7] Be rj/xerepa dp^rj ^aXeirrj Boxet elvcu, etVoTft)?* 

6 to irapbv yap alel ftapv roh v7tt)k6oi<;. vfieh 7' 
av ovv el KadeXbvres rj/jtas dp^acre, rd^* av tt)v 
evvoiav r\v Bid. to yfieTepov Seo? elXifyare \ieia- 
fiaXoire, elirep ola koI tots 777)0? rov MrjBov Bi 
oXiyov T)y7}<jd\±evoi vireBei^are, ofiota teal vvv 
yvooaeaOe. a/juet/cra yap id re /caO* vfias avrovs 
vofiifia roh aXXois e%€T6 /cal Trpocren eh e/ca<TTO<; 
i^icbv ovre tovtois ^prjraL oi>6* oh rj dXXrj 'EAAa? 

LXXVIII. " BovXeveaOe ovv /3paBea)<; a>? ov 
nrepl ftpaykwv, KaX fjurj dXXorpiais yvuofiais ko\ 
ey/cXy/iao-i ireLo-Oevres ol/ceiov ttovov irpoaOrfo-Oe. 
rov Be TroXe/jLOV rov irapdXoyov 6V0? ecni, irplv 

2 ev avrw yeveaOai 7rpoBidyva)T€' /jLrjfcvvofAevos yap 
cfuXel e? TU%a? rd iroXXd irepLiGTaaOai, wv caov 
re aTre^ofiev /cal oirorepax; earat ev dBrjXw klv- 

3 Bweverai. Zovres re oi avdpomoi e? tovs iroXe- 
/jlovs Tcov epycov irporepov eyp vTCLl > a XPW varepov 


BOOK I. lxxvii. 3-Lxxvm. 3 

and had openly sought our own advantage. In that 
case even they would not be setting up the claim 
that the weaker should not have to yield to the 
stronger. Men, it seems, are more resentful of in- 
justice than of violence ; for the former, they feel, is 
overreaching by an equal, whereas the latter is 
coercion by a superior. At any rate, they submitted 
to more grievous wrongs than these at the hands of 
the Persians, while our rule is hard to bear, as they 
think ; and no wonder, for the present yoke is always 
heavy to subjects. Certainly you, should you over- 
throw us and obtain supremacy, would soon tase the 
good will which you have gained through fear of us — 
if indeed you mean again to show such temper as you 
gave a glimpse of at that time when for a little while 
you had the hegemony against the Persian. 1 For the 
institutions that prevail among you at home are in- 
compatible with those of other peoples, and, besides, 
each one of you when he goes abroad uses neither 
these nor those which the rest of Greece is accustomed 

LXXVIII. "Be slow, then, in your deliberations, 
for no slight matters are at stake ; and do not, 
influenced by the opinions and accusations of others, 
burden yourselves needlessly with trouble of your 
own. Realise before you get into it how great are 
the chances of miscalculation in war. For when it 
is long drawn out, it is wont generally to resolve it- 
self into a mere matter of chance ; and over chance 
both sides equally have no control, and what the 
outcome will be is unknown and precarious. Most 
men rush into war and proceed to blows first, 
although that ought to be the last resort, and then, 



Bpav, fcafcoTraOovvres Be rjBr) rcov Xoyoiv awTovrai. 

4 /;/x6t? Be iv ovBepua itw roiavTrj dp,apjia 6We<? 
ovt avrol ov6* vfia<; opwvres Xeyo/nev v/mv, e<y? 
en avOaiperos afA(f)OT€poi<; i) evftovXla, airovBds 
firj Xvecv /jirjSe irapafiaiveiv rovs op/covs, ra Be 

5 Bid(f)opa Slkt) XvecrOai Kara- ttjv ^vv07]Krjv, rj 
deovs tov<? op/CLOvs fidprvpas iroiovfievoi iretpaao- 
fieda dfxvveaOai, iroXefiov dpyovra^ ravrrj fj av 

LXXIX. Toiavra Be ol 'AOrfvaloi elirov. iirei- 
Br) Be twv Te ^vixpud^wv rjKovaav ol AaKeBaipboviot 
tA ey/cXy/JUtTa ra e'9 tov<; ^AOrjvaiovs /ecu rcov 
* AOrjvaiwv a eXe^av, fieraarrjad/jLevoi irdvras 
eftovXevovro Kara cr(£a? avrovs irepl rcov irapbv- 
2 t(dv. koX tcov fiev irXeovwv eirl to avrb al yvcofiat 
€(f>epop, dBifcelv re tou? y A6r)vaLov<$ rjBrj zeal iroXe- 
firjTea elvai iv rd%er TrapeXOoov Be ' A/r^aSa/xo? 6 
ftaaiXevs avrcbv, dvrjp teal gvverbs Bokcov elvai 
Kal aaxppcov, eXetje roidBe. 

LXXX. " Kal avrbs iroXXcbv ijB>] TroXefiwv 
e/jLTreipos el/ju, &> Aa/ceBaifiovioi, Kal vp,cbv tou? iv 
rfj avrfj rjXiKia 6pw t axrre fJ<i]T€ direipia €7ri0v/j,ri- 
aai Tiva rod epyov, oirep av ol iroXXol irdOotev, 

2 /nj]T€ dyadbv Kal dacpaXes vofiiaavra. evpoire B' 
av rovBe irepl ov vvv /SoiAeyecr^e ovk av iXd- 
yjLGTOv yevofievov, el aaxfrpovw; rt? aurbv eKXoyi- 

3 £olto. 7rpo? fiev yap UeXo7rovvrjalov<i Kal tovs 


BOOK I. lxxviii. 3-Lxxx. 3 

when they are in distress, at length have recourse to 
words. But since we ourselves are not as yet involved * 
in any such error and see that you are not, we urge 
you, while wise counsels are still a matter of free 
choice to both of us, not to violate the treaty or 
transgress yonr-oaths,, but to let our differences be 
settled by arbitration according to the agreement. 
But if you refuse, we shall invoke as witnesses the 
gods by whom our oaths were sworn, and shall en- 
deavour to make reprisals on those who begin the war, 
following that path in which you have led the way." 

LXXIX. Thus the Athenians spoke. And when 
the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought 
by the allies against the Athenians, and what the 
latter said in reply, they caused all others to with- 
draw and deliberated by themselves on the situation 
before them. And the opinions of the majority 
tended to the same conclusion, namely, that the 
Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that 
they must go to war without delay. But Archidamns"* 
their king, a man reputed to be both sagacious and 
prudent, came forward and spoke as follows: 

LXXX. w I have both myself, Lacedaemonians, had 
experience in my day of many wars, and I see men " 
among you who are as old as I am ; no one of them, 
therefore, is eager for war through lack of experience, 
as would be the case with most men, nor because 
he thinks it a good or a safe thing. And you 
would find that this war about which you are now 
deliberating is likely to prove no trifling matter, if 
one should reflect upon it soberly. — Foi 4 m a contest 
with the Peloponnesians or the neighbouring states l 
1 By the Peloponnesians Thucyriitles means the Spartan 
alliance ; the neighbouring states would then be the Pelo- 
ponnesian states not in the alliance, e.g. Argos. 



acTTvyeLTOvas irapofJioios ijfiwv r) aXicrj, leal Bid 
rayewv olov re ecf) e/caara eXOelv irpos Be dvBpas 
ot yr/v re e/ea? e^ovcri /cal irpoaen OaXdacnjs 
i/jLTreiporaroL elau kclI tol$ aWocs airaaiv dpicrra 
i^VpTVvrai, irkovjrp re IBico Kal Brj/u,oal(a Kal 
vaval Kal Tttitois fcctl 07t\ol<; Kal o)(\q) oaos ovk 
ev aWep kv'i ye ^copiw 'YjW^vlkw earip, en Be real 
%vp,p,dyov<i 7roX\ov<> cj)6pov viroreXels eyovai, 7rw? 
%pr) 7T/30? tovtovs pqBlcos iroXefiop dpaaOai Kal 
t'lvl iricrrevaapra<; aTrapaatcevovs eireiyOr)vai ; 

4 irorepov raU vavaiv; dX\! rjo-aovs ea/xev el Be 
/jLeXeTijo-ofiev teal avrLTrapacrKevaao/xeOa, xpovo? 
evearcu. aXKa rols ^pr] p.aa w ; d\\d toXXw 
irXeov en rovrco iWelirofiev Kal ovre ev kolvw 
eyopuev ovre eroi/ncos etc rcov IBiwv cpepofiev. 

LXXXI. " Ta^' dv ri? Oapaoir) ore rot? oit- 
\ois avrwv koX tw irXrjOei vrrepcfyepo/iep, ware 

2 tt]P yr)v Byovp iirL(j)OLra)vre^. to£? Be aWrj yrj 
earc 7ro\\r] 979 dpyovai, Kal etc 6a\daai]<; wp 

3 Beovrat errd^oprai. el o° av to?)? %v}±iidyov<i 
d(f)tardpai iretpaaopieOa, Beijaei Kal tovtois vaval 

1 ftorjOeLP rb irXeop oval prjatcorai^. Tt? ovp earai 
r/ficop 6 irokefio^; el fir] yap i) paval Kparyjao/iep 
r) Ta? irpoaoBov; d(f)aipi']aofiep defy' d)p rb vavriKOP 

5 rpecfrovcri, /3\ayfro fieO 'a rd irXeiw. /cap rovra) 
ovBe fcaraXvecrOai en /ca\6p, aXXco? re /cal el 

1 i.e. it is military rather than naval ; similar, too, in the 
matter of wealth, equipment, absence of foreign resources, 
tributary allies, etc. 


BOOK I. lxxx. 3-Lxxxi. 5 

our power is of the same type with theirs l and we can 
be upon them quickly at every point ; but when op- 
posed to men whose territory is far away, who besides 
are beyond all others experienced in seamanship and 
are best equipped in all other respects, with wealth 
both private and public, ships, horses, arms and a 
larger population than is to be found in any other single 
district in Hellas, who have, moreover, numerous 
allies subject to tribute — against such men why should 
we lightly take up arms ? In what do we place our 
trust that we should attack them unprepared ? In 
our ships ? But there we are inferior ; and if we 
train and make ourselves ready to encounter them, 
that will take time. In our wealth then ? But in 
that respect we are still more deficient, neither having 
money in the treasury of the state nor rinding it easy 
to raise money from our private resources by 
taxation. 2 

LXXXI. " Perhaps some of us are emboldened by 
our superiority in arms and numbers, which enables 
us freely to invade and lay waste their territory. 
But there is other territory in plenty over which 
they hold sway, and they will import by sea what- _^- 
ever they need. And if, on the other hand, we try ~^V 
to induce their allies to revolt, we shall have in 
addition to protect them with a fleet, since they are 
chiefly islanders. What then will be the character 
of the war we shall be waging? Unless we can- 
either win the mastery on the sea or cut off the 
revenues by which they support their navy, we shall 
get the worst of it. And, if it comes to that, we 
can no longer even conclude an honourable peace, 

3 The poverty of the Peloponnesians is referred to bv 
Pericles in ch. cxli. 3. The statement is true especially of 
the Spartans, but also of all the rest except the Corinthians. 

VOL. I. 



6 Bb^opev ap^cu pdXXov rr)<; Biacf)opa<;. fir) yap Br) 
etceivr) ye rfj eXirihi erraipcopeOa &>? ra^v TravcrOr)- 
aerat 6 iroXepbos, r)v ttjv yrjv avrcov T6/icop,€v. 
BeBoitca Be p,aXXov prj teal Tot? iraialv avrbv viro- 
Xiirwpev ovtcos el/cbs ' ' AOrjvaiovs (fipovjjpLari pLrjre 
T V 7$ BovXevaai pbrjre axrirep direlpovs tcara- 
irXayrjvai rw iroXepw. 

LXXXII. " Ov fi?]v ouBe avaiaBy'jTcos avrovs 
tceXevco tou? re %v\ip.aypv<$ r)pba)v eav ftXaTrreiv 
teal eiriftovXevovTas /jltj Karacfxopdv, dXXa oirXa 
fxev fjurjircd tcivelv, irepureiv Be teal alrLaaOai fir/re 
TToXe/jiov ayav Br/Xovvra^ pi]6" ox? eiriTpe^ropev, 
tcdv tovtw teal rd r)perep avrwv e^aprveaOai 
gvpLpLd^cov re irpoaaycoyfj, teal 'EXXrfvcov real 
fiapftdpwv&el iroOev nva r) vavri/cov r) ^pr/pdrcov 
Bvvapuv irpoaX7]yjr6fie0a (dveiri<$>6ovov Be, oaoi 
(oairep teal rjpeh vir ' ' Aj&rjvaiayp eiTij3ovXev6p,eda, 
pr) e 'EXXrjva^ piovov, dXXd teal fiapfidpovs irpoaXa- 
ftovras Bia(T(t>6r)vai), teal rd avTcov dfia etciropi- 

2 ^(jL>[xe6a. teal r)v fiev ecra/couaxJL rt 7rpea(3evojjLevwv 
r)i±o)V, ravra apicrra' r)v Be par], BceXOovrcov er&v 
Bvo teal rpicov dpueivov yjBrj, i]v Botcf}, ire<$>payp,evoi 

3 Lfiev iir avTovs. teal I'crcos opcovre^ f/fiajv rjBrj rfjv 
re Trapaateevrjv teal tovs Xoyovs avrrj opoia viro- 
(Trj/ialvovTas p,ciXXov av el'tcocev, teal yr)v en arpLTj- 
tov cypres teal irepl irapovrcov dyaOuov teal ovirw 


BOOK I. lxxxi. 5-Lxxxii. 3 

especially if it is believed that we rather than they 
began the quarrel. For we assuredly must not be 
buoyed up by any such hope as that the war will 
soon be over if we but ravage their territory. I fear 
rather that we shall even bequeath it to our children, 
so improbable it is that the Athenians, high spirited 
as they are, will either make themselves vassals to 
their land, or, like novices, become panic-stricken at 
the war. 

LXXXII. " Yet assuredly I do not advise you 
that you should blindly suffer them to injure our 
allies and allow their plotting to go undetected, but 
rather that you should adopt the following course : 
Do not take up arms yet, but 'send envoys to them 
and make complaints, without indicating too clearly 
whether we shall go to war or put up with their 
conduct ; also in the meantime, let us proceed with 
our own preparations, in the first place by winning 
allies to our side, Barbarians as well as Hellenes, in 
the hope of obtaining from some quarter or other 
additional resources in ships or money (for those who, 
like ourselves, are plotted against by the Athenians 
are not to be blamed if they procure their salvation 
by gaining the aid, not of Hellenes only, but even of 
Barbarians) ; and let us at the same time be developing 
our resources at home. And if they give any heed 
to our envoys, there could be nothing better ; but if 
not, then, after the lapse of two or three years, we 
shall at length be better equipped to go against 
them, if we decide to do so. Or perhaps when they 
see our preparatiorisTancT that our words correspond 
thereto, they will be more inclined to yield, for they 
will both have their land still unravaged and their 
deliberations will concern goods that are still theirs 



4 efyOapfievwv flovXevofievoi. fir) yap aXXo ri 

V0/1L<T7]T6 TTjV yr)V CLVTtoV T) OflTJpOV €%€IV Kal 0V% 

r)acrov oaco afieivov i^elpyaarar rjs (frei&eaOai 
%pr) co? eirl ifKelcrrov, teal fir) e? dirovoiav /cara- 

5 cTTrjaavTas uvtov? dXrjTTTOTepovs eyeiv. el yap 
dirapdaKevoi to?? twv %vfifidyu>v iy/c\7]fiacTt,v 
eiret)^devTe<; Tepodfiev avrrjv, opdre 6Va)? fii) 
alayjiov zeal diropcorepov rfj YleXoTTOvvr)a(p irpd^o- 

6 fiev. iy/cky'i/iara fiev yap teal TroXecov Kal 
ISicorcov olov re KaraXvcrac woXefiov Be ^vfiirav- 
Ta? dpafievovs eveica rcov IBlcov, ov ov^ virdpyei 
elBevai fcaO' 6 ri ywp^aei, ov paBiov evirpeiroy^ 
Bead at. 

LXXXIII. "Kal dvavBpia firfhevl ttoXXovs fiia 

2 iroXei fir) Ta^u eireXOelv BoKeiTQ) elvai. elo~l yap 
teal etceivois ov/c eXdaaov<; xprjfiara (frepovres 
^vfifiayoi, teal eanv 6 iroXefios ov)£ ottXcov to 
nrXeov, dXXa Bairavr)?, 6Y r)v ra oirXa Q)(f)eXel, 

3 aUw? T€ teal rjireipcoTais irpbs OaXaacriovs. tto- 
piadifieOa ovv irpwTov avrrjv, teal fir) toZs tcop 
%vfifid~)(u>v Xoyois irpoiepov eiratpcopeOa, o'lrrep he 
teal twv cnroftaivovTwv to irXeov eir dfKporepa 
t/}? atria? e^o/nev, ovroi teal tead* rjav^Lav ri 
avrcov irpotBcofiev. 

LXXXIV. " Kal to fipaBi; teal fieXXw, o fiefi- 
(f)OVTat fidXcara r)fia)v, fir) ala^vveaOe. airev- 
Sovres re yap axoXacrepov av iravaaiade Bia to 
dirapdcneevot, ey^eipelv, Kal dfia eXevQepav Kal 

BOOK I. lxxxii. 3-Lxxxiv. 1 

and as yet not ruined. For do not regard their land 
as anything but a hostage for us to hold, and a better 
hostage the better it is cultivated. You should there- 
fore spare it as long as possible, instead of making them 
desperate and thus having a more intractable foe to 
deal with. For if, without adequate preparation, 
egged on by the complaints of our allies, we shall 
ravage their territory, beware lest we adopt a course 
which might rather 1 result in disgrace and diffi- 
culties for the Peloponnesus. For complaints, in- 
deed, whether brought by states, or by individuals, 
may possibly be adjusted ; but when a whole con- 
federacy, for the sake of individual interests, under- 
takes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, 
it is not easy to end it with honour. 

LXXXII1. "And let no man think it pusillanimous 
that many states should hesitate to attack a single 
city. For they also have allies not less numerous 
than ours who pay tribute ; and war is a matter not 
so much of arms as of money, for it is money alone 
that makes arms serviceable, especially when an- inland 
opposes a maritime power. Let us therefore provide 
ourselves with money first, instead of being carried 
away prematurely by the eloquence of our allies ; 
and, just as it is we who shall bear the greater part 
of the responsibility for the consequences, whether 
for good or evil, so let it be our task also calmly to 
get some forecast of them. 

LXXXIV. "And so be not ashamed of the slow- 
ness and dilatoriness for which they censure us most ; 
for speed in beginning may mean delay in ending, 
because you went into the war without preparation, 
and, moreover, in consequence of our policy we have 

1 i.e. than the opposite course. 



evBo^OTarrjv ttoXlv Blo, Travrbs ve/io/xeda^ /cat 
Bvvarai jxaXicrra aaxppocrvvr) e/Mppcov rovr elvar 

2 jjlovoi yap Bl avrb evirpayiai^ re ovk ij;v/3pi£o/jL€v 
teal £v/j.(f)opai<; rjcraov erepcov elKojiev, rcov re %vv 
eiraivw e^orpwovrcov r/yita? eirl ra Betva irapa to 
Bokovv rj/julv ovk e-naipbyueQa rjBovfj, /cal rjv tj? 
apa %vv KarrjyopLa Trapo^vvrj, ovhev Br) fiaXXov 

3 a^#ecr#eWe? dveTreio-Qi~\\±ev. TroXefiLKol re teal 
ev/3ovXot Sea rb €vkoo-/jlov yiyvofieOa, to fiev on 
at'Sa>? auxppoavvr)^ irXelarov fierex 61 ' alo"xyvrj<i Be 
evyjrvxia, evftovXoi Be afiaOearepov rwv vbpiwv 
t?}? virepoy\ria<; TraiBevofievoL real %bv ^aXeiroT^TL 
acoeppovearepov r) ware avrow avrjteovcnelv, teal 
/jLi) ra d^pela tjvverol ayav ovres, Ta? toji> iroXe- 
fiicov Trapao-fcevas Xoyw /eaA,aj? p,e/jL(f)6/jLevoi dvo- 
fjLoLws epyw eire^ievat, vofxl^eiv Be Ta? re BiavoLas 
rcov 7re\a? 7rapa7rX?;crtou? elvai teal Ta? irpoo~iTL- 

4 7TTOtVa? Tu%a? ov Xoycp Bcacperd^. alel Be a>? 77730? 
ev (3ovXevopLevovs tovs evavj'iovs epyw irapaaiceva- 
^6/xeOa' nal ovk e% etceivoov &)? dfiapryaofxevwv 
eyeiv Bel Ta? eXiTiBas, a\V a>? i)fjLU>v avrwv dacpa- 
Xco? irpovoovpLevcov, iroXv re Biacpepeiv ov Bel 

1 The speaker uses tvKoa^xou, rather than QpaSv employed 
by the critics of Sparta, to suggest the contrast with im- 
pulsiveness or undue haste. 


BOOK I. lxxxiv. 1-4 

ever inhabited a city at once free and of fairest 
fame. And, after all, this trait in us may well be in 
the truest sense intelligent self-control, for by 
reason of it we alone do not become insolent in 
prosperity or succumb to adversity as much as others 
do ; and when men try to goad us by praise into 
dangerous enterprises against our better judgment, 
we are not carried away by their flattery, or, if any- 
one goes so far as to attempt to provoke us to action 
by invective, we are none the more moved to com- 
pliance through vexation. Indeed, it is because of 
our orderly temper l that we are brave in war and 
wise in counsel — brave in war, because self-control is 
the chief element in self-respect, and respect of self, 
in turn, is the chief element in courage ; and wise in 
counsel, because we are educated too rudely to 
despise the laws and with too much severity of 
discipline to disobey them, and not to be so ultra- 
clever in useless accomplishments 2 as to disparage 
our enemy's military preparations in brave words 
and then fail to go through with the business with 
corresponding deeds, but rather to consider that the 
designs of our neighbours are very much like our own 
and that what may befall from fortune 3 cannot be 
determined by speeches. But it is our way always 
to make our preparations by deeds, on the presump- 
tion that we go against opponents who are wise in 
counsel ; and we ought never to build our hopes on 
the chance that they are going to make mistakes, 
but on the belief that we ourselves are taking safe 
precautions. And we must not believe that man 

1 With a glance at the Athenians' attention to culture, 
especially the art of elegant speech. 
' cf. the Corinthians' charge, ch. 1 


cf. the Corinthians' charge, c h, lxn^Ji, that the Spartans 
trusted to chance. 


vofii^euv avOpwTTOv avOpaoirov, Kpanarov Be elvai 
0(ttl<; ev rot? dvayfcaioTaTOis iraiBeverat. 

LXXXV. " TauYa? ovv a? ol irarepe^ re rjfAtv 
irapeBoaav {leXera? Kal avrol Bed iravrbs ux^eXov- 
fievoi eyop,ev p>r) irapoypuev, pirjBe eVer^eyTe? ev 
(Bpaxel piopiw 77/z.epa? irepi 7roXXcov acopdrcov Kal 
Xprj/judrcov Kal iroXecov teal Sof?;? ftovXevacopLev, 
d\Xa icaO' -qav^lav. e^eari 6° rjpuv pudXXov ere- 

2 pcov hid la^vv. Kal 73730? toi)? ^A9rjvaLov<s Trep,- 
7T€Te puev irepl r% TloTeiBaLas, ireparere Be Trepl 
<x)v ol ^vpupuayoi (fyaatv dBiKelaOai, aXXcos re /cal 
erolpLcov ovtcov avrcbv BiKas Bovvar eirl Be rbv 
BcBovra ov irpbrepov vop.ip.ov go? eV dBiKovvra 
levac. irapacTKevd^eaOe Be rbv iroXepov apia. 
ravra yap ical Kparicrra ftovXevaeaOe teal rols 
evavriois (poftepajrara" 

3 Kal 6 piev Wpx^Bap^o^ roiavra elirev irapeX- 
Oa)V Be *£0eveXaBa<; reXevracos, eh rwv ecj)6pcov 
rore &v, eXe^ev tols AaKeBacpLOVLois 1 a>Be. 

LXXXVI. "Tou? puev Xoyovs robs ttoXXovs tcov 
'AdrjvaicDV ov ytyvooaKco' eiraweaavre^ yap iroXXa 
eavrovs ovBap,ov avrelirov go? ovk dBifcovai rov<; 
fjperepov; ^v/upbd^ov^ Kal rrjv JJeXo7r6vvrjaov 
Ka'noi el 777:0? tou? MijBovs eyevovTO dyaOol rore, 
7T/30? 6° 77/xa? KaKol vvv, BinrXaaia^ tyipiLas d^tol 
2 eicriv, on dvr dyaOcov icaicol yeyevrjvrai. r)p,els 
Be opLoloi Kal rore Kal vvv eapev, Kal tou? gvpLpid- 

1 Hiule deletes with Kriiger. 

BOOK I. lxxxiv. 4-Lxxxvi. 2 

differs much from man, 1 but that he is best who is 
trained in the severest discipline. 

LXXXV. "These are the practices which our 
fathers bequeathed to us and we ourselves have 
maintained from the beginning to our profit ; let us 
not abandon them, nor allow ourselves in a small 
portion of one day to be hurried into a decision which 
involves many lives, much money, many cities and a 
good name ; but let us deliberate at our leisure. And 
this course is permitted to us more than to the sup- 
porters of the other view because of our strength. And 
send envoys to the Athenians to take up the question 
of Potidaea, and also to take up the matters wherein 
our allies claim that they are wronged. The chief 
reason for this is that they are ready 2 to submit to 
arbitration, and it is not lawful to proceed forthwith 
against one who offers arbitration as though against a 
wrong-doer. But all the while prepare yourselves 
for the war. This decision will be best for yourselves 
and will inspire most fear a your foes." 

Thus spoke Archidamu. r and finally Sthenelaidas, 
one of the ephors at that time, came forward and 
addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows : 

LXXXVI. "The long speeches of the Athenians 
I cannot understand ; for though they indulged in 
much praise of themselves, they nowhere denied that 
they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnesus. 
And yet, if they conducted themselves well against 
the Persians in former times but are now conducting 
themselves ill toward us, they deserve two-fold 
punishment, because they used to be good and have 
become bad. But we are the same now as we were 

1 cf. the Corinthians' praise of Athenian superiority, ch. Ixx. 
* q/". ch. lxxviii. 4. 



X 0V S> V v w(ppova)/jLev, ov 7repLO\jr6pLe0a dhiKov- 
fievovs ovhe fxeW^aofxev Ti/JLwpelv oi £' ovKeri 

3 fieXXovai KaKws nraayeiv. aXXois fiev yap xprj- 
jxaTa i<TTL Kal vrjes Kal Xititol, rj/xlv he gv/i/iaxoi 
ayaOoly ovs ov irapahorea tois 'AOrjvaiois eariv, 
ovhe Sitcdcs Kal Xoyois hiaKpcrea fit] Xoyw Kal 
avrovs /3\a7TTO/jL€vov<;, dXXa rc/jLcoprjrea ev rd-yei 

4 Kal iravrl aOevei. Kal co? ?7/ua? irpeirei fiovXev- 
ecrOai dhiKov/xevovs /irjheU hihao-Kerw, dXXa toi/? 
/leXXovra^ dhiKelv jiaXXov irpeirei itoXxjv xpbvov 

5 ftovXeveaOai. yjrr](f)L^eade o?n>, w AaKehat/xovioi, 
a£i(i)<; t?}? ^7rdpTr]<; rbv rroXefiov Kal fitfre tou? 
'Adrjvalovs idre fie'i^ovs yiyveaOac, /JLrjre tou? 
^vfJL/Jid'Xpy^ KaTa7rpoSiBo)fi€V, dXXa %i)V Tot? 6eoU 
eTriwfxev eirl tou? dhiKOvvTas" 

LXXXVII. Toiavra Xe'fa? eTreyjrrjcpL^ev avrbs 
ecfropos cov e? 1 rrjv 6KK\r)o~iav twv AaKehaifiovicov. 

2 6 he (Kpivovci yap ftor) Kal ov -v/r/j^eo) ovk e<£?; 
hiayiyvcoaKeiv rrjv ftorjv Trorepa fiei^cov, dXXa 
fiovXofxevos avrov? (jjavepax; diroheLKW/xevov^ rrjv 
yvcofir/v e? to iroXepLelv fiaXXov opfirjaai eXefeir 
""Otw fxev v/jLcov, a) AaKehaip,bvLoi, Sokovcti Xe- 
XvaOau at airovhal Kal oi 'AOrjvalou dhiKelv, 

dvCL(TT1)Ta> 69 6K€IV0 TO X w P lOV " hel^a? TL ywplOV 

avrols, "pTffl he p,7] hoKovcnv, e? rd eirl Bdrepa^ 

3 dvao~rdvTe<; he hiearrjaav, Kal ttoXXw irXeiovs 
I eyevovro oi? ehoKOW at airovhal XeXvaOai. irpoa- 

1 Hude deletes, after Fr. Muller. 


then, and if we are in our right minds, we shall not 
permit our allies to be wronged or even put off 
avenging their wrongs, since they cannot longer put 
off suffering them. Others, indeed, may have money 
in abundance and ships and horses, 1 but we have 
brave allies, and they must not be delivered over to 
the Athenians ; nor must we seek redress by means 
of legal processes and words when it is not in word 
only that we ourselves are being injured, but we 
must avenge them speedily and with all our might. 
And let no man tell us that it befits us to deliberate 
when a wrong is being done us ; nay, it befits rather 
those who intend to do us a wrong to deliberate a 
long time. Vote, therefore, Lacedaemonians, for the 
war as beseems the dignity of Sparta, and do not 
permit the Athenians to become too great; and let 
us not prove false to our allies, but let us with the 
favour of the gods go against the wrong-doer." 

LXXXVII. When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken, 
he himself, since he was an ephor, put the vote to 
the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. Now in their 
voting they usually decide by shout and not by 
ballot, but Sthenelaidas said that he could not distin- 
guish which shout was the louder, and wishing to 
make the assembly more eager for war by a clear 
demonstration of their sentiment, he said : " Who- 
ever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty 
has been broken and the Athenians are doing wrong, 
let him rise and go to yonder spot (pointing to a 
certain spot), and whoever thinks otherwise, to the 
other side." Then they rose and divided, and those 
who thought the treaty had been broken were found 
to be in a large majority. Then they called in the 

1 cf. oh. lxxx. 3. 



tcaXeaavres re rovs ^vpLpidyov^ elirov on atyiai 
fiev ho/colev aSt/ceiv ol * AQrjvaloi, ftovXeadai he 
teal tou? TTcivTas ^vpL^dyovs irapaKaXeaavre^ 
^rj(j)ov iirayayelv, O7ro><? fcoivfj ftovXevcrdfievoL rbv 

5 iroXefiov Troicovrai, tjv ho/cy. kcl\ ol fiev direy^- 
pyaav eV olkov hiairpa^dfievoL ravra, kcli ol 
'AOrfvalcov 7rpea/3ei<; varepov e'(/>' direp rfKOov XP1~ 

6 f H he SuxyvGOfir} avrrj tt)<; itcKXijcrLas rov ra<; 
o"TTOvhds \e\vo~0CLL l iyevero iv rerdprco kol he- 
Kara) erei robv r pia/covTOVTihwv airovhcbv irpo- 
Keyu)p7)KViu>v, at iyevovro /xerd rd Eu/3ot«a. 
LXXXVIII. e^lrrjcpLcravTO he ol AaxehaLpLOVLOi 
Ta? cnrovhds XeXvaOai zeal iroXepLrjrea elvcu, ov 
Toaovrov twv ^vpLfidx^v ireiaOevTes tols Xoyois 
oaov (fiofiovfievoi tov<z * AO-rjvalovs firj eirl jiel^ov 
hvv7]6(bo~iv, opebvjes ainols rd 7roXXa t>}? EtXXd- 
809 viroyelpici vhv ovra. 

LXXXIX. Ol yap 'AOrjvaloL rpoircp roiwhe 
2 rfkOov itri rd Trpdy/xara iv oU rjvgiftrjaav. iireihr} 
'M.tjSoi dve)(Gopy]o~av etc Trj? EvpcoTrr}<; vucrjOevTes 
koX vaval teal 7re£e5 virb c JLXX?]V(ov teal ol /cara- 
(pvyovres avTwv Tat? vavcrlv e\ ^S\vfcdXr)v hcecf)dd- 
pyjaav, AecoTVXihrjs piev 6 fiacriXevs tojv AatcehaL- 
fiovlcov, barrep yyelro rebv iv Mv/cdXy 'EXXyjvcov, 
drrexcoprio-ev in oI'kov eywv rov<i airb YieXorrov- 
vtjgov %vp,p,dxous' ol he AOrjvaLOL teal ol airb 

1 tov ras a-novVas \e\6a-eat, omitted by Hude, following 
van Herwerden. 


BOOK I. lxxxvii. 4-lxxxix. 2 

allies and told them that, in their opinion, the Athe- 
nians were doing wrong, but that they wished to 
summon the whole body of the allies l and put the 
vote to them, in order that they might all deliberate 
together and together undertake the war, if it should 
be so decided. And so the allies who were there 
went back home, having brought these matters to a 
settlement, and so did the Athenian envoys later, 
after they had finished the business on which they 
had come. 

This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had 
been broken, was made in the fourteenth year 2 from 
the beginning of the thirty years' truce, which was 
made after the Euboean war. 3 LXXXVIII. And 
the vote of the Lacedaemonians that the treaty had 
been broken and that they must go to war was 
determined, not so much by the influence of the 
speeches of their allies, as by fear of the Athenians, 
lest they become too powerful, seeing that the greater 
part of Hellas was already subject to them. 

LXXXIX. For it was in the following manner that 
the Athenians found themselves face to face with 
those circumstances in dealing with which they rose 
to greatness. When the Persians had retreated from 
Europe, defeated on both sea and land by the Hel- 
lenes, 4 and those of them who with their ships had 
taken refuge at Mycale had perished there, Leoty- 
chides, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was com- 
mander of the Hellenes at Mycale, went home with 
the allies from the Peloponnesus. But the Athe- 
nians, together with the allies from Ionia and the 

1 A general convocation of the allies ; at this time only 
part of them had been invited, according to ch. lxvii. See 
ch. cxix., where the plan is carried out. 2 445 n.c. 

8 cf. ch. cxiv. * At Salamis, Plataea, Mycale. 



'I&Wa? zeal r EWrja7r6vrov ^vyujiayoi, r)Br\ acfyearrj- 
fcores diro ftaaiXeo)*?, viropuelvavTe^ ^ijcttov eiro- 
Xcopieovv IsfojBwv e^ovTwv, zeal iinyeiyLa<javTe<i 
elXov avTJ]V ezeXtirovTwv tcjv fiapftdpeov, zeal fiera 
tovto diren-Xevaav e'f 'EXXtjo-ttovtov &>? e/caaroc 

3 /cara iroXeis. WQ-qvaiwv Be to zeoivov, eireiBr\ 
avroU oi ftdpflapoi, e/e r?}? %oopa<; dirrjXOov, Biezeo- 
fii^ovTO evOvs oQev vire<~e6evTO iralBas zeal yvval- 
zeas zeal tyjv irepiovaav Kcnacneevrjv, /edi ttjv ttoXlv 
dvoizcoBofielv irapeazeevd^ovTO zeal ra Te'i^y tov 
re yap irepifBokov ftpayea €icrT?]fcei /ecu ol/eLcu al 
fiev TroXXal iireTrrco/eeaav, oXtyau Be irepir)crav, ev 
ah avrol io-/ei]V(0(Tav ol Bvvarol rcov Ylepacov. 

XC. Aa/eeSaifjiovLOi Be alaOofxevoL to fieXXov rjX- 
Bov irpeo-fteiav, ra fiev zeal avrol ijBiov dv opoovTes 
fArjr etceivov? \±i)T aXXov p,i]Beva Telyos eyovra, 
to Be nXeov toov ^v/iudycov e^oTpvvovTwv /eat 
(f)OJ3ovfjLev(i>v tov T€ vavTizeov avTCov to ttXyjOos, o 
irpiv ovx v7r ?IPX € > Kai Tr i v e? T0V IMyBizcbv iroXe- 

2 /jlov ToXfiav yevofievrjv. r]%lovv tg avToij? jjlt] 
t eiyl^ew , dXXd zeal tgov etjco YieXoirovv^aov jjlclX- 
Xov oaoL<; elaTijzeei gvy/caOeXeiv fiera acfiwv roi>? 
irepifioXovs, to pev ftovXop,evov zeal vttotttov Trjs 
yvco/jL>]<; ov Bt]XovvT€<i e? tou? *A.6rjvaLov<;, a>? Be 
tov fiapfidpov, el av0i$ eireXOoi, ovze dv eyovTo? 

1 The contingents from the islands and the coast of Asia 
Minor, who, in consequence of the battle at Mycale and the 


Hellespont, 1 who were already in revolt from the 
King, remained at their task and besieged Sestos, 
which was held by the Persians ; and passing the 
winter there they took it, as it had been deserted by 
the Barbarians ; and after that the contingents of 
the several cities sailed away from the Hellespont. 
But the Athenian people, when the Barbarians had 
departed from their territory, straightway began to 
fetch back their wives and their children and the 
remnant of their household goods from where they 
had placed them for safety, 2 and to rebuild the city 
and the walls ; for of the encircling wall only small 
portions were left standing, and most of the houses 
were in ruins, only a few remaining in which the 
chief men of the Persians had themselves taken 

XC. But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving what 
was in prospect, came on an embassy, partly because 
they themselves would have preferred to see neither 
the Athenians nor anyone else have a wall, but more 
because their allies urged them on through appre- 
hension, not only of the size of the Athenian navy, 
which had hitherto not been large, but also of the 
daring they had shown in the Persian war. So they 
requested them not to rebuild their walls, but rather 
to join with them in razing the walls of whatsoever 
towns outside the Peloponnesus had them standing, 
giving no indication of their real purpose or of their 
suspicion with regard to the Athenians, but repre- 
senting that the Barbarian, if he should attack them 
again, would not have any stronghold to make his 

advance of the victors to Abydos, had been received into the 
Hellenic alliance. 

2 Salamis, Aegina, and Troezen ; cf. Hdt. vni. xli. 



dirb i^ypov iroOev, oiairep vvv etc rcbv ^r]Ba)v, 
opfxaadaL, tt]V re HeXoirovvrjaov irdaiv e(f>aaav 

3 avaywpi)(Jiv re koX d^>oppir\v ifcavrjv elvai. oi 8' 
' AO^valoi ©6/xicrTO/cXeoL'? yvcofij] tou? fiev Aa/ce- 
Baifiovlovs ravr eiTrovras, diroKpivdp,evoi ore Treft- 
yjrovacv co? clvtovs TTpeafieis irepl &v Xeyovaiv, 

> evOvs aiTifWa^av eavrbv B' i/ceXevev diroareX- 
Xeiv &)? Tayicna 6 (depuo-rofcXfjs e? ttjv AaiceBai- 
fiova, aXXovs Be Trpbs eavrch eXopevov? 7rpecrf3ei<; 
firj evOvs iKirepireiv, dXX iizlayeiv ^XP L T oaov- 
tov e&>? dv to rectos i/cavbv apwaiv ware diropd- 
yeaQai e/c tov avay/caiOTarov vyjrovs' Teixl^eiv Be 
TrdvTCLS it avBr) pel tou? iv rfj iroXei, 1 /cal avrov? 
/cal yvvalfcas ical TralBas, (f>eiBop.evovs p*r)Te IBlov 
/uLi']T€ Bypoaiov olKoBopi)paro<s bOev rt? oofyeXia 
earai e? rb epyov, dXXa KaQaipovvras rravra. 


5 avrbs rd/i€L nrpd^oi, dyero. fcal e? rrjv AaKeBal- 
p,ova iXOcov ov irpocryeL irpb$ rds dpy^d^ } dXXa 
Birjye real Trpov^aai^ero. kcll 07roT6~~~T£9 avrbv 
epoLTO rcov iv re\et ovtcov b n ov/c inep^e-icu iirl 
to kolvov, €<f>r) tou? ^upLirpea/3ei<; dvapeveiv, dayp- 
Xia<$ Be tivo<; ovar)<; avrovs V7roXeL(f)0r)vai, irpoa- 
BeyeadaL p,evroL iv tdyei tf^eLV /cal Qavpd^eiv go? 
ovrrco irdpuciv. 

XCI. 0/ Be d/covovres tw p,ev Sep,LaroKXel 
eirelOovTo Bid cfriXlav, tcov ~ Be dXXcov dcfriKvov- 
uevcov teal acuf)(bs Karrjyopovvroyv oil Teiyl^eral 

1 robs eV tt) ir6\€i, Kriiger brackets, followed by Hude. 
koI avrovs . . . irarSas also bracketed by Hude, as not read by 

,J Hude adopts Shilleto's conjecture abro-nrwy. 


BOOK I. xc. 2-xci. i 

base of operations, as lately he had made Thebes ; 
the Peloponnesus, they added, was large enough for 
all, both as a retreat and as a base of operations. To 
these proposals of the Lacedaemonians, the Athe- 
nians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied that 
they would send ambassadors to Sparta to discuss 
these matters, and so got rid of them without delay. 
Themistocles then proposed that they should send 
himself as speedily as possible to Lacedaemon ; that 
they should then choose other ambassadors in addi- 
tion, but, instead of sending them immediately, 
should wait until they should have raised the wall to 
such a height as was absolutely necessary for defence ; 
and that the whole population of the city, men, 
women, and children, should take part in the wall- 
building, sparing neither private nor public edifice 
that would in any way help to further the work, but 
demolishing them all. After he had given these 
instructions, and an intimation that, for the rest, he 
would himself look after matters at Sparta, he 
departed. And when he came to Lacedaemon he 
did not present himself to the magistrates, but kept 
putting it off and making excuses ; and whenever 
any one of those in authority asked why he did not 
come before the people, he said that he was waiting 
for his colleagues, who had stayed behind on account 
of some urgent business ; he expected them however 
to come soon, and wondered that they were not 
already there. 

XCI. And the Lacedaemonian magistrates were 
disposed to be content with this reply by reason 
of their friendship for Themistocles ; but when every- 
body who came from Athens declared quite positively 



T€ /cat 77S77 vyjros Xapbffdvei, ovk et%oi> ottcds XPV 

2 aiTi(jTi)(jaL. yvovs 8e eicelvos KeXevei avrovs fir) 
Xoyois jjlclWov irapdyeaOai f) irep^rai acfiwv av- 
twv avhpas oltivc? xprjarol fcal 7r/(TTW9 dvayye- 

3 Xovai (TKeyjfdfievoL. diroareXXovaiv ovv, ical irepl 
avjoiv 6 ©eyLticrTO/cA.% to£? ^ A6r)vaioi<$ /cpvcjia 
ire/jareL /ceXevcov 1 o>? tffciara eVt0a^w? Karaey/iv 
real pur) dfyelvai irplv dv avrol irdXiv fcopLLaOwaiv 
(77877 yap teal r)rcov avru> oi %v pur pea (3 e is, 'Aftpa>- 
vl^o? re Avai/cXeov<; teal 'Apiare'iBr)*; Avcri- 
pudxov, dyyeXXovres eyeiv i/cavco<; to rel^o?)- 
i<f)o/36LTO yap pbr) oi AaKehaipbOViou cr(/>a?, onore 

4 aa&cos dicovaeiav, ovtceri dfyoicnv. oi re ovv 
WOrjvacoL rov<; it pea /Set? ,w aire p eTTeardXr) % Karel- 
yov, teal 6 <depno~TOK,Xr)$ eireXOaiv to?? Aa/ceBai- 
poviois evravOa Sr) (fiavepm elirev on r) p,ev ttoXis 
a$u>v Tereixio-Tai 77877 (oare i/cavr) elvai acp^eiv 
tou? evoLKovvras, el Se rt (BovXovrai Aa/ce$ai- 
pLovioi 77 01 ^vpupayoi irpeafieveaOai irapd a<f>d<; 
a>? 7rpo? hiayiyvGoa/covras to Xolttov levai ra re 

5 afyiaiv avroU %vpi(popa fcal ra KOivd. tttjv re yap 
ttoXlv ore eBoKet eicXnreZv dpeivov elvai teal e? Ta? 
vavs eaftr/vai, dvev eiceivwv e(j>aaav 2 yvovre? roX- 
pbr/aai, real oaa av pier e/ceivutv (3ovXeveadai, 

6 ovhevb? vaiepoi yvcopir) (f>avfjvai. hoicelv ovv acpiai 
teal vvv apieivov elvai rrjv eavrcov irokiv Tet^o? 

1 Hude omits with Lex. Vindob. 

2 Deleted by Kruger, followed by Hude. 


BOOK I. xci. 1-6 

that the wall was going up and was already attaining 
height, they did not know how to discredit it. 
Themistocles, however, when he perceived this bade 
them not to be misled by reports, but rather to send 
some trustworthy men of their own number who 
would see for themselves and bring back a faithful 
report. They did so, and Themistocles sent word 
secretly to the Athenians to detain the envoys as 
covertly as possible and not to let them go until they 
themselves returned — for by this time his colleagues, 
Habronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of 
Lysimachus, had joined him, with the news that the 
wall was high enough — the reason for his precaution 
being that he was afraid the Lacedaemonians, when 
they heard the truth, would then refuse to let them 
go. Accordingly the Athenians detained the envoys 
as they were directed, and Themistocles, appearing 
before the Lacedaemonians, at length told them 
frankly that the city was now walled and therefore 
in a position to protect its inhabitants, and that if 
the Lacedaemonians or their allies cared to negotiate 
any matter with them they must hereafter come to 
them with the understanding that they were dealing 
with men who were fully aware of what was for 
their own and the general interest. For when they 
thought it best to abandon their city and embark on 
their ships, they had resolved, said the ambassadors, 
upon this bold step without the advice of the Lace- 
daemonians, and again in all matters in which the 
Athenans took counsel with the Lacedaemonians 
they had shown themselves inferior to none in 
judgment. Accordingly in the present instance also 
it seemed to them best that their city should have 
a wall, and that this course would be of great 



eyeiv, K-cX Ihla roU TToXirai? ical €9 tou? iravra^ 
7 ijvfi/iid)£ov<; w(f)€\ifjL(iOTepov eaeaOar ov yap olov r 
elvai fir) airo avniraXov Trapacrtcevr)*; 6/iolov n r) 
'(gov e? to kolvov fiovXeveGQcu. rj irdvras ovv 
aT€i%LGTOV<; €(f)7} %pf}vcu %v p. iiayeiv r) teal rdSe 
vofil^eiv opOoos zyeiv. 

XCII. O/ Be Aa/ceSai/uLOVLOL aKOVGavres opyrjv 
fiev (pavepav ovk Iitoiovvto tois WOrjvaLOis (ovBe 
yap eir\ kooXv/at), dXXa yvd)fjL7]$ irapaiveGei Br)dev 
tc5 KOLvco €7rp€G/3€VGavT0, dfia Be fcal TrpoGcfriXels 

OVT6S iv TU) TOTE Sid T7)V €<? TOV ^lljBoV IT pO0 U fliaV 

rd /idXiGTa avroU eTvyyavov), tj}? [xevToi ftov- 
XijGeoos d/jLaprdvovres aSr/Xa)? i]y0ovTO. 01 re 
irpeGfieis e/carepcov dirrjXOov eir ol'/cov dveiriKXr]- 


XCIII. ToVTOi T(p rpOTTCp Ot ' * KQl]valoi T7JV 7TO- 

2 Xlv ejeiyiGav iv oXiyo) ypovw, teal BtjXt] r) olkoBo- 
fiia en /cal vvv Igtiv on Kara gttovBtjv eyivero. 
ol yap Oe/JbeXioi iravroioiv XlOcov viroiceivTai teal 
ov ^vveipyaG /xevcov eGiiv fj, aXX* w? efcaGroc 1 

TTOTe 7TpOG€(f)€pOV, TToXXaL T€ GTpjXai aWO G7]fld- 

rcov Kal XlOoi elpyaG fievoL ey/careXeyrjGav. /xei- 
£cov yap 6 irepiftoXos iravra-yfi e^yfyOr) rrj<; tto- 

1 Hude reads tKaorov with C. 

1 The remains of the walls now seen around the Peiraous 
are not those of the Themistoclean walls, which were de- 
stroyed at the end of the Peloponn<-sian War, hut of the 
walls built by Conon in 393. A small part of these remains, 


BOOK I. xci. 6-xcin. 2 

advantage both to themselves in particular, and to 
the whole body of the allies ; for it was impossible 
for them, he added, to have equal or similar weight 
in the general councils of the alliance except on the 
basis of a military strength that was a match for 
theirs. Therefore, he concluded, the members of 
the alliance should either dispense with their walls 
one and all, or regard this act of the Athenians as 

XCII. On hearing this, the Lacedaemonians did not 
openly show any resentment against the Athenians ; 
for they had sent their embassy to Athens, not to 
stop the work, but to offer, as they professed, a sugges- 
tion in the common interest, and besides, they enter- 
tained at that time the most friendly feelings for the 
Athenians on account of their zeal in opposing the 
Persians ; since, however, they had failed in their 
purpose, they were secretly vexed. So the envoys 
on either side returned home without making any 
formal complaint. 

XCI1I. It was in this manner that the Athenians 
got their wall built in so short a time, and even 
to-day the structure shows that it was put together 
in haste. 1 For the lower courses consist of all sorts 
of stones, in some cases not even hewn to fit but just 
as they were when the several workers brought 
them, and many columns from grave monuments 
and stones wrought for other purposes were built in. 
For the circuit-wall of the city was extended in 

on the flat ground north of the Peiraeua toward the main- 
land, answers exactly to Thucydides' description— being of 
solid stone and over 25 feet thick — but most of the remains 
are of two outer faces of stone, the intermediate spaces rilled 
in with rubble and earth. On Munychia there is no trace 
anywhere of a solid wall of the age of Themistocles. 



Xews, /cal Bid rovro irdvra 6/jlolcos icivovvres 

3 i)ireiyovro. eizeiae Be /cal rod TLeipcuoix; rd Xonrd 
6 ®efiiaTOfc\r)<; oi/coBofielv (vTrrjpfcro 6' avrov 

TTpOTSpOV €7TL T?}? 6K6LVOV apXV? V? /caT ' CViaUTOV 

'A6r)vaioi<; VP% 6 )> vo/jll^cov to re %wpLov /caXov 
elvai Xi/JLevas eypv rpels avro(f>vei<;, /cal avrovs 
vavTL/covs <y€yev7] fievovs fieya 7rpocpepeiv e? to 

4 /crrjaaaOai Bvvapuiv (tt)? yap Br) 6akdaar]<; irpo)- 
tos eroX/xriaev elrrelv oj? dvOe/crea earl), /cal rr)v 

5 dp^iiv evOvs ^vy/carea/ceva^ev. /cal (p/coBopaicrav 
rfj i/celvov yvco/nrj ro 7m^o? toO re^ov? brrep vvv 
en BfjXov eart irepl rbv TleLpatd' Bvo yap d/xa^ai 
evavriai dXXrjXaiS rov<i XiOovs iirrjyov, euros Be 
ovre %«/Vi^ out€ TrrjXbs tjv, dXXd ^vvwKoBopaip,e- 
vol fieydXoi XlOol ical evropif) iyycovioi, atBrjpa) 
7too? dXXrjXov? ra e^coOev /cal /aoXv/3Bq) BeBepAvoi. 
to Be vijros tffAicrv pudXiara ereXeaOii ov Buevoelro. 

6 eftovXero yap rep ixeyeQei /cal rw rrd^ei d$io~rdvai 
Ta? rebv TToXefilcov €7ri/3ovXd<;, dvOpcowcov re •evo- 
fiL^ev oXiyoav /cal rwv d^peLordrcov dp/cecreiv rr)v 
<pvXa/ojv, tou? S' dXXovs e? rds vavs eafiyjaeaOai. 

7 rals yap vaval fidXiara irpoaeKeiro, IBcov, &>? 
£[aoI Bo/cet, Trj? /SacrtXeo)? arparcas rr)v /card 
OdXaaaav e(j)oBov eviropcorepav t?}? /card yiiv 
ovaav rbv re Heipaia axpeXi/iwrepov evbpn^e t/}? 
dvco iroXecos, /cal iroXXd/cis Tot? WOrjvaLOis iraprj- 

1 The Peiraeus, here in widest sense, is the peninsula, the 
heart of which is the steep height of Munychia, from which 


BOOK I. xcm. 2-7 

every direction, and on this account they laid hands 
upon everything alike in their haste. Themistocles, 
moreover, persuaded them also to finish the walls of 
the Peiraeus, a beginning of which had been made 
during the year in which he was archon of the Athe- 
nians ; for he considered that the Peiraeus with its 
three natural harbours l was a fine site to develop and 
that to have become a nation of seamen would be a 
great advantage to the Athenians themselves, with a 
view to their acquisition of power — indeed it was he 
who first dared declare that they must apply them- 
selves to the sea — and so he immediately took the 
first steps in this undertaking. 2 And following his 
advice they built the wall round the Peiraeus of the 
thickness that may still be observed ; for two wagons 
carrying the stones could meet and pass each other. 
Inside, moreover, there was neither rubble nor 
mortar, but stones of large size hewn square were 
closely laid together, bound to one another on the 
outside with iron clamps and lead. But the wall 
was completed to only about half of the height he 
originally intended, for what he wished was to be 
able to repel the assaults of the enemy by the very 
height and thickness of the wall, and he thought 
that a few men, and these the least effective, would 
suffice to guard it, while all the rest might man the 
ships. For Themistocles devoted himself particularly 
to the navy, because, as it seems to me, he had 
observed that the approach of the King's forces was 
easier by sea than by land ; and he thought that the 
Peiraeus would prove more serviceable than the upper 
city, and often advised the Athenians, if ever they 

it stretches into the sea like an indented leaf, forming three 
natural basins— the Peiraeus, Zea, Munychia. 

a Others render : immediately began to help them to lay 
the foundation of their empire. 



vei, rjv dpa irore Kara yrjv ftiaaQwcn, Kara/Sdvra 1 ; 

e\ avrov Tat? vavcrl 7T/30? arravra^ avdicrraaOai. 

8 ' ' AOrjvaloi fiev ovv ovrcos erei^laOrjaav real raXXa 

/career /cevd^ovro evOvs /xera rr)v MijBcoy avayw>- 


XCIV. Uavaavta<; oe 6 K\eo/j,/3porov Ik Aa/ce- 
Baifiovos crrparijyb? row 'EXX/jvcov e^eTrefupOi] 
/xera eiicoai vecov cltto UeXoirovvSjcrov ^vveirXeov 
Be teal 'AOrjvaloi rpidfcovra vavcrl ical rcov aXXcov 
2 %vp,p.dyu>v irXrjdo^. teal earpdrevaav e? KvTrpov 
teal avrrjf; rd troXXa tearearpeyjravro, teal vcrrepov 
e? JSvfyivriov Mi']Bcov eyovrcov teal e^eiroXibp- 
/crjcrav ev rfjhe rfj rjye/iovia,. 1 

XCV. *HBrj he (iiaiov ovros avrov o'L re aXXoi 
EXX^e? rj^Oovro kox ovy^ r\teicrra ol "Icoves 
teal ocroi dirb fiaaiXecos vecocrrl rfXevOepcovro' 
cpotrcovre^ re irpbs tou? ' ' ABrjvaLovs r)%Lovv av- 
rov<; r)yefiova<; crcfrcov yiyveaOat Kara to f~vy- 
yeves Kal Haver avia firj emrperreiv, ij'v rcov 

2 ftiatyirai. ol Be 'AOjjvaloi eBe^avro re rovs 
Xoyovs Kal rcpoGelypv rrjv yvcofirjv a>? ov rrepi- 
o^rofievoL raXXd re Karaar^erofievoL r) c\>alvoiro 

3 dpicrra auTOt?. ev rovrco Be ol AaKeBaL/xbinoi 
fiereirefjirrovro Ylavcraviav dvaKptvovvres cov irepi 
eirvvOdvovro' Kal yap dBiKia iroXXrj Kanjyopelro 
avrov virb rcov 'EXX-ijvcov rcov d<f)LKVOv/j,evcov, 
Kal rvpavvlBos fidXXov ecpaivero /jLi/xiicris r) 

. 1 Hude transfers, with Kriiger, iv TjjSe ttj rj-yf/xovia. to 

ch. xcv., deleting fit after ^877. 


BOOK I. xciii. 7-xcv. 3 

were hard pressed on land, to go down to the'Pei- 
raeus, and resist all their opponents with their fleet. 
It was in this way, then, that the Athenians got 
their walls built, and came to be engaged upon their 
other fortifications, immediately after the withdrawal 
of the Persians. 

XCIV. Meanwhile Pausanias son of Cleombrotus 
was sent out from Lacedaemon in command of the 
Hellenes with twenty ships from Peloponnesus, 
accompanied by thirty Athenian ships and a multi- 
tude of other allies. They made also an expedition 
against Cyprus, subduing most of it, and afterwards, 
at the time of Pausanias' leadership, besieged By- 
zantium, which the Persians then held, and took it. 

XCV. But, since he had already become head- 
strong, 1 the rest of the Hellenes became disaffected, 
especially the Ionians and all who had been recently 
emancipated from the King. So they waited upon 
the Athenians and begged them in the name of 
their kinship 2 to become their leaders, and to resist 
Pausanias if he should attempt to coerce them. 3 The 
Athenians accepted their proposals and gave full 
attention to the matter with the determination to 
endure Pausanias' conduct no longer and to settle 
all other matters as should seem best to them- 
selves. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians recalled 
Pausanias in order to interrogate him about re- 
ports they were hearing, for much wrongdoing was 
charged against him by the Hellenes who came to 
Sparta, and his behaviour seemed an aping of des- 
potic power rather than the conduct of a general 

1 cf. ch. cxxx. 2. 

* As the mother city ; cf ch. ii. (end). 

• 478 B.C. 



4 (jTpaTr)yla. %vve/37i re avrw /ca\elo~9ai re a/ia 
/ecu tovs !jv p /jid)(ov<; rw e/celvov e\Qei Trap 'A#>7- 
vaiovs fxerard^aaOai ttX^v roov dirb UeXoTrop- 

5 vqaov arparicoTcov. eXOcop Be e? Aa/ceBalpLOPa 
twv pep IBla, irpos tivcl dBi/c7]p,aT0)p TjvOvvdrj, ra 
Be /jLeyHTTa ajrokverai fit] dBi/celp' /caTtiyopetTO 
Be avrov ov% rjKLara p,r]Bicrp,b<; /cal eho/cei aafye- 

6 gtcltov elvai. /cal eicelvov fxev ovk4ti i/cTrepTrov- 
aiv apxovTa, Aop/ctp Be /cal ciXXovs riva? fier 
avrov enpariav e^ovTas ov ttoXXijp' ot? ov/ceri 

7 e<f)Leo~av ol %vixp,ayoi tt)p rjyepuopLap^ ol Be al- 
o~66p,epoi airrfkOov, /cal aXXovs ov/eeri varepov 
if;e7r€fAilrav ol AafceBatfioviOL, <po/3ovp,epoi p,r) 
o~(f)LO-iv ol el;i6vT€<; xeipovs ylyvwvrai, orrep /cal 
ev tw Uavcravia evelBov, cnraXka^elovTes Be ical 
iov MtjBlkov iroXepov /cal tovs 'AOrjvaLOvs vofil- 
%ovt€<; l/cavovs e^ijyelaOac /cal a(f)Lcrip iv Top Tore 
irapovTi eirLT7]Beiov^. 

XCVI. Uapa\a/36vTe<; Be ol 'AOtjvaloL rr)p 
7]yefiovlav tovtw tg> rpoirw e/eovrcov tcop fjv/j,/id- 
yjudv Bid to Uavaaviov plaos, era^av a? re eBei 
irapeyeiv rcov TroXewv %pi]p,aTa rrpbs top fidp- 
ftapop /cal as pads' irp6a)(iifia yap r)P d/uvveaOai 
2 cop erraOop Byovpras tiip fiao-iXews %copap. ical 
< KX\r]V0Tap,Lai Tore irpwrop ^AOrjPaioiS /carearTj 
apx>j, ol iBexoPTO top (fiopop* ovtco yap oopo/jLacrdrj 


BOOK I. xcv. 3-xcvi. 2 

And it so happened that he was cited before the 
court at the very time that the allies in vexation at 
him had gone over to the side of the Athenians, all 
except the soldiers from the Peloponnesus. And 
although, on his return to Lacedaemon, Pausanias 
was held to account for any personal wrongs he had 
committed against individuals, yet on the principal 
charges he was acquitted of misconduct ; for he was 
accused most of all of treasonable relations with the 
Persians, and it seemed to be a very clear case. And 
they did not again send him out as commander, but 
Dorcis, together with some others, with an incon- 
siderable force ; but the allies did not entrust these 
with the chief command. And they, being now 
aware of the situation, went back home ; and the 
Lacedaemonians sent out no other commanders 
thereafter, fearing that any who went out might be 
corrupted, as they saw had happened in the case of 
Pausanias ; they also wanted to be rid of the Persian 
war, and thought that the Athenians were com- 
petent to take the leadership and were friendly to 
themselves at the time. 

XCVI. After the Athenians had succeeded in this 
way to the leadership over the allies, who freely 
chose them on account of their hatred of Pausanias, 
they assessed the amount of their contributions, both 
for the states which were to furnish money for the 
war against the Barbarians and for those which were 
to furnish ships, the avowed object being to avenge 
themselves for what they had suffered by ravaging 
the King's territory. And it was then * that the 
Athenians first established the office of Hellenic 
treasurers, who received the tribute ; for so the 
1 476 b.o. 



rcov xprj/xdrcov r) fyopa. r)v S* o Trpwros <f>6po<; 
Ta%#el? Terpafcocna rdXavra Kal egiJKOvra, ra- 
fiteiov re A?)\o? r)v auroU Kal ai %vvohoi, e? to 
lepov iyuyvovro. 

XCVII. 'Hyov/xevoi he avrovoficov to irpcorov 


ovrtov roadhe iirrjXOov iroXe/jLtp re Kal Biaxeipiaei 
Trpayfidrcov fiera^v rovhe rov iroXe/nov kcli rov 
MrjhiKov, a iyevero 7roo? tc rov (3dpftapov avroU 
teal 7T/DO? Tou? <r<f)€Tepov<; gvfjLfidxovs vecorepi- 
frvras Kal He\o7rovvrjaicov toi/? alel it poarvyyd- 
2 vovra<; iv e/cd(TT(p. eypa-yjra he avid Kal rrjv 
ifcfioXrjv rod \6yov irr oilier dpur\v hid rohe, ore rocs 
irpo i/jbov dirao-tv iicK.i,ire<; rovro f)v to ywpiov /cat 
rj rd Fpb rcov MrjhiKCov 'EWrjviKa ^vveriOeaav rj 
avrahd MrjhiKa' rovrcov he oairep Kal rjyjraro 
iv rfj 'ArriKrj ^.vyypacjyfj 'EWdvircos, /9/oa^ea)? re 
Kal rot? xpovois ovk aKpiftcos iirepLvqaOrj' dpua he 
Kal rr)s ap%^? dirohei^iv e^ei t>)9 rcov 'AOrjvaicov 
iv ouo rpoirco Karecrrrj. 

XCVIII. Upcorov fiev 'Hiova r^v iirl ^rpv/movi 
'Mtfhcov iyovTwv TrdkiopKia elXov Kal r)vhpaTTO- 
hiaav KipLwvos rov MiXridhov ar partly ovvros, 

2 erreira %/cvpov rrjv iv rep Alyalcp vfjaov, r)v cokovv 

3 Ao\o7T6?, r)vhpaT7oBiaav 1 Kal cpKiaav avrol. 7r/)o? 
he Kapvariovs avrols dvev rcov dWcov TLvftoecov 
7roXeyu.o? iyevero, Kal XP^ V( P fjvvifirjaav Kad* 

1 Deleted by Hude, after Cobet. 

BOOK I. xcvi. 2-xcviii. 3 

contribution of money was termed. The amount 
of the tribute first assessed was four hundred and 
sixty talents, and the treasury of the allies was 
Delos, where the meetings were held in the temple. 

XCVII. Exercising then what was at first a leader- 
ship over allies who were autonomous and took part 
in the deliberations of common assemblies, the 
Athenians, in the interval between this war and the 
Persian, undertook, both in war and in the adminis- 
tration of public affairs, the enterprises now to be 
related, which were directed against the Barbarian, 
against their own allies when they attempted revolu- 
tion, and against such of the Peloponnesians as from 
time to time came into conflict with them in the 
course of each attempt. And I have made a 
digression to write of these matters for the reason 
that this period has been omitted by all my pre- 
decessors, who have confined their narratives either 
to Hellenic affairs before the Persian War or to the 
Persian War itself; and Hellanicus, the only one of 
these who has ever touched upon this period, has in 
his Attic History treated of it briefly, and with 
inaccuracy as regards his chronology. And at the 
same time the narrative of these events serves to 
explain how the empire of Athens was established. 

XCVI1I. First, then, under the leadership of 
Cimon son of Miltiades, they took by siege Eion 
on the Strymon, which the Persians held, and en- 
slaved its inhabitants l ; then they enslaved Scyros, 
the island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopians, 
and colonised it themselves. And a war arose 
between them and the Carystians, the other Eu- 
boeans taking no part in it, and after a time terms 

1 476 b.o. 



4 opLoXoylav. Na£toj? Be diroaracTi fiera ravra 
irroXepLrjaav teal rroXioptela rrapea-rrjaavro. npcorrj 
re avrrj ttoXls ^vfi/iaxU rrapd rb tca9ecTrr]fcb<; 
eBovXcoOrj, erreira Be teal rcov aXXcov ax? e/edarr) 
%vve/3r]. 1 

XCIX. Atrial Be aXXai re r)o~av rcov diroard- 
aecov teal fieyiarai at rcov cpopcov teal vecov €K&eiai 
teal Xiiroarpdrtov et rep eyevero' ol yap 'Adrjvaloi 
dtcpiftco? enpacrcTov teal Xvirrjpol rjaav ovte elcoOo- 
aiv ovBe /3ovXofjLevoi<; raXanrcopelv irpoadyovres 

2 rds dvdy/cas. rjaav Be 7r&>9 teal aXXcos ol 'AOtj- 
valoi ovieeri bp,oico<$ ev jjBovt} apxovres, teal ovre 
^vvecrrpdrevov dirb rod taov paBtov re irpoad- 
yeaOai rjv avroU tou? dfyiarapuevovs' cov aviol 

3 alrioi eyevovro ol £vjj,p,axor Bid yap rrjv drrb- 
kvy]ctiv ravrrjv rcov arpareicov ol 7rXetou? avrcov, 
Xva fir) air olkov cocti, y^pi')jxara erd^avro dvrl 
rcov vecov rb iKvou/ievov dvdXcofia cpepeiv, teal rols 
fiev 'Adtjvalois rjvgero rb vavritebv dirb Trp Banrd- 
vr]? rjv e/eelvoi ^vficpepotev, avrol Be, oirore drro- 
aralev, drrapdcTfcevoi teal direipoi e? rov iroXe/jiov 

C 'Ryevero Be fiera ravra teal rj eV Kvpv/jie- 
Bovn 7rora/jLco ev UapcpvXla 2 rre^opiayla teal vav- 
\xayla 'A07}valcov teal ra)v £vpi/LLdxcov 7T/30? MijBovs, 
teal evltccov rij avrfj i]/J>epa dptcporepa ' AOrjvaloi 

1 Deleted by Hude as probably not read by Schol. 

2 iv na(x<pv\ia f omitted by Hude and Stahl, with Codex M. 


BOOK I. xcviii. 3-c. i 

of capitulation were agreed upon. After this they 
waged war upon the Naxians, 1 who had revolted, 
and reduced them by siege. And this was the first 
allied city to be enslaved in violation of the estab- 
lished rule ; but afterwards the others also were 
enslaved as it happened in each case. 

XCIX. Now while there were other causes of 
revolts, the principal ones were the failures in bring- 
ing in the tribute or their quota of ships and, in 
some cases, refusal of military service ; for the 
Athenians exacted the tribute strictly and gave 
offence by applying coercive measures to any who 
were unaccustomed or unwilling to bear the hard- 
ships of service. And in some other respects, too, 
the Athenians were no longer equally agreeable as 
leaders ; they would not take part in expeditions on 
terms of equality, and they found it easy to reduce 
those who revolted. For all this the allies them- 
selves were responsible ; for most of them, on account 
of their aversion to military service, in order to 
avoid being away from home got themselves rated 
in sums of money instead of ships, which they should 
pay in as their proportionate contribution, and con- 
sequently the fleet of the Athenians was increased 
by the funds which they contributed, while they 
themselves, whenever they revolted, entered on the 
war without preparation and without experience. 

C. After this occurred at the river Eurymedon in 
Pamphylia the land-battle and sea-fight of the 
Athenians 2 and their allies against the Persians; 
and the Athenians were victorious in both on the 

1 -4C3 b.c. 

1 For this glorious victory of Cimon's, whose date (466 B.C. ?) 
is not certain, cf. Diod. xi. 60 ; Plut. Cim. xiL 

l6 7 


Ki/jLcovo? rod MiXridBov (TTpaTrjyovvTOS, teal el\ov 
rptrjpei^ Qoivifcwv teal Bi,e(f)9€ipav t<x? iracras e\ 

2 BiaKoaias. XP° V( P ^ vcrepov %vveftr) ©acrtou? 
avTcov aTTOcrTrjvaL Btevex^eira^ ire pi "rSiv ev rf} 
dvrnrepas Spa/crj epuropicov ical rod fieruXXov, 
a eve/iovTO. /cal vavcrl fiev inrl ®daov irXev- 
cravres ol *A6r)vaioi vavjxayia e/epdrrjerav /cal eV 

3 rr]V yyv direftrjaav eirl Be Hrpvfiova Tre/Ayfravres 
pLvpiovs ol/ajropas aurcov teal rebv H;vp,pudywv vrro 
tou? avrovs xpovov?, a>? ol/ciovvTe? ra<; tots 
tcaXov/neva^ 'Evvea 6Bov<t, vvv Be ^ A/jl^litoXlv, twv 
fiev 'Evvea oBcjv avrol etepdrrjaav, a? el%ov 'HS&)- 
vol, irpoeXOovre^ Be rrj<; (&pa/cr)$ e? fMeaoyeiav 
Bte^Odprjaav ev Apa/3r]o-tc(0 rfj 'HBcovitcr) vtto twv 
Spa/coov £v juLir dvr o)v ols TToX-ep-LOv rjv to yj o P l0V x 

CI. SdatoL Be viK7]9evre% ^"X/7 KaL iroXiopteov- 

fievoi AafceBaL/jLOVLOvs eiretcaXovvTO teal eirajivveiv 

2 etceXevov iaftaXovras e? ttjv 'AttikiJv. ol Be 

virea^ovTO fiev tepveba t6)v 'AOrjvalwv teal efieXXov, 

Bie/ccoXvdrjaav Be vtto rod yevofiivov creicr/iovy ev a> 

teal ol EiXeore? avroU teal tcov Trepioltcwv (dovpia- 

rai re teal Aldaifj? e? 'Idcofirjv direar^aav. irXel- 

1 at 'Evpea 680I, in the MSS. after x a3 pL° v > rejected by 

1 465 B.C. 

8 The Thasians had a gold mine at Skapte Hyle en the 
Thraeian coast, from which they drew rich revenues ; cf. 
Hdt. vi. xlvi. f. 


BOOK I. c. i-ci. 2 

same day under the command of Cimon son of 
Miltiades, and they took and destroyed triremes of 
the Phoenicians to the number of two hundred all 
told. And some time afterwards it came to pass 
that the Thasians revolted from them, 1 a quarrel 
having arisen about the trading posts and the 
mine 2 on the opposite coast of Thrace, of which 
the Thasians enjoyed the profits. Thereupon the 
Athenians sailed with their fleet against Thasos, 
and, after winning a battle at sea, disembarked on 
the island. About the same time they sent to the 
river Strymon ten thousand colonists, consisting of 
Athenians and their allies, with a view to colonising 
the place, then called Nine Ways, but now Am- 
phipolis ; and though these colonists gained posses- 
sion of Nine Ways, which was inhabited by Edoni, 
yet when they advanced into the interior of Thrace 
they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the 
united forces of the Thracians, to whom the settle- 
ment of the place was a menace. 

CI. As for the Thasians, who had been defeated 
in battle and were now besieged, they appealed to 
the Lacedaemonians and urged them to come to 
their aid by invading Attica. This, unknown to the 
Athenians, they promised to do, and intended to 
keep their promise, but were prevented by the 
earthquake 3 which occurred at the time 4 when both 
their Helots and the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea 
revolted and went to Ithome. 5 Most of the Helots 

8 Called "the great earthquake" in ch. cxxviii. 1. 

4 464 b.c. 

6 The Perioeci were the old inhabitants of the country, 
chiefly of Achaean stock, reduced to a condition of depen- 
dence, i.e. were not citizens, though not state-slaves as the 
Helots were. 

vol. I. 169 


(Ttol Be ro)V TLiXcotcov eyevovro ol tcov iraXaiwv 
^Aecrarjvlayv Tore SovXcodevrcov diroyovor rj teal 
3 Wecra/jviot e/eXijOrjaav ol irdvie^. irpbs fiev ovv 
tou? ev 'lOcofirj 7t6\€/jlo<; /eadeicmj/eet, AateeSai- 
fiovLow Sdcriot, Be rpLTQ) erei TroXioptcovpLevoi 
w/xoXoyrjaav ^ A6t)vaioL<; T€t%o? T€ fcaOeXovre^ teal 
vavs TrapaBovres, xpyj/iard re oaa eBet, diro- 
Bovvai avTLtca rai;dfjLevoi teal to Xolttov <j>epetv, 
rrjv re r]ireipov teal to pueraXXov d^evres. 

CII. AateeBaipibvioi Be, a>? auroU 7rpo<? tou? ev 
'lOcofir) ifjLi]fcvveTO 6 iroXefios, aXXovs re eireKaXe- 
cravro %v p,\xdyov<$ teal ' Adrjvaiovs' ol 8' r)X6ov 

2 K.l{jLG)VOS arparr/yovvro^ irXr]6ei ovte oXiyw. fxd- 
Xiara 8' clvtov? eireKaXeaavro, on TeL^o/jLa^elv 
iBoteovv Bvvarol elvai, tt}$ Be iroXt,opteLa<; fiatepd^ 
KaQecrT7)tcvla<; rovrov evBed efyaivero' ft la, yap 

3 av elXov rb yjaplov. /cal Biacpopd etc ravTrjs tt}<? 
crTparelas irpwrov Aa/eeBaipLOVLOi? teal ' AOrjvaiois 
<f)avepa iyevero. ol yap AateeBaifiovioi, e7reiBr} rb 
ywplov ftla x ov-% rfkiateero, Beio-avres rcov 'AOrj- 
valwv to ToX/jbi]pbv teal rrjv vewTepoirodav, teal 
dXXocf)vXov<; dfia rjyrjcrdfjLevoi, fir) n, r\v irapa- 
/xeivwaLv, virb rcov ev 'IOco/jltj 7reio~0evT€<; vecorepl- 
crcoai, fiovov? rwv I;v [Xfid^ov dTreTre/jLyfrav, rrjv fiev 
vTToyjrlav ov BrjXovvres, elirovres Be on ovBev 

4 irpocrBeovrai avrcov en. ol 8' ^AOyjvaloi eyvcoaav 

1 Kriiger deletes, followed by Hude. 

BOOK I. ci. 2-cn. 4 

were the descendants of the early Messenians who 
had been enslaved of old, 1 and hence were all called 
Messenians. The Lacedaemonians, then, were in- 
volved in war with the rebels on Ithome ; and so the 
Thasians, who were in the third year of the siege, 
came to terms with the Athenians, pulling down 
their walls and delivering over their ships, agreeing 
to pay forthwith whatever sum of money should be 
required of them and to render tribute in future, and, 
finally, giving up both the mainland and the mine. 

CI I. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, 
when their war with the rebels on Ithome proved a 
long affair, appealed to their allies in general and 
especially to the Athenians, who came with a con- 
siderable force under the command of Cimon. The 
principal reason why an appeal was made to them 
was that they were reputed to be skilful in siege 
operations, whereas the long continuance of the siege 
showed their own deficiency in this respect; for other- 
wise they would have taken the place by assault. And 
it was in consequence of this expedition that a lack of 
harmony in the relations of the Lacedaemonians and 
the Athenians first became manifest. For the Lace- 
daemonians, when they failed to take the place by 
storm, fearing the audacity and the fickleness of 
the Athenians, whom they regarded, besides, as men 
of another race, thought that, if they remained, they 
might be persuaded by the rebels on Ithome to 
change sides ; they therefore dismissed them, alone 
of the allies, without giving any indication of their 
suspicion, but merely saying that they had no further 
need of them. The Athenians, however, recognized 

1 Referring to the mythical time of the first Messenian 



ovk eVt rat fteXriovL Xoyqy diroTreiMirofievoi, dXXd 

TIVOS VTTOTTTOV y€V0/l€V0V, Kal heiVOV 7T0irjCrd/JL€V0L 

koX ovk dgiGoaavres viro Aa/ceSai/JLovicov rovro 
iraOelv, ei/Ovs eVeiS?) dve^dyprjaav, acpevres rijv 
yevofievrjv iirl rat M^Sco ^Vfjufia^iav 7rpb<; avrovs 
'Apyeiois rol<; etceivwv iroXefiiois gvpfiaxoi eye- 

VOVTO, teal 7T/50? ®€CTCraXoVS a/JLd d/JL(pOT€pOL<; 01 

avrol opKoi /cat ijv/ifMiXLci Karearr). 

CIII. Ot 6" iv 'lOcofjLj) Setcdra) eret, a>? ovtceri 
eBvvavro dvrkxe.iv, %vve(3r]<jav irpbs tou? Aa/ee- 
Sac/JLOVLOVS icf) co i^iaaiv £k YleXoTrovvrjaov vrro- 
cnrovSoi Kal fxrjBeirore liri^i]Govrai avrrjs' r\v Be 

2 Tt? dXiaKTjraL, rov Xafiovros elvai BovXov. tjv Be 
ri teal xprjarrjpiov Tot? AaKeBaifiovioLS UvOikov 
rrpb rov, rov iKerr]v rov Afo? rov 'Wco/jurfra dcpie- 

3 vat. e%ij\6ov Be avrol Kal iralBe? Kal yvvalKes, Kal 
aurou? ol 'AOrjvaloi Be^dfievoL Kara e^c^o? 77877 to 
AaKehaifiovicov e? NaviraKrov KarwKiaav, rjv 
erv\ov r/prjKores vecoarl AoKpwv rwv 'O&Xtov 

f ixovrcov. irpoaex^pio-av Be Kal Meyaprj? J A0t]- 
vaiois 6? jjvfifiaxiav AaKeBai/novLoov drroardvres;, 
on aurou? KoplvdcoL irepl 7^9 opcov iroXefio) 
Karelx ov ' Kai ^X ov 'AOrjvaLoi Meyapa Kal TI77- 
yds, Kal rd fiaKpd reixV (pKoBofirjaav Meyapevai 

1 455 b.o. 

BOOK I. en. 4-ciii. 4 

that they were not being sent away on the more 
creditable ground, but because some suspicion had 
arisen ; so because they felt indignant and con- 
sidered that they had not deserved such treatment 
at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, the instant 
they returned home they gave up the alliance which 
they had made with the Lacedaemonians against the 
Persians and became allies of their enemies, the 
Argives. And an alliance at the same time, on the 
same terms and confirmed by the same oaths, was 
concluded by both the Athenians and the Argives 
with the Thessalians. 

CIII. In the tenth year 1 the rebels on Ithome 
found that they could hold out no longer and surren- 
dered to the Lacedaemonians on condition that they 
should leave the Peloponnesus under a truce and 
should never set foot in it again ; and if any of them 
should be caught there, he was to be a slave of his 
captor. Moreover, before this time the Lacedae- 
monians also received a Pythian oracle, which bade 
them let go the suppliant of Ithomean Zeus. So 
the Messenians left the Peloponnesus, themselves 
and their children and wives ; and the Athenians 
received them, in consequence of the enmity to the 
Lacedaemonians already existing, and settled them 
at Naupactus, which they happened to have lately 
taken from its possessors, the Ozolian Locrians. And 
the Megarians also entered into alliance with the 
Athenians, revolting from the Lacedaemonians be- 
cause the Corinthians were pressing them hard in 
a war about boundaries ; and thus the Athenians 
secured Megara and Pegae, 2 and they built for the 
Megarians the long walls which run from the city to 

' Pegae was the Megarian harbour on the Corinthian gulf : 
Niaaea, a nearer one, on the Saronic gulf. 



ra airo tt}? 7roAe&)9 69 NLaaiav teal i(f>povpovp 
avroL. real Kopivdiois fiev ov-% rjKiara cltto rovBe 
to afyoBpov /xicro? rjp^aro irpcorov e'9 'AOrjvaLowi 

CIV. 'lvdpcos Be 6 "tyafifjirjTLXov, Ai/3f9, fiaai- 

XeU9 AlftvCOV TWV 7T/309 AlyVTTTQ), 6pfJL(O/l€V0$ €K 

Mapeias t?J9 virep <Pdpov TroXews direGr^aev 
AIjvtttov rd TrXeiw cltto /3ao~i\ecc><; 'Aprafjep^ov, 
teal auT09 apywv yevofievos 'Adrjvalovs einqyd- 

2 yero. ol Be (eTv%ov yap e'9 K.V7rpov arparevo- 
fjbevoi vaval BtaKoalai^ avTOiV re /cal rcov %v/a- 
ixd^wv) rjXOov airoXiTCOVTes rrjv Kvirpov, teal 
avairXevo-avTes cltto 6aXdaarj<; e'9 top NelXov rod 
re TTora/jLOV Kparovvres Kal rr)s MifjL<f)LBo<; rcov 
Bvo fxepoyv 7rpo9 to rpurov /Aepo9 o KaXelrai 
Aev/chv Tet^09 eiroXefiovp' evrjaav Be avrodu Ylep- 
acov Kal MtjBcov ol Karafyvyovres /cal AlyvTrjitov 
ol fir] tjvvaTroo-rdvTes. 

CV. 'A0rjvaioi<; Be vavalv diroftao-iv e'9 'AXia? 
7T/009 KopivOiov? Kal 'ETTiBavplovs p>dyr) eyivero, 
Kal eviKwv K.opLvOioi. Kal vo-repov 'AQ-qvaloi 
evavpudyr]aav eirl YLeKpvfyaXeiq TleXoTrovvrjaiwv 

2 vaval, Kal eviKwv *A6rjvaioi. TroXe/jLov Be Kara- 
ardvTO<; 717)09 Alyivrjra*; ' 'Adrjvaioi? fiera ravra 
vav^ayla ylyverai eV Alylvrj pueydXr) ' AOrjvaicov 
Kal AlyivrjTtov {Kal ol ^vfipLa^oL eKarepOLS Traprj- 
o~av), Kal eviKcov y A6)]vaL0i, Kal vavs e/3Bop,rJKOVTa 
Xa/36vre<; avTcov 69 rr)v yrjv direftrjaav Kal eVo- 
XiopKovv AecoKpdrovs tov XrpoLfiov arpaTrjyovv- 


BOOK I. cm. 4-cv. 2 

Nisaea and held it with a garrison of their own 
troops. And it was chiefly because of this act that 
the vehement hatred of the Corinthians for the 
Athenians first arose. 

CIV. Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a 
Libyan and king of the Libyans who are adjacent to 
Egypt, setting out from Mareia, the city just north 
of Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt 
from King Artaxerxes, 1 and then, when he had 
made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians. 
And they left Cyprus, 2 where they happened to be 
on an expedition with two hundred ships of their 
own and of their allies, and went to Egypt, and 
when they had sailed up the Nile from the sea, 
finding themselves masters of the river and of two- 
thirds of Memphis, they proceeded to attack the 
third part, which is called the White Fortress. And 
in this fortress were some Persians and Medes who 
had taken refuge there, and such Egyptians as had 
not joined in the revolt. 

CV. The Athenians also made a descent with a 
fleet upon Halieis, where they had a battle with 
some Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the 
Corinthians won. And afterwards the Athenians 
fought a sea-fight at Cecryphaleia with a Pelopon- 
nesian fleet, in which the Athenians won. After 
this war broke out between the Athenians and the 
Aeginetans, and a great sea-fight occurred between 
the Athenians and the Aeginetans off Aegina, in 
which the allies of both sides were present. This the 
Athenians won and having taken seventy Aeginetan 
ships they descended upon their territory and 
laid siege to the city, Leocrates son of Stroebus, 

1 im b.o. * cf. ch. xciv. 2. 
+»lfl 175 


3 to?. eirena YleXoirovvi^aioi afivveiv fiovXofievoi, 
AlyLvrjTdLS e? p,ev rrjv AXyivav t piaKoaiovs 
6ir\ira<s, irporepov KopivOlcov Kal 'RTrtSavpiwv 
eiriKovpovs, BLe/3l/3ao-av, ra Be a/cpa rrj<; Tepavelas 
KareXaftov Kal e? rrjv MeyaplBa Kare/3yaav 
Y^oplvQioi fxera rcov £v puidyj^v : , vo/Ai^ovTes dBv- 
vdrovs ecreaOcu 'AOrjvalovs fforjOelv rots Meya- 
pevatv ev re Alylvrj dirovarjs arpanct? ttoWtj^ 
teal ev Alyimrw' tjv Be /ecu /SotjOohtiv, an Alylvrj<; 

4 avcMJTi'jcrecrOaL avrovs. ol Be ^ AQr)vaZoi to fiev 
irpos Alylvrj crrpdrev/ia ovk eKivqaav, rcov B* Ik 
lips 7roXea)9 vttoXoL'kwv o'i re Trpea/Suraroi Kal ol 
vecoraroi dcfyiKvovvrat e? ra ^leyapa ^IvpcovlBov 

5 crrparrjyovvTO^. Kal ^a%^? yevofievrjs laoppoirov 
7T/oo? YLopivdiovs BieKpiQr)crav air* aWrfkcov, Kal 
evopuaav avrol eKarepoi ovk eXaacrov e%etv ev ra> 

6 epyw. Kal ol fiev 'AOrjvaloi (e/epdrrjerav yap 
o/xft)? fiaXXov) drreXOovrcov rcov KopivOlcov rpo- 
rralov earrjerav ol Be Y^opivQioi KaKi^ofievoi vrro 
rcov ev rfj iroXei irpecr^vrepcov /cal rrapaaKevaad- 
fjuevoi, rj/jiepacs varepov BcoBerca fidXiara eX66vre<$ 
avdlaraaav rpoiralov teal avrol o>? viKT]aavre<;. 
Kal ol ' 'A0r]valoi eic(3or]6r)aavTe<$ i/c rcov Meydpcov 
tovs re to rpoiralov Icrrdvras BiacpOeipovai Kal 
toI<$ dXXois %vfi[SaX6vres eKpdrrjcrav. CVI. ol 
Be viKco/ievoi vrre^copovv, Kal ri avrcov fiepos ovk 
oXiyov TTpoaftiacrOev Kal Bia/xaprov rf}<; 6Bov 
ecreireaev e? toi> %coplov IBicorov, co erw%ev 


BOOK I. cv. 2-cvi. i 

being in command. Thereupon the Peloponnesians, 
wishing to aid the Aeginetans, sent into Aegina 
three hundred hoplites, who had previously been 
assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. More- 
over, the Corinthians occupied the heights of Gera- 
neia, and made a descent upon the territory of 
Megara in conjunction with their allies, thinking 
that the Athenians would be unable to aid the 
Megarians, since many of their troops were away in 
Aegina and in Egypt, or if they should attempt it 
that they would have to withdraw from Aegina. 
The Athenians, however, did not disturb the army 
besieging Aegina, but with such forces as were left 
in the city, consisting of the oldest and the youngest 1 
men, marched into Megara, the general in command 
being Myronides. An indecisive battle was fought 
with the Corinthians, whereupon they separated, each 
side thinking they had not got the worst of it in the 
action. And the Athenians, who had in fact got 
rather the better of it, when the Corinthians with- 
drew, set up a trophy ; but the Corinthians, being 
reproached by the older men in their city, made 
their preparations and about twelve days later came 
back and set up for themselves a rival trophy, as 
though they had won. Hereupon the Athenians 
made a sally from Megara, slew those who were 
setting up the trophy, and joining battle with the 
rest defeated them. CVI. The vanquished party 
now retreated, and a not inconsiderable portion 
of them, being hard pressed, missed their way 
and rushed into a piece of land belonging to 

1 These performed military service only in extraordinary 
cases ; the former were between fifty and sixty, the latter 
under twenty years of age. 



2 opvy/ia fiiya irepielpyov Kal ovk rjv eifoBos. ol 
Be * AOrjvaiot, yvovre? Kara irpoawirov re eipyov 
Tot? 07t)utgu? kcli irepLarrjaavre^ kvkXw tou? 
yp-iXov^ KareXevaav irdvTas toi>? icreXOovras, real 
iraQos iieya rovro Kopivdioi? iyevero. to Be 
7r\r)0os ai€X<* ) PV a€V avTOt? r% arpcLTias eV 


CVII. "WptavTO he Kara tovs XP° vov s tovtovs 
kclI tcl Lia/cpa relxv 'Adr/valoL e? OdXaaaav 
olfcoBo/ielv, to T€ <£>aXr]p6vBe Kal to e'<? Ueipaia. 

2 Kal QooKecov arparevadvrwv e? Acopias rrjv AaKe- 


'Rpiveov, Kal eXovrcov ev twv iroXLcrfidTwv tovtcov 

ol AaKe&ai/jLOVLOl NiKOfirjBoVS TOV KXeOfjiflpOTOV 

virep TlXeio~TodvaKTO<5 rov Tlavcravlov fiaaiXecos, 
veov 6Vto? en, fjyovfievov e^orjd^crav tols l\co- 
pievaiv eavrcov re irevTaKoaiois Kal ^iXtoi? ottXl- 
tgu9 Kal twv ^vLLLidywv liv plots, Kal toj)? Ow/ee'a? 
ofioXoyia dvayKaaavres diroBovvac rrjv ttoXiv 

3 cLTreytopovv irdXiv. Kal Kara OdXaaaav Liev 
avTOu?, Bta rod Y^piaalov koXttov el (SovXoivro 
7repaLOva0ai, 'AOrjvaloL vaval TrepLTrXevaavres 
e/ieXXov KcoXvaeiv Bta. Be rrj$ Tepaveias ovk 
do-tyaXes avrols ecfcalveTo 'AOrjvalcov eyovrotv 
Meyapa Kal Urjycis TropevecrOar 1 BvcroBos re yap 
rj Yepdveta Kal efypovpelro alel biro 'AOrjvalwv, 
Kal rore rjaOdvovro avrovs fieXXovTa? Kal Tavry 

4 KwXvaeiv. eBo%e Be avrols ev Bot&JTOt? irepLfiel- 
vaai aKetyaadai otw rpoirw dcrfyaXeo-Tara Bta- 
Tropevaovrai. to Be ti Kal avBpe? eirrjyov avTovs 

1 iroptveo-6ai deleted by Hude as not read by SchoL 
l 7 8 

BOOK I. cvi. i-cvii. 4 

some private person, which was enclosed by a great 
ditch and had no exit. And when the Athenians 
perceived this, they shut them in by barring the 
entrance with hoplites, and stationing light-armed 
troops all round stoned all who had entered. And 
this was a great calamity to the Corinthians ; the 
main body of their army, however, returned home. 

CVI I. About this period 1 the Athenians began to 
build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum, 
the other to the Peiraeus. And the Phocians made 
an expedition against the land of the Dorians, the 
mother-country of the Lacedaemonians, namely the 
towns of Boeum, Citinium, and Erineum, one of 
which they captured ; whereupon the Lacedae- 
monians, under the lead of Nicomedes son of Cleom- 
brotus, acting for King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, 
who was still a minor, sent to the aid of the Dorians 
a force of fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and 
ten thousand of their allies, and after they had forced 
the Phocians to make terms and restore the city 
they began their return homeward. Now if they 
wished to take the sea-route and make their passage 
by way of the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians were 
sure to take their fleet round the Peloponnesus and 
block their way ; and to march over the Geranaean 
pass appeared to them hazardous, since the Athenians 
held Megara and Pegae. Besides, the Geranaean 
pass was not easy to traverse and was at all times 
guarded by the Athenians, and at this present time, 
as the Lacedaemonians perceived, they intended 
to block their way. So they decided to wait in 
Boeotia and consider how they might most safely 
cross over to the Peloponnesus. To this course they 
were partly influenced by some Athenians, who were 

1 457 b.o. 



tcov 'AOijvaicov Kpvcpa, iXiriaavTes Brjpcov re /cara- 
nravcreiv teal ra {Maze pa ret^V ol/coBofiovfieva, 

5 e/3oi']6rj(jav Be eV auTOu? ol * AOrjvaloi TravBt] p,el 
Kal 'Apyelcov ^iXioi Kal tcov aXXcov ^vfifid^cov 
go? efcacTTOf %vpiiTavT6$ Be eyevovTO TeTpaKiayl- 

6 Xioi Kal puvpioi. vofiiaavres Be diropetv oirrj 
BteXdcocriv, eireaTpdrevaav auTcn?, Kal tl Kal tou 

7 Sijfiov fcaraXv a etas viro^rla. rjXOov Be /ecu Setr- 
craXcov i7T7r^9 to?s ' 'AdrjvaCoi? Kara to %vp,p,ayji- 
kov, ol /iere(TT7)aav iv ra> epyco irapa tou? 

CVIII. Tevofjuivi]*} Be t?}? //a;^? iv Tavdypa 
rfj<; Boiama? eviKcov Aa/ceBcufiovLoi Kal ol %v/j,- 

2 ixayoi, fcal cpovos iyevero dpucpoTepcov 7ro\u?. teal 
AaKeBaifjiovioL pev e? ttjv MeyapiBa e\66vre<i ical 
Bei'BpoTOfirfcravTes irdXiv dirrjXdov eir oi/cov Bid 
Tepavelas iea\ laO/iov' *A9r)vaioi Be Bevrepa teal 
eljrj/eoo-TJj V^pa fierd rrjv fidxrjv iarpdrevaav e? 

3 Boicotovs MvpcovlBov arpaTiiyovvTos, /cal p-axy 
ev Olvo(f)VTOi<; Bomotovs vucrjaavTes rfj? re ^copa? 
i/epdrrjaav t?)? Boicorla? Kal <&g)kl8o<; zeal Tava- 
ypaicov to Tet^o? ireptelXov Kal AoKpcov tcov 
'Ottovvtlcov eKaTOV dvBpa<; opajpov; tou? itXov- 
cucoTaTou? eXaftov, t<x tc Tei)(V cclvtcov tcl fxaKpd 

4 direTeXecrav. copboXoy^crav Be Kal ol AlyivrjTai, 
peTa TavTa Tot? 'Adrjvalois, Tel^V T6 irepieXovres 
Kal vavs 7rapaB6vTe$ cfiopov T€ ra^dfievot e? t6v 

5 eireiTa ^povov. Kal UeXoTrovvrjcrov irepieirXevaav 
'AOtjvaloi ToX/jllBov tou ToX/xaiov o-TpaTrjyovvTos, 

i So 

BOOK I. cvn. 4-CV111. 5 

secretly inviting them into their country, in the hope 
of putting an end to the democracy and to the build- 
ing of the long walls. But the Athenians went out 
against the Lacedaemonians with their whole force 
and with one thousand Argives and contingents of 
the several allies, the whole body amounting to 
fourteen thousand men. And they undertook the 
expedition against them because they believed that 
they were at a loss how to get through, and partly 
too on a suspicion of a plot to overthrow the 
democracy. The forces of the Athenians were 
strengthened by some Thessalian cavalry, who came 
in accordance with the terms of the alliance, but 
they deserted to the Lacedaemonians in the course 
of the action. 

CVIII. The battle took place 1 at Tanagra in 
Boeotia, and in it the Lacedaemonians and their 
allies were victorious, and there was much slaughter 
on both sides. The Lacedaemonians then entered 
the Megaiian territory, cut down the trees, and went 
back home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. 
But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the 
Athenians, having made an expedition into Boeotia 
under Myronides, defeated the Boeotians at Oeno- 
phyta, got control of Boeotia and Phocis, pulled 
down the walls of Tanagra, and took one hundred 
of the wealthiest men of the Opuntian Locrians as 
hostages. Meanwhile they completed their own long 
walls. After this the Aeginetans also capitulated to 
the Athenians, pulling down their walls, delivering 
up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future. 2 
And the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides 
son of Tolmaeus, sailed round the Peloponnesus, 

1 456 b.o. ■ 455 b.o. 



koX to vecopiov twv AaKeBaLfjboviwv iverrprjaav 
Kal XaXxiBa KopivOlcov elXov real Xikvmvlovs iv 
aTToftao-ei r?)? 77)9 paxV ifepdrrjaav. 

CIX. Ol 8' iv rfi Al<yinTT(p WOrjvacot /ecu ol 
Ifv/jL/jLa'xoi eire/jLevov, Kal avrois iroXXal IBeai 

2 TroXefMcov Karea-Trjaav. to fiev yap irpwrov i/epd- 
tovv t?}? AlyvTTTov ol ' 'AOtjvcllol, Kal $ao~LXev<$ 
7rifi7T€L e? AaKeBaifiova Meydj3a£ov dvBpa Hep- 
o-j)v xpyjficiTa e^ovra, 6Va)9 es tt)V 'Attlktiv 
iafiaXelv ireiaOevrcov t&v HeXoTTovv^alwv air 

3 AIjiitttov diraydyoL ' AOrfvatovs. 009 Be avra> ov 
irpovydtpei real tcl ^prjixara aXXcos dvrfXovro, 6 
/xev Meyd/3a%o<; kcll tcl Xolttcl tcov xpiifidrcov 
TrdXiv €9 tt)v * Aglclv dv€KO/jLLo-07], Meydftv^ov Be 

TOP ZtGOTTVpOV 7TefjL7T€L CtvBpa UiparjV fJL€TCL 0~T pCL- 

4 T*a9 iroXXrjs' 09 d^Lfcofievo^ Kara yr\v tou9 Te 
Aiyv7TTL0v<; real' rovs %vp,}xdyov<; p>dxj) iKpdrrjo-e 
Kal ck tt}9 Me/j,(f)i$os e^rjXacre tov? "RXXrjvas Kal 
Te\o9 €9 Upoo-coTTLTtBa rrjv viigov KareKXrjaev 
Kal €7roXi6pK€L iv avTjj iviavTOV Kal €% firjvas, 
lie\pi ov ^rjpdvas tt\v BLcopvxa Kal 7raparpeyjra<i 
aXXy to vBcop ra9 Te rat>9 eirl tov gijpov iiroLrjcre 
Kal ttj<; vrjaov tcl ttoXXcl r/Treipov, Kal Biaftds 
elXe tt)v vrjaov Tre^fj. 

CX. Ovrco fiev tcl to)v 'EXXrjvcov nrpdyjiara 

£<f)0dpr) e£ eTt) woXefMrjaavTa' Kal bXiyoi diro 

ttoXXo)v iropevofievoL Bid t?;9 Al/Svtjs e'9 Kvpywjv 

2 eacodrjaav, ol Be irXelaTOL dircoXovTO. AtyviTTOS 

Be irdXiv virb /3acrLXea eyeveTo ttXtjv 'AfivpTaLov 


BOOK 1. cviii. 5-cx. 2 

burned the dock-yard 1 of the Lacedaemonians, took 
Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and making a de- 
scent upon the territory of the Sicyonians defeated 
them in battle. 

CIX. Meanwhile the Athenians and their allies 
stayed on in Egypt and the war took on many forms. 
At first the Athenians had the mastery in Egypt, and 
the King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian 
with a supply of money, in order that the Lacedae- 
monians might be induced to invade Attica and the 
Athenians thus be drawn away from Egypt. But 
when he found that matters did not advance and the 
money was being spent in vain, Megabazus betook 
himself back to Asia with the money that was left, 
and Megabyzus son of Zopyrus, 2 a Persian, was des- 
patched with a large army. 3 He marched thither by 
land, and defeated the Egyptians and their allies in 
battle, drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and fin- 
ally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where 
he besieged them for a year and six months, then 
finally, by diverting the water into another course, 
drained the canal and left the ships high and dry, 
converting the greater part of the island into main- 
land ; then he crossed over dry-shod and took the 

CX. Thus this undertaking of the Hellenes came 
to naught after a war of six years ; 4 and but few out 
of many, making their way through Libya into 
Cyrene, escaped with their lives ; the most of them 
perished. And all Egypt again came under the 
King's dominion, except Amyrtaeus, the king of the 

1 Gytheum, on the Laconian gulf. 
1 Hero of the capture of Babylon, Hdt. in. clx. 
3 Diodorus gives him with Artabazus 300,000 men (xi. 75) 
and 300 ships (xi. 77). * 454 B.C. 



rov iv Tot? eXeai fiacnXew rovrov Be Bia 
/j,eye66<; re rov eXou? ovk iBvvavro eXelv Kal apua 

3 fiavi/jLcoraroL elcri rcov Alyvirrlcov ol eXecoi. \va- 
pcos Be 6 Aifivcov j3aaiXev<;, o? ra irdvra eirpa^e 
irepl ri}<; Alyvirrov, irpoBoala XycpOeU dvearav- 

4 pcoOrj. ^ €K Be rcov 'AOrjvcov Kal tt)$ aXXr]<; %ufi- 
fia-)(ioo<; rrevrrjKovra rpirjpei? BidBoxoi TrXeovaat 
e? Alyvirrov eaypv Kara to MevBrjaiov Kepas, 
ovk elBores rcov yeyovorcov ovBev Kal avrocs €K 
re yrj? iirnreaovres nre^ol Kal eK OaXdaar)? <£>oi- 
v'ikcov vavriKov BiecfrOetpav ra<; iroXXds rcov vecov, 

5 al 8' iXaacrovs Biecpvyov rrdXtv. ra jxev Kara 
ri-jv peydXrjv crrpareiav ' AOifvaicov Kal rcov ^vfx- 
/id^cov 65 Alyvirrov ovrux; ireXevrrjcrev. 

CXI. 'E/c Be ®eo-o-aXtaf *0/a^o-T?7? 6 'Ex^Kparl- 
Bov v to? rov SecraaXcov flao-iXecos cpevycov erreiaev 
'Ad-qvalovs eavrov Kardyeiv Kal irapaXaftovres 
~Boicorov<; Kal 3>a>tfea? 6Wa? ff/x/xa^ou? ol 'AOrj- 
valou ecrrpdrevaav tj}? ®eo-cra\ia? eirl QdpaaXov. 
Kal rrjs fiev yr}<; eKpdrovv ocra fii] irpoi6vrei\oXv 
eK rcov orrXcov (ol yap limi)? rcov SeaaaXcov 
elpyov), rrjv Be ttoXlv ovx el\ov, ovB' aXXo irpov- 
ycopet avrot<; ovBev cov eveKa icrrpdrevaav, dXX 
direx^pyaav irdXiv 'Opearrjv exovres dirpaKroi. 
2 MeTa Be ravra ov ttoXXco varepov ^tAiOt 
'Adrjvaicov iirl Ta? vavs Ta? iv II?/yat9 e-mftdvres 
{elx ov ^ avrol ra? IT^ya?) irapeirXevcrav €? 
"EiKVcova UepiKXeovs rov "B^avOlirirov arparr}- 
yovvros, Kal drrofidvre*; ^ikvcovIcov toi>? irpoafj^l- 


BOOK I. ex. 2-cxi. 2 

marshes l ; for the Persians were unable to capture 
him, both on account of the extent of the marsh and 
because the marsh people are the best fighters 
among the Egyptians. Inaros, however, the king of 
the Libyans, who had been the originator of the 
whole movement in Egypt, was taken by treachery 
and impaled. And when fifty triremes, which sailed 
to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the con- 
federacy to relieve the fleet there, put in at the 
Mendesian mouth of the Nile, quite unaware of what 
had happened, the infantry fell upon them from the 
shore and a Phoenician fleet from the sea and de- 
stroyed most of the ships, a small number only 
escaping. So ended the great expedition against 
Egypt of the Athenians and their allies. 

CXI. And now Orestes son of Echecratidas, king 
of the Thessalians, who was exiled from Thessaly, 
persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And they, 
taking along some Boeotians and Phocians who were 
allies, made an expedition against Pharsalus in 
Thessaly. And though they made themselves masters 
of the land, so far as this was possible without going far 
from their camp — for the Thessalian cavalry hemmed 
them in — they failed to capture the city and indeed 
none of the other objects of their expedition was 
attained, so they went back home again unsuccessful, 
having Orestes with them. 

Not long after this 2 one thousand Athenians, em- 
barking on the ships at Pegae, which was now in 
their possession, 3 sailed along the coast to Sicyon 
under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, 
and disembarking defeated in battle the Sicyonians 

cf. Hilt. ii. oxl.; in. xv. 
454 B.C. ' cf. ch. ciii. 4. 



3 ]~avTa<; pa-XV i^pdrrjaav. Kai evOvs rrapaXa- 
(Sovres 'Ay^atov^ Kai BiairXevaavres rrepav, tt?? 
' ' AKapvavias e? OlvidBas iarpdrevaav teal eiro- 
XiopKovv, ov fievjoi elXov ye, dXX drreyoipr^aav 
eV oI'kov. 

CXII. "Tarepov Be BiaXiirovrcov ircov rpicov 
arrovBal yiyvovrai YleXoirovvriaioLS teal ' AOrjvaiOLS 

2 irevrereis. Kai 'RXXtjvlkov fiev iroXe/xov eaypv ol 
'AOrjvaloi, e? Be Kv7rpov iarparevovro vaval 
BiaKoaiais avrcov re real rcov %v/jl fiasco v Kl/acovos 

3 arparr]yovvro<;. teal e^rjtcovTa fiev vrjes e? At- 
yvirrov air avrcov enXevaav *Ap,vpraLov /xera- 
7T€/jl7tovto<; rod iv Tot? eXeai, j3aat,Xeco<;, ai Be 

4 aXXai Kiriov iiroXioptcovv. Kip.covos Be diro- 
Oavovros real Xl/jlov yevofiivov d.Tteyd>pY}aav arch 
K.ITLOV teal irXevaavres iirrep 'ZaXapuvos tt}? iv 
Ku77/o&) QolvL^i teal KvTrpLots teal KiXigiv ivav- 
\idyr]aav Kai i^c^opLay^rjaav dfjia, teal viKrjcavres 
dpicporepa drreycjop^aav eV oiteov Kai ai e£ At- 

5 yvirrov vrjes irdXiv^oCveXOovaai p,er avrcov. Aatee- 
Baifiovioi Be fierd ravra rbv lepov KaXovpuevov 
iroXepLov iaTpdrevaav, Kai KpaTijaavres rov iv 
AeX^ot? lepov irapeBoaav AeXcfxH?* teal avOis 
varepov ' Adrjvalot, div oyco pr\a dvr cov avrcov arpa- 
revaavres Kai Kparr)aavre<$ irapeBoaav QcoKevaiv. 

CXIII. Kai xpovov iyyevofievov fierd ravra 
'AOrjvaloi, Jioicojcov rcov cpevyovrcov iyovrcov 'O/o- 
yjofievbv Kai XaipcoveLav Kai aXX' drra ycopla rr}<; 
Botam'a?, iarpdrevaav eavrcov fiev ^tXtot? ottXl- 
tcu?, rcov Be ^vfifidycov &>? eKaaroi^ irrl ra ywpia 
ravra iroXepua ovra, ToX/jlBov rod ToXfiaiov 
arparrjyovvro*;. Kai Xaipcoveiav eXovres Kai 


BOOK I. cxi. 2-cxiii. i 

who came out against them. Immediately thereafter, 
taking along some Achaeans and sailing across the 
gulf, they made an expedition against Oeniadae in 
Acarnania and laid siege to it ; but failing to take it 
they went back home. 

CXII. Three years afterwards 1 a truce was made 
between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, to last 
five years. And the Athenians did abstain from war- 
fare against Hellenes, but they made an expedition 
against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own 
and of their allies, under the command of Cimon. 
Sixty of these ships sailed to Egypt on the summons 
of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, while the 
others laid siege to Citium. But Cimon died and a 
famine arose, and so they withdrew from Citium ; 2 
and on their way home, when off Salamis in Cyprus, 
they fought the Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians 
by sea and on land. Gaining the victory in both 
battles they went back home, and with them returned 
the ships that had been in Egypt. After this the 
Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called sacred war, 
and getting possession of the temple at Delphi, de- 
livered it to the Delphians ; and afterwards, when 
they had withdrawn, the Athenians made an expedi- 
tion, got possession of it, and delivered it again to 
the Phocians. 

CXIII. Some time after this 3 the Athenians under 
the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, with one 
thousand hoplites of their own and the respective 
quotas of their allies, made an expedition against 
Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and some other places 
in Boeotia, which were in the possession of the Boeo- 
tian exiles and therefore hostile. And after taking 

1 451 b.c. » 449 b.c, ■ 447 b.c 

«8 7 


avhpairohiaavTes aireyoopovv <f>vXaKjjv KaTaarr)- 

2 cravres. iropevofjievois 6" clvtols ev Kopoorcla 
eTUTiOevTCU ol re i/c t?)? 'Op^o/xevov (pvydBe? 


(pvydBes teal ocroi t?)? auT?]? yvd)/jL7}<; r)aav Kal 
fiaXV KpaTijaavres toi/? ptev BiecpOeipav twp W6r)- 

3 valoav, tou? Be ^ayvra^ eXaj3ov. Kal rrjv Boiwriav 
e£eXnrov 'AOjjvacoL irdaav, <nrovBds TrocrjcrdpLevoi 

4 e</>' cJ rou? avBpas kojiiovvtcli. Kal ol (pevyovres 
Bolcotgov KareXOovres teal ol aXXot, irdvre^ avro- 
vollol irdXiv iyevovro. 

CXIV. MeTa Be ravra ov noWa* varepov 
Rv/3olci dirkair) diro ^ AOrjvalwv. Kal e? avrrjv 
8ia^€^7]KOTO<; ijBrj UepLfcXeovs a-rparia ''AOrjvaiwv 
i)yyi\0rj avrw otl Meyapa d<pearr]Ke Kal IleXo- 
TTOwqaLoi fieXXovaiv ea/3dXXetv e? rrjv 'Attiktjv 
Kal ol (ppovpol ' 'A0i]vaLcov BiefyOapfievoi elalv V7r6 
Meyapecov, irXrjV oaoi e? Niaaiav drreepvyov eira- 
yayoiievoi Be KopivOlovs Kal Xlkvcoviovs Kal 'Etu- 
Bavplov? direarriaav ol Meyaprjs. 6 Be UepiKXrjs 
nrdXtv Kara idyo^ eKo/xi^e rrjv arpanav Ik t?}? 

2 Ei)/3ota?. Kal fierd rovro ol YleXoirovvi'jo'LOt tj}? 
'Attiktj*; e? ^EXevatva Kal (dpeco^e eVySaAoz/re? 
eBywaav YlXeiarodvaKTOS rod Uavaavlou fiacri- 
\e&)? AaKeBaipioviwv r^yovpievov, Kal to irXeov 

3 ovKeri irpoeX66vTe<; direx^pyo-av eV olkou. Kal 
WOrjvaloi TrdXiv e? JLvfiotav Biafidvres Uepi- 
tfXe'ou? GTparijyovvTos KareaTpeyfravTo iraaav, 
Kal Tr/v fxev aXXrjv o/xoXoyla KarearijaavTO, 
'EcrTfaia? Be e^oiKLaavie^ avrol rrjv yrjv evyov. 

1 88 

BOOK I. cxiii. i-cxiv. 3 

Chaeroneia and selling its inhabitants into slavery, 
they placed a garrison in it and departed. But 
while they were on the march they were attacked at 
Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, to- 
gether with some Locrians and Euboean exiles and 
others who held the same political views, and were de- 
feated, some of the Athenians being slain and others 
taken alive. Accordingly the Athenians evacuated the 
whole of Boeotia, making a treaty upon the stipula- 
tion that they should receive back their prisoners. 
And so the Boeotian exiles were restored, and they 
as well as all the rest of the Boeotians again became 

CXIV. Not long after this 1 Euboea revolted from 
Athens; and Pericles had just crossed over to the 
island with an Athenian army when word was brought 
to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponne- 
sians were about to invade Attica, and that all the 
Athenian garrison had been destroyed by the Mega- 
rians except such as had escaped to Nisaea. The 
Megarians had effected this revolt by bringing Corin- 
thians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians to their aid. So 
Pericles in haste brought his army back again from 
Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians, under the 
command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the 
Lacedaemonians, advanced into Attica as far as Eleusis 
and Thria, ravaging the country ; but without going 
further they returned home. Thereupon the Athen- 
ians again crossed over into Euboea under the com- 
mand of Pericles and subdued the whole of it ; 
the rest of the island they settled 2 by agreement, 
but expelled the Hestiaeans from their homes and 
themselves occupied their territory. 

1 Setting up democracies, etc. cf. G.I. A. iv. 27 a. 

is 9 


CXV. ^Ava-^wp-qaavre^ Be air Eu^Sota? ov 
7ro\\w varepov o~irovBas eiroLrjcravro 7rpo? Aclkc- 
SaifiovLOVs kcu tou? £v/jL/ndyov<; TpiaKovrovreis, 
dirohovres Ntera/ay Kal Urjyas Kal Tpoi%rjva Kal 
* Ayauav ravra yap elyov ' 'AOijvatOL TleXoirov- 

2 "Ea:t&> he erei ^ajjilois /cal MiXtjctlols iroXe/jLOs 
eyevero ire pi Tlpir)vr)$ m Kal ol ^.liXrjcnoi eXaa- 
aovfievoi tw 7roXefiw trap * AOrjvaiovs eXdovre? 
Karefiowv rcov Ta/jLLcov. %vve7reXdf3ovTO he /cal cf 
avrr)<; Tr}? 'Edfiov avhpes IhccoTai, vecorepiaai 

3 fSovXop.evoL T7]v iroXneiav} TrXevcravres ovv 
'AOrjvaioi €9 *2d/±ov vaval reaaapd/covra hr]/j,o- 
/cpariav Karearrjaav Kal ofiripovs eXa[3ov rcov 
Sa/jLicov TTevrijKOvra fiev iraiSas, "govs he dvhpas, 
Kal KareOevro e? Arj/ivov Kal (ppovpdv ey/cara- 

4 Xiirovres dveywp^aav. rcov he Xa/iLcov rjaav yap 
rives ot oi>x vTre/iecvav, dXX' ecf>vyoy e? rr)v rjirei- 
pov, %uv0€/jL€vol rSiV ev rrj iroXei to?? hwarco- 
TaroL<; Kal YliaaovOvrj ra> 'TardaTroiT^vixiJLayiav, 
6? e2^€ Xdphei? Tore, eiriKovpovs re IfvXXegavres 
e\ eTrraKoaiovs hieftrjaav \jito vvKra e? rr)v %d/j,ov. 

5 Kal izpoiTOV /iev ra> hij/xw eiraveo-rrjcrav Kal eKpd- 
rrjaav rwv irXeiarcov, eireira tou? 6fii)pov<; eV- 
KXtyavres Ik AiJ/jlvov tow? avr<ov^ air ear rjaav, 
Kal tou? (f>povpov<; rovs ^AOrjvaiwv Kal rovs 
apyovras o'l r)aav irapa afyiaiv e^ehoaav Uicr- 
aovdvr/, eirl re MlXtjtov evOvs irapeaKevd^ovro 
arparevecv. ^vvaTrearrjaav 8' avroU Kal Bu- 


1 tV woXiTtlav seems not to have been read by the Schol., 
and so is deleted by van Herwerden and Hude. 


BOOK I. cxv. 1-5 

CXV. Withdrawing their troops from Euboea not 
long afterwards they made a truce with the Lacedae- 
monians and their allies which was to last for thirty 
years, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea ; 
for these were the places belonging to the Peloponne- 
sians which the Athenians then held. 

Six years later l a war arose between the Samians 
and the Milesians about the possession of Priene, 
and the Milesians, who were being worsted in the 
war, went to Athens and cried out against the Samians. 
They were seconded in their complaint by some 
private citizens from Samos itself who wished to 
revolutionize the government. So the Athenians 
sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a de- 
mocracy, taking as hostages of the Samians fifty boys 
and as many men, whom they deposited in Lemnos ; 
then they withdrew from Samos, leaving a garrison 
behind. Some of the Samians, however, did not 
stay, but fled to the mainland, first making an alliance 
with the most influential men who remained in the 
city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, then 
satrap of Sardis ; and collecting mercenary troops to 
the number of seven hundred they crossed over by 
night to Samos. First they attacked the popular 
party and got most of them into their power ; then 
they secretly got their hostages out of Lemnos and 
revolted from Athens, handing over to Pissuthnes 
the Athenian officers and garrison that were on the 
island, and at once set about preparing an expedition 
against Miletus. And the Byzantines also joined in 
their revolt. 

1 440 b.o. 



CX"VI. *AOqvaloi he o>? rjaOovro, irXeva avres 
vavalv k^KOVTa eirl Id/iov tclIs pkv eKKalheKa 
rcov vechv ovk ixpjjcravTO (ervxov yap ai jiev 
eirl Kaplan e? irpoaKOTrrjv rcbv Qoiviaacov vecbv 
olyopuevaiy at he eirl Xlov Kal Aeaftov irepiayyeX- 
Xovaai /3oi]0elv), reaaapaKOvra he vaval tca\ rea- 
aapai HepucXeovs Se/cdrov avTod a t parity ovvtos 
ivavfid-X^crcLV Trpbs Tpayia rfj vt'-jaw ^a/ilcov 
vavalv efBhofii'pcovTa, o)v rjaav ai eiKoai arpancti- 
Ti8e? (ervxov he ai iraaai diro ^IiXtJtov irXe- 

2 ovaai), Kal ivUcov 'A0r)vdioi. varepov he avrols 
ejBorfi^aav etc rcbv ' AOrjvcov vijes reaaapaKovra 
koX XtW Kal AeafiLoov irevre teal e'iKoal, koX 
diro^avre^ Kal Kparovvres rw 7re£&> eiroXtopKovv 
rpial Tet^ecri rrjv ttoXiv Kal Ik 6aXdaai)<$ dfia. 

3 tlepiKXrjS he Xaftcov e^rjKovra vavs diro rcov 
i^op/iovacov <pX €T0 KaTa t^X 0? ^ 7rL Kavvov Kal 
Kapias, iaayyeXdevrcov on Qoiviaaai vi)e<$ eir 
avTovs irXeovaiv (*>X eT0 V^P KaL * K T W ^d/iov 
Trevre vaval %rr)aayopas Kal aXXoi eirl ras 

CXVII. *Ei> toutco he ol Td/iioi igairivaiax; 
eKirXovv TroiTjadpLevoi dcpdpKTcp rq> arpajoTrehw 
eTnirecrovTes Ta? re irpofyvXaKihas vavs hie^Oeipav 
Kal vavfiaxovvres Ta? dvravayopevas eviKijaav, 
Kal t% daXdaarjs T/79 Ka6" eavrovs eKpdrrjaav 
rjfiepas irepl reaaapas Kal heKa Kal eaeKopiaavro 
2 Kal e^eKoplaavTO a efiovXovro. eXOovro? he 
YlepiKXeovs ttuXlv rats vaval KareKXyadrjaav. 
Kal Ik tcjv 'AOtjvcov varepov TrpoaeftoijOrjaav 


BOOK I. cxvi. i-cxvn. 2 

CXVL But when the Athenians heard of this they 
sailed for Samos with sixty ships. Sixteen of these, 
however, they did not make use of on this enterprise, 
for these had already gone, some toward Caria to keep 
watch upon the Phoenician ships, others towards Chios 
and Lesbos to summon aid ; but with forty-four ships, 
under the command of Pericles and nine others, 1 
they fought a sea-fight at the island of Tragia against 
seventy ships of the Samians, of which twenty were 
transport-ships, the whole fleet being on the way 
back from Miletus ; and the Athenians were vic- 
torious. Later, having received a reinforcement 
from Athens of forty ships and from the Chians and 
Lesbians of twenty-five, they disembarked, and being 
superior to the Samians with their infantry proceeded 
to invest the city with three walls, at the same 
time blockading it by sea as well. But Pericles took 
sixty ships away from the blockading fleet and de- 
parted in haste towards Caunus in Caria, a report 
having come that a Phoenician fleet was sailing 
against his forces ; for Stesagoras and others had 
gone from Samos with five vessels to fetch the 
Phoenician ships. 

CXVI I. Meanwhile the Samians suddenly made a 
sally and fell upon the Athenian naval station, which 
was unprotected by a stockade, destroying the guard- 
ships and defeating in a sea-fight the ships that 
put out against them. And for about fourteen days 
they were masters of the sea off their coast, bringing 
in and carrying out whatever they wished ; but when 
Pericles came they were again blockaded by sea. 
And afterwards a reinforcement came from Athens 

1 Sophocles was on the fleet, as one of the ten generals of 
the year. 



reaaapaKovra fiev at flerd (dovKV&lBov koX "Ay- 
vcovos KaX Qop/iicovos vr)e<;, eiKoo~i Be al fxerd 
T\r)7ro\e{jLOV KaX 'AvTircXeovs, itc Be Xtou /cal 
3 Aeaftov rpiaKovra. KaX vav/uLa^lav p,ev riva 
ftpayeiav ejroirjcravro ol ^d/xioi, dBvvaroi Be 
ovres avTiayeiv e^eiroXiopKiffd^aav evdrw firjvl 
KaX Trpoae^coprjaau ofioXoyla, ret^o? re Kade- 

\0VT6S KaX 6/jL7]pOV<; S6vT€$ KaX VCLVS 7Tapa86vT€S 

teal xprj/xara rd dvaXcdOevra ra^d/ievoi Kara 
Xpovovs drroBovvai. %vve/3r)aav Be KaX "Bv^dvrcoi 
loairep KaX irporepov vtttjkooi elvai. 

CXVIII. Merd ravra Be tjBtj ylyverai ov 
7roXXol<; ereaiv varepov rd irpoeLprjpLeva, rd re 
K.ep/cvpal/cd KaX rd TLorecBeariKa KaX 6o~a irpo- 
2 <£a<x*? rovBe rov iroXefxov Karearrj. ravra Be 
Ijv/jLTravra oaa eirpa^av ol "EXXrjves 7rpo<? re 
d\Xt)Xov$ KaX rov fidpftapov eyevero ev ereai 
irevrrjKOvra fidXiara fiera^v ttj? re B,ep^ov dva- 
Xcoprjaecos KaX tj}? dpyr}<$ rovBe rov rroXejiov ev 
ol<; ol ' A6r)valoi rrjv re dpyr)v eyKparecrrepav 
Karearrjcravro KaX avroX irrX fieya eyd>pr)<jav 
Bvvdfieax;. ol Be AaKeBatfioviot, alaOofievot ovre 
iKcoXvov el fir) eirl ftpaxv, r)avxa£6v r€ T0 7r ^ eoz/ 
rov xpovov, ovres fiev KaX irpb rov fir) Ta^et? 
levat e? tou? TToXepuovs, r)v fir) dvayKafovrac, to 
Be n l KaX iroXefiois ol Keloid etjetpyo/uevoi, rrpXv Br) 
r) Bvvafiis rcov 'AOrpaicov aacficbs fjpero KaX rr)<; 

1 rb 8e ti, so MSS.: tots 5' fr» is read by Hude, after 
Reiske (Dion. H. t6t€ Se rt). 

1 Possibly the historian, as some have thought ; others 
explain as the son of Melesias and opponent of Pericles ; 
still others as the poet from the derae of Acherdus. 



of forty ships under the coriimand of Thucydides, 1 
Hagnon and Phormio, twenty under Tlepolemus and 
Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. Now 
the Samians did indeed put up a sea-fight for a 
short time, but they were unable to hold out, and in 
the ninth month 2 were reduced by siege and agreed 
to a capitulation, pulling down their walls, giving 
hostages, delivering over their ships, and consenting 
to pay back by instalments the money spent upon 
the siege. The Byzantines too came to terms, 
agreeing to be subjects as before. 

CXVIII. It was not many years 3 after this that 
the events already narrated occurred, namely the 
Corcyraean affair, 4 the Potidaean, 5 and all the other 
incidents 6 that furnished an occasion for this war. 
And all these operations of the Hellenes, against one 
another and against the Barbarian, took place in the 
interval of about fifty years between the retreat of 
Xerxes and the beginning of this war. 7 It was in 
this period that the Athenians established their rule 
more firmly and themselves advanced to great power. 
And the Lacedaemonians, though aware of their 
growing power, made no attempt to check it, except 
to a trifling extent, remaining indifferent the greater 
part of the time, since they had never been quick to 
go to war except under compulsion, and in this case 
were in some degree precluded from interference by 
wars of their own. 8 But at last the power of the 
Athenians began clearly to exalt itself and they were 

2 439 b.c. 

3 Hardly four years, since the naval battle between the 
Corcyraeans and Corinthians seems to have occurred 435 b.o. 

4 Chs. xxiv-lv. 6 Chs. liv-lxvi. 

6 The transactions in the Spartan assembly, chs. lxvii- 
lxxxviii. » 479-432 B.C. 

8 The Helot rebellion, ch. ci. et sea. , „ 

1 195 


%v/jL/jLa)£ia<; avrwv tjittovto. rore Be ov/eeri ava- 
a^erbv iiroLovvro, d\V eiuyeip^Tea eBo/cet, elvai 
irdcrrj TTpoOvfila real Kadatperea ?; tcr^u9, rjv Bv- 
vcdvtcu, apcLfjievoLS Brj rovBe rbv iroXe/jiov. 
3 Auto?? fiev ovv tch? AafceBaifiovioi? Bieyvcocrro 
XeXuadac re t«? o-ttovBcl? real tovs ' ' A.6rjvaLov<$ 
aSi/ceLV, 7T€/jLifravT€s Be e? Ae\(/>oi>? eTrrjpcorcov ibv 
debv el TroXefAOVcrLV afieivov earai. 6 Be dvelXev 
avroh, &)? Xeyerai, Kara fepdros 7To\€/j,ov<tl vikt\v 
eaecrOai, real avrbs ecpyj gvXXjfaeaOat, /cat irapa- 
fcaXovfievos teal a/cX^TO?. CXIX. &v6ls Be toi>? 
^u/ifid^ov^ Trapa/caXicravTes yjrrjcfrov e/BovXovro 
eirayayelv el X,? 7 ) ^oXefielv. kolI cXOovtcov rcov 
irpeafiewv dirb Tr}$ ^vyniaxia^ /cal gvvoBov yevo- 
[xevrjs ol T€ aXXoi elirov a e/3ovXovro, Karriyo- 
povvres ol irXeiovs rwv 'AOrjvaicov koli tov iroXefiov 
d^iovvre^ ylyveaOai, /ecu ol Y^opivQioi Ber)6evTe<$ 
fiev kcl\ Kara iroXei^i irpoTepov e/cdarcov IBla 
ware ^rj^laaaOai rbv TToXep.ov } BeBiores irepl rfj 
TLoreiBala fit] 7TpoBia(f)0apfj, irapovres Be recti Tore 
kcli reXevraloc eireXOovTes eXeyov roidBe. 

CXX. " Toi»? fiev Aa/ceBaifioviovs, a> avBpes 
tyfifiayoi, ovk av, irt alriaaaifieO ] a &>? ov real 
avrol iyjrrjcpLcr/jLevoi tov iroXefiov elcn real rjfias 1$ 
tovto vvv ^vvrjyayov. xpr) yap tou? fjyefiova? 
ra iBia cf Xaov vefiovras ra kolvcl Trpoo-KOirelv, 
QiGirep /cal ev aXXoL? ere iravTcov irpOTtficovrai. 

BOOK I. cxviii. 2-cxx. i 

laying hands upon their allies. Then the Lacedae- 
monians could bear it no longer, but determined 
that they must attack the Athenian power with all 
zeal and overthrow it, if they could, by undertaking / 
this war. 

The Lacedaemonians themselves, then, 1 had de- 
cided that the treaty had been broken and that the 
Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi 
they asked the god if it would be advisable for 
them to go to war. The god answered them, as it is 
said, that if they warred with all their might, victory 
would be theirs, and said that he himself would help 
them, whether invoked or uninvoked. CXIX. But 
they wished to summon their allies again and put «2 b. 
to them the question whether they should go to 
war. And when the envoys from the allies had 
come and an assembly was held, the others said 
what they wished, most of them complaining of the 
Athenians and demanding that the war should be 
entered upon, and especially the Corinthians. They 
had already, before the meeting, privately begged 
the allies city by city to vote for the war, fearing lest 
Potidaea would be destroyed before help came, and 
now, being also present at this meeting, they came 
forward last of all and spoke as follows : 

CXX. " Men of the allies, we can no longer com- 
plain of the Lacedaemonians that they have not both 
themselves voted for the war and also brought us to- 
gether for this object. And that is right ; for it is 
the duty of leaders, while equitably considering 
their particular interests, to have special regard for 
the general weal, just as in other matters they are 

1 Resuming the narrative interrupted at the end of ch. 



2 tj/jlcov Be oaoi fxev ' kd rival o is r)Brj gvvrjXXdyrjaav 
ovxl StoVj^f)? Beovrai ware <f)vXd£aa6aL avrovr 
tou? Be rr)v fieaoyecav fidXXov teal fir) ev iropcp 
fcaT(pfC7]jjLevov<; elBevai %pr) on, roU fedrco riv fir) 
dfivvcocri, ^akeiTWTepav e^ovai rr)v KaraKOfiiBr)v 
ru>v GDpaiwv teal irdXiv dvTiXrjyjnv S)V r) OdXaaaa 
jfj rjirelpu) BLBwcri, kol rcov vvv Xeyopevwv firj 
/ca/covs tcpLTas cb? fir) 7rpoo-r)fc6vTCDV eivai, irpoaBi- 
yeo-Qai Be irore, el ra ko,tw irpooivro, kclv fi^XP 1 
cr(f)(ov to Beivbv irpoeXOelv, teal irep\ avrwv ovx 

3 t]goov vvv (BovXeveaOat. 6Y oirep koi fir) oKvelv 
Bel avrovs rbv iroXefxov avr elpr\V7}<; fieraXafifta- 
veiv. dvBpwv yap awfypovwv fiev eariv, et firj 
clBikolvto, ijo-vxd&iv, dyaOojv Be dBucovfievovs etc 
fiev elpijvrj? iroXefietv, ev Be irapaaxpv eV iroXe- 
pov irdXtv ^vfiftr/vat, real fitjre rfj Kara TroXefiov 
evTvyia eira'ipeadai fiijre tw r)avx^ t?}? elprjvrjt; 

4 r)B6fievov dBiKelaOai' 6 re yap Bid, rrjv r)Bovr)v 
okvcov rdx'O'T av d<paipe0ei7j rr)<; paardovr)? ro 
repirvbv Bi oirep brcvel, el rjav^d^ot, 1 6 re ev 
TroXe/JLW evrv^lci irXeovd^cov ov/c evreOvfirfrai 

5 Opdcrei aTriarw eiraLpofievos. TroXXa yap tca/cox; 
yvwaOevra dftovXorepcov t&v ivavrlcov rvj^ovra 
KarcDpOwOrj, teal en irXelco /caXws Bo/covvra 
fiovXeuOrjvai e? rovvavrlov ala\pw<; TrepiecrTry 

1 u riavx*Lot deleted by Hude, after Lehner. 

BOOK 1. cxx. 2-5 

honoured above all. Now those of us who have 
had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not 
need to be taught to be on our guard against them. 
But those who dwell more injthe interior and away 
from any trade-route should be warned that, if they 
do not aid those who are on the seaboard, they will 
find it more difficult to bring the products of the 
land down to the sea and to get in return what the 
sea gives to the mainland ; and that they should not 
be careless judges of what is said here, as though it 
were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if 
they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger 
may possibly some day reach them, and that they 
are\ deliberating upon their own interests no less 
than upon ours. They ought not, therefore, to 
hesitate a moment to adopt war in place of peace. 
For though it is the part of men of discretion to 
remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it 
behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from 
peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers 
to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing 
themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor 
to be so enamoured of the quiet of peace as to sub- 
mit to wrong. For he who for the sake of his comfort 
shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil, 
very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which 
caused him to shrink ; and he who presumes upon his 
success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is 
the confidence which elates him. For many enter- 
prises which were ill-planned have succeeded because 
the adversary has proved to be still worse advised, 
and yet more, which to all appearances were well 
advised, have turned out the opposite way and 
brought disgrace. For no one ever carries out a 



evOvpelrai yap ovhels 6/jlolcl l rfj iriarei teal epyw 
irre^ep^erat, aXka /xer acr^aXeta? fiev ho^d^ofiev, 
l±€Ta Seovs Se ev tgj epyco i\\eL7rop,ev. 

CXXI. " 'Hftet? he vvv /cal dhucovLievoi top 
TroXefiov eyetpofxev /cal i/cavci e~£ovre<; eyfcXij/iara, 
teal orav dfivvcofieda W0T)vaiov<;, KaraOy]o-6/jLe6a 

2 avrbv ev Kaipw. Kara iroWa he r)fjLa<; el/cbs 
eTTifcparrjcrai, irpcorov fiev ir\rj6ei irpovyovras real 
i/nreipia TroXepLLfcf], eireira 6{lolco<; TTavras e? ra 

3 irapayyeWofieva lovras, vavracov re, a> fV%u- 
ovaiv, cltto tt)? virapxovcrrjs re etao-rots ovaias 
e^aprvaofieda koX airo t&v ev Ae\(/>ot? Ka\ 
'OXvLiiTia -^p-q/JLCLTCov hdveta/jLa yap iroLriadfievoL 
virokafielv olol T pna6u) fiei^ovi tou? fe- 
vovs avrcov vavfSdras. wvtjtt) yap r) 'AdrjvaLWV 
hvvafiis puaWov r) oiKela- t) he ij/xerepa rjaaov av 
tovto TrddoL, toi? ad>pxKTL to irXeov layyovaa 7) 

4 rot? xp?]p.acriv. p,ia re vlkt) vavp,ayias Kara to 
etVo? d\Lo-tcovTar el h' avricrypiev, fieXerijaofiev 
teal r)fiei<; ev irXeovv XP° V( P Ta vavjiKa, /cai orav 
rr)v eTTio-Ti)pLr}v e? rb ccrov Karaarrjcrco^ev, rrj ye 
evyjrvxia h/jirov irepieaopLeda' o yap ?; / u-et? eyppev 
(pvaeL dyadov, ifcecvoi? ou/c av yevoiro SiSa^r}, o 

1 Reiske's correction for o/xoia of the MSS. 

1 cf. ii. xiii. 4, where Pericles suggests a similar resource. 
The Delphic oracle favoured the Peloponnesians, according 
to ch. cxviii. 3. 


BOOK I. cxx. 5-cxxi. 4 

plan with the same confidence with which he con- 
ceives it ; on the contrary we form our fond schemes 
with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their 
execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short of 

CXXI. " And so now in our own case, it is because 
we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for 
complaint that we are stirring up this war, and as 
soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the 
Athenians we will bring the war to an end when 
occasion offers. And for many reasons we are likely I 
to prevail : first, because ^we^-are-superior in point of 
numbers and in military experience ; secondly, because 
we all with one accord obey the word of command ; 
and, thirdly, on the sea, where their strength lies, we 
shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with the 
means which we severally possess, but also with the 
funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia. 1 For by 
contracting a loan we can use the inducement of 
higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary 
sailors ; for the forces of the Athenians are made up 
of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, where- 
as ours, whose strength lies more in the quality of 
the men than in the pay they get, would be less 
subject to such defection. And so, if we win a single 
victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated. 2 
If, however, they should still hold out, we on our 
part shall have more time for pra ctice in seaman- 
ship, and as soon~as we have brought our skill to a 
parity with theirs, in courage, assuredly, we shall be 
superior. For the excellence that nature has given 
us - Cannot become theirs through instruction, whereas 

* Through the mercenary sailors flocking to the Polopon- 
nesian side for higher pay. 


6" e/celvoi eiriarrjiir) TTpovyov(Ji> /caOaiperbv Y rjfuv 
5 iari peXerr). xpij/iara Be ware eyeiv e? avrd, 
oXaofxev rj Seivbv av el'rj el oi fiev e/celvcov fu/z- 
ixayoi errl BovXela rfj avrcov (frepovres ov/c drre- 
povaiv, ?//xet? S' ^eirl tw ri/jLwpov/ievoi rovs e^- 
Opovs /cal avrol dfia &w^eadai ov/c apa Barravr)- 
aopuev /cal irrl tw jjlt] vrr e/ceivcov avrd difiaipe- 
Oivre? avTOLS tovtois /ca/ccos rrdayeiv^ 

CXXII. "^rrdpyovai Be /cal aXXai bSol rod 
iroXepov rjfMV, ^v/jL/jLci^cov re dirbaraai^, pudXiara 
irapaipeais ovaa rcov irpoaoBcov ah layyovai, ical 
emreiyia p.b<$ rfj %d>pa, ciXXa re 6a a ou/c av ri<; 
vvv rrpotSoi. rj/ciara yap 7roXe/j,os eirl prjrols 
ywpel, avrbs Se a</>' avrov ra ttoXXcl reyydrai 
rrpbs to rraparvy^dvov ev cp o fiev evopyrjro}^ 
clvto) Trpoao/jLiXtfcras fiefiaiorepos, 6 6' opytadeU 
irepl avrbv 2 ov/c eXdaaco irraiec. 
2 "'JLvdvp-cofieOa Se /cat on, el p,ev rjfioiv rjaav 
e/cdarot^ 7rpo? avraraXov^ irepl y?/<; opcov at Sia- 
<f)opai, olarbv av r\v vvv Se 7rpo? %vfiiravrd<$ re 
?}^a? ' ' AOrjvaloL l/cavol /cal Kara iroXiv en Bvva- 
rcorepor (bare, el jjlt) koX cidpooi ical /card eOvt] 
ical e/caarov darv pad yvcofirj d/juvvovfieOa avrovs, 
Sfya ye ovra<; ijfias dnovco^ yeipooaovrai. ical 
rrjv rjaaav, el /cal Secvov rep d/covaai, tarco ov/c 

1 KaQatperov, which Hude adopts from C and G (ex corr.), 
against KaQouptTtov of the other MSS., is confirmed by the 
echo in Dio C. xliii. 11, rb n<v yap Krrfrbv Sta. dpaxeos rots rbv 
vovv ai'Tfd irpo<Ttx ov<Tl KaL xaOatpfTov fjieXtTT) eli'ai. 

2 Dobree's correction for aurbv of nearly all MSS. 


BOOK I. cxxi. 4-cxxii. 2 

the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us 
through practice. And as to the money we need to 
accomplish all this, we shall provide it by contributions; 
or strange were it, if their allies should never fail to 
pay tribute to ensure their own slavery, but we, to 
secure at once vengeance upon our enemies and safety 
for ourselves, shall prove unwilling to spend money, 
aye, and that we may not be robbed of that very 
wealth and withal have it used to our destruction. 

CXXII. " But we have other ways also of waging 
war — inducing their .allies to revolt^ which is the 
best niean"s-"of depriving them of the revenues in 
which their strength consists, the planting of forts in 
their territory, and all the other measures which one 
cannot now foresee. For war least of all conforms 
to fixed rules, but itself in most cases has to form 
its plans to suit the occasion as its own resources 
allow ; when, therefore, a man keeps his temper 
cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be 
safe, while he who loses his temper over it 1 makes 
more blunders. 

" And let us reflect also that, if we individually 
were involved in a dispute about mere boundary-lines 
with an enemy who was no more than our equal, 
that might be borne ; but as the case stands, the 
Athenians are quite a match for us all together, and 
still more powerful against us city by city. Hence, 
unless all of us together, every nation and town, with 
one accord resist them, they will easily overpower 
us because we shall be divided. And as to de- 
feat—even though this is terrible to hear, let it 

1 Or, reading <xvt6v with the MSS., "makes blunders 
through his own fault as much as anything," i e. "the man 
who loses his head has only himself to blame for his disasters." 



3 aXXo ri (frepovcrav rj avri/cpv? hovXelav b ical 
Xoyw evhoiaaOrpai ala^pbv rfj TleXoirovvrjacp 
/cal 7roXet5 roadahe virb /ua? icaicoiraOeiv. iv u> 
rj hi/caLcos hoKolfxev av irdayeiv rj hid heiXiav dve- 
yeaQai /cal rcov irarepwv %€Lpov<; (fiaiveaOai, 01 
rrjv 'EXXdha rfKevOepcocrav r)/xel<; he ovo* tj/jllv 
aurot? /3ej3aiov/jL€v avro, rvpavvov he icbptev ey- 
KaOeardvai ttoXiv, rovs S' iv [xia fiovdp^ov<; 

4 dfjiov/iev /caraXveiv. /cal ov/c ta/iev 6V&)? rdhe 
rpiwv rcov fjueyiarcov ^vp^cpopcjv dTrrfXXa/CTai, 
d^vveala^ rj fiaXa/cias f) d/ieXelas. ov yap hrj 
irefyevyores avrd iirl rr)v irXeiajov^ hi) /3Xdyp*acrav 
fcaTa<pp6i>7)(TLi> /ce^wpij/care, fj i/c rod ttoXXovs 
acjidXXeiv rb ivavTLov ovofia d(f>poavvrj p,ercov6- 

CXXIII. "Ta puev ovv 7rpoyeyevrjfjL€va ri hel 
p.a*porepov rj e? ocrov rots vvv tjvp,(pepei alria- 
ffOat; nrepl he roiv eireira pieXXovrcov rots rrapov- 
gi fior/Oovvras xph i^iraXaiirwpelv (irdrpiov yap 
fjfilv 1 i/c rcov ttovcov Ta? dperas KraaOau), /cai fir) 
puerafiaXXeiv rb e6o<$, el cipa irXovrw re vvv /cal 
e^ovaia oXiyov rrpocpepere (ov yap hl/cacov a rfj 
drropia i/crrjO)) rfj rrepiovaia diroXeaOai), dXXd 
dapcrovvras levac Kara iroXXa e? rov jroXe/iov, 
rod re 6eov %pr)cravro<> /cal avrov vtt oa^o/ievov 

1 With C, the other MSS. have vpiv. 

1 Kara<t>p6vr]CTis is that proud and haughty spirit which pre- 
cedes and invites a falL It seems impossible to reproduce ic 


BOOK I. cxxii. 2-cxxiii. i 

be well understood that it brings nothing else than 
downright slavery. That such an outcome should 
even be spoken of # as a possibility, or that so many 
cities might suffer ill at the hands of one, is a 
disgrace to the Peloponnesus. In such a case men 
would say of us, either that vie deserved our fate, or 
that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that 
we were clearly degenerate sons of our fathers, who 
liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making 
this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be 
established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim 
the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single 
states. We know not how such a course can be ac- 
quitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity 
or cowardice, or carelessness. For I cannot suppose 
that, escaping those errors, you have reached that 
most fatal spirit of proud disdain l which has ruined 
so many men that it has taken on a new name, 
that of despicable folly. 

CXXIII. " With regard, however, to what is past 
and done, what need is there to find fault at 
length, except in so far as that is profitable for what 
is present? But with a view to what shall be 
hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task 
in hand — for to win virtue 2 by toils is our heritage 
— and make no change of custom because you 
now have a slight superiority in wealth and power ; 
for it is not right that attributes which have 
been won through poverty should be lost through 
prosperity. Nay, you should go into the war with 
confidence, and for many reasons : the god has 
spoken through his oracle and promised that he 

English the assonance of the words Ka.Ta<pp6pT)(ris a<ppoavvT}. 

Thucydides was fond of paronomasia ; cf. ch. xxxiii. 4. 

* Or, "the rewards of virtue" — honour, renown. 



^vXX^^reaOaL, real tt}? dXXrjs f E\XaSo? dirdar^ 
%vvaycovLOVfievr}<; f ra p.ev cf)6{3(p, ra Be ax^eXta. 
2 airovBas re ov Xvaere irporepot, a? ye kcli 6 Oebs 
tceXevcov iroXep^elv vojxi^u 7rapaf3e/3dcr0ai, r)Bi- 
K7]/jL€vcil<; Be fidXXov j3orj6i)<J6T6' Xvovctl yap ovx 
oi d/jLvi>6{ievoL, dXX' ot irporepoi eiuovTes. 

CXXIV. ""Hare iravTa^oOev /caXws virdpxov 
vfjbiv iroXep^elv real r)pLcov KOivfj rdSe irapatvovvrwv, 
eXirep /3e^ai6rarov to ravrd 1 £vp.(pipovTa real 
TroXeaL icai IBtwTais elvai, /nij /xeXXere YLotci- 
Searcus T€ 7roi€LG0ai Tip-wpiav overt, AcopcevaL 
/cat vito y ld)vcov TroXiop/covpLeuoiq, ov Trporepov 
rjv Tovvavrlov, teal tcov aXXcov pereXOelv Tr\v 
eXevOepiav, a>? ov/cirt ivBi^eraL irepipkvovra^ 
tovs pev i]Br] ftXairreaOai, rot/? B\ el yvcoaOijao- 
pieOa %vveX66vT€<; p,ev, afivvectOat Be aToXpwvres, 

2 p,7) ttoXv varepov to avTO Ttda^eiv dXXa vopl- 
crazTe? e? dpdy/crjv dfylyQai, a> avBpes T^vppayoi, 
teal dpa TuBe apioTa XeyeaOai, ^jrrjcpLaacrde tov 
iroXepiov /z>; fyofirjQevres to avritca Beivov, tt}? B 
air avTov Bid TrXeiovos eiprjvrjs ein6vpi)o-avTe<;' 
etc iroXep,ov p,ev yap elprjvr] fiaXXov /3e/3aiovTai } 
defi 7}Gvyia<$ Be yu,?) iroXepLrjaai ovx 6p,ol(o<; atclv- 

3 Bvvov. Ka\ Ti]v KaQeGT7)Kvlav ev rjj 'EXXdBi 
ttoXiv Tvpavvov Tjyrjadpuevoi eVt iraaiv opoio><; 
KaOeaTavai, coaTe twv p,ev ?/£?; dpxeiv, to)v Be 

1 So Hude, after Reiske {ravra F, ravrd yp.a^) ; ravra 


BOOK I. cxxiii. i-cxxiv. 3 

himself will help you ; all the rest of Hellas will join 
you in the struggle, partly through fear and partly 
through self-interest; and, finally, you will not be 
the ones to break the treaty, inasmuch as the god, in 
bidding you go to war, cpnsiders it to have been 
transgressed already, but you will be going to the 
defence of a treaty that has been violated. For it 
is not those who fight in self-defence that break a 
treaty, but those who attack others unprovoked. 

CXXIV. "So then, since from every quarter a 
favourable opportunity offers itself to you to go to 
war, and since we recommend this course in the 
common interest— if it be true that identity of 
interest 1 is the surest policy for states and individuals 
to follow— make haste to succour the Potidaeans, who 
are Dorians and besieged by Ionians — the reverse of 
what used to be — and to recover the liberty of the 
rest ; since it will no longer do for us to wait, when 
some are already being injured, and others, if it shall 
become known that we have had a meeting and 
dare not defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same 
fate. On the contrary, men of the allies, recognize 
that we are now facing the inevitable, and at the 
same time that this proposal is for the best ; and 
vote for the war, not fearing the immediate danger, 
but coveting the more enduring peace which will 
result from the war. For peace is more firmly 
established when it follows war, but to refuse to 
go to war from a desire for tranquillity is by no means 
so free from danger. And so, in the conviction that 
the state which has set itself up as a tyrant in Hellas 
is a menace to all alike, ruling over some already and 
( x Or, reading raCra, " if it be most certain that this course 
(i.e. declaration of war) is advantageous for states as well as 



BiavoetaOai, Trapaarrjacofieda eireXOovTes, fcal 
avroL re ukivBvvws to Xolttov OiKwaev teal tovs 
vvv BeBovXco/ievovs "EXXrjvas eXevO } epdoa a> /xcza" 

CXXV. Totavra fiev oi KopivOiot, elirov. oi 
Be Aa/cehaifioviOL eireiBr) a<fi dirdvTwv rjKOvaav 
<yvco/jL7]v, ^T](j)ov eirr^yayov rots ^vpfjbd^0L<; diracnv 
ogol iraprjqav ef »}$ fcal fiei^ovu teal eXdaaovi iro- 
2 Xer teal to irXrfio^ eyjnjcpiaavTO iroXepLelv. BeBoy- 
fxevov Be avTol<z evOvs fiev dBvvaTa tjv eiri^eipelv 
dirapaaKevoi<s ovaiv, eKiropi^eadai Be. iBoKei e/cd- 
cttols a 7rpoa(f)opa rjv Kai fjurj elvai pLeXXrjaiv. 
o/xo)? Be Ka6i<TTai±evoi<; wv eBei eviavTos p,ev ov 
BieTpiftr), eXaaaov Be, irplv ea/3aXetv e? tt)v 
'Attiktjv Kai top iroXep-ov apaaOai (pavepcos. 

CXXVL 'Ei> tovtw Be eirpeo-ftevovTO tw %P^ V( P 
77-00? tou? ' AOrjvaiov? eyrcXijfiaTa Tcoiovpuevoi, 
otto) 1 ; a(f)to~iv otl /jLeylaTrj irpoc^aai^ eh] tov rroXe- 

2 fielv, r)v fii] ti iaafcovcocriv. Kai irpaiTov fiev 
Trpecrfieis irepb^ravTe^ oi AaKeBaifiovioi eKeXevov 

3 TOik 'AOrjvaiovs to dyo<; iXavveiv tt}<; Oeov. to 
Be ayos r)v TOiovBe. KvXcov rjv 'AOrjvatos dvrjp 
'OXv/ittiovUi]*; twv irdXai evyevi]^ Te Kai BvvaTor 
eyeyap,7]K€i Be duyaTepa ©eayerof? Mey apias 
dvBpos, o? KaT eKelvov tov xpbvov eTVpdvvei 

4 Meydpcov. ^pcofievcp Be t&> JsLvXcdvl ev AeXcpol? 
dvelXev 6 6eb<; ev tov A«o<? ttj fieyiaTrj eopTrj 

5 KaTa\a/3elv ttjv ' AOrjvalwv clkpottoXlv. 6 Be irapd 
Te tov ©eayevovs Bvvap.iv Xaftoov Kai tov<; <f)iXov<; 
dva7reiaa<i, eireiBr) eirr}X6ev ^OXvparia tcl ev 
UeXo7rovv/]o-(p, KareXafte ttjv aKpoiroXcv a>? eirl 
TvpavvLBi, vou'iaa? eopTr]v tc tov A to? jieyio-TTjV 


BOOK I. cxxiv. 3-cxxvi. 5 

designing to rule over others, let us attack and reduce 
it, and henceforth dwell in security ourselves and set 
free those Hellenes who are already enslaved." 

CXXV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the 
Lacedaemonians when they had heard the opinions 
of all, put the vote in succession to all the allied 
states which were present, both, great and small; 
and the majority voted for war. But though the 
decision was made it was impossible for them to 
take up arms at once, as they were unprepared ; it 
was determined, however, that the several states 
should make the fitting preparations and that there 
should be no delay. Nevertheless, in providing them- 
selves with what was needed there was spent, not 
indeed a full year, but somewhat less, before they 
invaded Attica and took up the war openly. 

CXXVI. During this interval they kept sending 
embassies to the Athenians and making complaints, 
that they might have as good a pretext as possible 
for making war, in case the Athenians should refuse 
to consider them. And first the Lacedaemonian 
envoys bade the Athenians drive out the " curse of 
the goddess." The curse was as follows: There 
was an Athenian in days of old named/ Cylon, a 
victor at Olympia, of noble birth and powerful ; and 
he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, 
who was at that time tyrant of Megara. Now Cylon 
consulted the oracle at Delphi, and the god in 
answer told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens 
"at the greatest festival of Zeus." So he obtained a 
force from Theagenes and, persuading his friends to 
help, when t he Olympic festival jn jjie Peloponnesus 
came on he: seized the Acropolis with a view to 
making himself tyrant; for he thought that the 



elvai koX eavrw ri 7rpoai)iceiv 'OXvpnua vevL/crj- 

6 icon, el Be iv rfj 'Arrifcf} y) aXXoOi irov i) /xeyiarr) 
eoprrj eiprjro, oure i/ceivos en Karevorjae to re 
fiavretov ov/c iBrjXov (Jean yap koX 'A6r)vaiois 
kidcria, a KaXelrai, Ato? eoprrj MeiXtxiov /ze- 
yiaTr], e£a) rr)<; 7roXeco<;, iv fj iravBijpiel Ovovai, 
ttoXXoI 1 ov^ lepela dXXa dvpiara iTrc^oypia), 
Bokcov Be 6pdcx)s yiyvcoaKeiv eVe^e^/cre t&j epyw. 

7 ol he 'AdrjvaioL alaOopLevoi iftoijOrjadv re rrav- 
hr/fjieX €K rwv dypcov eV avrovs /ecu irpoaicaOe- 

8 ^ofievoi eiToXtopKovv. ^povov Be iyyvyvofievov ol 
^A6r)valoi Tpvyop.evoi rfj irpoaeBpia dirrfkOov ol 
ttoXXol, iirirpe^ravres roU ivvki dp^ovai rrjv 
(fyvXaKijiAje kcu to rrav avroKpdropai BiaOelvai 
y av dpiara BiayiyvdoaKwaLV Tore Be rd iroXXa 
rcov iroXiTLKOiv ol ivvea dp^ovres eirpacraov. 

9 ol Be fiera rod KuXoovos iroXiopKovpievoi (f>Xavpo)$ 
10 elyov airov re kclI vBaros diropia. 6 /.tev ovv 

KvXwv teal 6 dBe\(f)b<; i/cBiBpaa/covaiv' ol 8' dXXoi 
ci)9 iirie^ovro kclL rives teal direOvyo-fcov virb rov 
Xi/iov, KaO'i^ovaiv iirl rov ficofibv l/cerut rov iv rfj 

1 iroXKol : Hude adopts C. F. Hermann's conjecture no\\d, 
and, after Madvig, inserts 07*0 before dv/j-ara. 

1 On this first attempt to establish a tyranny in Athens, 
see also Hdt. v. lxxi ; Plut. Solon, xii. It was not a rising 
of the people against the nobles, but the attempt of an am- 
bitious man who aspired to royal power, supported only by a 
few friends an4 % body of Megarian soldiers. To the mass 

BOOK I. cxxvi. 5-10 

Olympic festival was not only the greatest festival 
of Zeus, but also in a manner was connected with 
him as having won an Olympic victory. 1 But 
whether the oracle meant the greatest festival in 
Attica or somewhere else he did not go on to con- 
sider, and the oracle did not make it clear. For, in 
fact, the Athenians also have a festival in honour of 
Zeus Meilichius, the Diasia, as it is called, a very 
great festival celebrated outside the city, whereat 
all the people offer sacrifices, many making offer- 
ings 2 peculiar to the country instead of victims. 
But Cylon, thinking that he was right in his opinion, 
made his attempt. And the Athenians, when they 
were aware of it, came in a body from the fields 
against them and sitting down before the Acropolis 
laid siege to it. But as time passed the Athenians 
grew weary of the siege and most of them went 
away, committing the task of guarding to the nine 
Archons, to whom they also gave full power to settle 
the whole matter as they might determine to be 
best ; for at that time 3 the nine Archons transacted 
most of the public business. But Cylon and those 
who were being besieged with him were in hard 
straits through lack of food and water. So Cylon 
and his brother escaped ; but the rest, when they 
were in great distress and some of them were even 
dying of hunger, sat down as suppliants at the 

of the people it seemed to portend subjection to Megara, so 
they flocked in to crush the movement, not, as Cylon hoped, 
to support it. 

2 A scholiast suggests cakes {iti^ara) made in the forms 
of animals. 

* i.e. before the legislation of Solon ; from that time the 
power of the Archons decreased, and was restricted chiefly 
to judicial functions. 



11 aKpoiroXei. ava<TT7JaavT€<; Be avrovs ol rcov 'Adrj- 
vaiwv iiriTeTpaiifievoi tt)v <f>v\aK)]v, go? ewpcov 
airoOvrjafcovTas iv t<5 lepco, i<$> w /x /Bev kclkov 
iroirjcrovGiv, airayayovTes aireKTeivav KaOeto/ae- 
pov? Be Tivas icaX eVl tcov aepuvoyv Oewv tois 
/3co/jlol<; iv rfj rrapoBw aire^prjaavro. kcu airo 
tovtov ivayels /cat aXirrfptoL r?}? Oeov ecelvol re 

12 eKoXovvro teal to yevo? to air i/ceivcov. tfXacrav 
[lev ovv zeal ol 'AOqvaloi tovs ivayecs toutovs, 
rfkaae Be real KXeofievr]^ 6 AatceBaL/jLovLOs vo~Tepov 
fieTCL 'AOrjvalcov aTaaia^ovTcov, tov<z Te ^a>VTa<; 
iXavvovTes koX tcov TeOvecoTcov tcl ogtcl ave\ovTe$ 
i^e(3aXov KaTrjXOov /xevTOi vaTepov, kcu to yevos 
avTcov eTi eGTiv iv tt) iroXec. 

CXXVII. Tovto Br) to ayo? ol AateeBaipovioi 
CKeXevov ekavveiv BrjOev toU Oeols irpcoTov ti/hco- 
povvTes, elBoTes Be UepifcXea tov EavdiTrirov 
irpoae^ofievov avrcp kcltcl tt)v fii]Tepa kcu vi/jli- 
%ovTes ifcrreaovTos clvtov paov av x crtyicn irpo- 

2 ^copelv to airo tcov ^AOrjvalcov. ov /jl€Vtol^tocto^- 
tov tfXrri^ov iraOelv av avTov tovto oao-frBiafioXrjV 
otaeiv avTco irpbs t>]v ttoXiv, &)? kcu Bia ttjv 

3 iKelvou ^vficpopav to fiepos eo~Tai 6 iroXe/xos. U)v 

1 Added by Stahl. 

1 Of Athena Polias. 

2 The sanctuary of the Eumenides, which lay between the 
AcropolU and the Areopagus. 


BOOK I. cxxvi. io-cxxvii. 3 

altar 1 on the Acropolis. And the Athenians who 
had been charged with guarding them, when they 
saw them dying in the temple, caused them to arise 
on promise of doing them no harm, and leading 
them away put them to death ; and some who in 
passing by took refuge at the altar of the Awful 
Goddesses 2 they dispatched even there. For this 
act both they and their descendants 3 were called 
accursed and sinners against the Goddess. Accord- 
ingly the accursed persons were driven out not only 
by the Athenians but also at a later time by Cleo- 
menes the Lacedaemonian, with the help of a 
faction of the Athenians, during a civil strife, when 
they drove out the living and disinterred and cast 
out the bones of the dead. Afterwards, however, 
they were restored, and their descendants are still 
in the city. 

CXXVII. It was this "curse" that the Lacedae- 
monians now bade the Athenians drive out, prin- 
cipally, as they pretended, to avenge the honour of 
the gods, but in fact because they knew that Pericles 
son of Xanthippus was implicated in the curse on 
his mother's side, 4 and thinking that, if he were 
banished, they would rind it easier to get from the 
Athenians the concessions they hoped for. They 
did not, however, so much expect that he would 
suffer banishment, as that they would discredit him 
with his fellow-citizens, who would feel that to some 
extent his misfortune 5 would be the cause of the 

* Chiefly the Alcmaeonidae, whose head was Megacles, 
Archon at the time of Cylon's attempt. 

* Pericles was a descendant in the sixth generation from 
Megacles, his mother Agariste being niece of the Alcmaeonid 
Cleisthenes (Hdt vi. cxxxi.). 

6 As belonging to the accursed family. 



yap Bvvarcoraro<; reov teaO* eavrbv teal aywv rr)v 
irokiTeiav tjvcivtlovto irdvra Tot? Aa/eeBaifioviois, 
teal ovte eta vireiteeLV, aXX! e? rbv iro^e/iov oopfia 
tovs 'AOrjvaLOVS. 

CXXVIII. 'Avre/eeXevov Be teal ol 'Adrjvalot, 
roix; AateeBat/iovLovs to curb Taivdpov ayo? eXav- 
veiv. ol yap AateeBaipbovioi avao-Trjaavris irore 
etc rod lepov rod UocreiBojvos dirb Tacvdpov 1 
tcov JLiXcoTeov Iteeras dirayayovres Bce<bOeLpav Si* 
o Brj teal erfyiGiv avrols vojjli^ovq-i top fieyav 

2 aeia/ibv yevecrOai ev ^irdpTr). e/eeXevov Be teal to 
t?)? XaX/eioi/eov ayo? eXavveiv avrovs' eyevero Be 

3 roiovBe. eireiBrj UavaavLas 6 AateeBaLfiovLO? to 
TTpcorov fiera7r€p,(f)0el<; vtto ^irapriarcov dirb tt}? 
u-PXW T VS £ p e EiX\r)o~7r6vT(p teal teptOe\<; vtt aurcbv 
dtreXvOrj fir) dBi/eelv, Bij/moala /iev ovteeTt e^eirepL- 
(f)0rj, IBia Be avrbs rpiyjpr) Xafteov 'EppuoviBa 
avev Aa/eeSatfiovLcov dcpL/evelrat, e? ' EXX?]o-7tovtov, 

Tft) JJL€V \6y<p €7rl TOV M * )oIm-0 1' TToXepLOV, TO) Be 

epyqy ra Trpbs ftacriXea Trpdypbara irpdccretv, 
cbairep teal to irpcbrov ejrex^prjaev, iepiepLevo? rrjs 

4 'EWrjvifer/s ap%?}?. evepyeaiav Be dirb rovBe 
TTpwrov e? (BacnXea KareOero teal rod Travrbs 

6 7rpdy/jLaro<; dpxh v eTTOLijaaro. JSv^avriov yap 

1 Van Herwerden deletes, followed by Hude. 

1 cf. ch. ci. 2. 

BOOK I. cxxvn. 3-cxxviii. 5 

war. For being the most powerful man of his time 
and the leader of the state, he was opposed to the 
Lacedaemonians in all things, and would not let 
the Athenians make concessions, but kept urging 
them on to the war. 

CXXVIII. The Athenians answered with the 
demand that the Lacedaemonians should drive out 
the curse of Taenarus. For the Lacedaemonians had 
on one occasion caused some suppliant Helots to leave 
their refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, 
then had led them off and put them to death ; and 
the Lacedaemonians believe that it was because 
of this sacrilege that the great earthquake 1 befell 
them at Sparta. And the Athenians also bade them 
drive out the curse of Athena of the Brazen House. 2 
And this is the way it was incurred. After Pau- 
sanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the 
Spartans, on the first occasion, 3 from his command 
on the Hellespont, and on trial had been acquitted 
of wrong doing, he was never again sent out in a 
public capacity, but privately and on his own account 
he took a trireme of Hermione without authority of 
the Lacedaemonians and came to the Hellespont, 
to take part, as he pretended, in the Persian war, but 
in reality to carry on an intrigue with the Great King 
— an enterprise to which he had set his hand in the 
first instance also, his aim being to become master 
of all Hellas. He had namely first laid up for him- 
self with the King a store of gratitude in the follow- 
ing circumstances, and thus had begun the whole 
affair. When he was in that quarter before, after 

3 So called from her temple or shrine in the citadel at 
Sparta. Pausanias says (m. xvii. 2) both temple and statue 
were of bronze. 8 477 B.C. cf. ch. xcv. 3. 



eXcjv ry rrporepa irapovGia fiera. rr)v etc Ku7roou 
ava^copTjcnv (et%o^ Be Mr/Boi avrb /cat fiacriXecDS 
TTpocnqKovres rives koX ^vyyevels, o'l edXwGav ev 
avrw rore) rovrovs ovs eXa/3ev airoirefxirei ftaai- 

Xcl KpV(f)a TOiV ClXXcDV ^UfJLfld^COV, tw Be Xoycp 

6 direSpaaav avrov. eirpaaae Be ravra fiera Toy- 
yvXov rov 'Eperpiws, wirep eirerpe^re ro re Bi/fay- 
nov teal rov<; al^fiaXcorovs . eVe/i^e Be teal 

7 i7TL<TTo\j]v rbv YoyyvXov (f>epovra avrw. eve- 
yeyparrro Be rdBe ev avrfj, oj? varepov dvrjvpedrj' 

" Tlavaavias 6 rjyeficov tt}? %7rdprr)<; rovaBe re 
goi yapi^eaQcu f3ov\6/juevo<; diroTrepLTrei Bopl eXoov, 
teal yv(£>pLr\v iroiovfiai, el teal gol Botcec, Ovyarepa 
re rrjv arjv yrjfiav kclL gov ^rrdprrfv re teal rr)v 
aXXrjv 'EXXdBa viroye'^P^ov iroLrjaai. Bwarbs Be 
Bokg) elvai ravra irpa^ai fiera gov {3ovXev6p,evo<$. 
el ovv Tt Ge rovrcov dpeG/cet, irkfiire dvBpa iriarbv 
erfl OdXaGGav Bt ov rb Xotirbv rov? Xoyov<; ttoiy)- 
Go/ieOa." roGavra fiev r) ypacfrr) eBijXov. 

CXXIX. He/?f>7? Be tjgOtj re rfj eiriGroXfj real 
diroGreXXeu y Aprd/3a^ov rbv <f>apvdtcov eVl Od- 
XaGGav teal /ceXevet avrov rrjv re AaG/cvXlnv 
Garpairelav irapaXafielv Meyafidrrjv diraXXd- 
£avra, o? irpbrepov ypx e > KaL trapa Tlavaavlav 
e? l$v£dvriov erriGroXr)v dvreireridei avrcp co? 
rd^LGra BiaTrefityai /cal rrjv G(j)payiBa diroBel^ai, 
Kal r)v ri avrco IlavGavias irapayyeXXrj irepl rebv 
eavrov irpayfidrwv, irpaGGeiv a>? dpiGra Ka\ 
2 iTLGrorara. 6 Be d(f>L/c6pi€vos rd re aXXa eiroiijGev 


BOOK I. cxxvm. 5-cxxix. 2 

the return of the Hellenic fleet from Cyprus, 1 he 
had taken Byzantium, then in the possession of the 
Persians, and certain connections and kinsmen of 
the King were captured in the place when the city 
fell. These prisoners he sent back to the King 
without the knowledge of the allies in general, whom 
he gave to understand that they had escaped from 
him. And he was carrying on this intrigue in con- 
cert with Gongylus the Eretrian, the very man whom 
he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the 
captives. And he also sent a letter by Gongylus 
to the King, in which the following was written, 
as was afterwards discovered : 

u Pausanias, the Spartan commander, wishing to 
do you a favour, sends you back these men whom 
he took with the spear. And I make the proposal, 
if it seems good to you also, to marry your daughter 
and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to 
you. And I am able, I think, to accomplish these 
things with the help of your counsel. If any ot 
these things pleases you, send a trusty man to the 
sea, and through him we shall in future confer." 
So much the letter disclosed. 

CXXIX. Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and 
sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the sea, com- 
manding him to take over the satrapy of Dascvlium, 
superseding Megabates, who was governor before ; 
and he charged him with a letter in reply to 
Pausanias, bidding him transmit it to him in By- 
zantium as quickly as possible and to show him 
the seal, and if Pausanias should give him any 
direction about the King's affairs, to execute it with 
all care and fidelity. And he on his arrival did 

1 cf. ch. xciv. 2. 



wcnrep etprjro koX rrjv iiricnokrjv BieTre/jLyfrev. 
avreveyeypairro Be rdBe' 

3 N ft *fl8e \eyei fiaaiXevs 'Eep^rj^ UavaavLa' kcu 
to)v dv8p6)v~ov<$ fJLOt rrepav daXdaar]^ e/c ^v^avrlov 
eawaak Keiaeial aoi evepyeala ev rw rj/xerepq) 
oi/CG) e? alel dvdypairro^, kcu rols Xoyois rots dirb 
crov apecr/cofiai. kcli <re firjre vv% jMrjO* rjfiepa 
eTTKT^erco ware dvelvat trpdacreiv tl wv e/xol 
xnria'xyei, /Jbr)8e %pvaov kcli dpyvpov Bairdvy 
K6Kco\v(jo /jbrjSe arpancts TrX-qQei, el itoi Bel 
TrapaylyveaOai, dXXa per y Apra/3d£ov dvBpbs 
dyaOov, ov aot eirefi^ra, irpdcrae Oapawv kol ra 
ifid kcli rd ad ottyj KaXXiara kcll dpiara e^ei 

CXXX. Tavra Xaficov 6 Havaavuas rd ypdfx- 
fiara, cbv koX irporepov ev fieydX<p d^id>fiaTi virb 
T03V 'EWijvwv Bid rrjv HXaraidaiv i)ye(JLoviav, 
ttoXXu) Tore fiaXXou rjpro kcli ov/ceri eBvvaro ev 
to) KaOearoiTt rpoirco (Sioreveiv, dWa cncevd*; re 
M^Ka? evBvo/ieros e/c rod J$v£civtlov efrja teal 
Bod tT;? SpdfCTjf; Tropevo/xevov avrbv MfjBoi kol 
AlyvTTTioi eBopvcjiopovv, rpdire^dv re HepaiKrjv 
iraperiOero real Karex eLV T V V Bidvoiav ovk eBv- 
varo, dXX epyoi? ftpayeai irpovhrfkov a rrj yvcofirj 

2 fiei^6v(c<; e? eiretra e/ieXXe irpd^eiv. BvarrpbaoBbv 
re avrbv irapel-y^e kol rfj opyfj ovrco ^aXeTrj} 
€XP?}to e? rravra? ofioicos ware fiijBeva BvvaaOai 
Trpoateiar Be oirep zeal Trpbs tou? ' AOrjvaiovs ov^ 
yKiara rj fu/x^a^ta /xerearrj. 

CXXXI. Ot Be AafceBai/jLovioL aicrOofievoi ro 
T€ rrproTov Bl avrd ravra uveKaXeaav avrbv, koX 


BOOK I. cxxix. 2-cxxxi. 1 

other things as he was told and transmitted the 
letter. And this reply of the King ran as follows : 

" Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias : As touch- 
ing the men whom thou didst save for me out of 
Byzantium beyond the sea, a store of gratitude is 
laid up for thee, of record, in our house forever, and 
with thy words also I am pleased. And let neither 
night nor day stay thee to make thee remiss in 
performing aught of what thou dost promise me ; 
and let nothing hinder thee, either expense of gold 
and silver or number of troops., if there be need of 
their presence anywhere ; but with Artabazus, a 
good man, whom I have sent to thee, transact with 
confidence my business and thine as shall be most 
honourable and best for both of us." 

CXXX. When Pausanias received this letter, 
although even before this he had been held in high 
consideration by the Hellenes because he had led 
them at Plataea, he was then far more elated and 
could no longer bring himself to live in the usual 
manner of his people, but clad himself in Persian 
apparel whenever he went forth from Byzantium, 
and when he travelled through Thrace a body-guard 
of Medes and Egyptians attended him; he had his 
table served in Persian style, and indeed could not 
conceal his real purpose, but by such trifling acts 
showed plainly what greater designs he purposed in 
his heart to accomplish thereafter. And so he made 
himself difficult of access, and indulged in such a 
violent temper towards everybody that no one could 
come near him ; and this was one of the chief 
reasons why the allies went over to the Athenians. 

CXXXI. Now it was just this conduct that had 
caused the Lacedaemonians in the first instance to 



eVetS?; rjj 'KpfitoviBi vrjl rb Bevrepov eKirXevcras 
ov tceXevcrdvrwv aurcbv rotavra icpalvero rroioiv, 

KCLl 6K TOV T$V%aVTLOV ftlCL V1T ' 'AOlJVaLCOV €K7T0\l- 
OpKTjOeU €? fl€V T7]V %TT(ipTT)V OVK ilT CLV 'e^Ci) p€l, 6<? 

Be K.oXcova<; ra<; TpcpdBas IBpvOels irpdcracov re 
ecrrjyyeXXero avrols e? tou? ftapftdpovs real ovk 
eV dyadqy rr)v p,ovr)v rroLOvp,€vo$, ovrco Br) ovtceri 
eirkcrypv, dXXa ire/i^ravre^ tcrjpv/ca ol ecfiopoi zeal 
a/cvrdXrjv elrrov rod fcrjpvtcos fir) XeiireaOai, el Be 
firj, iroXe/jiov avrCo ^irapndras irpoayopeveiv.j 

2 6 Be (SovXbfievos ax? rjKiara vttotttos elvai real 
iriarevcov XP ) l/ jLacrL BiaXvaeiv rr)v BiaftoXrjv dve- 
"X&pei rb Bevrepov €9 ^rrdprr\v. Kal e? jxev rr)v 
elpfCTrjv eaiilirrei to irpayrov vtto rebv e<popcov 
(e^earc Be Tot? ecf)6poi<; rbv (BaaiXea Bpacrai rovro), 
eireira Bicltt pa^dfievo? varepov e^fjXOe Kal kclQi- 
arrjenv eavrbv e? Kplaiv rots /3ovXo/jLevoi<; irepl 
avrCov eXey^eiv. 

CXXXII. Kal (fravepbv pev efyov ovBev ol 
%7rapriarai arf/xelov, ovre ol e^Opol ovre r) iraaa 
7roXt9, otgi) av inarevaavre^ /3e/3ai<w? irificopovvro 
dvBpa yevovs re rod ftao-iXeiov ovra teal ev ra> 
nxapovri rtfir)v exoira% (YlXelarap^ov yap rbv 
AewviBov ovra ftaaiXea Kal veov en dveyjribs cov 

2 eirerpoTrevev), viro-^rLas Be 7ro\\a? trapeZ^e rfj re 

1 The <TKvraXt) was a staff used for writing dispatches. 
The Lacedaemonians had two round staves of one size, the 
one kept at Sparta, the other in possession of commanders 


BOOK I. cxxxi. i-cxxxii. 2 

recall Pausanias, when they learned of it ; and when 
this second time, on his sailing away in the ship of 
Hermione without their authority, it was evident 
that he was acting in the very same manner — when, 
after being forcibly dislodged from Byzantium by 
the Athenians, instead of returning to Sparta, he 
settled at Colonae in the Troad and was reported to 
the ephors to be intriguing with the Barbarians and 
tarrying there for no good purpose — then at length 
they held back no longer, but sent a herald with a 
skytale-dispatch, 1 in which they told him not to lag 
behind the herald, or the Spartans w r ould declare 
war upon him. And he, wishing to avoid suspicion 
as far as possible, and confident that he coulcj' 
dispose of the charge by the use of money, returned 
the second time to Sparta. And at first he was 
thrown into prison by the ephors, who have the 
power to do this in the case of the king himself; 
then, having contrived after a time to get out, he 
offered himself for trial to any who might wish to 
examine into his case. 

CXXXI I. There was, indeed, no clear proof in 
the possession of the Spartans, either his personal 
enemies or the state at large, on the strength of 
which they could with entire confidence proceed to 
punish a man who was of the royal family and held 
high office for the time being — for as cousin of 
Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was king and 
still a minor, he was acting as regent for him ; but 
he, by his disregard of propriety, and particularly by 

abroad. A strip of paper was rolled slantwise round the staff 
and the dispatch written lengthwise on it ; when unrolled 
the dispatch was unintelligible, but rolled slantwise round 
the commander's skytale it could be read. 



'/rapavofiia Kal ^rjXooaei row ftapfldpcov /jltj tcxo? 
$ov\e(jQai elvai rols 7rapovcri, real 1 ra re aXXa 
avrov aveGKoirovv el ri rrov e^eSeSirjrrjro rcov 
KaOearcorcov vopijacov teal ore eirl rbv rplrrood 
wore rbv iv AeX(pol<; } ov aveOeaav oi "JLXXrjves 
dirb rcov M?;S&>z> aKpoOiviov, rj^tcoaev emypd- 
^aaOav avrbs Ihiq rb iXeyelov tooV 

'EXXijvcov apxvy°$ e' 77 ^ o-rparbv coXeae MtjScov, 
Tlavaavias Qoiftto jivrjfi dveOrjfce robe. 

3 to fiev ovv iXeyelov ol AaKeSai/iovLOi i^e/coXayjrav 
evOvs rore dirb rov t/hVoSo? rovro koX iireypayjrav 
ovojackttI t<z? 7roXe£? oaai ^vyKaOeXovaat rbv 
fidpfiapov eari]aav rb dvd6vp.a' rod fievroi 
Tlavaaiiov ahiK^fia fcal ror iSotcei elvat,Kal iirei 
ye 8?) iv rovrcp Ka0€Lo~n']/cei, ttoXXco fiaXXov 
nrapopoiov irpayOr]vai ic^aivero rjj Trapovarj 8ia- 

4 voia. iirvvOdvovro Be ical e? rov? ElXcoras 
irpdao-eiv ri avrov, teal r)v Se ovrco^' iXevOepcoaiv 
re yap vrno-^yelro avrois real rroXireiav y , fjv 
^vveiravaarooai. teal rb rrav ^vyKarepydcrwvrai. 

5 d\X' (qv$ o)<? ,ov8e rcov JLtXcorcov fnjvvrais riat 
TTLarevaavres rj^icoaav vecorepbv ri iroielv e? 

1 Added by Ullrich. 

1 A golden tripod set upon a three-headed bronze serpent 
(Hdt. IX. lxxxi.). The gold tripod was carried off by the 
Phbcians in the Sacred" War (Pans, x. xiii. 5), but the 
bronze pillar, eighteen feet high, of three intertwined snakes, 
was removed by the Emperor Constantine to Constantinople 


BOOK I. cxxxn. 2-5 

his aping of the Barbarians, gave them much ground 
for suspecting that he did not want to remain an 
equal in the present order of things at Sparta. And 
they went back into his past and scrutinized all his 
other acts, to see if perchance he had in his mode 
of life departed from established customs, and they 
recalled especially that he had once presumed, on 
his own authority, to have inscribed on the tripod 
at Delphi, 1 which the Hellenes dedicated as first 
fruits of the spoils they had won from the Persians, 
the following elegiac couplet : 

"When as captain of the Hellenes he had 
destroyed the Persian host, Pausanias dedicated 
this memorial to Phoebus." 2 

Now the Lacedaemonians had immediately chiselled 
off these verses and inscribed on the tripod by 
name all the cities which had had a part in over- 
throwing the Barbarians and had together set up 
this offering. The act of Pausanias, however, was 
felt at the time to have been a transgression, and 
now that he had got into this further trouble, it 
stood out more clearly than ever as having been 
but a prelude to his present designs. They were 
informed also that he was intriguing with the 
Helots; and it was even so, for he was promising 
them freedom and citizenship if they would join 
him in a revolt and help him accomplish his whole 
plan. But not even then, nor relying on certain 
Helots who had turned informers, did they think it 
best to take harsh measures against him ; they 

and placed in the hippodrome, the modern Atmeidan, where 
it still is. It contains the names of thirty-one Greek states 
which took part in the Persian War. 

8 The distich was composed by Simonides. 



avrov, XpcofievoL rw rpoirw tpirep elooOacnv e? 
erects avrovs, fii] ravels elvai irepl dvhpbs Xirap- 
ridrov avev dvafKpiafiijryjrcov reK/xrjpLwv /3ov- 
Xevaal tl dvrjKearov, irpiv ye hrj avroU, o>? 
Xeyerac, 6 fxeXXwv rds reXevraia^ (BacnXeZ 
e7riaro\a<z Trpbs *Aprdj3a^ov KOfitecv, dvljp 'Ap- 


ifceiva), fi7]vvrr)<; ylyverai, helaas Kara ev8vp,r)(jiv 
riva otl ov8eL<z ttco rcov irpb eavrov dyyeXwv 
rrdXiv a(pLfceTO, ical 7rapa<jr}/jL7ivdfievos, "va, r)v 
yfrevaOfj rrjs 86<;r]<; rj nal IkeIvos ri fieraypd-^rai 
alrrjcrj, firj emyvfh, Xvei rd<; eiricrroXd^, iv al<z 
vTTOvorjcras ri toiovtov irpoaeireGraXQai /cal av- 
rov rjvpev iyyeypapLfievov /creiveiv. 

CXXXIII. Tore hrj ol eipopoi, cel^avros avrov 
ra ypd/i/JLara fiaXXov fiev iTrlcrrevaav] avrijfcooi 
he fiovXrjOevres ert yeveaOai avrov Tiavaaviov ru 
Xeyovros, drrb Trapao-Ksvrjs rov dvdpcoTrov iirl 
Taivapov l/cerov olyop,evov teal a/c^vwaafxevov 
hirrXyjv Sia<f)puy/iart, /caXvfirjv, e? rjv rcov 
icpopcov 1 ivros rivas e/cpvyjre, /cal Tiavaaviov a>? 
avrov i\6bvro<$ /cal ipcorayvros rrjv irpb^aaiv T/79 
1/cereias fjaOovro it dm a crac^w?, alricofievov rov 
dvOpooirov rd re irepl avrov ypa(pevra ical rcOOC 
dirocfraivovTOS /ca0 y e/caarov, a)? ovSev irooirore 
avrov iv rat? rrpbs ftaaiXea hia/coviais TrapafSd- 
Xoiro, irporLfirjOeLTj Be iv tcra* rots 7roXXo£? rcov 

1 t<Ji/ re 4<p6pwv in the MSS. ; Toppo deletes t«. 

BOOK I. cxxxn. 5-cxxxiii. 

adhered to their usual method in dealing with men 
of their own class — not to be hasty, in the case of a 
Spartan, in adopting an irrevocable decision unless 
chey had indisputable proofs. But at last, as it is 
said, the man who was to take to Artabazus 
Pausanias' last letter to the King, a man of Argilus 
who had once been a favourite of his and had 
hitherto been most loyal to him, turned informer. 
For he took fright when he called to mind that no 
previous messenger had ever come back again ; and 
so, having made a counterfeit seal, in order that his 
act might not be discovered, in case he should be 
wrong in his suspicion or in case Pausanias should 
ask to make some alteration in the letter, he opened 
the letter and in fact found written therein, as he 
suspected he should find something of the sort to 
have been directed, an order for his own death. 

CXXXI1I. At this point the ephors, when the 
man showed them the letter, were at last more 
nearly convinced, but they wished besides to hear 
with their own ears some word from Pausanias' own 
lips ; so in accordance with a prearranged plan the 
man went as a suppliant to Taenarus and put up 
there a hut divided by a partition. In the inner 
room of the hut he concealed some of the ephors, 
and when Pausanias visited him and asked the 
reason of his taking the position of a suppliant, they 
heard clearly everything that was said : they heard 
the man accuse Pausanias of having written the 
order about himself, reveal the other items of the 
plot in detail, and protest that, though he had never 
yet compromised Pausanias in his errands to the 
King, the special honour awarded him was no better 
than that which the common run of his servants 



Siarcovcov airoQavelv, kclk€lvov avra re tclvtcl 
gvvofioXoyovvTO? kcu irepl tov irapovTos ovk 
eo)vro<i opyl^eaOcu, dXXd ttigtiv Ik tov lepov 1 
hihovTO? rr)<; dvaaTaaew<; kcl\ af-iovvTO? co? rd- 
yiGTd iropeveaOai kcu /jlt) tcl irpaaaofieva hiaKw- 


CXXXIV. ' ' AicovaavTes he dfcpiftcos Tore fiev 
dirrjXOov ol efyopoi, /3e/3ata>? he ifhrj eiSores ev rfj 
TroXet rt]v gvWrjyjnv eiroiovvTO. XeyeTCU £' clvtov 
fieXXovTct %vXXi]$6r}o-ea9cu ev rfj 6ha>, eVo? fiev 
tcov efyopoov to irpoo-coiTov irpocriovTO^ co? elhe, 
yvtovcu e\p' g5 e^wpei, aXXov he vevfiam dcpavel 
Xprfaafievov kcli hrfXajaavTos evvola, rrpo^ to lepov 
tt}? XoXklolkov ywpr}aai hpofiw koli TrpoKCLTatyv- 
yelv r)v o° iyyvs to Te/ievos. koX e? oiKrj/ia ov 
fieya o r)v tov lepov iaeXdcov, Xva fir) viraWpio^ 

2 TakaiTrcopolr), r}0~ vya^ev , 0i &" e T0 TrapavTi/ca fiev 
vaTeprjcrav Ty hico^ei, fieTti he tovto tov tc ol/crj- 
/mitos tov opocpov dcpecXov teal tcis Ovpas evhov 


aTrcDKohofirjaav. upoo-KaOe^ofievoi ts e^eiroXtop- 

3 KTjerav Xifiw. /cat fieXXovTOS avTOV airoy\rv-)(€LV 
uiarrep ely^ev ev tco OLKtffiaTi, alaOofievot e%d- 
yovaiv Ik tov lepov eTi efiirvovv ovtcl, koli e^a\- 

4 (9a? aireOave 7rapaxPVP<4. kcl\ clvtov e/ieXXifaav 
fiev 69 tov KaidBav, ovrrep tou? Kaxovpyov^, ea- 

1 in rod Upov deleted by Hude, after Krtiger. 

1 The temple would have been polluted if he had been 
allowed to die there. 


BOOK I. cxxxiii.-cxxxiv. 4 

received — to be put to death ; and they heard 
Pausanias acknowledge these same things, urge the 
man not to be angry with him this time, offer him 
a guarantee that he might leave the temple in 
safety, and finally request him to go on his way 
with all speed and not frustrate the negotiations. 

CXXX1V. When the ephors had heard all the 
details they went back home for the present, but 
inasmuch as they now had certain knowledge, they 
were planning to make the arrest in the city. And 
the story goes that when Pausanias was about to be 
arrested in the street, he saw the face of one of the 
ephors as he was approaching and realised for what 
purpose he was coming, and that another ephor out 
of friendship warned him by giving a covert nod, 
whereupon he set off on a run for the temple of 
Athena of the Brazen House, and reached the refuge 
first, as the sacred precinct was near by. Entering 
then into a building of no great size belonging to 
the temple, that he might not suffer from exposure 
under the open sky, he kept quiet. For the 
moment then the ephors were distanced in their pur- 
suit, but afterwards they took the roof off the build- 
ing and, watching until he was inside and shutting off 
his retreat, walled up the doors ; then they invested 
the place and starved him to death. And when he 
was about to expire, imprisoned as he was in the 
building, 1 they perceived his condition and brought 
him out of the temple still breathing; but when he 
was brought out he died immediately. It was their 
first intention to cast him into the Caeadas, 2 where 

2 A cleft in the mountains not far from the city, probahly 
near the modern Mistra, into which in early times prisoners, 
in later, corpses of criminals, were thrown; cf. Strabo, vni. 
v. 7 ; Paus. iv. xviii. 3. 



ftdXXetv eireiTa eBo^e rrXr^aiov irov Karopv^au. 
6 Be Oebs 6 ev Ae\(f)ol$ tov t€ rd^ov varepov 
e^p^ae rots AafceBai/jLovlois fierevey/ceZv ovrrep 
direOave (real vvv xelTai ev tco 7rpoT€/jLevicr{iaTi, o 
ypacfyf) aT?)Xai B)]Xovai), zeal go? ayos avrols bv to 
Treirpaypievov Bvo aciifiara dv9* eVo? rrj XaAyaot/e&) 
diroBovvai. ol Be 7roir]o~dp.evoi- %aXfcov<; dvBpidv- 
Ta9 Bvo go? dvri Ylavcraviov dveOecrav. 

CXXXV. Ol Be 'AOrjvaioi, ft>? /ecu tov 6eov 
ayos tcplvavTos, avreTrera^av rot? hcucehcufioviois 
eXavveiv avro. 

2 Tov Be [xrihiapbov tov Tiavaavlov ol Aa/ceBai- 
fiovioi rrpeafieis 7Te/jb\jravTes irapd toi>? ' AOrjvaiovs 
^vveirrjTicovTo /cat tov ^epaaTO/cXea, go? rjvpiafcov 
etc Toyv Tiavaavlov eXey^wv, tj^lovv T€ toIs avTols 

3 KoXdteaOai avTov. ol Be ireia0evT6<; (erf^e yap 
waTpaKia/xevos koX e\(ov BlaiTav fiev ev "Apyei, 
eTTKpoiTcbv Be zeal e? ttjv aXXrjv TieXoirovvrjaov) 
TTefiTTovai fieTa twv AaKeBai/j,ovl(ov eTol/xcov ovtcov 
£vvBmok€LV avBpa<; oh ecpijTo dyeiv ottov av 


CXXXVI. r O Be Se/McrTOfcXrjs Trpoacadofievos 
(Pevyet etc TieXoirovvy]aov e? K.ep/cvpav, cov avTcov 
evepyeTT)?. BeBievai Be cfraa/c ovtcov Kep/cvpalcov 

1 cf. ch. exxviii. 1. 

2 eif6p76T7js, benefactor, a title of honour bestowed upon 
him, either because he took the part of the Corcyraeans in a 
dispute with Corinth (Plut. Them, xxiv), or because he had 


BOOK I. cxxxiv. 4-cxxxvi. 1 

they throw malefactors ; but afterwards they decided 
to bury him somewhere near the city. But the god 
at Delphi afterwards warned the Lacedaemonians by 
oracle to transfer him to the place where he died 
(and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, 
as an inscription on some columns testifies), and that 
they should recompense Athena of the Brazen House 
with two bodies in place of one, since their act 
had brought a curse upon them. So they had two 
bronze statues made and dedicated them to Athena 
to be a substitute for Pausanias. 

CXXXV. Thus it was that the Athenians, 1 in re- 
sponse to the demand of the Lacedaemonians, 
ordered them to drive out the curse of Taenarus, 
seeing that the god also declared it to be a curse. 

But when Pausanias was thus convicted of treason- 
able dealings with Persia, the Lacedaemonians sent 
envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles 
also of complicity in the plot, in accordance with 
discoveries they had made in connection with their 
investigation about Pausanias ; and they demanded 
that he be punished in the same way. The Athenians 
agreed, but as he happened to have been ostracised, 
and, though living in Argos, frequently visited other 
parts of the Peloponnesus also, they sent some men, 
accompanied by the Lacedaemonians (who were 
quite ready to join in the pursuit), with instructions 
to arrest him wherever they chanced to find him. 

CXXXVI. But Themistocles, forewarned, fled 
from the Peloponnesus to Corcyra, since he was a 
benefactor 2 of the Corcyraeans. As they, however, 
alleged that they were afraid to keep him and thus 

excused their absence (Schol.) in the Persian war (Hdt. vn. 
cxv). Thi'mistocles relied upon the right of asylum, which 
had doubtless been decreed him as tbepytrris. 



eyew avrov coare AafceSaifioviois Kal i A07]vaiOt<; 
direyQeaOai, hiaKO puller ai utt' avrcov e? ttjv 

2 r)ireipov rr)V KaravriKpv. Kal hicoKO/ievo^ viro 
rcov irpoareray puevcov Kara ttvgtlv fj yjopolrj, 
av ay ledger a i Kara ri airopov irapa "Alp^rov rov 
MoXocracbv /3aai\ea ovra avrw ov <f>i\ov /cara- 

3 \vaac. Kal 6 puev ovk erv^ev eiriSripLcov, 6 8e tt}? 
yvvat,Ko<; iKerr)<; yevopuevos SiBdaKerai vw avTrjs 
rov iralBa a(pa)v \a/3(bv tcaOe^eaOai eirl rrjv 

4 eariav. Kal i\6ovro$ ov ttoXv varepov rov 
'A&fnJTOV SrjXoc re o? ean Kal ovk afjiol, el tl 
apa avrbs dvreirrev avrtp 'AOrjvaicov 8eop,ev(p, 
(pevyovra ripcopeladaL. Kal yap av bit* eKeivov 
rroXXw daOevearepov 1 ev r&> rrapovri Ara/cw? ird- 
vyeiv, yevvalov 8e elvat toi>? opoiovs dirb tov 
laov Ti/Mopelo~0ai. Kal apa avrbs pev eKeivu 
^peia? rivbs Kal ovk e? to aoypba acp^eaOaL evav- 
ricoOfjvac, eKeivov S' av, el €K8oir) avrov (etTTCOP 
b<$> aiv Kal e'(£' <*> SicoKerai,), crwrrjpia^ av T179 
y ^ v XV^ diroareprjcrat. 

CXXXVII. 'O 8e uKovcra^ dvlan^ai re avrov 
p,era rod eavrov vleos {uairep Kal e^cov avrbv 2 
eKaOe^ero, Kal p.eytarov tjv iKerevp,a rovro) Kal 
varepov ov 7ro\\(p TOt? re AaKeSaipoviOLS Kal 
' AOrpaiOLs eXOovac Kal ttoWcl er/rovaiv ovk 
€k818co<tiv, dX)C diroareWei /3ov\6pevov a;? ftaai- 
\ea Tropevdrjvai eirl rijv erepav OdXaaaav ire^jj 
2 e? TlvBvav rrjv ' A\e%dv8pov.\ ev fj 6\Kd8os tv^gov 

1 The reading of nearly all the better MSS. ; Hude and 
man}' other recent editors adopt the correction of Graevianua 

2 Hude deletes, as not read by the Scholiast. 


BOOK I. cxxxvi. i-cxxxvii. 2 

incur the enmity of the Lacedaemonians and 
Athenians, he was conveyed by them across to the 
mainland opposite. And being pursued by those 
who had been appointed to the task, according as 
they could learn the course he was taking, he was 
forced in some strait to take lodging with Admetus, 
king of the Molossians, who was not friendly to him. 
Admetus happened not to be at home, but Themis- 
tocles approached his wife as a suppliant and was 
instructed by her to take their child and seat 
himself on the hearth. And when Admetus re- 
turned after a short time, Themistocles declared 
who he was and urged that, if he had ever opposed 
any request Admetus had made to the Athenians, ' 
he ought not to take vengeance on him when a 
fugitive ; for in his present plight he might come to 
harm at the hands of a far weaker man than 
Admetus, whereas the noble thing to do was to 
take vengeance on fair terms upon equals. Besides, 
he added, he had opposed Admetus merely in the 
matter of a petition and not of his personal safety ; 
whereas Admetus, if he gave him up to his pursuers 
(telling who these were and what the charge against 
him), would deprive him of the salvation of his life. 

CXXXVI I. Admetus, hearing this, raised him up, 
together with his own son, even as he still sat 
holding him, this being the most potent form of 
supplication. And when, not long afterwards, the 
Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and made 
urgent demands for him, Admetus would not give 
him up, but, since he wished to go to the King, gave 
him an escort overland to Pydna on the other 1 
sea, the capital of Alexander. 2 There lie found a 
1 The Aegean. a King of Macedonia. 



dvayofih'Tj? eV 'IoWa? /cal imfta? /carafe per a* 
^ei/icovi e? to 'Adrjvaicov arparoireBov o eiroXi- 
6p/ceL Nd^ov. /cal (rjv yap dyvQ)<; rots ev rfj vrji) 
Belaas (fipd^ei rw vav/cXijpqy oar is earl /cal BS a 
<f>evyei. /cal el /nrj acoaei avrov, e<f)7) epetv 6ri 
^prjfiaai TreiaOels avrov ayer rrjv Be da^dXetav 
elvai puqBeva i/c/3f}vai, etc rrjs veco^ fie^pt, 7rXov<; 
yevrjTai' TreiOofievM 8' avrcp y/ipiv aTro/JLvqaeaOai 
/car d^Lav. 6 Be vav/cXrjpos iroLel re ravra /cal 
diroaaXevaas i)pepav /cal vv/cra virep rod arparo- 

3 tt<eBov varepov dfyucveljai e? "E^eco^ ical 6 
Se/iiaro/cXrj<; e/celvbv re eOepdirevae y^prnidriov 
Bbaei (rjXOe yap avrw varepov e/c re 'AOrjvoov 
irapa rebv (piXcov /cal e'f "Apyovs a vTre^e/ceiro), 
fcal fierd rcov /carta Tlepawv rivos iropevOels avco 
ecnrepuirei ypdfifiara rrpb<; ftaaiXea 'Apra%ep%r)v 

4 top ziiepj;ov vecoarl /3aaiXevovra. eBrjXov Be rj 
ypacf))) on " ®ep,iaro/cXr)<; w/ca) it a pa ae, 09 ■ /ca/cd 
fjiev irXelara JLXXip'cov e'lpyaa/xat^'rov v/xerepov 
ol/cov, b'aov xpovov rbv abv irarepa ernbvra i/xol 
dvdyfcrj rjfivvo/njv, 7roXij B' ere rrXeico^" 'dy aOd, 
iireLBt] ev rep dafyaXel fiev ifioi, e/celv<p Be ev 
eiriKLvBvvcp nrdXiv rj drro/copLiBr] eyiyvero. icai /10c 
evepyeaia o^eiXerai (ypdijfas r/]vre e/c SaXafiivos 
irpodyyeXatv t>}? dvayu>pr)ae(£><$ /cal rrjv roiv 
yedj)vpa)v, r)v -^revBa)^ rrpoae7roi7]aaro, rore oY 


BOOK I. cxxxvn. 2-4 

merchant vessel putting off for Ionia, and going on 
board was driven by a storm to the station of the 
Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. Themis- 
tocles became afraid and told the captain who he 
was (for he was unknown to those on board) and 
why he was in flight, adding that if he did not 
save him he would tell the Athenians that he 
had been bribed to give him passage ; their only 
chance for safety, he explained, was that no one 
be allowed to leave the ship until the voyage 
could be resumed, and he promised that if he com- 
plied with his request he would make a fitting 
return for the favour. The captain did as he was 
bidden, and after riding out the gale for a day and 
a night just outside the Athenian station, duly 
arrived at Ephesus. And Themistocles rewarded 
him handsomely with a gift of money (for he soon 
received from his friends in Athens and from Argos 
the funds which he had deposited for safekeeping) ; 
then proceeding into the interior with one of the 
Persians who dwelt on the coast, he sent on a letter 
to King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, who had lately 
come to the throne. And the letter ran as follows : 
u I, Themistocles, am come to you, who of all Hel- 
lenes did your house most harm so long as your 
father assailed me and I was constrained to defend 
myself, but still greater good by far when, his 
retreat being in progress, I was in security and he 
in dire peril. And there is a kindness due to me 
(here he related the timely warning to retreat given 
at Salamis, and the failure of the Hellenic fleet to 
destroy the bridges at that time, 1 which he falsely 

1 For Themistocles' advice given to Xerxes to retreat before 
it was too late and his claim about the non-destruction of 
the bridges, cf. Hdt. viii. cviii-cx. 

VOL. I. I 


avrov ov hidXvcriv), tea l vvv eywv a€ f^jdXa 
dyaOd hpaaat rrdpeipa hico/co/jLevos vrrb rcov f EA,X?j- 
vcov hid tt)v ai-jv cpiXiav. fiovXopai h eviavrhv 
eTria^cbp clvtos ctoi irepl cov ij/cco hrjXoocrai." 

CXXXVIII. ftacriXev*; he, a)? Xeyerai, eOav- 
fiaae re avrov r-tjv hidvoiav real eiceXeve irotelv 
ovroo. 6 8* ev tw xpovop bv erreo-ye tt}? re Uep- 
(Xt'So? yXcocrcrr)s baa ihvvaro Karevorjcre /ecu rcov 

2 eirirrjhevfidrcov rf)<; %cbpa<;' dcfit/co/jLevo? he fiera 
rbv eviavrhv yiyverai Trap avrco fieyas real 6cros 
ov&€L<; rrco 'KXXijvcov hid re rr)v rr povrrdpyovcrav 
d^Lcocnv /cal rod 'EXXtjvlkov eXrrlha ijv vrreriOet 
avrco hovXcbaeiv, fidXiara Be drrb rov irelpav 

3 hihovs %vvero<; cpaiveaOai. rjv yap 6 Se/xiaroKXi)^, 
fteftaibrara hrj cpvaecos layyv hrjXcbaas, /cal hia- 
cpepovrcos re e? avrb fiaXXov erepov dtjios Oav- 
fido-ar ol/ceia yap ^vvecret /cal ovre rrpopaOcov e? 
avrrjv ovhev ovr eTrtfiaOcov, rcov re ivapaxpr]jxa 
hi eXayiarr)*; /3ovXr t $ jc par terror yvebpeov /cal rcov 
jieXXovrcov eirl rrXecarov rov yevi]<rop.evov apiaro 1 ; 
elicacTr?]st m kcu a pev per a yelpa<i €%oi, koX 
e^rjyrjaaaOai olo<; re, wv & drreipo<; etrj, icplvai 
i/cavcos ov/c drn'fXXaKro, rb re d/xeivov rj yelpov ev 

1 Or, as some take it, " character." cf. Pint. Them, xxviij 
rb <pp6vy\ixa koX tt)v roKfxav avrov, the boldness of his spirit. 


BOOK I. cxxxvn. 4-cxxxvm. 3 

claimed to have been due to his own efforts), and 
now I am here, having it in my power to do you 
great good, being pursued by the Hellenes on 
account of my friendship to you ; and my desire is 
to wait a year and then in person explain to you 
that for which I am come." 

CXXXVIII. The King, it is said, marvelled at 
his purpose l and bade him do as he desired. And 
Themistocles, in the interval of his waiting, made 
himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the 
Persian language and with the customs of the 
country ; but when the year was ended he came to 
the King and became more influential with him 
than any of the Hellenes ever had been before, both 
because of the reputation he already enjoyed and 
of the hope which he kept suggesting to him that 
he would make all Hellas subject to him, but 
most of all in consequence of the insight he mani- 
fested, of which he gave repeated proofs. For 
indeed Themistocles was a man who had most con- 
vincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural 
sagacity, and was in the very highest degree worthy 
of admiration in that respect. For by native in- 
sight, not reinforced by earlier or later study, 2 he 
was beyond other men, with the briefest delibera- 
tion, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present 
and wise in forecasting what would happen in the 
most distant future. Moreover, he had the ability 
to expound to others the enterprises he had in 
hand, and on those which he had not yet essayed 
he could yet without fail pass competent judgment; 
and he could most clearly foresee the issue for better 

2 i.e. without knowledge acquired either before or after 
the occasion for action had arisen. 



tw dfyavel ere irpoedopa fidXio~Ta. teal to ^vpurav 
elirelv fyvaews fiev Bvvdfiei, /xeXerr]^ Be /3pa-%vT7)Tt, 
/cpdricrTos Brj ovto<; avToayeBid^eiv tcl Beovra 

4 Noo-^cra? Be reXevra top j3iov Xeyovat Be 
rives kol eKOvatov (^apfiaKw dirodavelv avrov, 
dBvvarov vofiiaavra elvai eiTLTeXeaai (BaaiXel a 

5 virecrx eT0 ' livrjiielov fiev ovv avrov ev yiayvrjaia 
earl rfi ' Aatavfj ev rfj dyopa- Tavrr]<; yap rjpx e 
T?j? ^wpa?, hovTOS (3aaiXeto<; avrw "MayvrjaCav 
fiev aprov, r) irpoae^epe irevrtf/covra raXavra rov 
eviavrov, Adfiyfra/cov Be olvov (iBo/cec yap iroXv- 
oivbrarov rcov rore elvai), ^<lvovvra Be 6-^rov. 

6 rd Be ocrra (f>ao~i KOfiiaOrjvai avrov ol rrpoaif- 
tcovres OL/caBe fceXevaavros eicelvov koX reOijvai 
/cpv(f)a 'Adrjvaiwv ev rfj ^ArriKj}' ov yap e^i)v 
Odrrreiv l a>? eVl irpoBoala (pevyovros. rd fiev 
Kara Tiavaavlav rov AatceBaifioviov /cal Sefii- 
crro/cXea rov 'AfirjvaZov XafiTrpordrov^ yevofievovs 
rwv rcaO* eavTOvs ' ' KXXtjvcov outo)? ereXevrrjaev. 

CXXXIX. AaiceBaifiovioi Be iirl fiev tt)? Trpco- 
tt;9 TrpeajBeias roiavra eirera^dv re teal avre- 
tceXevo-Orjcrav irepl rcov ivaywv tj}? iXdcrew 
varepov Be cpoiroovres irapa 'AOrjvaiov? YloreiBaias 
re diraviaraaOai enekevov ical Alyivav avrovofiov 
d(j)ievai, koX fidXiard ye irdvrwv koX ivBrjXorara 
irpovXeyov ro rrepl ^leyapecov yjrtfcfrio- fia fcadeXovai 

Hude deletes, after Cobet. 

BOOK I. cxxxviii. 3-cxxxix. 1 

or worse that lay in the still, dim future. To sum 
up all in a word, by force of native sagacity and 
because of the brief preparation he required, he 
proved himself the ablest of all men instantly to 
hit upon the right expedient. 

He died a natural death, an illness taking him off, 
though some say that he put an end to his own life 
by poison 1 when he realised it to be impossible to 
fulfil his promises to the King. There is a monu- 
ment to him at Magnesia in Asia, in the market- 
place ; for he was governor of this country, the 
King having given him, for bread, Magnesia, which 
brought in a revenue of fifty talents a year, for wine, 
Lampsacus, reputed to be the best wine country of 
all places at that time ; and Myus for meat. But 
his bones, his relations say, were fetched home by 
his own command and buried in Attica unknown to 
the Athenians ; for it was not lawful to bury him 
there, as he had been banished for treason. Such 
was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and of 
Themistocles the Athenian, the most distinguished 
of the Hellenes of their time. 

CXXXIX. The Lacedaemonians 2 then had on 
the occasion of their first embassy directed the 
Athenians, and received a counter demand from them, 
to take such measures about the expulsion of the 
accursed. Later, however, they frequently repaired 
to Athens and bade them withdraw from Potidaea, 
and give Aegina its independence, and above all 
they declared in the plainest terms that they could 
avoid war only by rescinding the decree about the 

1 For the various accounts, see Cic. Brut. xi. 43 ; Plut. 
Them, xxxi.; Diod. xi. 58 ; Ar. Eq. 83. 
a Taking up the narrative from ch. cxxvi. 



firj dv yiyveaOai 7r6Xep,ov, ev w etprjTO avrovs pur) 
%pr)a6ai to£? Xifiecn to is ev rf} 'AOrjvaicov dpyrj 

2 p,y]Be rf) Wrri/cfj dyopa. ol 8' 'A6r)valoi ovre 
TaXXa virrjKovov ovre to yjn](f>ca/ia KaOrjpovv 
eiTucaXovvTes eirepyaaiav Meyapevai ttjs yr)s tt)? 
iepas Kal tt}? aopiaTOV Kal dvBpairoScov uiroSoyrjv 

3 twv d<ptaTa/uL6va)v. reXo? Se dcfriKopevcov tcov 
TekevTaiwv irpeajBecov i/c AaKehaipovos, 'Pap,(f)lov 
T€ Kal WeXriaiirirov Kal ' Ayr/advSpov, Kal Xeyov- 
tcov aXXo fiev ovSev cjv irporepov elcodeaav, 1 clvtcl 
he Tahe otl "AafceSai/jLovioi $ov\ovtcll tt)V elprjvrjv 
etvat, elrj 8' dv, el tou? ''"EXXyvas avTOvopiovs 
a</>etTe," 7rocrjaavT€<; eKKXrjaiav ol AOrjvaioi yvco- 
fias atyiaiv avTois irpovTiOeaav, teal e&otcei aira^ 
irepl diravTCdv /SovXevaapievovs diroKpivaaOai. 

4 fcai mapibvTes aXXoi Te 7roXXol eXeyov, eir dp,- 
(jyoTepa yiyvopievoi Tat? yvcopiais teal a)? ypr) 
nroXepielv Kal &>? pur) epLirohiov elvai to tyrjfaapa 
elprjvr)?, dXXa tcaOeXelv, Kal irapeXOtov TLepitcXf)? 
6 B,av0L7nrov i dvr)p kclt etcelvov tov ypovov Trpco- 
tos 'AO^vaicov, Xeyeiv re Kal irpdaaeiv BvvaTco- 
TaTO?, iraprjvei ToidSe. 

CXL. " Tr}<; p,ev yvcopirjs, a> 'AOrjvaiot, at el tt}<; 
avTTjs eyppiai pir) etKeiv !JeXo7rovvrjaiot<;, Kalirep 
elScos tou? dvOpooiTovs ov Tjj avTrj opyfj dvaireiOo- 
pievovs T€ iroXepielv Kal ev tw epyw irpdaaovTas, 
irpos Be ra? gvpLcfropds Kal Ta? yv(op,a$ Tpeiropie- 

1 dwBeaav deleted by Hude. 

1 See ch. lxvii. 4, and the references in Ar. Acharn. 520-3 
and 533 f. The date of the decree must have been near the 
outbreak of the war (432). 


BOOK I. cxxxix. i-cxl. i 

Megarians, 1 in which they were forbidden to use any 
of the ports in the Athenian empire or even the 
Athenian market. But the Athenians would pay no 
heed to their other demands and declined to rescind 
the decree, charging the Megarians with encroach- 
ment upon the sacred land and the border-land not 
marked by boundaries, 2 and also with harbouring 
runaway slaves. But at last a final embassy came 
from Lacedaemon, consisting of Ramphias, Mele- 
sippus, and Agesander, who said nothing of the 
demands they had hitherto been wont to make, 
but only this : " The Lacedaemonians desire peace, 
and there will be peace if you give the Hellenes 
their independence." Whereupon the Athenians 
called an assembly and gave their citizens an oppor- 
tunity to express their opinions ; and it was resolved 
to consider the whole question and then give their 
answer once for all. And many others came forward 
and spoke, in support of both sides of the question, 
some urging that war was necessary, others that the 
decree should not stand in the way—of peace, but 
should be rescinded ; and finally Pericles / son of 
Xanthippus, the foremost man of the Athenians at 
that time, wielding greatest influence both in speech 
and in action, came forward and advised them as 
follows : 

CXL. "I hold, men of Athens, to the same judg- 
ment as always, that we must not yield to the Pelo- 
ponnesians, although I know that men are not as a 
rule moved by the same spirit when they are actually 
engaged in war as when they are being persuaded 
to undertake it, but change their judgments in 

a The reference is, first, to the tillage of land dedicated to 
the Eleusinian goddesses ; second, to land still in dispute 
between Athens and Megara, and therefore unmarked. 



vow;, opco Be real vvv 6/jloicl koX irapaTrXrjaia 
gv/jL/SovXevrea p,oi ovra, real tou? dvairei6op.evov<i 

V/JLCOV &LKCU(0 TOt? KOLvfj Bo^aCTlV, TjV CLpa TL Kd\ 

<r(j>a\X(i)/jL€0a, fiorjOelv, r) fir/Be KaTOp9ovvra$ t?}? 
%vveae(D<$ /jLeraTroieiaOai. ivSe^erai, yap ra<; 
tjvf/xpopas tgl)v irpaypLarcov ov% r)<rcrov d/iaOcos 
XcoprjcciL fj real t«9 Siai'OLas tov avOpcoirow 6V 
oirep fcal rrjv Tu^r, oaa av irapa Xoyov ^vfiftf], 
elooda/jLev auTLaaOai. 

2 " AafceSaifiovioL Be irporepov T€ BrjXoc rjaav 
€7ri/3ovXevovTe<; r)plv /ecu vvv oi>x rjfCLara. elprj- 
fjuevov yap Si/cas fiev rcov Biafyopcov dXXrjXot,*; 
BiBovai /cal Se^eaOai, e^eiv he e/carepovs a e^o/iev, 
ovre avrol St/ca? ttco rjrrjcrav ovre tj/acov BiBovtcov 
Be^ovTai, ftovXovrai Be iroXififp fiaXXov rj Xoyois 
ra ey/cXrj/jLara BiaXveaOai, real eTrirdcrcrovTes tfBrj 

3 koX ovKeri alrioo/jLevoi irdpeiaiv. UoTeiBaias re 
yap uTTavLaracrOai teeXevovcn koX AXyivav avro- 
vo/jlov deptevat teal to ^leyapecov yfrrj^icr/ia /eaOai- 
pelv ol Be TeXevraiot otBe rj/covres teal tou? 
^EXXrjvas irpoayopevovaiv avrov6/iov<; dcftievai. 

4 iificov Be /j,r)BeU voplo-jj irepl yS/ja^eo? av iroXefielv, 
el to Meyapecov yjn](f)io-/jLa /irj KaOeXot/iev, oirep 
fidXiara irpovyovrai el fcadaipeOeir) /irj av yi- 
yveadai tov iroXefxov, firfBe iv v/ilv avroh alrlav 

5 vTroXiTrrjade go? Bed puKpov eTzoXepLrjcrare. to yap 
ftpaxv Ti tovto irdaav vp,(ov ex €L ttjv Beftaicoo-iv 

BOOK I. cxl. 1-5 

accordance with events. And now also I see that 
I must give you the same or nearly the same advice 
as in the past, and I demand that those of you who 
are persuaded by what I shall say shall support 
the common decisions, even if we should in any way 
fail, or else, in case of success, claim no share 
in the good judgment shown. For it is just as 
possible for the course of events to move perversely 
as for the plans of men ; and it is for that very 
reason that we commonly lay upon fortune the blame 
for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations. 

" As for the Lacedaemonians, it was perfectly 
clear before that they were plotting against us, and 
it is now clearer than ever. For whereas it was 
expressly stipulated that we should submit our 
differences to arbitration, each side meanwhile 
keeping what it had, they have never yet asked for 
arbitration themselves nor do they accept it now 
when we make the offer. | What they want is to 
redress their grievances by war rather than by 
discussion/and they are here dictating already and 
no longer expostulating. For they order us to raise 
the siege of Potidaea, restore the independence of 
Aegina, and rescind the Megarian decree ; and these 
men that are just come boldly proclaim that we must 
give all theHellenes also their independence. But 
let no one of you think that we shall be going to 
war for a trifling matter, if we should refuse to 
rescind the Megarian decree — the thing they espe- 
cially insist upon, saying that there will be no war 
if it is rescinded — and do not let there remain 
in your minds any self-reproach that it was a 
small matter for which you went to war. For 
this trifling thing involves nothing less than the 



/cal irelpav tt)? jvcd/it]?, oh el %vyywpr}oere, /cat 
aXXo ri fieltov evOvs eirirax^ ] Rereads &)? cfioftqy 
/cal rovro v7ra/covaavre<;'\ airway pio~a\xevoi oe 
crac^e? av /car aarrjer aire avrols airo rod laov 
vplv fidXXov irpoa^epeaOai. CXLI. avroOev hrj 
Eiavoiftrjre r) vitclkovuv TTpLV ri /3Xa/3r)vai, rj el 
nTo\€fjLi]crop.ev, coairep e/juocye dfieivov hotcei eivai, 
Ka\ eirl fieydXy real iirl /9pa^eta 6/iolco<; irpo^daei 
fxrj e^ovres firjhe %vv (fcoftw e£ovre$ a /ce/crrijjieOa. 
rrjv yap avrrjv hvvarai SovXcoaiv r) re fieylarrj 
/cal r) eka^iaTT] hiicaLwcns cltto rwv o/jloicov rrpo 
hl/crfs to 4? 7reXa? e7nraaaofievrj. 

2 " Ta Se rod iroXe/xov /cal rwv e/carepoL? vrrap- 
j(pVT(ov a)? ov/c dadevearepa e^ofxev yvcore /caO' 

3 e/caaTOV a/covovres. avrovpyoi re yap elcri IleXo- 
irovvr]GioL KoCi ovre ISi'a ovr ev koivw xpi')pard 
eariv, eirecra %povlcov iroXeficov /cal hiarrovricdv 
arreipoi Sid to ySpa^eco? avrol eV' d\\i]\ov$ vtto 

4 rrevias iiricfyepetv. /cal ol roiovroc ovre vavs irXrj- 
povv ovre 7re£a? arparids TroXXd/cis e/cnepureLV 
Bvvavfai, diro rwv IBlcov re d/ia dirovres /cal dirb 
rwv avrwv hairavwvres ical irpoaeri /cal OaXdaarj^ 

5 elpyofievot' al he irepiovcriai toi>? TroXefiows 
fxdXXov rj al /3iaLOi eacfiopal dveyovaiv. aco/xaai 
re eTOLfiorepoL ol avrovpyoi rwv dvOpdmwv t) 

1 i.e. by the superior navy of the Athenians. 

BOOK I. cxl. 5-cxLi. 5 

vindication and proof of your political conviction. 
If you yield this point to them you will imme- 
diately be ordered to yield another and greater 
one, as having conceded this first point through 
fear ; whereas by a downright refusal you will give 
them clearly to understand that they must be more 
disposed to deal with you on terms of equality. 
CXLI. So make up your minds, here - and now, 
either to take their orders before any damag e is 
done you, or, if we mean to go to war, — as to me 
at least seems best — do so with the determination 
not to yield on any pretext, great or small, and not 
to hold our possessions in fear. For it means en- 
slavement just the same when either the greatest or 
the leajat^clarm is imposed by equals upon their 
neighbours, not by an appeal to justice but by 

" But as regards the war and the resources of 
each side, make up your minds, as you hear the 
particulars from-me, that our position will be fully 
as powerful as theirs. For the Peloponnesians till 
their , * , *kH*ds--u4%fr^ieir own hands ; they have no 
wealth, either private or public ; besides, they have 
had no experience in protracted or transmarine wars, 
because, owing to their poverty, they only wage brief 
campaigns separately against one another. Now 
people so poor cannot be manning ships or frequently 
sending out expeditions by land, since they would 
thus have to be away from their properties and at 
the same time would be drawing upon their own 
resources for their expenses, and, besides, are barred 
from the sea as well. 1 Again, it is accumulated 
wealth, and not taxes levied under stress, that 
sustains wars. Men, too, who till their own lands 

/ 243 


Xprjuaai iroXefielv, to fiev irio-rbv €%ovt6<; etc t(ov 
tcivhvvwv kclv irepiyevecrOai, to he ov fieftaiov fir) 
ov irpoavaXwaeiv, aXXcos re kclv irapa ho^av, 

6 oirep eltcos, 6 7roXe/xo? avrols fir)/cvvr)Tai. p-a%V 
fiev yap fiia 7rpo? airavras "EUr]i;a? hvvarol 
UeXoTTOWijo-Lot teal ol %vfi\iayoi avTia^eiv, iroXe- 
fielv he fir) 7r/)o? ofiolav dvTLirapaateevrjV dhvvaroi, 
orav firjre fiovXevrrfp'up evl ^paifievoi irapaxpij/id 
Ti ofea)? eirireXcocri, iravres re la6^rr}<f>oi ovres 
teal ov% 6fio<j)vXoi to i(j) eavrbv etcaaTos enrevhrj, 

7 e'f wv $iXel firjhev eViTeXe? ylyveaBai. teal yap 
ol fiev a)? fidXtara rificopyjcraaOai riva /3ovXovTai, 
ol he oj? rjtciara ra ol/cela <f)0elpai. xpovcol re 
^vviovres ev (Bpa^el fiev fioplw gkoitovgi ti tcov 
koivgjv, t<S he irXeovv ra ol/cela Trpdaaovai, teal 
eAracrro? ov irapa rrjv eavTov dfieXeiav oterai 
fiXd-^reiv, fieXeiv he tlvl teal aXXa) virep eavrov 


ho^da/iari Xavddvetv to tcoivbv dOpoov efrdeipo- 
fievov. CXLII. fieyicnov he, rfj rcov xprffidrwv 
airdvei tccoXvaovTai, orav a^oXij avTairopi^bfievoi 
hia/ieXXcoatv rod he iroXefiov ol teaipol ov fie- 
2 " Kal /irjv ovh y fj iirnel-xiGis ovhe to vavTiKov 


BOOK I. cxu. 5-cxlii. 2 

are more ready to risk their lives in war than * 
their property ; for they have confident hope of 
surviving the perils, but no assurance that they will 
not use up their funds before the war ends, espe- 
cially if, as may well happen, the war is protracted 
beyond expectation. Indeed, although in a single 
battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are strong 
enough to withstand all the Hellenes, yet they are 
not strong enough to maintain a war against a 
military organisation which is so different from 
theirs, seeing that they have no single general 
assembty, and therefore cannot promptly put into 
effect any emergency measure ; and as they all 
have an equal vote and are of different races they 
each strive to advance their own interests. In suclr 
circumstances it usually happens tliat nothing is 
accomplished. And indeed it could scarcely be 
otherwise, for what some of them want is the 
greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy, 
others the least possible damage to their own pro- 
perty. And when after many delays they do meet, 
they give but a scant portion of their time to the 
consideration of any matter of common concern, but 
the larger portion to their own individual interests. 
And each one thinks no harm will come from his 
own negligence, but that it is the business of some- 
body else to be provident on his behalf; and so, 
through all separately cherishing the same fancy, 
universal ruin comes unperceived upon the whole 
body. CXLII. And what is most important, they 
will be hampered by scarcity of money, seeing that 
providing it slowly they are subject to delays ; but 
the opportunities of war wait for no man. 

" Moreover, neither the planting of forts in our 



3 avrcov a^tov (j)0^7]drjvat. rrjv fiev yap ^aXeirbv 
teal ev elprjvfi itoXiv avriiraXov KaracrKevdaaaOai, 
rj itov Brj ev irokefiia re zeal ovx r^aaov etcec'voLS 

4 rj/ioov avTeTriTereLXLO-fievcov' fypovpiov 8' el iroir\- 
aovrai, rr}<$ fiev 777? /3Xa7rrotev av tl fiepos /cara- 
Spofiais /cal avro/jLoXicus, ov fievroi ikclvov ye 
earau eiriTei'xL^eiv re tccoXveiv ?5/xa? irXevcravTas 
ev rfj i/celvcov /cat, fjirep Icr^vo/iev, rat? vavaiv 

5 djxvveaQai. irXeov yap o/jlcos rjpels eyppuev rod 
Kara yrjv etc rod vavri/cov e/jLireipia^ rj \elvoi 

6 e/c rod tear rjireipov. e? ra vavri/cd. rb Be rrj<; 
OaXaaayjs i7rio-Ti]fjLOva<; yeveaOai ov pa&Lcos avrols 

7 irpoayevrjaerai. ovBe yap v/jiels, pLeXercovre^ avro 
ev0v<z dirb rwv ~Mr)BLK(ov, e^eipyaaOe 7rco' 7rco? Btj 
avSpes yecopyol fca\ ov daXaaaiot, real irpoaeTi 
ovBe fieXerfjo-ai eaabpuevoi Sea to vfi rj/xcov ttoX- 
Xals vavaiv alel icj)op/xe?a@ac, cl^lov av re Bpwev; 

8 7T/50? fjuev yap oXtya? ecpop/xovaas kolv Bia/civ- 
Bvvevaeiav irXrjOei rr)v dpaOlav Opaavvovres, 
iroXXals Be elpyofievoi rjav^daovai, /cal ev ra> 
/jur) fieXeTwvTi d^vvercorepoi eaovrai teal Be avro 

9 fcal OKvrjporepoi. rb Be vavrtKov re^vr]? earlv, 
toairep teal aXXo ri, fcal ov/c evBe^erai, orav rv^rj, 
eic ivapepyov peXeraaOai, dXXa puaXXov firjBev 
etceivco irdpepyov ciXXo yiyveaOai. 

1 cf. ch. exxii. 1. 

BOOK I. cxlii. 2-9 

territory 1 need cause us to be afraid, nor yet their 
navy. For as regards the first, it is a difficult matter 
even in time of peace to construct here a city that 
will be a match for ours, to say nothing of doing 
this in a hostile country and at a time when we 
have fortifications quite as strong to oppose them. 
But suppose they do establish a fort ; although they 
might injure a part of our territory by making raids 
and receiving our deserters, yet that will not be 
sufficient to prevent us from sailing to their land and 
building forts there, or making reprisals with our 
fleet, wherejn_ _our strength lies. For we have gained 
more experience of operations on land from our 
career on the sea than they of naval operations 
from their career on land. As for their acquiring 
the art of seamanship, that is an advantage they 
will not easily secure ; . for even you, who began 
practising it immediately after the Persian war, 
have not yet brought it to perfection. How 
then could men do anything worth mention who 
are tillers of the soil and not seamen, especially 
since they will not even be permitted to practise, 
because we shall always be lying in wait for them 
with a large fleet? For if they had to cope with 
only a small fleet lying in wait, they might perhaps- 
risk an engagement, in their ig norarrc e getting 
courage from their mere numbers"TT>ut if their way 
is blocked by a large fleet, they will remain inactive, 
their skill will deteriorate through lack of practice, 
and that in itself* will make them more timid. 
Seamanship, like any other skill, is a matter of art, 
and practice in it may not be left to odd times, as 
a by-work ; on the contrary, no other pursuit may 
be carried on as a by-work to it. 



CXLIII. " Et re Kal Kivrjaavres rcov 'OXvp- 
Triaaiv rj Ae\$ot? xprj/jbdrcov paadw fiel^ovL 7r€L- 
pwvro rjficov vTTokajSelv rovs ferou? rwv vavrwv, 
fir) ovrwv fiev rjficov avri7rd\cov. icrftavrcov avrcov 
re Kal rcov fieroUcov Betvbv av r)v vvv Be roBe re 
b-ndpyei kcli, oirep Kpdnarov, Kvftepvrjras e^PfiOf 
ttoXltcls Kal rrjv aXkrjV virrjpealav ifKelovs Kal 

2 a/ieivovs r) diraaa r) aWrj 'EX\a?. Kal iirl rw 
kivBvvw ovBels av Be^atro rcov %evcov rrjv re avrov 
cpevyeiv Kal /jLerdrfjs r)acrovo<; afiaiXirlBos okiycov 
rjixepcov eveKa fieydXov fiitrOov Boaecos €K€lvol<; 

3 " Kal rd puev TieXoirovvrialcov e\ioiye roiavra 
Kal irapairkricria Bokcl elvai, rd Be rjfierepa 
tovtcov re covirep eKelvois eiLeyu>ifdp,7)v dirriXXaxOai 

4 Kal aXka ovk diro rod taov fieyaXa e\eLv. r\v re 
€7rl rrjv ywpav rjficov ire^fj icoaiv, rj/xel^ eirt rrjv 
eKeivcov irXevaovfieOa, Kal ovKert €K rov ofioiov 
earai HeXoirovvrjcrov re fiepo? ri r/irjOrjvat Kai 
rrjv y ArriKr)v diraaav oi /lev yap ov% e^ovcnv 
aXXrjv dvrtXa/3etv afia^ei, rjjslv 8' ecrrt yrj iroXXr) 
Kal iv vijltois Kal Kar rjrreipov fieya yap rb rrjs 

5 OaXdaarjs Kpdros. aKe^jraaOe Be- el yap rj/iev 
vrjaicorai, rives av dXrjTrrorepoi rjcrav; Kal vvv 
Xprj on eyyvrara rovrov BiavorjOevras rrjv fxev 
yr)v Kal ot/aa? dcpelvai, rrjs Be daXdaarrjs Kal 

1 The mercenaries drawn from the states of the Athenian 
confederacy ; no one of those who had taken part with the 
Peloponnesians would be allowed to return to his native city. 


BOOK I. cxliii. 1-5 

CXLIII. "Then again, if they should lay hands 
upon the money at Olympia or Delphi and try to 
entice away the mercenaries among our sailors by the 
inducement of higher pay, that indeed might be a 
dangerous matter if we were not a match for them, 
assuming that both citizens and our resident aliens 
have manned our ships. But as a matter of fact we 
are a match for them, and, what is of the highest 
importance, we have citizens for pilots, and our 
crews in general are more numerous and better than 
those of all the rest of Hellas. And no one of our 
mercenaries, 1 when it came to facing the risk, would 
elect to be exiled from his own land and, with a 
lesser hope of victory at the same time, fight on 
their side because of the offer of a few days' high 

" Such, as it seems to me at least, or approxi- 
mately such, is the situation as far as the Pelopon- 
nesians are concerned ; as regards our own, I believe 
we are free from the defects I have remarked upon 
in them, and that we have in other respects advan- 
tages which more than counterbalance theirs. If 
they march against our territory, we shall sail 
against theirs ; and the devastation of a part of the 
Peloponnesus will be quite a different thing from 
that of the whole of Attica. For they will be 
unable to get other territory in its place without 
fighting, while we have an abundance of territory 
both in the islands and on the mainland. A great 
thing, in truth, is the control of the sea. Just 
consider : if we were islanders, who would be more 
unassailable ? So, even now, we must, as near as may 
be, imagine ourselves such and relinquish our land and 
houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city ; 



lr6Xeco<; cpvXa/crjv e%eiv, real TleXo7rovv)]crloi<; virep 
avrcov opyiaOevras iroXXw irXeocri /jltj hiapbdyeaQai 
(KpaTijaavris re yap av6i<;\ovtc eXdaaoaT^/JLa-^ov- 
fieOa /cal rjv acpaXco/aev, tcl rcov ^vp,pid^cov, o6ev 
1(T)(vo/jl€V, it poaairoWvTai' ov yap ijavyjiaovai 
fxr] l/cavcov r)ficov ovrcov eir auTOu? arparevetv), 
rrjv re 6\6(f)vpcnv /H7] ol/cicov teal 7^9 iroLelaOai, 
dXXd rcov cw/Jbdrcov ov yap rdSe rov$ civ8pa<;, 
dXX' ol dvSpes ravra /crcovrai. /cal el cpfirjv 
rreiaetv v/JLas, avrovs dv e^eXOovras i/ceXevov avrd 
Srjcoaai teal hel^ai TleXoirovvrjcrLOLS on r ovrcov ye 
eve/ca ovx viraKOvaeaOe. 

CXLIV. " IToXXa he fcal aXXa e%co e? eXiriSa 
rov TrepceaeaOac, r)v edeXrjre dp)(r]v re /jlt) eiri- 
KjdaOaL dfia 7roXe/u,ovvre<; ical Kivhvvovs avdai- 
perovs fit] 7rpocrTL0ea6ar paXXov yap TTecpo/Sij/xaL 
rds ol/ceLa$ rj/xcov d/iaprla^ rj ras rcov evavrlcov 
2 havolas. a\V e/cetva fxev ical ev aXXcp Xoyco d/ia 
Tot? epyois SrjXco0r]CT6Tar vvv Se tovtols drro- 
Kpivdfievoi dTTOTre/nyfrco/iev, Xleyapeas fiev on edao- 
fiev dyopa kol Xifiecn ^prjcrOac, rjv fcal AafceSaLfio- 
VLot %evr)Xao~ia<; fii) iroicoau ^)re yficov jir\re rcov 
rj/ierepcov ^v/uL/jbd^cov (ovre yap e/ceivo KcoXveu ev l 
rat? cnrovhals ovre roBe), Ta? £e 7roXe£? ore avro- 
vo/jlovs dcpijao/nev, el kol avrovo/iovs e^ovres 
ecTTreicrdfieOa fcal brav /cdtceivoi rals eavrcov 

1 eV deleted by Hude, after Diou. H. 

BOOK I. cxliii. 5-cxLiv. 2 

and we must not give way to resentment against the 
Peloponnesians on account of our losses and risk a 
decisive battle with them, far superior in numbers 
as they are. If we win we shall have to fight them 
again in undiminished number, and if we fail, our 
allies, the source of our strength, are lost to us as 
well ; for they will not keep quiet when we are no 
longer able to proceed in arms against them. And 
we must not make lament for the loss of houses and 
land, but for men; for these things-donot procure ^ 
us men, but men these. Indeed, SScT I tnoiigftff n< ^ 
that I #Ould persuade you, I Si/ould ttaae urgedf 
you to go forth and lay them waste yourselves, and 
thus show the Peloponnesians that you will not, for 
the sake of such things, yield them obedience. 

CXLIV. " Many other considerations also lead me 
to hope that we shall prove superior, if you will 
consent not to attempt to extend your empire while 
you are at war and not to burden yourselves need- 
lessly with dangers of your own choosing ; for I am 
more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's 
plans. But these matters will be explained to you 
on some later occasion x when we are actually at 
war; at the present time let us send the envoys 
back with this answer : As to the Megarians, that 
we will permit them to use our markets and 
harbours, if the Lacedaemonians on tfeelr part will 
cease^passmg laws for the expulsion of aliens so far 
as concerns us or our allies (for nothing in the treaty 
forbids either our action or theirs) ; as to the states 
in our confederacy, that we will" give them their 
independence if they were independent when we 
made the treaty, and as soon as they on their part 
1 cf. 11. xiii. 



airoScoGi iroXeat fir) atf-caiv tols AaKeBaifioviois 1 
eir irrfB eiws avrovofielaOai, dXTC avrol<; e/cdcrTOis 
&)? /3ovXovrar BUas re on eOeXo/iev Bovvai Kara 
Tfl? £vi>07]Ka<;, rroXefiov Be ovk ap^ofiev, dp-^o- 
fjLevovs Be dfivvovfieOa. ravra yap BUaia kcli 
irpeirovTa dfia rfjBe rf) iroXet, diroKpivaadai. 

3 elBevai Be ^pr) ori dvdyKTf iroXefielv (t)v Be etcov- 
(tlol fidXXov Be^cofieda, rjaaov eyKeicrofievov? rovs 
evavTLOvs e^ofiev), ex re ra>v fieytcrrcov klvBvvcdv 
on real iroXet Kal IBiddrrj peyiarat rifial irepi- 

4 yiyvovrai. oi yovv irarepes rjficov vTroardvTes 
MtfBovs fcal ovk airo roawvBe opficofievoL, dXXd 
teal ra vTrdpyovra eKXiirovres, yvcofiy re TrXeovi 
V T ^XV Kai T oXp,r) fiei^ovi rj Bvvdfiei rov re /3dp- 
fiapov direcocravTO /cal e? rdBe irporjyayov avrd' 
uv ov XPV XeiireadaL, dWa rovs re e^Opov^ 
iravrl rpoirco dfivveaOai /cal tols eiriyiyvofievoLs 
ireipaoQai avrd fir) eXaaaco irapaBovvai" 

CXLV. c O fiev Hepifc\rj<; roiavra elirev. oi Be 
'AOrjvaloi vofiiaavTes dpiara afyiai irapaivelv 
avjov e^ni^iaairo a etcekeve, /cal Tot? AaKeBatfio- 
vlols uire/cpLvavTO rfj e/celvov yvd>fir], KaO* e/caard 
re o>9 e(ppa<re /cal rb £v/nrav, ovBev KeXevofievoi 
Troiiicreiv, BL/cr) Be Kara Ta? %vv0)]K.a<; erolfioi eivai 
BiaXveadai irepl rwv eyKXrjfidrcov eVl tar] Kal 

1 Deleted by Hude, following Schol. 


grant the states in their alliance the right to exercise 
independence in a manner that conforms, not to the 
interest of the Lacedaemonians, but to the wishes of 
the individual states ; and as to arbitration, that we 
are willing to submit to it in accordance with the 
treaty, and will not begin war, but will defend our- 
selves against those who do. This answer is just 
and at the same time consistent with the dignity of 
the city. But we must realise that war is inevitable, 
and that the more willing we show ourselves to 
accept it, the less eager will our enemies be to 
attack us, and also that it is from the greatest 
dangers that the greatest honours accrue to a state 
as well as to an individual. Our fathers, at any rate, 
withstood the Persians, although they had no such 
resources as ours, and abandoned even those which 
they possessed, and by their resolution more than by 
good fortune and with a courage greater than their 
strength beat back the Barbarian and advanced our 
fortunes to their present state. And we must not 
fall short of their example, but must defend our- 
selves against our enemies in every way, and must 
endeavour to hand down our empire undiminished 
to posterity." h- 

CXLV. Such were the words of Pericles j and the 
Athenians, thinking that he was advising them for 
the best, voted as he directed, and answered the 
Lacedaemonians according to his bidding, both as 
regards the particulars as he set them forth and on 
the whole question, to the effect that they would do 
nothing upon dictation, but were ready in accord- 
ance with the treaty to have all complaints adjusted 
by arbitration on a fair and equal basis. So the 



6/xoia. /cai ol /nev aiTex^pv (Tav &* oi/cov icai 
ovk6ti varepov eirpea^evovjo. 

CXLVI. KWiai he avrcu /cal htafyopal eyevovro 
a/jL(poT6pois iTpb rod 7ro\e[iov, ap^dfievat evdvs 
airo roiv ev 'EirihdfAvq) teal Kep/cvpa. eirefiiyvvvro 
he opus ev avTacs /cal Trap' aWijXovs ecpoircov 
a/cr}pvfCT(0<; \xev, avviroTrrco^ he ov' airovhwv yap 
gvyXvcTLS ra <yiyv6/xeva tjv /cal irpo^acn^ rov 



Lacedaemonian envoys went back home and there- 
after came on no further missions. 

CXLVI. These were the grounds of complaint 
and the causes of disagreement on both sides before 
the war, and they began to appear immediately 
after the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Never- 
theless the two parties continued to have intercourse 
with one another during these recriminations and 
visited each other without heralds, 1 though not 
without suspicion ; for the events which were taking 
place constituted an actual annulment of the treaty 
and furnished an occasion for war. 

1 i.e. without the formalities which are indispensable after 
war is declared. 




I. "Ap^eraL Be 6 7ro\e/xo? evOevBe i]Br) ' ' A6v t vaiwv 
kcu Yie\oiTovvi]aicov real rwv e/carepois ^v/jifid^cov, 
ev a> ovre eirepiiyvvvro en dfcrjpv/crl nap dXXr}- 
A-ou? Karao-TavTe? re %vvexu>$ eiroXepiovv, tcai 
yeypairrai ef?}? &>? e/cacrra eyiyvero Kara depos 

KOI J(6L[10}Va. 

II. Teaaapa real Be/ca fiev errj evejieivav at 
TpiatcovTOVTei<; airovBal at eyevovro pber Ev/3olcl<; 

uXcOCTLV' TW Be TTefXlTTCp KoX B&KaT(p 6T6i, llTl 

XpiWSo? ev "Apyet, Tore irevrrjKOvra Bvolv Beovra 

err) lepwixivrj^ tcai Alvrjalov ecfropov ev %irdprr) 

teal HvOoBoopov ere Teaaapas firjvas apyovros 

*A6r)vaLoL<;, fiera rr)V ev TioreiBaia, fidy^v firjvl 

e/crcp tcai Be/cdrw, d/ia * rjpu dpyofievca (drjfta'uov 

avBpe? oXlyw 7rXeiov<; rpLafcoaicov (y)yovvro Be 

avrcbv {3oiCD-ap)(ovvTe<; UvOdyyeXos re 6 <$>v\eLBov 

teal kiepbiropos 6 ^OvrjTopiBov) earjXOov irepl nrpco- 

rov vttvov £vv ottXol? e? IlXdraiav tP)<; Boicorta? 

1 Hude's correction for ektw koI a/ia of the MSS. Lipsius 
suggested sure? < ical Senary > KCtl. 

1 The mode of reckoning customary in the time of Thucy- 
dides, and continued long afterwards. In such a scheme 
the summer included the spring and the winter the autumn : 

2 5 8 


T. At this point in my narrative begins the 
account of the actual warfare between the Athenians 
and the Peloponnesians and their respective allies. 
While it continued they ceased having communi- 
cation with one another except through heralds, and 
when once they were at war they waged it without 
intermission. The events of the war have been 
recorded in the order of their occurrence, summer 
by summer and winter by winter. 1 

II, For fourteen years the thirty years' — tl ' Ul ' e y 
which had been j^rr 111 ^^^ after the capture of / 
Euboea remained unbroken'; but in the fifteenth- 
year, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year 
of her priesthood 2 at Argos, and Aenesias was ephor 
at Sparta, and Pythodorus had still four months to 
serve as archon at Athens, in the sixteenth month 
after the battle of Potidaea, at the opening of 431 b. 
spring, some Thebans, a little more than three 
hundred in number, under the command of the 
Boeotarchs Pythangelus son of Phyleidas and Diem- 
porus son of Onetoridas, about the first Match 
of the night entered under arms into Plataea, a 

the summer period was equal to about eight months, the 
winter to about four. 

2 The commencement of the war is fixed according to the 
forms of reckoning customary in the three most important 
Hellenic states. 



2 ovaav ' AQj)vaiwv ^v/ifiax^Ba. eirriydyovro Be 
/cal dvew^av ras irvXas YiXaraiOiv avBpes, Nau- 
icXeLB))? re /cal oi per avrov, fiovXofievoi IBia? 
eve/ca Bvvdfieox; dvBpas re rcov ttoXlt&v tou? 
afyiaiv vTrevavTiowi BiaxfrOelpai /cal rrjv ttoXlv 

3 ®7}j3aiois 7Tpo(nroi.7](Tcu. eirpa^av Be ravra Bl 
^Evpy/id^ov rod AeovridBov, dvBpos (dr)ftai(Dv 
Bwarcordrov. TrpoiBovTes yap oi (drjfiaLOL on 
eaoiro 6 TroXe/bLos, ifSovXovro rrjv UXdraiav alel 
a(j)L(TL Bidcf>opov ovaav er i iv elptjvrj re /cal rod 
iroXep-ov /xtjttco <f>avepov /caOearwros irpoKara- 
Xaj3elv. y /cal paov eXaOov iaeXOovres, (j>vXa/cri<; 

4 ou Trpo/caOeo-Tii/cvlas. Oepbevoi Be e? rrjv dyopdv 
rd oirXa rot? fiev iirayayo/jLevoLS ov/c iireiOovTO 
ware evdv<; epyov eyeaQai /cal ievai iirl Ta? oltcia? 
rwv e\6pa)V, yvco/xrjv 8' eTroiovvro /crjpvy/jLaai re 
Xpijaao-dai iiriTrjBdoi? /cal e? gvfipaaiv /xdXXov 
/cal <f)iXiav rrjv ttoXiv dyayelv (/cal avelnev 6 
icr)pv%, €L tis (BovXerai Kara rd irdrpia rcov rrdv- 
tcdv Bolcotcov %v pup,ay/iv , riOeaQai irap avrovs 
rd oirXa), vofii&vres afylai paBico^ tovtw tw 
Tp6iT(p irpoGywpr](jeiv rrjv ttoXlv. 

III. Oi Be TlXarair}? a>? yaOovro evBov re ovras 
rov<; QrjfSaLovs /cal i^arrivaiws /careiXrj/ifievrjv 
rr)v ttoXlv, /car aBeiaav re<; /cal vo/x[aavre<; iroXXa) 
7rXeiov<; iaeXijXvOevai, (ou yap ecopcov iv rfj vv/crl) 
nrpos j-vfiflaaiv eyjAp^aav /cal rovs Xoyovs Be%d- 



BOOK II. ii. i-m. i 

town of Boeotia which was in alliance with Athens. 
They had been invited over by some Plataeans, 
Naucleides and his partisans, who opened the gates 
for them, intending, with a view to getting power 
into their hands, to destroy the citizens who were 
of the opposite party and make over the city to the 
Thebans.' And they had conducted their intrigue 
through Eurymachus son of Leontiades, a man of 
great influence at Thebes. Fo r, as Plataea w as 
always at variance with them, the Thebans, fore- J 
seeing that the war 1 was coming, wished to get\/ 
possession of it while there was still peace and 
before the war had yet been openly declared. And 
so they found it easier to make their entry unob- 
served, because no watch had been set to guard the 
city. And when they had grounded their arms in 
the market-place, instead of following the advice of 
those who had invited them over, namely to set to 
work at once and enter the houses of their enemies, 
they determined rather to try conciliatory proclama- 
tions and to bring the city to an amicable agreement. 
The proclamation made by herald was that, if anyone 
wished to be an ally according to the hereditary 
usages of the whole body of the Boeotians, he 
should take his weapons and join them. For they 
thought that in this way the city would easily be 
induced to come over to their side. 

III. And the Plataeans, when they became aware 
that the ThebanT were inside, and that the city 
had been taken by surprise, took fright, and, 
as it was night and they could not see, thinking 
that a far greater number had come in, they con- 
cluded to make terms, and, accepting the proposals 
1 i.e. the war between Athens and Sparta. 



fievoi i)(j\)")(atov ', aW&)? re koX eireiSr) e? ovheva 

2 ovSev evecorepi^ov. irpdaaovre^ Se 7r&)? ravra 
fcarevoyaav ov ttoXXovs tou? 0^/3atou? 6Wa? /tat 
evbpicrav €7tiOi/jl€vol pq8lco<; /cparijcreiv' tw 7a/? 
rrXi)9ei rcov TiXaratcov ov ftovXofievci) r)v rcov 

3 WOrjvaicov dcpuaraaOai. iSo/cei, ovv emyeiprjrka 
elvai real ^vveXeyovro Biopvao-ovres tou? kolvovs 
tol)(ov<; irap dXXijXovs, oVa)? pur) hid rcov ohoov 
cpavepol coaiv lovres, dp,d^a^ re dvev rcov viro- 
£vyi(DV e? ra? bhovs KaOiaraaav, Iva dvrl Tefyovs 
r}, kclI raXXa e^jprvov fj e/cacrrov iifxtivero rrpb<; 

4 rd irapbvra fjvfufcopov eaeaOai. eirel he co? etc 
rcov hvvaroov eroliia rjv, cpvXdtjavres en VVKTa 
teal avrb rb rrepiopO pov e^oopovv e/c rcov olxloov 
eV avrovs, ottcos fir} /card (££>? OapcraXecorepois 
ovai 7Tpocr(fcepoivTO real acpiatv ire rod Xgov yi- 
yvcovrai, dX)C ev vv/crl cpo/3epoorepoL oWe? ijaaovs 
wo- 1 TTJ? ac^erepa^ epareipia^ tt}? Kara rrjv 7ToXlv. 
TrpoG-efiaXov re ev0v<; teal e? ^etpa? fjaav Kara 


IV. 01 8* 009 eyvcoaav e^rjirarrffievoi, ^vvearpe- 
ebovrb re ev crc^icriv avrols kcl\ to.? irpoafioXds 
2 fj ir po a it Lit to lev direeoOovvro. real St? p,ev rj rpU 
drreKpovaavro, eiretra iroXXw 6opvj3co avrcov re 
rrpoa j3aX6vroov /cat rcov yvvaiKcov teal rcov oiKercov 
dpia dirb rcov olkicov Kpavyy re teal oXoXvyfj 
XpcopLevwv A.t'#ot? re ical Kepdfiro fiaXXbvrcov, koX 
verov dp,a hid Wfcrbs ttoXXov ernyevofievov, ecpo- 

BOOK II. in. i-iv. 2 

made to them, raised no disturbance, especially as 
the Thebans did no violence to anyone. But, as it 
happened, while they were negotiating the terms 
they perceived that the Thebans were few in 
number, and thought that by an attack they might 
,easily overpower them; for it was not the wish of 
the majority of the Plataeans to withdraw from the 
Athenian alliance. So it was determined to make 
the attempt, and they began to collect together, 
reaching each other's houses by digging through the 
party-walls that they might not be seen going 
through the streets, and they placed wagons 
without the draught-animals in the streets to serve 
as a barricade, and took other measures as each / 
appeared likely to be advantageous in the present 
emergency. And when all was ready as far as they / 
could make it so, waiting for the time of night just 
before dawn, they sallied from their houses against 
the Thebans, not wishing to attack them by day 
when they might be more courageous and would be 
on equal terms with them, but at night when they 
would be more timid and at a disadvantage, in com- 
parison with their own familiarity with the town. 
And so they fell upon them at once, and speedily 
came to close quarters. 

IV. The Thebans, when they found they had 
been deceived, drew themselves up in close ranks 
and sought to repel the assaults of the enemy 
wherever they fell upon them. And twice or three 
times they repulsed them ; then when the Plataeans 
charged upon them with a great uproar, and at the 
same time the women and slaves on the house-tops, 
uttering screams and yells, kept pelting them with 
stones and tiles — a heavy rain too had come on 



/3ij9r)o~av Kal rpa r rr6fievoi e<f>evyov Bia rr)<; 7r6\eo)?, 
d-rreipoi /iev ovres ol rrXeiovs ev gkotw Kal irrfXw 
rwv BioBcov f) %p7] o~w6r)vai (Kal yap reXevrwvros 
rov /j.7]vos ra yiyvbfieva r)v), epiTreipovs Be e^ovres 
robs BicoKovras rov fir) i/ccfcevyetv, 1 tocrre BiecpBei- 

3 povro iroXXoi. rcbv Be UXaraiwv ns ra? rrvXas 
17 earjXOov real aXirep rjaav fiovai dvewypuevai, 
eKXrjae GTvpafcifj) clkovtlov dvrl jBaXdvov xprjad- 
/xevos e? rbv fio^Xov, coare fir/Be ravrrj e^oBov en 

4 eivai. BiwKOfievoi Be Kara rr)v iroXiv ol fiev rives 
avrcbv eirl rb T€t^09 dvaftdvres eppiyfrav e? to ef co 

V(/)a? avrovs Kal 8ie<fi6dpr)o~av ol rrXeiovSy ol Be 
Kara irvXas eprj/xovs yvvaiKos Bovaijs ireXeKW 
Xa06vres 2 BiaKo^fravres rbv fioxkbv e%i)X6ov 
ov ttoXXol (aio-Orjais yap ra\ela eireyevero), 
aXXoi Be aXXrj rr)s nroXecos arropdBes dircoXXwro. 

5 rb Be irXelarov Kal oaov fidXiara r)v ^vvearpa/jb- 
fievov earrlirrovGiv e? OLKr)p,a fieya, b r)v rov 
T6t%ou? Kal at 3 Ovpai dveqiyfievai erv^ov avrov, 
olofxevoi rrvXas ra? Ovpas rov oiKrj/j,aro$ eivai 

6 Kal avriKpvs BioBov e? rb efw. bpwvres Be av- 
tou? ol TlXarairjs dTreiX^pL/aevov; e/3ovXevovro 
e"re KaraKavacoaiv wairep e^ovaiv, ifjarp^aavres 

7 to o'lKfjiia, ellre ri aXXo y^p^awvrai. reXos Be 

1 rov ^ iic(pevyciv Hade deletes, after van Herwerden. 

2 Kal of MSS. after \a06vrcs deleted by van Herwerden. 

3 So Hude with CG ; ot irXrjariov dvpai ABEFm^ L>idot and 
ITaase would transpose thus : rod reixovs *\i)o~lov Kal at dvpat. 


BOOK II. iv. 2-7 

during the night — they became panic-stricken and 
turned and fled through the city ; and since most 
of them were unfamiliar with the thoroughfares by 
which they must save themselves amid the darkness 
and mud — for these things happened at the end of 
the month 1 — , whereas their pursuers knew full well 
how to prevent their escape, many of them conse- 
quently perished. One of the Plataeans, moreover, 
had closed the gates by which they had entered — 
the only gates which had been opened — using the 
spike of a javelin instead of a pin to fasten the bar, 
so that there was no longer a way out in that direc- 
tion either. And being pursued up and down the 
city, some of them mounted the wall and threw 
themselves over, most of these perishing ; others 
succeeded in getting out by an unguarded gate 
without being observed, cutting through the bar 
with an axe which a woman gave them — but not 
many, for they were soon discovered ; and others 
got isolated in various parts of the city and were put 
to death. But the greater number, those who had 
kept more together than the others, rushed into a 
large building abutting upon 2 the wall whose doors 
happened to be open, thinking that the doors of the 
building were city-gates and that there was a pas- 
sage right through to the outside. And the 
Plataeans, seeing that they were cut off, began to 
deliberate whether they should set fire to the 
building and burn them up without more ado or 
what other disposition they should make of them. 

1 When tli ere would be no moon. 

2 Or, as most MSS. read, " a large building . . . whose 
doors near by happened to he open "; with Didot and Haase, 
" a Large building near the wall whose doors . . ." 


VOL. I. K ° 


ovroi re zeal ocroi aXXoi rcbv ®rij3aLcov irepcr/aav 
Kara rrjv ttoKlv irXavcb/ievoL, %vve/3r}crav Tot? 
HXaratevcri rrapaBovvai acfids re avrovs /cal ra 
oirXa xpyjcraaOcu 6 ri av ftovXcovrai. 

V. Ol fiev Br) ev rfj TiXaraia, ovrcos e-Kerrpdye- 
aav. ol B* aXXoi 0-rj/3aloi ou? eBet en rr)s vv/crbs 
irapayeveaBai rravcrrparia, el ri apa /jltj rrpo- 
ywpoir\ rot? eaeXifXvOoai, t>}? dyyeXias dp.a /ca@* 
6Bbv clvtoIs py]06Lcn]<; rrepl rcbv yeyevi]pLevcov iire- 

2 /3o)]6ovv. drre^ei Be r) TiXaraia rcbv Srj/3cbv 
araBlovs e{3Bop,r)/covra, /cal to vBcop rb yevbfievov 
rr)<$ vv/crbs eiroliiae /3paBvrepov avrov? eXOelv 
6 yap 'AacoTrbs iTO-a/ios eppvr) fieyas teal ov 

3 pqhiw<$ Sm/3aTO? r)v. 7ropevo/xevol re ev verco /cal 
rbv irorapbv fioXis Bi.af3dvre<; varepov irape- 
yevovro, ?;S>; rcbv dvBpcbv rcbv fiev Btecpdap/jLevcov, 

4 rcbv Be ^covrcov eypixkvwv. a)? 6° jjadovro ol &r)- 
ftaloi, to yey evrifxevov, eirefiovXevov tols e£co rr)<$ 
7roXeco<> rcbv UXaratcbv (jjgclv yap teal dvOpcoiroi 
Kara rovs dypoix; /cal /caraa/cevi), ola dirpocrBo- 
ktjtov rod 1 /ca/cov ev elpi'ivr) yevopivov)' e/3ov- 
Xovro yap crcf)Lcnv, el riva Xdfioiev, virdpyeiv 
civrl rcbv evBov, r)v cipa tv%coctl rives i^coyptipievoi. 

5 /cal ol fiev ravra Btevoovvro' ol Be UXaraiijs ere 
BiafiovXevo/jLevcov avrcbv viroroirtjaavres rotovrbv 
ri eaeaOai teal Belaavres rrepl rots e%w /c)]pv/ca 
e^errefji'^rav rrapa rovs Srj/3aLou<;, Xeyovres ore 
ovre ra TreTroirj/jLeva bena Bpdaeiav ev cnrovSais 
acf>cbv ireLpdcravres fcaraXaj3elv rr\v rroXiv, ra re 
e^co eXeyov avrocs fii) dBi/celv el Be puii, /cal avrol 
ecpacrav avrcbv rovs dvBpas diro/crevelv ov? e^ovau 

1 Added by Bredow and Baumeister. 

BOOK II. iv. 7-v. 5 

But finally these and the other Thebans who sur- 
vived and were wandering up and down the city 
came to an agreement with the Plataeans to 
surrender themselves and their arms, to be dealt 
with in any way the Plataeans wished. 

V. The Thebans in Plataea had fared thus ; but 
the main body of the Thebans, who were to have 
come in full force while it was still night, on the 
chance that things might not go well with those 
who had entered the city, received while on the way 
news of what had happened and were now hastening 
to the rescue. Now Plataea is about seventy stadia 
distant from Thebes, and the rain that had come 
on during the night delayed their coming ; for 
the river Asopus was running high and was not easy 
to cross. And so, marching in the rain and crossing 
the river with difficulty, they arrived too late, some 
of their men having already been slain and others 
taken captive alive. And when the Thebans learned 
what had happened, they began to plot against the 
Plataeans who were outside the city — there were, of 
course, men in the fields and household property, as 
the trouble had come unexpectedly in time of 
peace — for they desired to have such men as they 
could lay hands on as hostages for those within, in 
case any of them had chanced to be taken captive. 
Such then were their plans ; but the Plataeans, 
while the Thebans were still deliberating, suspected 
that something of the sort would be done, and 
fearing for those outside sent out a herald to the 
Thebans, saying that they had done an impious 
thing in trying to seize their city in time of peace, 
and they bade them do no injury outside the walls; 
if they did, they on their part would put to death 



£a)VTd<;' avaxtepyvavrwv Be irdXiv e/c r?)? 77}? 

6 airohdiaeiv avTois rovs avBpas. Srjftaloi fiev 
ravra Xeyovai /cal iiro/jLoaaL tyaalv avrovs' 
U\aTair)s £>' ov% opLoXoyovcri tou? dvBpas evBvs 
vircHjykGQai aTro&Gocreiv, dXXa Xoycov irpoiiov 
yevofievcov r\v ri ^v/i/3aivco(Ti, /cal iiroyioaai ov 

7 (paaiv. i/c £' ovv rf)<; 7/79 dvexcopV crav °i ®?7/3#«h 
ovBev ahi/cijcravTes' oi Be TiXarairj*; irretBr] rd i/c 
tt}? ^copa? Kara Ta^o? iaeKOfiiaavro, dire/CTeivav 
toi>? avBpas evOvs. -qaav Be oyBoyj/covra /cat 
e/carbv oi Xt](f)flevT€<;, /cal Evpvp.axo<; avrcov tjv, 
777)09 bv eirpa^av oi irpoBiBovre^. 

VI. Tovro Be iroLijo-avres e? re rd? 'Adijvas 
dyyeXov eirepLirov /cal tou? ve/cpovs vttoo-ttovBovs 
drreBoaav tols ©?7/3aiO£9, rd re iv rfj iroXet, 
/ca6io~TavTO 777)09 rd irapovra y iBo/cei avrols- 

2 TOt9 S' 'A#?7zWo£9 rjyyeXOi] evOvs rd Trepl rwv 
HXaraiwv yeyevr/fieva, /cal J$o ia>j(by re irapa- 
Xp?)/j,a ^vveXaftov oaoi rjaav iv rfj ^Arri/cfj ical 
e? ttjv TLXdraiav e-Trefi-^rav /c/jpv/ca, /ceXevovres 
elirelv /xTjBev vecorepov irocelv Trepl rebv dvBpwv ov$ 
exovai Qiiffalcov, rrplv dv tl ical avrol fiovXev- 

3 awcri Trepl avrwv ov yap rjyyeXOrj avrol<; on 
reOvrj/cores elev. dpua yap rfj iaoBa yiyvofievy 
twv &>i{3aiG)V 7T/3WTO? ayyeXos ifjrjei, 6 Be Bev- 
repos dpn vevL/crjfjLevwv re /cal ^vi'eLXrj/u/iei'cov, /cal 
rcov varepov ovBev vBeaav. ovrco Brj ov/c elBores 
oi ' AOtjvaioL iTreareXXov 6 Be /cijpvg d<pi/c6/jL€vo<; 

BOOK II. v. 5-V1. 3 

the men whom they held captive, but if the Thebans 
withdrew from their territory they would restore 
the men to them. Now this is the account which 
the Thebans give, and they allege that the Plataeans 
confirmed their promise with an oath ; the Plataeans 
do not admit that they promised to restore the men 
at once, but only that they would do so in case- 
they should come to an agreement after preliminary 
negotiations, and they deny that they swore to it. 
At any rate, the Thebans withdrew from their terri- 
tory without doing any injury; but the Plataeans, 
as soon as they had hastily fetched in their property 
from the country, straightway slew the men." And 
those who had been taken captive were one hundred 
and eighty in number, one of them being Eury- 
machus, with whom the traitors had negotiated. 

VI. When they had done this, they sent a mes- 
senger to Athens, gave back the dead under a 
truce to the Thebans, and settled the affairs of the 
city as seemed best to them in the emergency. 
The report of what had been done in Plataea was 
made to the Athenians promptly ; and they instantly 
apprehended all the Thebans who were in Attica 
and sent a herald to Plataea, bidding him tell 
them to take no extreme measures regarding the 
Thebans whom they held captive until they them- 
selves should have taken counsel about them ; for 
the news had not arrived that the men had been 
put to death. For the first messenger had set out at 
the time the Thebans were entering the city, the 
second immediately after their defeat and capture, 
and the Athenians knew nothing of later events. 
Consequently the Athenians sent their orders 
without knowing the facts ; and the herald on his 



4 rivpe tou9 avhpas Biecf)6ap/j,evovs. /cal fiera ravra 
ol 'AOt-jvaloi arparevaavre<; e? TlXdratav alrov 
re io-jp/ayov /cal (ppovpovs ey/careXnrov, rwv re 
avOpaoiTwv tol/? d^piziordrovs %iiv yvvculjl /cal 
rraialv i^e/eopuaav. 

VII. Teyevrjfxevov he rov ev TLXaraiai? epyov 
/cal XeXvpuevcov Xajxirpw^ rcov cnrovBoov ol 'A^>;- 
vaioi irapea/cevd'Covro a>? rroXepLijcrovres, rrape- 
encevd^ovro Be teal Aa/cehaifiovLOi teal ol ^v^iiayoi, 
Trpecr/Selas re /leXXovres nre^ireiv rrapd fiaaiXea 
teal aXXoae irpos rovs ftapftdpovs, el iroOev riva 
axfieXiav tjXitl^ov etc are pot rrpoaX^y\rea6aL f 7roXei<; 
re ^vpLjjLa-^i8a<; rroiovp-evoi oaai j)aap e/cro? t>}? 

2 eavrcov hvvdfieco^. teal Aa/ceSai/xovlois /xev Trpbs 
rat? avrov virapyovcrai^ eg 'IraXta? teal 'EtteeXla<; 
roZ? rdteelvcov eXofievoi^ vav<; errerdydi^aav x rroi- 
elaOcu Kara fxeyeOo^ rcov iroXetov, a)? es rov 
rrdvra dpiO/nbv rrevrateocricov vecov ecropievcov, /cal 
dpyvpiov p-rjTov eroifid^eiv, rd re aXXa rjcrv^d- 
%ovras /cal y Adi]vatov<; he"%opLevov$ pud vi)l eco? 

3 dv ravra Trapaa/cevacrOr). W&r/vaioi, Be rrjv re 
virdpyovaav ^vpbjiaylav e^qra^ov /cal e? rd irepl 
TleXoirovvrjcrov fiaXXov ywpla iirpeafievovro, Ke/3- 
Kvpav teal Keep aXXrjv lav /cal ' Atcapvdvas /cal 
Zd/cvvOov, optovres, el acplat (f)lXia ravr el'rj 

1 fV erax^J? Stanoalas Hude, with Herbst (eVe-rax^ cr'). 

1 cf. ch. Ixxviii. 3. 

2 Referring, in the one case, to the unsuccessful embassy 
of the Lacedaemonians to the King mentioned in ch. lxvii. ; 


BOOK II. vi. 3-V11. 3 

arrival found the men slain. After this the Athe- 
nians, marching to Plataea, brought in food and left 
a garrison, 1 taking away the least efficient of the 
men along with the women and children. 

VII. Now that the affair at Plataea had occurred 
and the treaty had been glaringly violated, the 
Athenians began preparing for war, and the Lace- 
daemonians and their allies also began; both sides 
were making ready to send embassies to the King 
and to the barbarians of any other land, 2 where 
either of them hoped to secure aid, and they were 
negotiating alliances with such cities as were outside 
of their own sphere of influence. The Lacedae- 
monians, on their part, gave orders to those in Italy 
and Sicily who had chosen their side 3 to build, in 
proportion to the size of their cities, other ships, in 
addition to those which were already in Pelopon- 
nesian ports, their hope being that their fleet would 
reach a grand total of five hundred ships, and to 
provide a stated sum of money ; but as to other 
matters, they were instructed to remain inactive and 
to refuse their ports to Athenians if they came with 
more than a single ship, until these preparations 
had been completed. The Athenians, on the other 
hand, began to examine their existing list of allies 
and also sent embassies more particularly to the 
countries lying about the Peloponnesus — Corcyra, 
Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus — perceiving 
that if they were sure of the friendship of these 

in the other, to the connection of the Athenians with the 
Odrysian court mentioned in chs. xxix. and lxvii. 

;: Referring to the Dorian colonies in Italy and Sicily (cf. 
in. lxxxvi. 2), which, however, contributed no ships till 
412 B.C. (cf viii. xxvi. 1). 



/3e/3auw?, irepi% rr\v UeXoirovvrjaov KarairoXepLr}- 

VIII. 'OXiyov re eirevoovv ovBev d/xcporepot, 
dXX' eppcovro e? rbv rr6Xep.ov ovk airetKOTW 
dpyopuevoi 'yap rrdvre^. o^vrepov avrtXafi^dvovrai, 
rore Be Kal veorrjs 7roXXy fxev ovaa ev rfj IleXo- 
7rovv7]o~G),7roWr] 8' ev Tat? 'A#?/z/a£? ovk a/covaiw<; 
virb aireipias rjirrero rod iroXepiov. r\ re aXXrj 
'EXXa? drraaa /jLerecopos r)v ^vvtovatov rcov irpco- 

2 tcov iroXetov. Kal iroXXd fiev Xoyca eXtyero, 
iroXXd he j(pT)apioX6yoi yBov ev re roh fieXXovai 

3 7roXe/u,i]creiv real ev rals aXXai? iroXeatv. en Be 
AfjXos eKivijOr) oXiyov irpo rovrcov, irporepov 
oviTco aeiaOeicra defy' ou EXXrjves /le/jLVTjvrai. 
iXeyero Be Kal iBoKec eVl rots [xeXXovcn yevij- 
aeaOai aTjfirjvai' el re re aXXo rotovrbrpoirov 
£vve/3ii yeveoQai, irdvra dve^relro. 

4 f H Be evvoia irapa iroXv eiroiei tcov dvOpcorrcov 
fiaXXov e? rovs AaKeBai/xoviovs, aXXcos re Kal 
rrpoeiirovrccv on ttjv 'EAAaSa eXevOepovaiv. 
eppcoro re 7ra? Kal IBhott)*; Kal ttoXls el ri Bvvairo 
Kal Xoyco Kal epyco %vverriXa}±$dveiv avrol^' ev 
rovrco re KeKcoXvaOai eBoKei eKciarco ra rrpdy- 

5 fiara co firf Tt? avrbs irapearai. ovrcos ev l opyf) 
el%ov ol irXeiovs rovs \\.07]vaiov<;, oi fxev t% 
dpxvs drroXvOrjvai /3ovXop.evoi, ol Be jjltj dp^Otocri 

1 Added by Stephanua. 

BOOK II. vii. 3-V111. 5 

places they would be able to encircle the Pelo- 
ponnesus and subdue it. 

VIII. There was nothing paltry in the designs of 
either side ; but both put their whole strength into 
the war, and not without reason, for men always 
lay hold with more spirit at the beginning, and at 
this time, in addition, the young men, who were 
numerous both in the Peloponnesus and in Athens, 
were unfamiliar enough with war to welcome it. 
All the rest of Hellas was in anxious suspense as its' 
foremost cities came into conflict with each other. 
And many were the prophecies recited and many 
those which oracle-mongers chanted, both among 
the peoples who were about to go to war and in the 
Hellenic cities at large. Moreover, only a short 
time before this, Delos had been shaken, although it 
had not before been visited by an earthquake within 
the memory of the Hellenes. 1 This was said and 
believed to be ominous of coming events, and indeed 
every other incident of the sort which chanced to 
occur was carefully looked into. 

The general good-will, however, inclined decidedly 
to the side of the Lacedaemonians, especially since 
they proclaimed that they were liberating Hellas. 
Every person and every state was strongly purposed 
to assist them in every possible way, whether by 
word or by deed, and each man thought that 
wherever he could not himself be present, there the 
cause had suffered a check. To such an extent were 
the majority of the Hellenes enraged against the 
Athenians, some wishing to be delivered from their 
sway, others fearful of falling under it. 

1 Probably an intentional contradiction of H«lt. vi. xcviii., 
where it is stated that an earthquake occurred shortly before 
the buttle of Marathon, but none later. 



IX. YlapacrKevfi /xev ovv /cal yvcofirj toiclvttj 
wpfirjvro. 7ro\ei? Be e/cdrepoi rdaSe e^ovTes gv/n- 

2 /xa^ou9 e? tov nroXepLOv tcadicTTavTO. Aa/ceBaipLO- 
ricov puev ol'ce ^vfi/xa^ot' YleXoTrowijcrioi puev 01 
eWo9 ladfxov rrdvTes ttXtjv *Apyelcov /cal ^ kyaiwv 
{tovtois Be e? dpcpOTepov? cjuXia rjv UeXXjjvrjS Be 
'A^cuto^ [iovol ^vveiroXepiOvv to irpcoTov, eireira 
Be vcrrepov /cal airavTes), e%co Be UeXoirovvrjcrov 
^leyaprjs, V>oicotoi, Ao/cpoi, Qco/cr)?, 'A/xirpafacoTac, 

3 AevKuBioiy 'AvarcTopioi. tovtcov vavTi/cbv irapel- 
%ov70 Kooli'dioi, ^leyaprjs, Xlkvcdvioi, UeXXT]vr)s, 
'HXetot, ' ApLTrpaKLcoraL, Aeu/cdBtoi, iirireas Be 

TSoiCDTOL, <&WKT)S, AoKpOl, at £' dXXai IToXet^ 

4 metpv irapel^ov. 1 avrr) pcev AaiceBaipLOVicov 
%v pLfxayLa' ' AOrjvalcov Be Xioj, Aeo~/3ioi, U\a- 
tclli)<;, Meo-crtjvioi, ol ev NavTrd/cTcp, 'A/capvdvcov 
ol 7T/\,e/ou9, KepKvpaloi, Za/cvvdiot,, /cal ciXXai 
TroXeis at vTTOTeXels ovaai ev eOvecri roaolaBe, 
Kapia rj eirl OaXdaar), AcoptfjS Kapal irpoaoiKOi, 
'Icovla, 'EXXijcnrovros, rd errl Spd/cr)<;, vr\aoi oaai 
cvtos HeXoTTOwrjaov /cal Kp7]rr}<; 777309 ijXiov 

5 dvLcrxoi'Ta 2 7tXt]V MtjXov kclI %r)pa$. tovtcov 
vavTiKOv iTapei\ovTO Xtoj, Aeafttoi, Kep/cvpaloi, 

6 ol 8' d\Xoi ire^bv ical xprjpaTa. %vpLp,axla p,ev 
clvtt) e/cciTepcov /cal irapaaKevr) €9 tov iroXepiov rjv. 

X. Ol Be AafceBcupLOVLOi pueTa Ta ev TlXaTaLals 

ev6v<; 7T€pL?jyyeXXov icaTa t^v HeXo7r6vvr]aov kcu 

1 Herbst deletes, followed by Hude. 

3 Before tt\t)v C gives iracrai at KvK\dSes, the other MSS. 
Taaai at &k\at KvkKclScs. Deleted by Dobree. 


BOOK II. ix. i-x. i 

IX. Such were the preparations and such the 
feelings with which the Hellenes went into the 
conflict. And the states which each side had as its 
allies when it entered the war were as follows. 
These were the allies of the Lacedaemonians : all 
the Peloponnesians south of the Isthmus with the 
exception of the Argives and Achaeans (these latter 
had friendly relations with both sides, and the 
Pellenians were the only Achaeans who at first took 
part in the war with the Lacedaemonians, though 
eventually all of them did), and outside of the Pelo- 
ponnesus the Megarians, Boeotians, Locrians, Pho- 
cians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. 
Of these, the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, 
Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians 
furnished ships, while cavalry was contributed by 
the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, and infantry 
by the other states."" These were the allies of the 
Lacedaemonians. Those of the Athenians were : 
the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians of 
Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Cor- 
cyraeans, the Zacynthians, and in addition the cities 
which were tributary in the following countries : 
the seaboard of Caria, the Dorians adjacent to the 
Carians, Ionia, the Hellespont, the districts on the 
coast of Thrace, and the islands which lie between 
the Peloponnesus and Crete toward the east, with 
the exception of Melos and Thera. Of these, the 
Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans furnished ships, 
the rest infantry and money. Such were the allies 
of each side and the preparations they made for 
the war. 

X. Immediately after the affair at Plataea the 
Lacedaemonians sent word around to the various 



rrjv efft) Ev/jL/jLaxlSa arparidv irapacncevd^eaOai 
ra?? irokeai rd re eiriT^heia ola elzcbs eirl e^oSov 
eKhrjfjLov e^eiv, a>9 icrfiakovvTes e? ttjv 'Am/cr/v. 

2 €776lStj Se efcdcrrois eroipua yiyvotTO, zeard top 
%p6vov top elprj/ievov ^vvfjaav rd Svo fieprj dirb 

3 7roXea)? e/eacrT^? 69 rbv laO/iov. zeal eVeiS^ irav 
to arpdrev/ia tjvveiXeyp,evov rjv, 'A/r^'Sa/zo9 o 
/BaatXevs tcov Aazce&at '/jlovlcov , oairep i)yelro rrjs 
e^oBov ravT7]<;, %vyzcaXeaa<$ tou? aTparrjyovs tcov 
iroXewv Tracrcov zeal tou? /idXiara ev reXet zeal 
d^ioXoywrdrovs irapijvei roidBe. 1 

XI. " "AvSpes TleXoTTOvvtjaiOL zeal ^vpLfxa^oi, 
zeal ol iraTepes rjfiwv 7roXXa? arparela^; /ecu ev 
avrfj rfj UeXoTTOWijcrfp /cal e^co iiroirfaavTO, /ecu 
r)/j.(x)v aurcov ol irpeaftvTepoi ovzc dneipoi iroXefiwv 
elaiv o/xo)? he rrjcrSe ovttco /nel^ova Trapaazeevrjv 
e%o^T€9 e^Xdofiev, dXXd zeal eirl ttoXlv Bwcitoo- 
Tarrjv vvv epxbpLeOa, /ecu avrol irXelaroi zeal 

2 dpiGToi (TrparevovTes. hitcaiov ovv r)jnd^ fiijre 
rwv TTcnepwv yeipovs fyaiveadai fiyjre i)ficdv avrwv 
rr/s 3of/?9 evheea-epovs. ?) yap 'EXXas irdaa 
ry&e ttj oppufj eirr)pTai zeal irpoaey^et, rrjv yvco/njv, 
evvoiav eyovaa hid to ' 'A0y]vaicov e'%^09 irpd^ai 

3 rjpLcis a eirivoovpiev.. ovzcovv %p>;', € % tg> zeal 
hozeovpiev irXr/Oei eirievai zeal dacfidXeia ttoXXtj 
elvai /jlt] civ iXOelv T01/9 evavriovs i)puv Sid pidx 1 !^, 
tovtoov eve/ea dfieXearepov n Trapecrzcevaa/jLevovs 
Xcopelv, dXXa zeal TroXea)? ezedarr]^ ?)ye/j,6va zeal 
GTpartdiTi]v to zea0^ aurbv alel TrpoahexarrOai e'9 

1 Sintenis' correction for irapelvai roiiV «Af£«v of the MSS. 

BOOK II. x. i-xi. 3 

states in the Peloponnesus and their confederacy 
outside the Peloponnesus to make ready such troops 
and supplies as it was appropriate they should have 
for a foreign expedition, their intention being to 
invade Attica. When everything was ready in the 
several states, two-thirds of the contingent of each 
state assembled at the appointed time at the 

/Isthmus. And when the whole army was assembled, 
Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, who 
was to be the leader of this expedition, called 
together the generals of all the states as well as the 
chief officials and the most notable men, and 
exhorted them as follows : 

XI. " Peloponnesians and allies, o ur fath ers made 
many campaigns both in the Peloponnesus and 
beyond it, and the elder men also amongst us do 
not lack experience in warfare, yet never before 
have we taken the field with a greater armament 
than this ; but though we were never more numerous 
and puissant, it is also a very powerful state we 
now go against. It is but right, therefore, that we 
neither should show ourselv es worse men than ou r 
fathers nor wanting to our own fame. For all 
Hellas is stirred by this enterprise of ours, and 
fixes her gaze upon it, and being friendly to us on 
account of their hatred of the Athenians hopes 
that we shall succeed in carrying out our designs. 
Therefore, even if some of us may think that we 
are going against them with superior numbers and 
that in all likelihood the enemy will not risk a 
pitched battle with us, we must not on that account 
be a whit less carefully prepared when we advance, 
but rather must officer and soldier of every state for 
his own part b e always expecting to eru-mmte r 



4 klvSvvov rwa r)%eiv. dBrjXa yap ra rcov rroXefxcov, 
Kal e'5 oXiyov rd 7roXXd Kal 6V opyfjs al iiri- 
XeipijaeLS ylyvovrav iroXXaKis re ro eXacraov 
TrXrjOos hehibs d\ieivov rjfivvaro tou? rrXeova<; Sid 

5 to Karacppovovvras cnrapacncevovs yeveaOai. ^ph 
he alel iv rrj iroXejiua rfj fiev yvwfiy OapcraXeovs 
arpareveiv, rco o° epyco SeSioras irapeaKevdaOai. 
ovrco yap rrpos re to iirikvai rocs ivavrioL<i 
ev^rv^oraroi av elev, irpos re to eiriyeipeloQai 

6 " 'H/net? Be OU& iirl dSvvarov dpuvveaOai ovrco 1 
iroXiv ipy^ofieda, dXXa rols Trdaiv dpiara rrape- 
aKevaap-evrjv, coare ^pr) Kal irdvv iXirl^eiv hid 
fjLd%r)<; levai avrovs, el p,>] Kal vvv copfiijvrai iv 
co ovirco Trdpecr/nev,^ dXX brav iv rfj yfj opcoaiv 

7 fjfjLa? Syovvrds re Kal raKelvcov cp0elpovra<;. rrdcri 
yap iv TOi? o/n/jLacn Kal iv rco rrapavriKa opciv 
irdaypvrd^ ri a?;#e? opyrj rrpocrrriTrrei, Kal oi 
Xoyicr/Acp iXd^tara ^pco/ievot dvfxco irXelara e? 

8 epyov KaOlaravrai. ' ' AOrjvaiovs he. Kal irXeov ri 
rcov dXXcov et/co? rovro Spdaai, oc dpyeiv re rcov 
aXXcov dgiovcri Kal iiriovres rrjv rcov rreXas Srjovv 

9 fidXXov rj rrjv avrcov opciv. w? ovv iirl roaavrqv 
ttoXlv arparevovres Kal fieyicrrrjv So^av olcrofievoi 
Tot? re rrpoyovoL? Kal vpZv avrol^ iiv d/icporepa 
iK rcov drro^aivovrcov, eireaOe oirrj av T£? i)yijrai, 
KOGfiov Kal cfivXaKrjv irepl rravrbs Troiovfievoi Kal 
ra irapayyeXXofieva ofew? Sexofievoc KaXXcarov 

1 ourw deleted by Hude, after Madvig. 

BOOK II. xi. 3-9 

some danger. For the events of war c annot be 

foreseen, and attacks are generally sudden and 
furious ; and oftentimes a smaller force, made 
cautious by fear, overmatches a larger number that 
is caught unprepared because it despises the foe. 
One should, however, when campaigning in___an 
erremyV-t^cwrntry always be bold in spirit , but in 
action cautious and therefore prepared. For thus 
men will be most valorous in attacking their oppo- 
nents and most secure against assault. 

" And we are going against a city which is not 
so powerless to defend itself as some may think, 
but is perfectly prepar ed i n all respects ; we have 
therefore every reason to expect them to risk a 
battle, if they have not already set out before we 
are yet there, at any rate when they see us in 
their territory laying it waste and destroying their 
property. For with all men, when they sulf'er an 
unwonted calamity, it is the sight set then and 
there before their eyes w hich makes them angry , 
and when they are angry they do not pause to think 
but rush into action. And the Athenians are even 
more likely than most men to act in this way, since 
they are more disposed to claim the right to rule 
over others and to attack and ravage their neigh - 
hours* land than to see their own ravaged. Real- 
ising, then, how powerful is the city against which 
you are taking the field, and how great is the fame, 
for better or for worse, which you are about to win 
for your ancestors and for yourselves from the out- 
come, follow wherever your officers lead you, 
regarding good order and vigilance as all-important, 
and sharply giving heed to the word of command ; 
for this is the fairest as well as the safest thing — for 



yap Tohe teal aacjyaXeararov ttoXXovs ovtcls evl 

XII. Tocravra eliraiv teal hiaXvcras tov f vXXo- 
yov 6 'ApxiSa/jLos yieXrjcriTTTrov irptorov air o a TeXXec 
e? ras 'A0tjva$ tov AiatepiTov, dvhpa ^Traprid- 
ri]i', el tl dpa fiaXkov evholev ol ' AOrjvaloi opejv- 

2 re? o~(f>a<; 7]drj ev ohw ovra<$. ol he ov Trpoaehe- 
%avro avrov e$ ttjv ttoXlv ov& iirl to tcoivov fjv 
yap TLepiKA.tov$ yvcofirj irporepov vevLKVjKvla tay 
pvfca teal irpeo-fieiav pu) he^ecrOai AatcehatfiovCcov 
i^earpaT6vp,€vwv. ciiroTrepirovaiv ovv avrov irpiv 
dtcovaai /cat eteeXevov cVto? opcov elvat avOii p.epov , 
to T6 Xoiirov avax^pv <TavTa<i ^ 7r * Ta c^^Tepa 
a\JTon>, i)V tl j3ov\wi>Tai, irpecrfievecrOaL. %vp,- 
Trepirovai T€ tgG ^Sl eX7ia lit it (p dyeoyovs, oVo)? 

3 /jLiyBevl £vyyevr)Tai. 6 8' iireiBrt i-ni tols opioid 
iyevero teal epieXXe hLaXvaecrOaL, Toaovhe slttcdv 
eiropevero otl ""Hhe 7) 7)pepa toi? "EXX^o-t peyd- 

4 Xwv teatecov dp^ei" oj? he dcf>iteeTO e'9 to o~TpaTo- 
irehov teal eyveo 6 'Ao%tSa/zo? cm ol ' 'AOrjvaioi 
ovhev ttco evScoaovo-LV, ovrw hi] a pas tw aTparco 

5 7rpovxa)p6i e'9 tiiv yrjv avTwv. Bo^cotoI he p,epo$ 
pev to a(peTepov teal toik; lirireas irapelxpvTo 
UeXoTrovi'Tjaiois ^vaTpareveiv, to?? he Xenro f.ievoi<; 
€9 TlXuTaiav eXOovTes tt)v yrjv ehtjovv. 

XIII. "Et* he TOiv YleXoTTOvv7iaioiv %vXXe'/op.e- 


BOOK II. xi. 9-xm. i 

a great, host, to show itself subject to a single d is 
c^ line." 

XII. With these words Archidamus dismissed ~tn"e 
assembly. He then first sent Melesippus son of 
Diocritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in the hope that 
the Athenians, when they saw that the Lace- 
daemonians were already on the march, might be 
somewhat more inclined to yield. But they did not 
allow him to enter the city, much less to appear 
before the assembly ; for a motion of Pericles had 
already been carried not to admit herald or embassy 
after the Lacedaemonians had once taken the field. 
They accordingly dismissed him without hearing 
him, and ordered him to be beyond their borders 
that same day ; and in future, they added, the Lace- 
daemonians must first withdraw to their own terri- 
tory before sending an embassy, if they had any 
communication to make. They also sent an escort 
along with Melesippus, in order to prevent his 
having communication with anyone. And when he 
arrived at the frontier and was about to leave his 
escort, he uttered these words before he went his 
way, "This day will be the beginning of great evils 
for the Hellenes." When he came to the army, 
and Archidamus had learned that the Athenians 
would not as yet make any concession, then at 
length they broke camp and advanced into Athenian 
territory. And the Boeotians not only supplied 
their contingent 1 and the cavalry to serve with the 
Peloponnesians, but also went to Plataea with their 
remaining troops and proceeded to ravage the 

XIII. While the Peloponnesian forces were still 
1 i.e. two-thirds of their full appointment ; cf. ch. x. 2. 




vcov re e? rbv laOfiov /cal ev 6Bo) ovrcov, irplv 
iaffaXelv e? rrjv 'Am/ajv, Uepi/cXrjs 6 'B.avOiir- 
itov, crrparTjybs top 'AOtjvcllcdv Be/caro<; avrcs, a>? 
eyvco rrjv ea/3oXijV eaop^ev^v, viroroTrrjo-a^, on 
* ApyiBapuOt avrcp f evos wv ervyyave, pur) iroXXd- 
tcis tj auro? IBia j3ov\6fievo<; yapi^eaQai tovs 
dypov? avrov irapaXiTTr) /cal pur] Brjdocrr}, tj /cal 
AafceSaifiovLcov /ceXevadvrcov iirl BiaftoXf) rfj 
eavrov yevrjrat rovro, coairep /cal rd dyr\ eXavveiv 
Trpoelirov eve/ca i/cetvov,, rrporjybpeve to£<? 'AOrjval- 
Oi? iv rfj eK/cXr/aia, on 'A/r^iSa/zo? fiev oi feVo? 
€lt], ov puevroi iirl kcucCo ye t?}? 7roXe&)? yevotro, 
T01/9 Be aypovs tou? eavrov /cal oltcia? f)v apa purj 
Bycocrcocriv ol iroXefiioi tooirep koX ra rQ>v aXXcovj 
afyirjo-iv avra BrjpLOcria elvai, ko\ pLrjBe/ulav oi 

2 viro^fiav Kara ravra yiyveaOai. irapyvei Be real 
irepl royv irapovrwv direp koX irpbrepov, irapa- 
cncevd^eaOaL re e? rbv TroXepiov /cal ra e/c roiv 
dypwv io-fco/jLL^ecrOai, e? t€ ^d^W p<r) eire^Levai, 
dXXa rrjv ttoXlv eaeXOovras cfrvXdcraeiv, /cal to 
vavrtKov, fjrrep layyovaiv, e^aprveadai, rd re rwv 
%v p.pbdywv Bid yeipb^ e^etv, Xeycov rrjv la^vv 
avrols drrb rovrcov elvai rwv y^pr\ixdr(jdv r?)? 
irpoGoBov} rd Be 7roXXd rov 7ro\e/.iov yvcopurj /cal 

3 xpi]p,drci)v irepiovGia KparelaOai. Oapaelv re 

1 raJy xp-qixaToov tj}s -npoaoSuv deleted by Hade, after van 


BOOK II. xm. 1-3 

collecting at the Isthmus and while they were on the 
march but had not yet invaded AtticajPericles son 
of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten"" AtKenian 
generals, when he realised that the invasion would be 
made, conceived a suspicion that perhaps Archi- 
damus, who happened to be a guest-friend of his, 
might pass by his fields and not lay them waste, doing 
this either on his own initiative, in the desire to do 
him a personal favour, or at the bidding of the Lace- 
daemonians with a view to creating a prejudice 
against him, just as it was on his account that they 
had called upon the Athenians to drive out the 
pollution. 1 So he announced to .the Athenians in 
their assembly that while Archidamus was indeed a 
guest-friend of his, this relationship had certainly 
not been entered upon for the detriment of the 
J state ; and that in case the enemy might not lay 
/ waste his fields and houses like the rest, he now gave 
them up to be public property, and asked that no 
suspicion should arise against himself on that account. 
And he gave them the same advice as before 2 about 
the present situation : that they should prepare for 
the war, should bring in their property from the 
fields, and should not go out to meet the enemy in 
battle, but should come into the city and there act 
on the defensive ; that they should equip their fleet, 
in which their strength lay, and keep a firm hand 
upon their allies, explaining that the Athenian power 
depended on revenue of money received from the 
allies, and that, as a general rule, victories in war 
were won by abundance of money as well as by wise 
policy. And he bade them be of good courage, as on 

1 cf. i. cxxvii. 1. 
8 cf. I. cxliii. 



e/ceXeve irpocnovTWv fiev e^aKoaiwv raXdvrcov &)? 

eVl TO TToXv (j)6pOV KCLT iviCLVTOV CL1TO TOOV tjUfl/jLCl- 

ywv rfj iroXei dvev tt?9 dXXr]<; irpocrohov, virap- 
yovrcov Be ev rfj aKpoiroXei en Tore apyvpiov 
€7Tia?]/j,ov e^aKia^iXicov raXdvrcov (ra yap 7rXei- 
ara r piaKOGixav diroSeovra fxvpia eyevero, dcj)' 
cov e? re rd irpoirvXaia tt}? dfcporroXetos teal raX- 
Xa ol/coBop.r/fiara teal e? II orelocuav aTravrjXcoOr]), 

4 yaypis Be y^pvoiov darjfiov tc%\ apyvpiov ev re 
dvaOrjfiaaip I&lols kclL Btjiaoctiols xal ocra lepd 
afceui) irepi re Tfl? Troyurra? /cal tou? dycovas real 
a/evXa XbjBi/cd real el re rotovrorpoirov, ovk 

5 eXdaaovos 1 r) irevraKoaicov TaXdvrcov. en Be 
teal rd etc rcov aXXoov leptov irpoaeriOei ^pi]p.ara 
ovk oXiya, 0Z9 -^p^aeaOai avrov<;, K.a\ rjp irdvu 
e^elpytovrai rrdvrcov, real avrrjs tt}? Oeov toZs 
Trepi/ceipevois xpvaiois' drrecpaive B' eyov to 
dyaXpua reaaapaKOvra rdXavra araO/ibv XP V ~ 
aiov direfyOov teal rrepiaiperov elvai dirav. XP 7 1~ 
aa/A6i>ov<; re eirl aconjpLa efa] \pr]vai fiif eXdcraco 

1 §v of the MSS., after i\da<rovos, deleted by Abresch. 

1 About £120,000, or §583,200. The original amount at 
the institution of the Confederacy of Delos was 460 talents 
(1. xevi. 2). The figure here given is an average amount, 
because the assessment was revised every four years at the 

These figures, and all other equivalents of Greek financial 
statements, are purely conventional, inasmuch as the purchas- 
ing power of money was then very much greater than now. 

- The ordinary revenue, apart from the tribute, consisted 
of customs duties, tax on sales, poll tax on resident aliens, 


BOOK II. xni. 


an average six hundred talents l of tribute were 
coming in yearly from the allies to the city, not 
counting the other sources 2 of revenue, and there 
were at this time still on hand in the Acropolis six 
thousand talents 3 of coined silver (the maximum 
amount had been nine thousand seven hundred 
talents, from which expenditures had been made for 
the construction of the Propylaea 4 of the Acropolis 
and other buildings, 5 as well as for the operations at 
Potidaea). Besides, there was uncoined gold and 
silver in public and private dedications, and all the 
sacred vessels used in the processions and games, and 
the Persian spoils and other treasures of like nature, 
worth not less than five hundred talents. 6 And he 
estimated, besides, the large amount of treasure to 
be found in the other temples. All this would 
be available for their use, and, if they should be 
absolutely cut off from all other resources, they 
might use even the gold plates with which the 
statue of the goddess herself was overlaid. 7 The 
statue, as he pointed out to them, contained forty 
talents' weight of pure gold, and it was all re- 
movable. 8 This treasure they might use for self- 
preservation, but they must replace as much as they 

rents of state property, especially the silver mines, court 
fees and tines. 
8 About £1,940,000, or $9,4'2S,400. 

4 Completed about 432 B.C. 

5 Such as the Parthenon, the Odeum, and the Telesterion 
at Eleusis (see Plut. Per. xiii.). 

6 About £100,000, or $486,000. 

7 The,chryselep]n»ncine statue of Athena by Phidias in the 

8 According to Plut. Per. xxxi., Phidias, by the advice of 
Pericles, laid on the gold in such a way that it could all be 
removed and weighed. 

28 5 


6 avriK(na<J7r)GCLi irdXiv. ^p-qpaat pev ovv ovrco 
iOdpavvev avrovs' birXira^ Be rpLa^iXiov^ /cal 
fivpiovs elvai dvev rcov iv to?? cppovpuois teal rcov 

7 irap eiraXfyv e^aKicrxcXLcov real fivpicov. rocrov- 
roi yap icfrvXaacrov rb irpcorov oirore 01 iroXepLioi 
icrftaXocev, drrb re rcov it pea fivrdr cov teal rcov 
vecordrcov teal pieroifccov octol birXlrav rjaav. rov 
T6 yap QaXrjpifcov Tet^ou? ardBtot rjcrav irevre 
teal TpLciKOvra irpbs rbv kvkXov rov aarecos /cal 
avrov rod kvkXov to (pvXacraofievov rpels zeal 
recrcrapaKOvra {ean Be avrov o /cat dcj)vXaKrov 
rjv, to pera^v rov re p,cucpov zeal rov QaXrjpucov), 
rd Be fia/cpa reixv TTpb<; rov Yleipaid reacrapd- 
Kovra araBicov, cov rb e^coOev errjpelro, teal rov 
Ueipaico<; %vv Mow^a e%>]fcovra fiev araBlcov 6 
aTTas irepifioXos, rb 5' ev cf>vXa/cf} bv i)piav rov- 

8 rov. iTTTreas Be direfyaive BiaKoaiov? /cal %iXlov<; 
%vv LTTiroro^brais, e^aKocTLOvs Be teal xiXiovs 
TofoVa?, teal Tpujpsi? ra? TrXcolpiovs rpiaKoaias. 

9 ravra yap virrjp^ev ^K6r)vaioi<; /cal ovk eXdaaco 
e/caara rovrcov, ore rj eVySoX?; to irpcorov epueXXe 
YleXoiTOvvrjcTLCov eaeaOai ko\ c? rbv rroXefiov KaOi- 
aravro. e'Aeye Be xal dXXa oldirep elcoOet Tiepi- 
kXi)s e? diroBet^LV rov irepiecreadat, rco vroXepco. 

XIV. Oi Be % A6rjvaloi dfcovaavres dveirelOovrb 
re /cal eaeKopi^ovro Ik rcov dypcov iralBa<; Kal 
7uraZ/ca? Kal rr)V dXXrjv fcaraaxevijv y tear ol/cov 


BOOK II. xm. 5-xiv. i 

took. As to their resources in money, then, he thus 
sought to encourage them ; and as to heavv-armed 
infantry, lie told them that there were thirteen 
thousand, not counting the sixteen thousand men 
who garrisoned the forts and manned the city walls. 
For this was the number engaged in garrison duty at 
first, when the enemy were invading Attica, and they 
were composed of the oldest and the youngest 1 
citizens and of such metics as were heavily armed. 
For the length of the Phalerian wall was thirty-five 
stadia to the circuit-wall of the city, and the portion 
of the circuit- wall itself which was guarded was forty- 
three stadia (a portion being left unguarded, that be- 
tween the Long Wall and the Phalerian) ; and the 
Long Walls to the Peiraeus were forty stadia in extent, 
of which only the outside one was guarded ; and the 
whole circuit of the Peiraeus including Munichia 
was sixty stadia, half of it being under guard. The 
cavalry, Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve 
hundred, including mounted archers, the bow-men. 
sixteen hundred, and the triremes that were sea- 
worthy three hundred. For these were the forces, 
and not less than these in each branch, which the 
Athenians had on hand when the first invasion of the 
Peloponnesians was impending and they found them- 
selves involved in the war. And Pericles used still 
other arguments, as was his wont, to prove that they 
would be victorious in the war. 

XIV. After the Athenians had heard his words 
they were won to his view, and they began to brin"- 
in from the fields their children and wives, and also 

1 The age limits were eighteen to sixty, those from 
eighteen to twent}' (ireplnobm) being called on only for gar- 
rison duty within the bounds of Attica. The age of full 
citizenship was twenty. 



evpwvTO, Kal aurwv rcov olklcjv KaOaipovvres rrjv 
gitXaxjiv 7rp6,Sara Be Kal viro^vyta e? rrjv Eu- 
fioLav Bieirepi-^ravTO Kal Ta? vr)aov<$ ra$ eiriKei- 
2 ftevas. ^aX-€7rco5 Be avTols Bed rb alei elwQevai 
tou? iroWovs iv rots a7/)ot? BiairdcrOai ?; dvd- 
GjacrLS eyiyvero. XV. %vve@e/3?]Kei Be curb rov 
irdvv apya'iov erepcov fiaWov ' Ad^vaiois tovto. 
eVl yap Ke«rpo7ro9 Kal rcov Trpcorcov ffaaiXeoov rj 
'Attikt) 6? Srjaea alei Kara 7roXet? wKelro irpv- 
raveld re i^ovcra^ Kal dpyovra^, Kal oirbre fitj 
tl Beiaeiav, ov ^vvfjcrav /3ov\evcr6/j.evoi a>? rov 
/3aai\ea, a\V avrol eKaaroi eiroXirevov Kal 
ifiovXevovro' Kal TLves Kal eiroXepiTiGdv irore au- 
Ttov, cocrirep Kal 'EXevcrtvioi fier Evpbb\irov irpbs 

2 'Epex^ea. eireiBi) Be @/?creu? efiaaiXevae, yevo- 
fievos fiera rov j-vverov Kal Bvvarbs rd re d\Xa 
SieKoo-fMrjae rrjv yozpav Kal KaraXvaa<; rcov dX- 
Xwv iroXewv rd re ftovXevri'ipia Kal ra<; «p%a? e? 
rrjv vvv itoXiv ovaav, ev (3ovXevr)]piov diroBei^as 
Kal TTpvraveiov, ^vvwKiae irdvra^, Kal vepLopevovs 
-rd avroiv eKaarovs direp Kal -rrpb rov SjvdyKaae 
pad iroXei ravrrj xPW@ aL > V dirdvTwv rjBr) %uv- 
reXovvrcov e? avTrjv /xeydXt] yevopievr] TrapeBoOr] 
virb @?7crea><? toZ? erreLra' Kal ^vvoiKia e£ eKeivov 
'Ad7]i>aloL en, Kal vvv rfj 6ew eopn)v BrjporeXi] 

3 To Be irpb rod i) aKpoiroXis t) vvv ovaa 7ro)u<> 

1 Others render : "since all were now counted as belonging 
to it." 


BOOK II. xiv. i-xv. 3 

their household furniture, pulling down even the 
woodwork of the houses themselves ; but sheep 
and draught-animals they sent over to Euboea and 
the adjacent islands. And the removal was a hard 
thing for them to accept, because most of them 
had always been used to live in the country. 
XV. And this kind of life had been the character- 
istic of the Athenians, more than of any other Hel- 
lenes, from the very earliest times. For in the time 
of Cecrops and the earliest kings down to Theseus, 
Attica had been divided into separate towns, each 
with its town hall and magistrates, and so long as 
they had nothing to fear they did not come together 
to consult with the king, but separately administered s 
their own affairs and took counsel for themselves. 
Sometimes they even made war upon the king, as, 
for example, the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did upon 
Erechtheus. But when Theseus became king and 
proved himself a powerful as well as a prudent ruler, 
lie not only re-organized the country in other respects, 
but abolished the councils and magistracies of the. 
minor towns and brought all their inhabitants into / 
union with what is now the city, establishing a single 
council and town hall, and compelled them, while con- 
tinuing to occupy each his own lands as before, to use 
Athens as the sole capital. This became a great city, 
since all were now paying their taxes to it^and was 
such when Theseus handed it down to his successors. 
And from his time even to this day the Athenians 
have celebrated at the public expense a festival 
called the Synoecia, 2 in honour of the goddess. 

Before this 3 what is now the Acropolis was the 

3 "Feast of the Union," celebrated on the sixteenth of the 
month Hecatombaeon. 

8 i.e. before the Synoecismus, or union of Attica under 



rjv, teal rb vtt avrr)v 727)09 vorov pbakiara rerpafi- 

4 fievov. reKpijpiov he- ra yap lepa iv avrfj rfj 
a/cpoiroXei Kal aXKcov decov ian, real ra efo> 
777)0? rovro rb fjuepos rrj<; iroXecos fxaWov ISpvrai, 


rb t?)? r?)? teal to toO * eV Aifivai? Atovvaov, (p 
ra apyaiorepa Aiovvaia rfj hcoheKarrj 2 iroielrat 
iv pLrjvl ' AvdeaTT] picbvL, axnrep Kal oi air * A6rj- 
vaicov "Ia)i>e? ert Kal vvv vop,i£ovaiv. 'ihpvrai he 

5 Kal aWa lepa ravrrj apxaia. Kal rfj Kprjvrj rfj 
vvv fiev rcov rvpdvvtov ovrcos crKevaadvrcov Ey- 
veaKpovvw Ka\ovjievrj, to Be irakau cpaveptov rcov 
rrrjycov ovacov KaWipporj covofiaajievrj eKelvoi Te 
iyyvs ovarj ra irXeicrrov a%ia expwvro, Kal vvv 
en airo rov apxaiov irpo re yapiKcov Kal e? aWa 

6 rcov iepcov vopi^erai tw vhan XP^1 (J ^ aL ' Kakelrai 
he hia rrjv iraXaiav ravrrj KaroUrjaLV Kal r) ciKpo- 
7roXi? ^XP l T0V & € ^ Tl V7r * * AQrjvaicov 7ro)U?. 

XVI. T77 o° ovv iirl iro\v Kara rrjv %<£pav 

avrovojicp oik/jcto, 3 oi 'AOrjvatoi, Kal iireihrj 

^vvcpKio-Orjaav, hia rb e#o? iv to?? aypols o/xa)? 

oi rrXeiovs rcov re apxaucov Kal rcov varepov 

1 Added by Cobet. 

* T?7 5w5e/caT7? deleted by Hude, after Torstrick. 
a fxiTf?xov, in the MSS. before oi "hd-qvaloi, deleted by 

1 It is taken for granted that these temples were ancient 


BOOK II. xv. 3-xvi. i 

city, together with the region at the foot of the 
Acropolis toward the south. And the proof of 
this is as follows : On the Acropolis itself are the 
sanctuaries 1 of the other gods as well as of Athena, 2 
and the sanctuaries which are outside the Acro- 
polis are situated more in that quarter of the city, 
namely those of Olympian Zeus, of Pythian Apollo, 
of Earth, and of Dionysus in Limnae, in whose 
honour are celebrated the more ancient Dionysia 3 
the twelfth of the month Anthesterion, just as the 
Ionian descendants of the Athenians also are wont 
even now to celebrate it. In that quarter are also 
situated still other ancient sanctuaries. And the 
fountain now called Enneacrunus, 4 from the fashion 
given it by the tyrants, but which anciently, when 
the springs were uncovered, was named Callirrhoe, was 
used by people of those days, because it was close by, 
for the most important ceremonials ; and even now, 
in accordance with the ancient practice, it is still 
customary to use its waters in the rites preliminary 
to marriages and other sacred ceremonies. And, 
finally, the Acropolis, because the Athenians had ♦ 
there in early times a place of habitation, is still to 
this day called by them Polis or city. 

XVI. Because, then, of their long-continued life of 
independence in the country districts, most of the 
Athenians of early times and of their descendants 
down to the time of this war, from force of habit, 
even after their political union with the city, continued 

2 A lacuna in the text is generally assumed; Classen would 
supply Kal to. ttjs 'A6r]i'as after dewv eV-ri, and I translate this. 

" The Anthesteria, contrasted with the Lenaea, which was 
also an ancient festival, hut of less anticpiiity. The city 
Dionysia was of comparatively recent origin. 

4 Enneacrunus, Nine Conduits ; Callirrhoe, Fair Stream. 



(lexpi* TovSe rod iroXe/JLOV iravoitcrjaia 1 yevofievoi 
re teal olfajaavres, ov paBloo? ras dvaardcreis 
€7tolovvto, aXXcos re kcl\ dpri dveiXijcpores ra<; 
2 fcaracrfcevds fierd rd Mrjhued* e/3apvvoi'To Se real 
XaXeircbs e$epov olklck; re KciTaXe'nrovTes /cal 
tepd a Sid iravrbs rjv avroh Ik ttJ? Kara to 
dpxaiov 7ro\tT€ta? iraTpta, hiatrdv re /jLeXXovre? 
/jLera/3dXXetv real ovoev dXXo r) ttoXlv rrjv avrou 
dTroXeiTrcov etcacnos. 

XVII. 'E-JTeiSr] Se depiKovro is to darv, oXiyois 
ixkv tig iv V7rrjpx° v oltcrjaeis koli irapa cf^Xcov tlvcls 
i) olfcelcov Karac^vyy], ol he ttoXXoI ra re iprjfia 
t>}? 7roXea>? Q)Kr]crav real rd tepd /ecu ra rjpwa 
iravjci irXriv t?}? aKpoiroXecos kclL tov 'EXevaiviov 
teal el re dXko (3e/3aL(o<; fcXycrrbv r)v to re 
YleXapyifcbv 2 KaXovfievov to v-tto rr)v d/cpoTroXcv, 
o Kai eirdparov re rjv p,r) ol/celv teal tl kcu Uv6i- 
kov fiavTeiov d/cporeXevriov roiov&e SieKojXve, 
Xeyov a)? " To UeXapyi/cbv dpybv d/ieivov" opws 
2 vtto Tr)s Trapaxprjfia avdy/cr}? e^cpKi)0rj. tcca fioi 
hotel to fiavreiov rovvavrlov jjufjL@fjvai rj irpoae- 
§ex ovTO > °v y^P ^ T *) v rjTa P ( - lvo \ xov ivolfcrjaiv at 
j~v/jL<j)opal yeveaOai rfj TroXei, dXXa Bid rbv iroXe- 

1 iravoiK-nala. placed by Hude, following Lipsius, after 

2 With C and a popular decree found in 18S0 (C.I.A., iv. 
27 b) ; the other MSS. Ilc\a<rytK6v. 


BOOK II. xvi. i-xvii. 2 

to reside, with their households, in the country where 
they had been born ; and so they did not find it easy 
to move away, especially since they had only recently 
finished restoring their establishments after the 
Persian war. They were dejected and aggrieved at 
having to leave their homes and the temples which 
had always been theirs, — relics, inherited from their 
fathers, of their original form of government — and at 
the prospect of changing their mode of life, and 
facing what was nothing less for each of them than 
forsaking his own town. 

XVII. And when they came to the capital, only a 
few of them were provided with dwellings or places 
of refuge with friends or relatives, and most of them 
took up their abode in the vacant places of the city 
and the sanctuaries and the shrines of heroes, all 
except the Acropolis and the Eleusinium and any 
other precinct that could be securely closed. And 
the Pelargicum, 1 as it was called, at the foot of the 
Acropolis, although it was under a curse that forbade 
its use for residence, and this was also prohibited by 
a verse-end of a Pythian oracle to the following 
effect : 

"The Pelargicum unoccupied is better," 

nevertheless under s'ress of the emergency was com- 
pletely filled with buildings. Anct the oracle, as it 
seems to me, came true, * but in a s ense quite the 
opposite of what was expected ; for it was Hot on 
account of the unlawful occupation of the place that 
the city was visited by the calamities, but it was on 

1 A fortification built by the " Pelasgians " on the west 
side of the Acropolis, the only side accessible to an enemy. 
It was to the space below and above this fortification that 
the curse attached. 

2 93 


fiov rj avdyter) ttJ? ol/cyjaecos, ov ov/c ovofid&v rb 
pavrelov TrporjBei /Mr) eir dyad(o iroie avro kcltol- 

3 KMT0r)cr6/j.evov. KaTea/cevdaavro Be teal ev rols 
irvpyois tcov rei^cov itoWoX koX &)? e/caaros: irov 
iBvvaro' ov yap eydip^ae ^vve\66vra<; avrov? ?/ 
7roXi?, aXX' varepov Br) rd re fia/cpa reixv 
aj/crjcrav Karavei/jLa/ievot kcli tov Tletpaioos rd 

4 TToWd. dpa Be /ecu rebv 77/30? tov iroXe/JLOv 

TJ7TT0VT0, ^Vpbpbd^OV^ TG dyelpOVTe? KOLl TYj IleXo- 

5 Trovvr]<T(p ifcarbv vecov iiriTrXovv i^aprvovres ical 
01 fiev ev tovtg) Trapaa/cevrjs ycrav. 

XVIII. f O Be aTparbs tcjv YleXoirovvrjaicov 
irpolaov d(j)LKero rf)<; 'Att^?]? e? Olvorjv 7rpcorov, 
fjirep efieWov eaftaXeiv. teal G09 e/caOe^ovTO, 
TTpocr{3o\ds jrapeo'/ceud^ovro tw reiyei Tronjao- 

2 fievoi pur)yaval^ re /cal aXXco rpbirw' r) yap Olvorj 
ovaa ev peOopiois t?}? *Att*«^9 teal Boicorlas 
eTereixLo-TO teal avrQ> cppovplro ol 'A0)]va?.ot 
€)(pcovro 07T0T6 iroXefio^ icaTaXdftoi. ra? re ovv 
TrpoafioXas ^vrpeiri^ovTO teal aXXa>9 evBierpi\jsav 

3 xpbvov irepl avrijv. alrlav Be ov/c ika"XpJTqv 
Wp)(iBapo<; eXaftev air avrov, Bo/ccov teal ev rfj 
fjvvaywyfj tov 7roXep,ov p,aXa/cb<> elvai teal tols 
'AOrjvaiois e7U7}]Beio<;, ov napaivoiv irpoOvymys 
iroXefielv eireiB)) re ^vveXeyero 6 arparo^, ?; re 
ev ray laO/xy lirium>r\ yevopevrj teal /card ttjv 

1 cf. 1. lxxx.-lxxxv. 


BOOK II. xvii. 2-xvm. 3 

account of the war that there was the necessity of its 
occupation, and the oracle, although it did not men- 
tion the war, yet foresaw that the place would never 
be occupied for any good. Many also established 
"lemselves in the towers of the city walls, and where- 
ever each one could find a place ; for the city did 
not have room for them when they were all there 
together. But afterwards they distributed into lots 
and occupied the space between the Long- Walls and 
the greater part of the Peiraeus. And while all 
this was going on, the Athenians applied themselves 
; to the war, bringing together allies and fitting out 
an expedition of one hundred ships against the 
Peloponnesus. The Athenians then, were in this 
stage of their preparations. 

XVIII. Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians 
was ady^ ncing^ and the first point it reached in Attica 
was Oenoe, where they intended to begin the ' 
invasion." And while they were establishing their 
camp there, they prepared to assault the wall with 
engines and otherwise ; for Oenoe, which was on the 
border between Attica and Boeotia, was a walled 
town, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians 
whenever war broke out. So the Lacedaemonians 
went on with their preparations to assault the place, 
and in this and other ways wasted time. And it was for 
his conduct here that Archidamus was most severely 
censured, though it was thought that in the levying 
of the war, too, he had been slack and had played 
into the hands of the Athenians when he did not 
advise the Peloponnesians to make war with vigour. 1 
Again, when the army was being collected, he was 
criticized for the delay which occurred at the 
Isthmus, and afterwards for the leisurely way in 



aXXrjv iropeiav rj a^oXaiorr)^ htefiaXev avrov, 

4 ixaktara he // ev rf} Olvor] eVtV^eo-^. oi yap 
* AOyvalot icrexo/jLi^ovTO ev tw xpoixp tovtoj, real 
ehoKOW oi UeXoTrovvijcrioL eireXObvTe? dv hid rd- 
%ou9 ^rdvia €ri €<;(D KaraXa(3elv, el /at) hid rr)v 

5 i/cetvov p.eXXrjaiv. ev roiavrrj p,ev opyfj 6 arparb<; 
top ^ApxiSctfiov ev rf) fcaOeSpa el^ev. 6 he, irpoa- 
8e-%6pevo<;, co? Xeyerai, rovs WOrjvalovs rrj<; yr)<; 
en a/cepalov ovarjs evhcocreiv ri teal KaroKV7]creiv 
irepuhelv avrrjv TfjaiOelaav, avelyev. 

XIX. 'JLireihr] ixevroi TrpoaftaXovTes rfj Olvor] 
Kal iraaav Iheav Treipdaavre^ ovtc ehvvavro eXeiv, 
o'i re 'AOrjvaloi ovhev eirefcripvKevovTO, ovtco hrj 
6pfJLr]aavre<; air avrrj<; ixera, ra ev TlXaraia 1 
yevbpueva i)p.epa byhorjKoaif] fidXiara, 6epovs Kal 
rod ctltov aKjJLci^ovTOs, eaefiaXov e'9 ttjv 'Attiktjv 
iiyelro he \\pxlhap,o<; 6 Zevgihapiov, AaKehai- 

2 /jlovlcov /3ao-iXevs. /cal KaOetopbevoi erep,vov irpo)- 
7ov fiev 'EXevaiva Kal to Sptdaiov irehiov teal 
rpoTnjv riva rebv 'AOrjvaicov iirirecov irepl robs 
'FeLTOhS KaXov/ievov? irroiyjcravTO' eireira irpov- 
yjjapovv ev he^ia exovres rb AlydXecov 0/009 Sid 
Kpft)7Tia9 £&)9 depLKOvro 69 'A^a/3^a9, xooplov f 1 ^' 
yiaiov t?)9 ^ At i ik )}s rebv hijpicov KaXovpuevcov, Kal 
KaOe^opuevot e'9 avrbv arparoTTehov re eironiaavTO 
Xpbvov re iroXvv epLfieivavre^ erepivov. 

XX. Tvaof-irj he roiahe Xeyerai rbv ^Apx^hapLOv 

1 Tie e<re\8ovTu>v <dr\$aloov , ill the MSS. after U\aTai<f, 
deleted by Classen. 


BOOK II. xviii. 3-xx. i 

which the march was made, but most of all for the 
halt at Oenoe. For in the interval the Athenians 
continued to bring their property into the city and 
the Peloponnesians believed that but for his pro- 
crastination they could have advanced quickly and 
found everything still outside. Such was the re- 
sentment felt by the army toward Archidamus while 
they were sitting still. But the reason, it is said, 
why he kept holding back was that he expected the 
Athenians would make some concession while their 
territory was still unravaged and would be loath to 
see it laid waste. 

XIX. When, however, after assaulting Oenoe 
and trying in every way to take it they were not able 
to do so, the Athenians meanwhile making no over- 
tures, then at length they set off from there, about 
eighty days after the events at Plataea, when it was 
midsummer 1 and the corn was ripe, and invaded 
Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of 
Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. Making 
a halt they proceeded to ravage, first of all, the 
territory of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and 
they routed the Athenian cavalry near the streams 
called Rheiti ; then they advanced, keeping Mount 
Aegaleos on their right through Cropia,- until they 
came to Acharnae, the largest of the denies of Attica, 
as they are called. Halting in the town they made 
a camp, where they remained for a long time ravaging 
the country. 

XX. And it is said that the motive of Archidamus 

1 The reference is to the Attic summer, which included 
spring. The date was about the end of May, the average 
time for cutting grain in Attica. 

8 A deme between Aegaleos and Parnea. 

VOL. I. L 


rrepl re ra<; y A^apva^ a>9 e? fid^iv ra^d/ievov 
fietvat Kal e'9 to TreSlov etce'ivy rfj eafioXf) ov kcltci- 

2 (Brjvar tou? yap ' Adyjvalov^ ifXin^ev, dfCfjLd^ovrd<; 
re veorijTL ttoXXjj xa\ irapea Kevacrpievov^ e'9 7roXe- 
^oz; gj9 ovttm rrporepov, uro)9 av eTreJ-eXOelv Kal 

3 t?)z> 77}^ ovk ai> irepuSelv TfirjOrjvai. iireiSi] ovv 
avrw €9 ^EXevalva Kal to &pidcnov irehlov ovk 
dir^vrrjaav, irelpav iiroLetro irepl rd<; ^A^apva^ 

4 Ka8)]fi€vo<; el eir^laaiv ci/xa fiev yap avrw 6 
%6joo9 eTTLTi'iheios ecpauvero evo~TpaToirehevaai, d/ia 
Se teal ol 'A^apv^s pt,eya fiepos ovres ttjs iroXews 
(rpio-%L\ioi yap oirXlrai eyevovTo) ov ireptoy^reaOat 
e&ofcovv rd ac^erepa StacfrOapevra, dXX' oppuy^creiv 
Kal tou9 iravTas e'9 fxd^v. el re real firj eVef- 
eXOotev etceivr) rfj eaftoXfi ol 'AOrjvaloi, dSe- 
earepov ijSrj €9 to varepov to Te irehlov repbelv 
Kal €9 avTr/v ttjv iroXiv x a) PW eo ~@ ar toi>9 yap 
' A^a pveas eo-Teprj/Aevovs tcov afyeTepwv ov^ olio'uos 
TrpoOvfiovs eaeo-Qai iiirep T779 tcov aXXcov klvBv- 

5 veveiv, a-Tacnv 6° evecreaOai tt} yvcofirj. TOiavTy 
fiev Siavola 6 'Apxltafios irepl t<Z9 ' A^apvds rjv. 

XXI. ' AOrjvalot Be fie^pt fiev ov irepl 'EXevaiva 
Kal to Qpidaiov irehiov 6 o"t/?oto9 yv Kal Tiva 
eXirlha elyov e'9 to eyyvTCpm avrov<; fir) irpo'ievai, 
fiefivrffievoi Kal TlXetaTodvaKra top Ylavaavlov 
AaKehaifioviwv f3ao-i\ea, oVe eafiaXcov tj/9 'AfrTi- 
«r)9 €9 'EXevaiva Kal Spicb^e aTpaTto UeXoirov- 
vrjalcov irpb TovSe tov iroXefiov TeacrapaL Kal SeKa 
ereaiv dveydiprjae irdXiv e'9 to irXeov ovkItl 


BOOK II. xx. i-xxi. i 

in waiting about Acharnae with his troops ready for 
battle, instead of descending into the plain during 
this invasion, was as follows: He cherished the 
hope that the Athenians, who were at their very best 
as regards the multitude of their youth and prepared 
for war as never before, would perhaps come out 
against him and not look on and see their land 
ravaged. So when they did not come to meet him 
at Eleusis and in the Thriasian plain, he settled 
down in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, to make a 
test whether they would come out ; for not only did 
that seem to him a suitable place for his camp, but 
also the Acharnians were an important part of the 
state, their hoplites numbering three thousand, and 
he thought that they w r ould not look on and see their 
fields ravaged, but would urge the whole people 
also to fight. And even if the Athenians should not 
come out against him during this invasion, he would 
thenceforward proceed with less apprehension to 
ravage the plain and even advance to the very walls 
of the city ; for the Acharnians, once stripped of 
their own possessions, would not be as eager to incur 
danger as before in behalf of the lands of the rest, 
and so a division would arise in the counsels of the 
Athenians. It was with this design that Archidamus 
stayed at Acharnae. 

XXI. Now so long as the Peloponnesian army 
remained in the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the 
Thriasian plain, the Athenians retained hope that they 
would not advance nearer; for they remembered that 
Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedae- 
monians, when fourteen years before this war he had 
invaded Attica with an army of Peloponnesians and 
proceeded as far as Eleusis and Thria, had advanced 



7rpoe\6a)V (6Y b Bjj /cal r) (f)vyrj avra> eyevero i/c 
^irdprr]^ Bb^avrt ^pi'i/iaac TreiaOrjvai rrjv dvayu>- 

2 pr\crivy eireiBi) Be nrepl J A^apva<; elBov rbv arparbv 
e£i]/covra araBlov^ rfj<; 7roAe&)? dire)(Ovra, ovtceri 
avaayeiov errotovvro, a\X clvtols, go? el/cos, 77)9 
repbvofxevr]^ ev ru> ifupavel, ovttco eopd/cecrav ol 
ye vecorepot, ovB' ol rrpeaftvrepoi tt\ : i]v rd Mrj- 
hixa, Beivbv e^auvero kcli eBo/cec rois re a,\\oi? 
/cal fiaXiara rfj veorrjri eire^ievai /cal jjlt) irepi- 

3 opdv. /card %vo~rdo~ei<; re yiyvofievoi ev iroWfj 
epiBc Tfaav, ol jiev /ceXevovres eire^ievai, ol Be nves 
ov/c euivres. ^pijo-fxoXuyoi re fjBov ^prjafiov^ 
iravroiov^, Oiv d/cpodadai &)? e/cacrros cop/xyro. 1 
o'i re * \yapvr)<s olbjxevoi irapa afyiGLV avrols ov/c 
e\ax^rr]v fiolpav elvai \\6rivaLwv, a>? avrcov r) 
yr) erefiverOy ivrjyov rr)v e^oBov fidXtara. rravrl 
re rpoirw dvrjpiOiaro r) ttoXls /cal rbv Uepc/cXea 
ev bpyfj elyov, /cal wv irapyveae irpbrepov ip,e- 
/xv7]vro ovBev, aXV e/cd/ci£ov on o~rpari]ybs wv ov/c 
erre^dyoi, aXribv re acjylaiv evbya^ov irdvrcov o)v 

XXII. Uepi/cXr}$ Be bposv /iev avrovs TTpbs 
to irapbv xaXe7raLV0vra<; /cal ov ra dpiara (f)po- 
vovvras, iriarevcov Be 6p0co<; yiyvoocr/ceiv irepl rod 
jjlt] iire^Levai, e/c/cX^alav re ov/c eirolei avrcov ovBe 
^vXXoyov ovBeva, rod fir) opyf} re fidXXov r) yvcofiy 
jjvveXdovras e^a/iapretv, n)v re ttoXiv icpvXacrae 

1 , ft*ith CEG ; & prn ro ABM. 

BOOK II. xxi. i-xxii. i 

no farther but had gone back again. (And indeed this 
was the cause of his banishment from Sparta, since 
he was thought to have been bribed to retreat.) But 
when they saw the army in the neighbourhood of 
Acharnae, only sixty stadia from the city, they thought 
the situation no longer tolerable ; on the contrary, it 
naturally appeared to them a terrible thing when their 
land was being ravaged before their eyes, a sight 
which the younger men had never seen, or even the 
older men except in the Persian war ; and the general 
opinion, especially on the part of the younger men, 
was that they ought to go forth and put a stop to it. 
They gathered in knots and engaged in hot disputes, 
some urging that they should go out, others opposing 
this course. Oracle-mongers were chanting oracles 
of every import, according as each man was disposed 
to hear them. And the Acharnians, thinking that 
no insignificant portion of the Athenian people lived 
at Acharnae, insisted most of all upon going out, as 
it was their land that was being devastated. Thus 
in every way the city w r as in a state of irritation ; and 
they were indignant against Pericles, and remember- 
ing none of his earlier warnings they abused him 
because, though their general, he would not lead 
them out, and considered him responsible for all 
their sufferings. 

XXII. Pericles, however, seeing them exasperated 
at the present moment and that their iatentions 
were not for the best, and convinced that his 
judgment was right about refusing to go out, would 
not convoke a meeting of the assembly or any 
gathering whatever, for fear that if they got to- 
gether there would be an outbreak of passion 
without judgment that would end in some serious 



/cal hi rjavxias fiaXtcna oaov ihvvaro efyev. 

2 linrias fiivroi e^iireijorev alel rod firj TTpohpopuovs 

CL1T0 T?}? GTpCLTLCLS io"KlTTTOVTa<$ 6? TOU? dypOVS 

Tou? iyyi><; tt}? iroXecos /ca/covpyelv /cal Itttto- 
pLdylcL ns iyivero (Spa-%ela iv <&puyloi<; rcov re 
Adi^valcov re\ei evl tcov lirrricov /cal ©ecrcra/Voi? avrcov rrpos tovs TSoicorcov iirTreas, iv y, 
ovk ekacraov eayov ol 'Adrjvaioi kcli ©ecra-aXot 
p-iXP 1 °v 7r P oa ftorjd )]advrwv rots Bota)TOt? rcov 
oitXitcov rpojrr) iyivero avrcov zeal diriOavov rcov 
©eaaaXcov teal * AOqvaicov ov 7ToXXol, dveiXovro 
/xevTOi avrovs avOrj/nepov dairovhovs. /cal ol 
UeXoTTOWijcrioi Tpoiralov rjj varrepaLa earrjaav. 

3 rj he florjOeLa avry tcov SecrcraSXcov Kara to 
iraXaiov ^v/x/iaxiKOV iyivero Tot? 'Adrjvalois, teal 
dcj>LKOvro irap avrovs Aapiaaloi, QapcrdXiot,, 1 
KpavvcovtOL, livpdaiot, TvprcovtOL, Qepaloi. 
rjyovvro he avrcov etc fiev Aaptcrrjs TloXv [irjhri^ 
/cat WpLcrrovovs, diro t>}? ardaeco<; ercdrepos, ire 
he <£>apadXov Mivcov r)aav he Kal rcov ciXXcov 
Kara iroXeis ap^ovres. 

XXIII. Oi he TleXoTT ovinia lo i, iirethrj ovk 
eire^fjaav avrol? ol ' AOrjvaloi e? jid^v , dpavres 
iic rcov 'A^a/waw ihyovv tcov hi'i/Jicov nva<; aXXov<; 
rcov /xera^v Tldpvr)6o<$ /cal JSpiXrjcrcTov opovs. 
2 ovrcov he avrcov iv ry yfj ol Adrjvaloc aTzeareiXav 
to.? e/carbv vavs rrepl TleXoirovv^aov dairep 
Trapea/cevd^ovro /cal ^tXtov? 07r\i/ra? eV avrcov 

1 napacrtoi, in MSS. after $apad\ioi, deleted by Heringa. 

BOOK II. xxii. i-xxiii. 2 

mistake ; moreover he guarded the city, and as far 
as he could kept it free from disturbances. He 
did, however, constantly send out detachments of 
cavalry to prevent flying parties from the main army 
from raiding the fields near the city and ravaging 
them ; and there was a cavalry skirmish at Phrygia 
between a company of Athenian horsemen, assisted 
by some Thessalians, and the Boeotian cavalry, in 
which the Athenians and Thessalians fully held their 
own, until their heavy infantry came to the support 
of the Boeotians, when they were routed. A few of 
the Thessalians and the Athenians were killed, but 
their bodies were recovered the same day without a 
truce ; and on the next day the Peloponnesians set up 
a trophy. This auxiliary force of the Thessalians was 
sent to the Athenians in accordance with an ancient 
alliance, 1 and those who came were Larisaeans, 
Pharsalians, Crannonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and 
Pheraeans. And their leaders were, from Larissa, 
Polymedes and Aristonous, each representing his own 
faction, and from Pharsalus Menon ; and the others 
had their own commander city by city. 

XXIII. The Peloponesians, on the other hand, 
when the Athenians did not come out to do battle 
with them broke up their camp at Acharnae and 
ravaged some of the demes which lie between Mt. 
Parnes and Mt. Brilessus.'- But while they were 
still in their territory the Athenians sent out on 
an expedition round the Peloponnesus the hundred 
ships 3 which they had been equipping, and on 

1 cf. i. cii. 4. 

2 More generally known as Pentelicus, so called from the 
deme Pentele on its southern slope. 

a cf ch. xvii. 4. 



Kal rotjoras rerpaKoatov^- iarparrjyet Be Kap- 

Ktl'OS T€ 6 "BeVOTipOU Kal HpCDTeaS E7T£/cXeOL'9 

3 Kal S(OKpdTr)<; 6 'Avrtyevovs. /cat oi ptev apavres 
tt) irapaaKevf} ravrrj irepteTrXeov, oi Be IleXo- 
irovvrjatot y^povov eptptetvavres iv rrj 'Attikt) oaov 
6lx ov Ta iTTtrrf&eia aveyu>pr)Gav Bid Botcortuv, ovy 
yirep iaeftaXov iraptovTes Be 'Clpwirbv rr)v <yr)v 
rr)v YpatKTjV fcaXov/jtevrjv, r)v veptovrat ^Clpwirtot 
'AOrjvaicov viri]Koot, eBrjwaav. a^LKopuevot Be e'<? 
UeXoTTovvrjcrov BteXvdr^aav /caret iroXets eKaarot. 
XXIV. 'AvaxtepyGavTwv Be avrcov oi WOrj- 
valot (pv\a/ca<; Karearrjcravro Kara yrjv Kal Kara 
6dXao~o~av, axnrep Br) e/xeXXov Bid iravTos rod 
TToXe/jiov (j)v\d^etv Kal ytXta rdXavra diro tcov 
iv rfj d/cpoiroXet yprjixdrcov eBol~ev avrots igatpera 
7TOtr)aa/jtevot<; %&>/?£? OeaOat Kal ptr) dvaXovv, aXX 
airb rcov aXXwv TToXeptelv r)v Be T£? eXirrj r) eirt- 
yp-Tjcfriar) Ktvelv ra xptj/jtara ravra e? aXXo rt, 
r)v ptr) oi iroXe/jtiot vrjiry arparcp iTrtirXewai rfj 
TroXet Kal Bey dixvvaaOai, Odvarov fy/xiav iire- 

2 Oevro. TptJjpets re fier avrcov e^atperovs eirotr)- 
aavro Kara top ivtavrbv eKarov ra? /3eXj terras 
Kal rptiipdpypvs avrats, wv ptr) -)(^pr]aOat pti]Be/ita 
e'9 aXXo rt r) iiera rcov yjn]paTwv irepl rou avrov 
KtvBvvov, r)v Bey. 

1 Named after the ancient town of Tpala (Horn. B 498). 

BOOK II. xxm. 2-xxiv. 2 

them a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers ; 
and the generals in command were Carcinus son of 
Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son 
of Antigenes. So they set sail with this force and 
began their cruise ; the Peloponnesians, on the other 
hand, remained in Attica for as long a time as they 
were provisioned and then withdrew through Boeotia, 
taking a different route from that by which they had 
entered Attica. They passed by Oropus and laid 
waste the district called Graice, 1 which the Oropians 
occupy as subjects of the Athenians. 2 Then on their 
return to the Peloponnesus they were dismissed to 
their several cities. 

XXIV. After the retreat of the Lacedaemonians, 
the Athenians set guards to keep watch both by land 
and sea, their purpose being to maintain a like guard 
throughout the war. They decided also to set apart 
one thousand talents 3 of the money stored on the 
Acropolis as a special reserve fund, and not to 
spend it, but to use the rest to carry on the war ; 
and if anyone should make or put to vote a pro- 
posal to touch this money except in the one case 
that the enemy should attack the city with a fleet 
and they should have to defend it, death was to be 
the penalty. And along with this sum of money 
they set apart for special service each year one 
hundred of the very best triremes, appointing 
trierarchs to command them, and no one of these 
ships was to be used in any other way than in connec- 
tion with this particular fund in dealing with the 
same danger should the emergency arise. 

2 This was written before 412/11, when Oropus was cap- 
tured by the Boeotians. 

3 About £200,000, or $972,000. This was part of the 
6,000 taleuts stored on the Acropolis (ch. xiii. 3). 



XXV. 01 8' ev rals e/carbv vavcri irepl IleXo- 
TTOvvtjGov 'A6)]valoi /cal Kep/cvpalot /ner avrcov 
7T€VT7]/covTa vavcri TTpoo-ftei3or)6r)ic6T6<; /cal aXkoi 
rives rcjv i/cel %vp/xd%ojv aXka re i/cd/covv irepi- 
rrXeovres /cal e? We6d>vr)v t§s Aa/ccovi/crj<; airo- 
ftdvres tw reiyei 7rpocrif3a\ov, ovri daOevel /cal 

2 dvOpdiirwv ov/c ivovrcov. eVin^e 8e irepl rovs 
Xojpovs tovtovs Bpacrtoa? o Te\\t8o9, dviip 
^TTapTLarrjs, (f>povpdv eywv, /cal aio~66p,evo<; eftorj- 
Qei rot? ev r<p ^copuo p,erd ottXltcjv e/carov. 
SiaSpaficbv Be to tcov 'Adrjvalcov arparoTrehov, 
ea/ceSaapevov Kara rrjv yozpav /cal 7T/0O? to rel^o^ 
rerpapLpievov, eairiirjeb e? rrjv 7tyle0(ov7]v /cal oXl- 
yovs Tivas ev rfj eo~6pop,f) diroXeaa^ rcov p,e6* 


rod To\pii]paTO<; 7rpcorou rcov Kara, rbv irbXepov 

3 eirrjveOri ev ^irdprri. ol he ' 'A07]valoL dpavre? 
irapeirXeov, /cal a^ovres tt}<; 'HXeias €? <£>eiav 
ehrjovv rr)v yrjv eirl hvo rjpLepas /cal Trpocr/3or)0?]- 
aavras rcov etc t?}? kolXtjs "H?uSo? rpia/coaiovs 
Xoyd&as /cal row avrodev e/c tt)? TrepiOL/clSos 

4 'klXelcov p,d-)(r) e/epdrrjaav. dvepov Be Kariovros 
pueydXov yeipa^bpievoi ev dXcfxevw yo&pup, ol pXv 
ttoXXoI eire^ijaav eirl Ta? vav<; /cal TrepieirXeov 
rbv ''XyOvv /caXovp,evov ri]v atcpav e? rbv ev rfj 
<£>eia Xipeva, ol Se Meao-rfvioi ev rovrcp /cal aXXoi 
rives, ol ov hvvdpevob eTTi^?]vai, Kara yr)v %«/};;- 

5 aavres riiv Qeidv alpovaiv. /cal varepov aX re 
vrjes TrepiTrXeuaaaac dvaXapi(Sdvovaiv avrov? /cal 
e^avdyovrai e/cXelirovres tpetdv, ical rcov 'HAetW 
7) 7roWi] )]Bt] crrparid irpoael3e/3oi]6i]KeL t irapa- 


BOOK II. xxv. 1-5 

XXV. Meanwhile the Athenians who had been 
despatched in the hundred ships around the Pelopon- 
nesus, together with the Corey raeans, who had rein- 
forced them with fifty ships, and some of their other 
allies in that quarter, were pillaging various places as 
they cruised about, and in particular disembarked at 
Methone in JLaconia and assaulted its walls, which / 
were weak, and without adequate defenders. But/ 
Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in 
that neighbourhood with a guarding party, and 
seeing the situation he set out with one hundred hop-/ 
lites to relieve the garrison. Dashing through the 
army of the Athenians, which was scattered over the 
country and was occupied solely with the fortress, he 
threw his force into Methone, losing a few of his men 
in the rush, and thus saved the city. '"This daring 
exploit, the first of the kind in the war, was acknow- 
ledged at Sparta by a vote of thanks. The Athenians 
then weighed anchor and continued their cruise along 
the coast, and putting in at Pheia in Elis ravaged the 
land for two days, defeating in battle a rescue-party 
of three hundred picked men gathered from the low- 
lands of Elis and from the immediate neighbourhood 
of Pheia. But a heavy gale of wind arose, and since 
they were exposed to the storm in a harbourless 
region, most of them embarked on their ships and 
sailed round the promontory called Ichthys into the 
harbour at Pheia. Meanwhile the Messenians and 
some others, who could not get on board, marched 
overland and took Pheia. Afterwards, when the 
fleet had rounded the promontory, it took up thesrf 
men, abandoned Pheia, and put out to sea, for mean- 
while the main body of the Eleans had come to the 
rescue. The Athenians now resumed their voyage 



7r\evaavT€<; Be ol 'AOijvaioi eVt aXXa ywpia 

XXVI. Ttto Be rov avrbv y^povov tovtov 
1 'A6y]valoL rpid/eovra mu? e^eirefx^rav irepl ry)v 
AoicpiBa teal l Eu/3ota? tifia cfrvXa/ajv earpaTijyet 
Be avrcov KXeo7royLt7ro? 6 KXewLOv. teal airo- 
fidcreis TTOir)aa\±evo<$ t?)? re irapaOaXacraiov eariv 
a ihrjwae teal Spoviov elXev, 6fJbi]pov$ re eXaftev 
avrcov, teal ev ^AXoirrj rovs j3or]0)]o-avTa<i Ao/epcov 
fJ-dxy e/epdrrjaev. 

XXVII. 'Avecrrrjaav Be teal AlyivtJTas tQ> avrw 
depei Tovrcp e£ AlyLvr)*; AOrjvaioi, avrovs re teal 
7ralBa<; teal yvvai/eas, eirLfeaXeaavre^ ovy^ rjKLara 
rod iroXefiov acjiiacv alrlovf elvar teal rrjv Alyi- 
vav dcr(f)aXeo~Tepov e^alvero rfj WeXoTTovvrjaw 
en iKenxkvr)v avrwv Tre/juyjravras €7tolkov<; e^eiv. 
kcCi e^eirepsifav varepov ov 7roXXw e? avrrjv toi>9 
OLKijropas. eKireaovat Be to?? Alyivrjrais ol 
AaKeBaifiovLOi eBoaav Qvpeav ol/eeiv feal tj)v yrjv 
ve/jL€o-0aL, Kara re to WOrjvatcov Bid(popoi> teal 
ore a(f)(x)i> evepyerau rjcrav biro top creiafAov teal 
to)V JLlXcorcov rr)V e7r av 'do 'i ao iv '. t) Be Qvpearis 
yrj fieOopia rfjs 'Aoyeta? teal AafecoviKrjs eartv, 
€7rl OdXaaaav teaOij/covcra. teal ol fiev avrcjv 
evravOa oj ter)o-av, ol Be io-irdprjaav Kara ttjv 
aXXrjv IhXXdBa. 

XXVIII. ToO £' aurov Oepovs vovfirjvla teard 
o-eXi]V7)v, coairep teal jiovov Bo/eel eivai ylyveaOai 

1 Kar read by Hude, after Madvig. 

BOOK II. xxv. 5-xxvm. 

along the coast, and visiting other plncx 4i - 


XXVI. About this same time the Athenians sent 
out thirty ships to operate around Locris and at the 
same time to serve as a guard for Euboea. These 
were under the command of Cleopompus son of 
Clinias, who made descents upon various places along 
the seaboard and ravaged them, captured Thronium, 
some of whose inhabitants he took as hostages, 
and at Alope defeated in battle the Locrians who 
came to the defence of the town. 

XXVII. In the course of this summer the Athen- 
ians also expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina, to- 
gether with their wives and children, making it their 
main charge against them that they were responsible 
for the war in which they were involved ; besides 
Aegina lay close to the Peloponnesus, and it was 
clearly a safer policy to send colonists of their own 
to occupy it. And indeed they soon afterwards sent 
thither the settlers. As for the Aeginetan refugees7 
the Lacedaemonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in 
and its territory to cultivate, moved to do this not 
only by the hostility of the Aeginetans towards the 
Athenians but also because the Aeginetans had done 
them a service at the time of the earthquake and 
the revolt of the Helots. 1 Now the district of Thyrea 
is the border country between Argolis and Laconia, 
extending down to the sea. There some of the 
Aeginetans settled, while some were scattered over 
the rest of Hellas. 

XXVIII. During the same summer at the beffinniiljr 
of a lunar month 2 (the only time, it seems, when 

^> cf. i. ci. 2. 
a August 3rd, 431 B.C. 



hvvdTOV, 6 tfXios efe'Xi7re fiera i~iear)pif3piav Kal 
rrdXiv dveirX^pcoOT}, yevofievos fJLrjvoeihr)? /cat aa- 
Tepcov tivcov eKcpavevrcov. 

XXIX. Kal ev rep avTco Oepei 'Nv/icpoScopov rbv 
YlvOeco, dvhpa "'AfB&rjpiT'qv, ov el^e rifv d&eXcfirjv 
^iTaXrcrjs, Swdpuevov Trap avrco fieya ol 'AOrjvaloi 
irporepov rroXepLLOv vo/AL^ovTes irpo^evov eirotrj- 
aavro teal [xeTeTrepi^ravTO, (Sov\op.evoi ^iraX/cr/v 
cr<pL(Ti rbv Tijpeco, SpqKcov ftaaiXia, ^upL/ia^ov 

2 yeveaOai. 6 Be TrjprjS ovtos 6 rod ^ltoXkov 
ttcltijp 7T/3WTO? 'Odpvcrais ttjv p,eydXv,v (BaaiXeLav 
irrl irXeov t?)? aXXrjs (dpafcr)$ irrolrjo-ev rroXv 

3 yap fiepos Kal ai/Tovofiov iart SpqKOJv. Trjpel Se 

no IlpoKvrjv rr)v TlavBiovos air Wdrjvcov Gyovri 

yvvalKa Trpocnj/cet 6 T^'/Q?;? ol»to? ovSev, ovhe 

t/}? avr?79 &pdfcr)<; eyevovTO, a,\\' 6 fxev ev AavXiq 

rip <£>cdfci8os vvv KaXov fievris 77)? T^peu? 1 co/cei, 

rore virb SpqKcov oiKOVfievris, Kal to epyov to 

rrepl rbv "Itvv at yvvalKes ev ttj yfj Tavrrj 

eirpa^av (iroXXols he. Kal tcov ttol^tcov ev a^cwo? 

fivij/jLr] AavXcas 7] opi'i c iircovofiao-Tai), eiKos Te 

Kal to Krj&o? UavBlova ^vvd^aaQai tt)<; OvyaTpbs 

Bid toctovtov far cocpeXCq ttj 7T/do? aXXijXovs 

fiaXXov TJ Bid ttoXXcov yfiepcov es 'OBpvaas 6Bov, 

Ti)pT]<; Be ovBe to avTo ovopa e%a>*> (SatnXevs 2 

1 Deleted by Hude, after van Herwerden, as not read by 
the Scholiast. 
* re, in the MSS. after Rcur^evs, deleted by Classen. 

1 i.e. their representative to look after Athenian interests 
in the country of Sitalces and Tereus. The latter had violated 


BOOK II. xxviii.-xxix. 3 

such an occurrence is possible) the sun was eclipsed 
after midday ; it assumed the shape of a crescent and 
became full again, and during the eclipse some stars 
became visible. 

XXIX. In this summer, too, Nvmphodorus son of 
Pythes, a man of Abdera, whose sister Sitalces had 
to wife, and possessing great influence with Sitalces, 
the Athenians made their proxenus l with that king, 
although they had hitherto regarded him as an 
enemy ; and they summoned him to Athens, wishing 
to gain Sitalces, son of Teres and king of the 
Thracians, as their ally. Now this Teres, the father 
of Sitalces, was the first to found the great kingdom 
of the Odrysians, which extended over the larger 
part of Thrace ; for a considerable portion of the 
Thracians are independent. This Teres is not in 
any way con nected with Tereus who took from Athens 
t o be h is wife Procne the daughter of Pandion, nor 
indeed did they come from the same Thrace. Tereus 
dwelt at Daulia in the land now called Phocis, which 
was then occupied by Thracians, and it was in that 
land that the women 2 perpetrated their deed upon 
Itys. In fact many of the poets, when they refer to • 
the nightingale, call it the bird of Daulia. Besides . 
it was natural for Pandion to contract the marriage 
alliance for his daughter at so short a distance as 
Daulia with a view to mutual protection, rather than 
among the Odrysians, who are many days' journey 
distant. Teres, however, whose name was not the 
same as the other's, was the first king to attain 

Philomela, sister of Procne, and cnt out her tongue to prevent 
her telling of it ; but she revealed it by weaving the story 
into a piece of tapestry. 

2 The women, i.e. Procne and Philomela, who murdered 
Itys, son of Procne. 



4 TrpMTos ev Kparet 'OSpvcrwv iyevero. ov Srj ovra 
rov 2t7 d\fcr)i> oi 'AOrjvaioi, ^vfipba^ov inoiovvro, 
fiovXofievoi a(f)L(TL rd iirl 0/j^/c?;? ywpia Kal 

5 Hep&iKfcav i^vve^eXelv avrov. iXOcov re e? ra? 
'A#?;Va? 6 Nv/.t(p68(opo<; rrjv re rov XiraXKov 
^vfifia^tav eiroirjae Kal XdSoKov rov viov avrov 
WOrjvaiov, rov re iirl Spaicr)? iroXefiov v7reSi^ero 
KaraXvceiv ireiGeiv yap ZirdX/erjv rrepLireiv arpa- 
ridv %paKiav ' 'A07]vaioL<; lirirewv re real ireX- 

6 rao-rwv. ^vve/3i/3aae Be /cal rov TlephiKtcav roU 
'AOrjvaLOis Kal Sepfirjv avrut eireiaev dirohovvar 
^vvear par ever e re evdvs TlephiKKas iirl Xa\/aSea9 

7 per a ^AO^vaioov Kal QopfAicovos. ovrco fiev lirdX- 
Kr}s re 6 Typeco, Spafcwv fiacnXevs, ^vpLfia^o^ 
iyevero 'Adqvauois Kal UepSiKKas 6 *AXei;dv8pov, 
~hlaK€$6vcov (3aaiXev<;. 

XXX. 0/ cj ev rals eKarov vavalv ' ' A6i]valoi 
en ovres irepl TleXoirovvrjcrov 'EoXXiov re K.opiv- 
Oioov iroXiapLa alpovcri Kal irapahihoaai UaXac- 
pevcuv i AKapvdvo)V p,6voi$ rrjv yr\v Kal iroXiv 
vepbeadar Kal 'AcrraKov, ^? Euap^o? ervpdvvet, 
Xaftovres Kara Kpdro^ Kal i^eXdcravre^ avrov to 

2 ywplov e? r-qv ^vp.fia^lav rrpocrenroaqGavro. eirl 
re KecpaXXyviav rrjv vrjerov TrpoarrXevcravre^ 
TTpocniydyovro dvev p,d\r\^' Kelrai he ?) KecfraX- 
Xt]vla Kara WKapvaviav Kal AevKciSa rerpdiroXi^ 

3 ovaa, TlaXfjs, Kpdvioi, *2ap,aioi, Upcovvoi. vare- 
pov 8' ov ttoXXw dve^copijaav at j/fjes e? ra? 


BOOK II. xxix. 3-xxx. 3 

great power among the Odrysians. And it was his 
son, Sitalces, whom the Athenians wanted to make 
their ally, wishing him to help in subduing the 
places on the coast of Thrace and Perdiccas. So 
Nymphodorus came to Athens, brought about the 
alliance with Sitalces, and got Sadocus son of Sitalces 
made an Athenian citizen ; and he promised also 
to bring the war in Thrace to an end, saying that he 
would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a 
Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. Moreover, 
he brought about a reconciliation between Perdiccas 
and the Athenians, whom he persuaded to restore 
Therme 1 to him. Perdiccas immediately joined 
forces with the Athenians under Phormio 2 and took 
the field against the Chalcidians 1 . It was in this way 
that Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, 
became an ally of the Athenians, and also Perdiccas 
son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians. " 

XXX. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred 
ships, who were still ope?ating"on the Peloponnesian 
coast, took So llium, a town belonging to the Corin- 
thians, wliich they" then handed over, the territory 
as well as the city, to the people of Palaerus in 
Acarnania, for their exclusive occupation. They also 
stormed Astacus, which Euarchus ruled as tyrant, 
drove hint" otif^' and incorporated the place in their 
confederacy. Sailing then to the island of Cephal- 
lenia, they brought it over to their side without a 
battle.* Now Cephallenia lies over against Acar- 
nania and Leucas and is a union of four communities, 
the Palians, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronnians. 
And not long afterwards the ships withdrew to 

* cf. 1. lxi. 2. 2 cf. 1. lxiv. 2 ; lxv. 3. 



XXXI. Hepl Be rb ^>Qivorrwpov rov 6epov<; 
rovrov WOrjva'iOL iravSqixei, avrol /cat ol /ler- 
olkoi, ecrefiaXov e? tijv ^SleyaplSa UepiKXeov? rov 
'B-avOimrov arparrjyovvro^. Kal ol rrepl ITeXo- 
irovvrjGov * K&i\vaZoi ev rah etcarov vavaiv 
(erv^ov yap r t Sr] ev Alyivr) 6We? eir olkov dva- 
/co/jLi^o/ievoi) &)? rjadovro tou? ifc tt}? 7ro\e&)? 
rravcrrparia ev ^leydpois ovras, eirXevcrav Trap 

2 avrovs real ^vvepLeix^^o-av. arparoireSov re 
fieyio-TOV Sy rovro dOpoov 'Adrjvalcov eyevero, 
aKfia^ovo-ty; en t?}? TroXeco? teal ovirco vevocrrjKvias- 
fjLVpLtoV yap oirXtrwv ovk eXdao~ov<; rjaav avrol 
ol W0r]valoL (^copU S' avrol? ol ev YloreiSala, 
rpirry/iKLOi rjcrav), jieroiKoi Be ^vveaeftaXov ovk 
eXdcraov? rpia^t-Xtcov oirXirwv, %ft>p*? he 6 aXXos 

3 b/niXo? ^\rtX(hv ovk oXlyos. Srjcoaavre 1 ; Se ra 
7roXXa t?}? yrjs dveyodpr\o~av. eyevovro Se koX 
aXXai varepov ev rat TroXe/iw Kara eVo? eKaarov 
eaftoXai 'A6)]valcov e? rr)v MeyapiSa Kal lirrrecDV 
Kal rravarparia, p-^XP 1 °^ NtVata edXco U7r' 

XXXII. ^ILreiyLo-Qy} Se Kal 'AraXdvrrj vtto 
'AOrjvaicov <f>povpiov rov depovs rovrov reXevrcov*- 
to?, r; eVt AoKpots to?? 'O-rrovvriois vrjeros, i pi] fir) 
rrporepov ovaa, rod fir] Xr/crras eKirXeovra? ei; 
Oirovvros Kal rrj? aXXrj? AoKpiSos KaKOvpyelv 
r^v Rvftocav. ravra fiev ev rep Oepei rovrq) puera 
rijv TleXorr ovvrjalcov Ik tt}? ' ArrLKr)? dvaxd>pr)cnv 

XXXIII. Tov 8* iircyLyvo/jievov %e£/i.coi>o? ~Ev- 
apx<>S o 'AKapvdv, /3ovX6/ievo<; e? rr)v 'AaraKov 


BOOK II. xxxi. i-xxxin. 


—X XX I. Towarc^he autumn of this year the Athe- 
nians with all their military forces, drawn both from 
the citizens and the resident aliens, invaded Megaris 
under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, 
who was general. 1 The Athenians of the fleet of 
one hundred ships operating around Peloponnesus, 
who happened to be at Aegina on their way home, 
when they heard that the whole military force of the 
city was at Megara, sailed over and joined them. / 
This was the largest army of Athenians that had 
ever been assembled in one body, for the city was 
still at the height of its strength and not as yet 
stricken by the plague ; the Athenians themselves 
numbered not less than ten thousand heavy in- 
fantry, not including the three thousand at Potidaea, 2 
and there were three thousand heavy-armed aliens ^ 
who took part in the invasion, and, besides, a con- 
siderable body of light-armed troops. After they 
had ravaged most of the Megarian country they 
retired. Later on in the course of the war still 
other invasions were made by the Athenians into 
Megaris every year, both with the cavalry and with 
the whole army, until Nisaea was captured. 3 _ \ ^/ 

XXXII. Towards the end of this summer the 431 B - 
Athenians also fortified and garrisoned AtalanteJthe 
island which lies off Opuntian Locris andliaThlth'erto 
been unoccupied. Their object was to prevent 
pirates sailing from Opus and the other ports of 
Locris and ravaging Euboea. These were the events 
which took place during this summer after the 
withdrawal of thei feloponnesians from Attica. _____ j 

XXXIII. But i j the ensuing wi nter) Euarchus the "" 
Acarnanian, wishinlfTo*rffflffl"RWfc5fe*{:us, persuaded i 

1 i.e. one of the ten generals elected annually. 
9 cf. i. Ixi. 4. 3 iv. lxvi.-lxix. 



fcareXOelv, ireiOei KopivOLovs reaaapaKovra vavcrl 
teal TrevTafcoaLois Kal %t\tot? oirXirai*; eavrbv 
Kardyetv irXevaavra^, teal avros eTriKOvpovs Tivas 
TTpocrefjuaOcoo-aro' vpx ov &* T7 1^ (nptnia? Eu- 
<j)a/jLL$a<; re 6 'ApiaTcovvfiov real TV/zofe^o? 6 

2 Tif.LOfcpdTOv<; teal Eutta^o? o XpvaiBos. Kal 
irXevaavTes Kariqyayov Kal tt}? aXXri<; 'A/cap- 
vavias tt}? irepl OdXaacrav ecrriv a ywpla /3ov\6- 
[xevoi TrpoaTTOirjaaadai Kal ireipaQevTes, a>? ov/c 

3 eBvvavro, air eirXeov eV olkov. a^ovTes 8' eV t<w 
irapdirXw e'9 Keep aXXriv Lav Kal aTro/Saaiv 11011)- 
(jdfxevoL e? t^ Kpaviwv yi)v, dirarrjOevTe^ vtt* 
avioiv ef 6 fjLokoyias rivbs avBpas re diro^aXXovac 
crcf)(ov avrcov, eirtOejievwv ciTrpoaBoKrjrco^ rcov 
Kpavicov, Kal fiiaiorepov dvayayofievoi eKo/xlaOi)- 
aav eV oikov. 

XXXIY. 'Ev Be tg) avrw yei\xo$vi 'Adrjvaloi 
too Trarpiw v6fi(p y^pwfievoi BrjfMocria rafyds eiroLij- 
aavro rebv iv rooBe tw TroXe/iw TrpcoTcov diroQavov- 

2 tcdv rpoirw rocwBe. ra fiev 6o~ra irporidevTai 
toov diroyevojievcDV irpoTpira aKi]v?)v Troufoavres, 
Kal €7TL(f)6p6L Tw avrov eKaaros rjv ri /3ovXr)Tar 

3 eireiBdv Be 1) eK(j)opd y, XdpvaKas KVirapicnjivas 
dyovcriv dfia^ai} (fivXy]<; e«:a<7T>7? fiiav evean Be 
rd oara 779 e/cacrTo? iiv cpvXij^. /xla Be kXlvtj 
Kevri (peperat io-rpw/ievrj rwv dcjxivcov, 01 dv p,i) 

4 evpeOoiaiv e? dvatpeacv. ^vveK^epec Be 6 (SovXo- 
fievos Kal darayp Kal ^evcov, Kal yvvaiKe? Trdpeicnv 
al irpo<j)')KovaaL eirl top rdfyov oXofyvpofievai. 

/- l Hude inserts Hxa, following Gertz. 

BOOK II. xxxiii. i-xxxiv. 4 

the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen 
hundred heavy infantry and restore him to power, 
and for this purpose he himself hired some mer- 
cenaries. The commanders of the expedition were 
Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of 
Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. They 
did in fact sail over and restore him ; and wishing 
to acquire some other places along the seaboard of 
Acarnania they made the attempt but failed, and 
thereupon sailed for home. As they skirted the 
coast they touched at Cephallenia, where they 
made a descent upon the territory of the Cranians ; 
here deceived by the inhabitants through some sort 
of agreement they lost a few of their men by an un- 
expected attack of the Cranians, and finally, after 
they had got out to sea with considerable difficulty, 
managed to get back home. ^ . 

XXXIV. In the course of/fthe same winter /the 
Athenians, following the custom of their fathers, 
celebrated at the public expense the funeral rites bf 
the first who had fallen in this war. The ceremony 
is as follows. The bones of the departed lie in state 
for the space of three days in a tent erected for that 
purpose, and each one brings to his own dead any 
offering he desires. On the day of the funeral 
coffins of cypress wood are borne on wagons, one 
for each tribe, and the bones of each are in the 
coffin of his tribe. One empty bier, covered with a 
pall, is carried in the procession for the missing 
whose bodies could not be found for burial. Any 
one who wishes, whether citizen or stranger, may 
take part in the funeral procession, and the women 
who are related to the deceased are present at the 



5 TiOeacriv ovv e? to Btj/aoo-iov arjfia, o icrriv eVl 
tov tcaXXuaTOV TTpoao-relov tt}<; 7roXeco<; teal alel 

iv CLVTO) OaTTTOVGL TOU5 6K T(OV TroXificov tt\i'-)v J€ 

tovs iv "hlapaO&vr etceivcov Be StairpeTrr] tt)v 
aperrjv tcpivavTes avrov teal tov rdfyov e7rou]aav. 

6 eireiBdv Be tepvyjrcoac yfj, dvrjp ypripbevos xjito t??? 
7roA.60)? o? av yvco/jLT) re Botefj /jlt) a^vveros elvai 
teal a^iwcrei, Trporjier), Xeyei eV avrols eiraivov 

7 tov TrpeirovTCL' /jbera Be tovto airep^ovrai. wBe 
fiev dciTTTOvaiv teal Bed iravTos rod iroXe/iov, 

8 07TOT6 %V/jL/3cdr) CLVTOZS, i%p(x)VTO T(p VOflfp. eVI 

5' ovv rot? TrpCDTOi? TolaBe TLepiteXrjs 6 "EZavOiinrov 
r/peOr} Xeyetv. teal eTreiBr) teaipbs iXdfiftave, 
irpoeXOcbv airb tov o-i}\iaT0<$ irrl f3r}/ia vtyriXbv 
7re7roLi]/jLevor, ottcl><; dteovoLjo &)? eiri TrXelarov tov 
6/j.lXov, eXeye ToidBe. 

XXXV. " 0/ p<ev ovv ttoXXoI twv evOdBe tfBi] 
elprj/coTcov Ittclivovgi tov rrpoaOevTa tg> vo/kd tov 
Xoyov TovBe, oj? teaXbv iirl Tot? ite tcov TroXificov 
OaTTTOfiivois dyopeveaOai clvtov. ifiol Be dpteovv 
av eBoteei elvai dvBpwv dyaOcov epyw yevofievcov 
epytp teal BrjXovo-Oat Ta? Ttp,d<;, ola teal vvv irepl 
tov Tacf)0V TovBe Brj/Jboaiq irapaGteevaodevTa 
0/3O.T6, teal fir) iv evl dvBpl iroXXwv aperd? teivBv- 
veveadac ev re teal yelpov elirovTi irKrrevOrjvai. 
2 ^aXenbv yap to peTpiux; elirelv ev u> fioXis teal rj 

1 The Outer Cerameicus, just outside the Dipylon gate 
This street was to Athens what the Appian Way was t< 



BOOK II. xxxiv. 5-xxxv. 2 

burial and make lamentation. The coffins are laid 
in the public sepulchre, which is situated in the most 
beautiful suburb 1 of the city; there they always bury 
those fallen in war, except indeed those who fell at 
Marathon; for their valour the Athenians judged to 
be preeminent and they buried them on the spot 
where they fell. But when the remains have been 
laid away in the earth, a man chosen by the state, 
who is regarded as best endowed with wisdom and is 
foremost in public esteem, delivers over them an 
appropriate eulogy. After this the people depart. In 
this manner they bury ; and throughout the war, 
whenever occasion arose, they observed this custom. 
Now over these, the first victims of the war, Pericles 
son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. And wTien 
the proper time came, he advanced from the sepulchre 
and took his stand upon a platform which had been 
built high in order that his voice might reach as far 
as possible in the throng, and spoke as follows : 

XXXV. "Most of those who have spoken here in 
the past have commended the law-giver who added 
this oration to our ceremony, feeling that it is meet 
and right that it should be spoken at their burial 
over those who have fallen in war. To me, however, 
it would have seemed sufficient, when men have 
proved themselves brave by valiant acts, by act 
only to make manifest the honours we render them 
— such honours as to-day you have witnessed in 
connection with these funeral ceremonies solemnized 
by the state — and not that the valour of many men 
should be hazarded on one man to be believed or not 
according as he spoke well or ill. For it is a hard 
matter to speak in just measure on an occasion 
where it is with difficulty that belief in the speaker's 



hotcqaus Tr)? dXrjOeia^ /3e/3aL0i>TCu. 6 re yap 
^vvetBoos Kal €vvov<; afcpocnr)? rd% dv ti evBe- 
earepco<; 7rpo? a ftovXeral re Kal eTriararai vo/il- 
creue B>]Xovcr0ai, o re aireipos eariv a Kal 
rrXeovd^eaOat, Bid (f>66vov, et ri virep ttjv avrov 
(f>uacv clkovol. /jiexpL yap rovBe avetcToi ol eiraivol 
elai rrepl erepcov Xeyofievoi, e? oaov dv real avrbs 
eKaaros otrjrac l/cavos elvai Bpdaai tl a)v i]Kovaev 
Tft) Be vTrepfidWovTL avrcov (f)0ovovvTes rjB?] Kal 
3 aTTLGTOvcriv. eireiBr] Be toIs ird\ai ovtms eBo- 
KipidcrOr) ravra AraXw? eyeiv, XPV Kai e V^ evro/ievov 
to) v6fi(p ireipdcrdai v/xwv tt}? e/edcrrov /5ouXr;creco? 
re fcai B6t;t]$ rvyelv &)? eirl irXelarov. 

XXXVI. " "Ap^o/iat Be dirb rcov irpoyovcov 
irpcjrov' BUaiov yap avrols Kal irpeirov Be dfia 
ev to) roiQiBe rr)v Ti\xr]V ravrrjv tt)? pjvr)p,r\^ 
BiBoaQai. rr)v yap yjjopav ol avrol alel ol/covvres 
BiaBoy^fi roiv e7riyiyvo/j,evcov p-^xpi TovBe eXev- 

2 Oepav Bt dperrjv irapeBocrav. Kal eKelvoi re afyoi 
eiraivov Kal en fidXXov ol irarepes rjjitov Krrjad- 
fievoi yap 7rpb<; oh iBi^avro oarjv eyop,ev dp-yi^v 

3 ovk dirovo}*;, f)plv tck? vvv TrpoaKareXLTTOv. ra 
Be 7rXel(o avrf)<; avrol t) fie is olBe ol vvv en ovres 
pdXiara ev ry KaOearrjKvia rjXiKia, eirj]v^)Gap.ev, 
Kal rr)v itoXlv rots iraa TrapeaKevdaapLev Kal e? 

4 TroXefiov Kal e? elprjvyjv avTapKeardrrjv. wv eytb 

1 Those enumerated by Pericles in ch. xii . — money, army 
and navy. 


BOOK II. xxxv. 2-xxxvi. 4 

accuracy is established. For the hearer who is 
cogn izant of the facts and partial to the dead will 
pertlaps think that scant justice has been done 
in comparison (with his own wishes > )and his own 
knowledge^whiTe he who is not so informed, when- 
ever he hears of an exploit which goes beyond^ 
his own capacity, will be led by envy to think 
there is some exaggeration. And indeed eulogies 
of other men are tolerable only in so far as each 
hearer thinks that he too has the ability to perforni> 
any of the exploits of which he hears ; but whatever 
goes beyond that at once excites envy and unbelief. " 
However, since our forefathers approved of this- 
practice as right and proper, I also, rendering obedi- 
ence to the law, must endeavour to the best of my 
ability to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of each of 


XXXVI. " I shall speak first of our ancestors, for 
it is right and at the same time fitting, on an occasion 
like this, to give them this place of honour in re- 
calling what they did. For this land of ours, in 
which the same people have never ceased to dwell in 
an unbroken line of successive generations, they by 
their valour transmitted to our times a free state. 
And not only are they worthy of our praise, but our 
fathers still more ; for they, adding to the inheritance 
which they received, acquired the empire we now 
possess and bequeathed it, not without toil, to us who 
are alive to-day. And we ourselves here assembled, 
who are now for the most part still in the prime of 
life, have further strengthened the empire in most 
respects, and have provided our city with all re- 
sources, 1 so that it is sufficient for itself both in 
peace and in war. The military exploits whereby 



ra fxev Kara 7roXefiov<; epya, oh e/caara eKTrjOrj, 
r) el ti avTol r) ol Trarepes r)pcov fidpfiapov rj 
"EXXrjva TroXefiov 1 Ittiovtcl 7rpoOv/j,(D<; rj/xwdpeOa, 
fiafcpjjyopelv ev elBocnv ov /3ovXop,evo<;, id&co- 
airb Be ota? Te iiriT>i$€vcreco<; yXOofiev eir avra 
Kal fxeO* oia? iroXiTeias Kal Tpbirwv e'£ o'lcov 
fieydXa iyevero, tclvtcl Br)\(tio~a<; irpoyrov el/xi Kal 
eirl tov TwvBe eiratvov, vo/jll^gov iirl re too irapovri 
ovk av carpeir?! XexOfjvai avra Kal tov irdvra 
o/jllXov Kal darcov Kal £evcov %v/jL(f)opov elvai 
eTraKOvcrai avTchv. 

XXXVII. " Xpco/meOa yap Trokireiq ov ^rjXov- 
(ttj tou? tgov 7re\<x? vofiovs, irapdBecyfia Be fiaXXov 
avrol ovTes ricrlv r) fiifiovfievoi erepovs. Kal 
ovofia fiev Blcl to fir) e? oXuyovs dXX* e? irXeiovas 
OLKelv BrjfMOKpaTia KetcXr)Tai, fierecTTL Be Kara fiev 
tovs vbfiovs 7T/90? tcl IBia Bidcfropa iraai to taov, 
KaTa Be ttjv aglcocriv, &>? eKaaTos ev to? evBoKi/xel, 
ovk airb fiepov? to irXeov e? tcl kolvcl r) dii 
dpeTr)^ irpoTtparai, ovB* av KaTa ireviav, eywv Be 
ti dyaObv Bpaaai tijv ttoXlv, d£uop,aTO<; dcpaveua 
2 KeK(i>\vTai._, eXevOepws Be ra Te 777)0? to kolvov 
TToXiTevofiev Kal e? ttjv 777)09 dXXijXovs twv Ka9" 
7]\xepav e7TLT7]Bev/j,dT(ov viroy\riav, ov Bl bpyrjs tov 
TreXas, el KaO' rjBovrjv ti Bpa, e^ozrre?, ovBe d£rj- 
1 ir6\e/jLov, Hude adopts Haase's conjecture iro\4fxtov. 

1 Alluding to the Spartans, whose institutions were said 
to have been borrowed from Crete ; in fact, throughout the 
whole speech the contrast is with Spartan conditions. 


BOOK II. xxxvi. 4-xxxvii. 2 

our several possessions were acquired, whether 
in any case it were we ourselves or our fathers 
that valiantly repelled the onset of war, Bar- 
barian or Hellenic, I will not recall, for I have no 
desire to speak at length among those who know. 
But I shall first set forth by what sort of training we 
have come to our present position, and with what 
political institutions and as the result of what mariner 
of life our empire became great, and afterwards pro- 
ceed to the praise of these men; for I think that on 
the present occasion such a recital will be not in- 
appropriate and that the whole throng, both of citizens 
and of strangers, may with advantage listen to it. 

XXXVII. " We live under a form of government 
which does not emulate the institutions of our neigh- 
bours 1 ; on the contrary, we are ourselves a model 
which some 2 follow, rather than the imitators of 
other peoples. It is true that our government is 
called a democracy, because its administration is in the 
hands, not of the few, but of the many ; yet while 
as regards the law all men are on an equality for 
the settlement of their private disputes, as regards 
the value set on them it is as each man is in any way 
distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, 
not because he belongs to a particular class, but be- 
cause of personal merits ; nor, again, on the ground of 
poverty is a man barred from a public career by 
obscurity of rank if he but h as it in him to do the 
state a sen ice. And not only in ourp'uBlTcriife are 
we JiI)craT,""I)ut also as regards our freedom from 
suspicion of one another in the pursuits of every-day 
life ; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour 

3 Possible allusion to the embassy sent from Rome in 
454 B.C. to examine the laws of Solon (Livv, iii. 31). 



liiov^ fiev, \v7rr]pa<z Be rfj dyfrei d^6i]B6va^ TrpoaTi- 
3 Oe/ievoi. dveirayOcos Be rd iBia TrpoaofAiXovvTes 
tcl SrjjuLoata Bid Seo? /nakicrra ov nrapavoixovpLev, 
tcov re alel ev apXV ovtcov aKpodaei Kal tcov 
vo/xcov, koX /idXicrra avTcov octoi re err co<f)eXia 
tcov dBi/cov/ievcov tcelvTcu Kal octoi dypac\>oi ovres 
alo~)(vvqv 6fio\oyov/jL€vrjv cpepovcriv. 

XXXVIII. "Kal firjv Kal tcov ttovcov 7r\eicrra^ 
dvairavXas rfj yvcofir) eiropiadpieOa, dycom piev 
ye Kal Overlaid BieTrjaiois vopi&VTes, IBiais Be 
tcaTaafcevais evirpeiTeo-iv,cov /ca0' 7]/jiepav r) repyfris 

2 to XvTTijpbv eKTrXijaaeL. eirecrepxeTai Be Bid 
fj,eye0o<; t% iroXecos etc 7rdcrr]<; yr)<> ra irdvra, Kal 
j~vp,/3aivei rjfiiv fxrjBev oiKeiorepa tyj diro\avcrei 
ra avrov dyaOd yiyvo/xeva Kapirovadai r) Kal rd 
tcov aXXcov dvOptOlTCOV. 

XXXIX. " Aiacpepo/iev Be Kav Tais tcov iroXe- 
/ukcov fieXerais tcov evavTicov ToicrBe. tt)v re yap 
ttoXiv Koivyjv irapeyopuev Kal ovk eariv ore %evr)- 
\acriais aTreipyo/xev Ttva rj fiaOijfiaros i) Oedfia- 
to?, o fir) Kpv$6ev dv Tt? tcov iroXepblcov IBcov 
cocpeXrjOelii,) iriarevovTe<; ov Tat? TrapaaKevaU to 

1 Referring especially to the contests at the chief festivals, 
like the Panathenaea and Dionysia, which by their artistic 
setting and performance were recreations of mind and spirit 
quite as much as physical exercises. 

2 Thucydides refers to the spiritual no less than to the 
physical products which the greatness of Athens attracts to 
her, to the poetry, music, and urt which find there & con- 


BOOK II. xxxvii. 2-xxxix. i 

if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour 
looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold. 
But while we thus avoid giving offence in our private 
intercourse, in our public life we are restrained from 
lawlessness chiefly through reverent fear, for we 
render obedience to those in authority and to the 
laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained 
for the succour of the oppressed and those which, 
though unwritten, bring upon the transgressor a 
disgrace which all men recognize. 

XXXVIII. "Moreover, we have provided for the 
spirit many relaxations from toil : we have games l 
and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and 
homes fitted out with good taste and elegance ; and 
the delight we each day find in these things drives 
away sadness. And our city is so great that all the 
products of all the earth flow in upon us, and ours is 
the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our 
own soil with no more home-felt security of enjoy- 
ment than we do those of other lands. 2 

XXXIX. "We are also superior to our opponents 
in our system of training for warfare, and this in the 
following respects. In the first place, we throw pur 
city open to all the world and we never by exclusion 
acts debar any one from learning or seeing anything 
which an enemy might profit by observing if it were 
not kept from his sight ; for we place^enr depend- 
ence, not so much upon prearranged devices to 

genial home as well as to articles of commerce. On these 
latter compare a passage in the pseudo-Xenophontic Con- 
stitution of Athens (ii. 7), written somewhat earlier than this 
portion of Thucyo" ides' history : " Whatever desirable thing 
is found in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, the Pontus, the 
Peloponnesus, or anywhere else, all these things are brought 
together at Athens on account of her mastery of the sea." 



irXeov Kal aTTinais rj ra> deft rjpiojv avrcov €9 ra 
epya ey^u^co' Kal iv rat? 7rai&eLai<; ol /jev iirv- 
irbvto daKi](T€i evOvs veoi ovres to dvSpecov 
{lerepxovTai, i)fiel^ Be dveifiivco^ hiaiTOifJuevot ov&ev 
rjcraov iirl tou? laoTraXels kivSuvovs ywpovp,ev. 

2 Tex/jLijpiov 8£ ovre yap AaKeSaipLOVtoc Ka6' eav- 
tovs, yu,e#' dirdvrwv he e? rtjv yrjv rjpcov arparev- 
ovcri, ttjv re twv 7re\a? aVTol iTTe\66vT€S ov 
^aXe7rco? iv 777 dWorpla rovs irepl tu>v olfceicov 
d/.wvo/jLevov<s fia^opievoi tcl irXelw Kparovuev' 

3 ciOpoa re rfj Bvudpiei y/i(ov ovSeis irco TroXepuos 
everv^e hid tt/v tov vavrircov re apua iiripieXeiav 
Kal ttjv iv tt} yfj iirl iroXXa r^pboiv avrwv iiri- 
irefi'yjnv rjv Be irov piopiw rivl irpoapiei^waL, 
KpaTijo-avres re rivas i)ijlwv Trdvras av^ovenv 
direuHjOai Kal viKrjOevres vcj> diravrcov rjcraijaOaL. 

4 KaiTOi el paOvpula p,dXXov ?} irovwv fieXerr) Kal pur) 
piera vopucov to irXeov ?) Tpoirwv dvhpeias iOeXopiev 
Ktv&vveveiv, irepiylyveTai r)puv Tot? Te pueXXovaiv 
dXyeiVols pur) irpoKapiveiv, Kal e? av~a iXOovcn 
p,i] aToXpLOTepov<; T(bv alei pLoyQovvTuiv <j>aL-€cr0ai, 
Kal ev Te tovtols ttjv ttoXlv d^iav elvai 6avp,d- 
^eo-Qai Kal eri iv dXXois. 

XL. " QiXoKaXovpev Te yap jier evreXeia? Kal 
(f)iXoo-o(j)ovp.ev clvev /za\a/aa<r ttXovtw re epyov 
fiaXXov Kaipco tj Xoyov Kop,ir(p xpdypieOa, Kal to 

1 Pericles here hints at his policy, outlined in ch. xiii. 2, 
of always acting on the defensive when the enemy forces are 
distinctly superior. 


BOOK II. xxxix. i-xl. i 

deceive, as upon the courage which springs from our 
own souls when w r e are called to action. And again, 
in the matter of education, whereas they from early 
childhood by a laborious discipline make pursuit of 
manly courage, we with our unrestricted mode of life 
are none the less ready to meet any equality of 
hazard. 1 And here is the proof;/ When the Lace- 
daemonians invade our territory they do not come 
alone but bring all their confederates with them, 
whereas we, going by ourselves against our neigh- 
bours' territory, generally have no difficulty, though 
fio-htinir on foreign soil against men who are defend- 
ing their own homes, in overcoming them in battle. 
And in fact our united forces no enemy has ever yet 
met, not only because we are constantly attending to 
the needs of our navy, but also because on land we 
send our troops on many enterprises ; but if they by 
chance engage with a division of our forces and defeat 
a few of us, they boast that they have repulsed us all, 
and if the victory is ours, they claim that they have 
been beaten by us all. If, then, by taking our ease 
rather than by laborious training and depending on a 
courage which springs more from manner of life than 
compulsion of laws, we are ready to meet dangers, the 
gain is all ours, in that we do not borrow trouble by 
anticipating miseries which are not yet at hand, and 
when we come to the test we show ourselves fully 
as hr t av^ as those who are always toiling; and so our 
city is worthy of admiration in these respects, as well 
as in others. 

XL. " For we are lovers of beauty yet with no 
extravagance and lovers of wisdom yet wiiliout 
weakness. Wealth we employ rather as an oppor- 
tunity ""for action than as a subject for boasting; 



ireveaOai ovx 6/ioXoyelv rivi alo~xp6v, dXXa fir) 

2 Biacfrevyeiv epyfp ata^iov. evi re to?9 avrols 
olfceicov afia Kal ttoXitlkojv eTrifieXeia real erepois 1 
777)09 epya Terpafjufxevoi^ ra ttoXituccl fxr) evBecos 
yvcbvar p,ovoi yap iov re [irfBev rcovBe fierey^ovra 
ovk airpdyfiova, d\7C a^pelov vofiL^opLev, teal 
avroi 2 rjroc Kplvopev ye i) evOvpLovpeOa 6p0cos ra 
7rpdypara, ov tou? Xoyov? rots epyots f$Xdftv)v 
rjyov/JLevoc, dXXa pur) TrpoBLBay^drjvai puaXXov Xoycp 

3 irporepov i) eVl a Bel epyw eXOelv^j SiacfrepovTcos 
yap Br) Kal roBe eyop,ev ware roX/xdv re 01 avroi 
/idXicrra /cal irepl u>v eiriyeipiqo'opiev i/cXoyi^eaOar 
o rots aXXois afxadua p,ev Opdaos, Xoyiapios he 
okvov (frepec. Kpdriaroi 8* av ^v)(ri v BiKaicos 
KpiQelev ol rd re Beiva Kal rjBea aax^ecrrara 
yiyvdxTKOVTes Kal Bid ravra p,r\ dirorpeiTopievoL 

4 etc rwv kivBvvwv. Kal rd e\ aperr^v ivyjvricofieOa 
rol<; rroXXols- ov yap irdaxovre^ ev, dXXd Bpcovres 
KToofieOa toi>9 (j)iXov<;. /3e/3ai,6repo<; Be 6 Bpdaas 
rr)v ydpiv ware oycbecXo/JLevrjv Bl evvoias &> BeBcoKe 
aro^etv 6 Be dvro^eiXwv dfi/3Xvrepo<;, elBcos ovk 
e'9 ydpiv, dXX 1 o>9 6(pelX7j/jLa rt)v dperrjv drroBco- 

1 crepois < €Tfpa> , Hude. 2 Hnde reads ol avroi. 

1 As contrasted with the Spartans, whose officials made the 
most important decisions. 


BOOK II. xl. 1-4 

and with us it is not a shame for a man to ac- 
knowledge poverty, but the greater shame is for 
him not to do his best to avoid it. . - And you 
will find united in the same persons an interest at 
once in private and in public affairs, and in others 
of us who give attention chiefly to business, you 
will find no lack of insight into political matters. 
For we alone regard the man who takes no part in 
public affairs, not as one who minds his own business, 
but as ffood for nothing ; and we Athenians decide 
public questions for ourselves 1 or at least endeavour 
to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the 
belief that it is not debate that is a hindrance to action, 
but rather not to be instructed by debate before the 
time comes for action. For in truth we have this point 
also of superiority over other men, to be most daring 
in action and yet at the same time most given to re- 
flection upon the ventures we mean to undertake ; 
with other men, on the contrary, boldness means 
ignorance and reflection brings hesitation. And they 
would rightly be adjudged most courageous who, 
realizing most clearly the pains no less than the 
pleasures involved, do not on that account turn away 
from danger. Again, in nobility of spirit, we stand 
in sharp contrast to most men ; for it is not by 
receiving kindness, but by conferring it, that we 
acquire our friends. Now he who confers the 
favouFls a firmer friend, in that he is disposed, 
by continued goodwill toward the recipient, to 
keep the feeling of obligation alive in him 2 ; but 
he who owes it is more listless in his friendship, 
knowing that when he repays the kindness it will 
count, not as a favour bestowed, but as a debt 

2 This must be the meaning of the Stare clause, but some- 
thing is perhaps wrong with the text. 

3 2 9 
vol. i. M ° * 


5 acov. real /ulovoi ov tov ^vpcfcepovTO? fiaXkov 
XoyLGfAcp rj t?}? eXevOepias tco Tnarw aSew? riva 


XLI. " pivveXcov re Xeyco tt)v re iraaav ttoXiv 
T779 'EAAaSc? iraiBevcriv elvai /cal /caO' e/cacrTov 
Bo/cecv av fioi tov avTOv dvBpa Trap 1 rjjicov eVl 
TrXetcn' av elBrj ical fiera yapiTcov fiaXiar av 

2 evr pair ekco<; to acopua avTap/ces TvapeyecrQai. /cal 
oo? ov Xoycov ev tco irapovTL /copLiro? TaBe /idXXov 
rj epycov ecrTiv aXrjOeia, avTrj r) Bvvap.L<; tt)<$ 
7roXeft)9, i)v cltto TcovBe tcov Tpoircov i/CTrjcrdpLeOa, 

3 arjpatvei. fiovr) yap tcov vvv d/corj? /cpeiacrcov 
e? irelpav epx eTal > /cal pLovrj ovts tco TroXepLico 
eireXdovTi dyavd/CTrjatv eyei vcf olcov /ca/coTraOel, 
ovTe tco virrj/coco /caTafie/jLyfriv co? ov% vtto d^icov 

4 apyeTai. peTa fieydXcov Be arjpLeicov /cal ov Brj 
tol dpdpTvpov ye tt)v Bvvap.Lv irapaoyopLevoi 
Tot? re vvv koX tois eireira Oavp,acr0i'icr6p,e6a, 1 
ovBev nrpoaBeopLevov ovTe Opijpov eiraiveTOv ovTe 
octtis eirecTL puev to avTi/ca Tep-frei, tcov 8' epycov 
tt]v virovoiav rj dXr]6eia /3Xdy]rei, dXXci irdcrav 
pb€v BdXaaaav ical yrjv iaftaTov ttj ToXpuy 
/caTavay/cdaavTes yeveaOai, iravTaypv Be pLvi]p,eia 

5 /ca/ccov T€ /cdyaOcov diBia gvy/caTOt/clcravTes. irepl 
T0iai>T7)<; ovv rrroXecos oi'Be Te yevvaico<; Bi/caiovvTe<; 

1 Ka\, before ovbev in the MSS., deleted by Kriiger. 

1 The reference is to Athenian colonies and cleruchies, 
which, according to the bearing of the natives, had been 


BOOK II. xl. 4-xli. 5 

repaid. And, finally, we alone confer our benefits 
without fear of consequences, not upon a calculation 
of the advantage we shall gain, but with confidence 
in the spirit of liberality which actuates us. 

XLI. " In a word, then, I say that our city as a 
whole is the school of Hellas, and that, as it seems to 
me, each individual amongst us could in his own per- 
son, with the utmost grace and versatility, prove 
himself self-sufficient in the most varied forms of 
activity. And that this is no mere boast inspired by 
the occasion, but actual truth, is attested by the very 
power of our city, a power which we have acquired in 
consequence of these qualities. For Athens alone 
among her contemporaries, when put to the test, is 
superior to the report of her, and she alone neither 
affords to the enemy who comes against her cause 
for irritation at the character of the foe by whom 
he is defeated, nor to her subject cause for com- 
plaint that his masters are unworthy. Many are 
the proofs which we have given of our power and 
assuredly it does not lack witnesses, and there- 
fore we shall be the wonder not only of the 
men of to-day but of after times ; we shall need 
no Homer to sing our praise nor any other poet 
whose verses may perhaps delight for the moment 
but whose presentation of the facts will be dis- 
credited by the truth. Nay, we have compelled 
every sea and every land to grant access~~tcT~our 
daring, and have everywhere planted 1 everlasting 
memorials both of evil to foes and of good to friends^ 
Such, then, is the city for which these men nobly 
fought and died, deeming it their duty not to let her 

attended with ill consequences for these {e.g. Oreos, and later 
Aegina) or good (e.g. on the Thracian coast). 



/at) afyaipeOrjvai avrrjv pbayopbevoi ireXevTijaav t 
Kal rcov XeciTOfievcov irdvra nvd el/cbs edekeiv 

V7T6p aVTrjS KCLflveLV. 

XLII. " Al b 8rj real ifi?]Kvva ra irepl rf}<; 7ro- 
Xe&)?, BiBaaKaXiav re iroiov[ievo<; p.r\ irepl icrov rjfilv 
elvai rbv dywva /cat ol? rcovBe fi-qBlv virdpyei 
6/jlolcds, Kal tt]v evXoyiav a/ia eft oh vvv Xeyco 

2 (pavepav arjfieuois KaOiord^. Kal el'pijrat avr?]? 
rd /jLeytara' a yap rrjv itoXlv vfivrjaa, al rcbvBe 
/cal rcov roioovBe dperal eKoa/iijcrav, Kal ovk av 
ttoXXol? rcov 'KWrjvcov laoppoTTO? coairep rwvde 
6 Xoyos ro)v epywv (paveiy. BoKel Be fioi BijXovv 
dvBpbs dperrjv Trpcorr] re fjLTjvvovcra koX reXevrala 

3 /3e/3aiovcra rj vvv rcovBe Karaarpocf)^. Kal yap 
Tot? raXXa -)(eipoai BiKaiov rrjv e? tovs iroXe/jLovs 
inrep rrj<; irarpiho^ dvhpayaOiav irpoTiQeaBai' 
dyadw yap KaKov d§avicravTe<$ koivo)<; /j,a\Xov 

4 d)(f>€Xi](rav rj etc rcov IBlcov efiXayfrav. rcovBe Be 
oure ttXovtov 779 r>]v en cnroXavaiv TrportpL^aa^ 
€{iaXaKL(T07] ovre irev'ia^ eXiriBi, go? kolv en Bia- 
cf)vycov avrrjv 1 TrXovTrjaeiev, dvaftoXrjv rod Beivov 
eiron]craTO' rrjv Be rcov evavrlcov ri/Moplav iroQei- 
vorepav avrwv Xa/36vre<; Kal KtvBvvcov ap,a rovBe 
kuWigtov vofiiaavres e(3ovXi]0riaav jier avrov 


BOOK II. xli. 5-xlii. 4 

be taken from them ; and it is fitting that every man 
who is left behind should suffer willingly for her 

XLII. " It is for this reason that I have dwelt 
upon the greatness of our city ; for I have desired to 
show you that we are contending for a higher prize 
than those who do not enjoy such privileges in like 
degree, and at the same time to let the praise of these 
men in whose honour I am now speaking be made 
manifest by proofs. Indeed, the greatest part of 
their praise has' already been spoken ; for when I 
lauded the city, that was but the praise wherewith 
the brave deeds of these men and men like them 
have already adorned her ; and there are not many 
Hellenes whose fame would be found, like theirs, 
evenly balanced with their deeds. And it seems to 
me that such a death as these men died gives proof 
enough of manly courage, whether as first revealing 
it or as affording its final confirmation. Aye, even in 
the case of those who in other ways fell short of 
goodness, it is but right that the valour with which 
they fought for their country should be set before all 
else ; for they have blotted out evil with good and 
have bestowed "a greater benefit Uy their service to 
the state than they have done harm by their private 
lives. And no one of these men either so set his 
heart upon the continued enjoyment of wealth as to 
become a coward, or put off the dreadful day, yield- 
ing to the hope which poverty inspires, that if he 
could but escape it he might yet become rich ; but, 
deeming the punishment of the foe to be more de- 
sirable than these things, and at the same time 
regarding such a hazard as the most glorious of all, 
they chose, accepting the hazard, to be avenged 



tovs fiev Ti}JLwpel(j9ai, TOdV 8e d(piecrOai, €\7tl8l 

p,ev to agaves rod KaropOcoaeiv eTriTpe^avTes, 

epyq* 8e irepl rod 7]8rj opcofievov crfyicriv civtols 

d%iovvTe<; ireiroiOevai' koX ev avrw to 1 dfiv- 

veaOat /cat 2 iraOelv kolXXlov 3 rjyrjcrdpLevoL r) to 4 

ivSovres aro^eaOai, to fiev ala^pbv rod Xoyov 

€(f>vyov, to 8' epyov tw (tgo/jlclti vire fie ivav, kclI 6V 

ekayio'TOV Kcupov Tvj(r}S dfia dfCfifj tt}9 86%r)s 

fidXXov rj tov 8eov$ aTrijXXdyrjaav. 

XLTIT. " Kal oi'Se fiev irpoa-qKoi'Tw^ tyj iroXet 

TOioiSe eyevovTO' toj)? 8e XoiTrovs ^prj dcrcfra- 

XeGTepav fiev evyecdai, aToXfioTepav he fii]8ev 

d^tovv ttjv e'9 tol/9 7roXe/j.Lovs hiavoiav e)(eiv, 

gkoitovvtcl*; fir) Xoyw [lova) ttjv dx^eXlav, r)v dv 

T£9 7rpo9 ov8ev yelpov clvtovs vficis 5 elloTas firj- 

kvvol, Xeycov oca ev tw toi>9 iroXefiiovz; dfivveaOai 

dyadd eveo~Tiv, dXXa fidXXov t>)i> tt)? iroXecos 

8vvap.iv Ka6 y r)fiepav epyco Oewfievovs /cal epao~Ta<; 

y ly vofievov^ avTr}<;, /cal OTav vpuv fieydXrj 86%rj 

elvai v evOupLov/jbevov? 6tl toX/jlcqvt€<; /cal yiyvd>- 

crfcovTes Ta heovTa /cal ev toI$ epyots alayyvofievoi 

dvSpes avTa e/CTr)aavTO, /cal oiroTe /cal ireipa tov 

acftaXelev, ovk ovv /cal ttjv iroXtv ye ty)<; acfreTepas 

dpeTrjs d!;iovvTe<; GTeplcr/ceiv, /cdXXiaTov 8e epavov 


1 So most MSS. Hude reads r<f with CG. 

2 xa\ : Hude brackets. 

3 Dobree's correction for /j.a\\m- of the MSS. Hude inserts 
5e<V and retains /xaWov. 4 Deleted by Hude. 

6 vfxas : Hude brackets. 


BOOK II. xlii. 4-xliii. i 

upon the enemy and to relinquish these other things, 
trusting to hope the still obscure possibilities of 
success, but in action, as to the issue that was before 
their eyes, confidently relying upon themselves. And 
then when the moment of combat came, thinking it 
better to defend themselves and suffer death rather 
than to yield and save their lives, they fled, indeed, 
from the shameful word of dishonour, but with life 
and limb stood stoutly to their task, and in the brief 
instant ordained by fate, at the crowning moment 
not of fear but of glory, they passed away. 

XLIII. " And so these men then bore themselves 
after a manner that befits our city ; but you who 
survive, though you may pray that it be with less 
hazard, should resolve that you will have a spirit to 
meet the foe which is no whit less courageous ; and 
you must esti mate the advantage of such a spirit j ot 
alone by a speaker's words, for he could make a 
long story in telling you — what you yourselves know 
as well as he — all the advantages that are to be gained 
by warding off the foe. Nay rather you must daily 
fix your gaze upon the power of Athens and become 
lovers of her, and when the vision of her greatness 
has inspired you, reflect that all this lias been ac- 
quired by men of courage who knew their duty and 
in the hour of conflict were moved by a high sense 
of honour, who, if ever they failed in any enter- 
prise, were resolved that at least their country 
should not find herself deserted by their valour, but 
freely sacrificed to her the fairest offering 1 it was in 

1 ipavos, a joint contribution, the regular term for a con- 
tribution made for mutual benefit, e <j. to a common meal, 
to a benevolent society, etc. Demosthenes (cont. Mid. 27) 
represents the state as a sort of benefit society to which 
every citizen owes a contribution. 



2 avrfj Trpo'ie/ievoc. KOivfj yap ra aco/jbara Si&ovres 
IBia tov ciyijpcov eiraivov iXdp,/3avov teal tov 
rd(f)ov eiTLariiioraTOVy ovte iv w /celvrai fiaXXov, 
dXX* iv co r) So^a avrcjv irapa tw ivTvyovTi alel 
teal Xoyov teal kpyov Kcupto aleifivrjO'TO^ fcara- 

3 \eliT6Tai. dvSpcov yap iiri<\>av(hv irdaa yr) Tacpos, 
koX ov (TrrfKwv /jlovov iv rrj olteelct o-ij/iaivei iiri- 
ypa<f)7], dXXa ical iv rf) /jltj Trpoarjteovar) dypa(f)0<> 
fiv^prj irap etedaTW rrj<; yvco/jii]^ jjloXXov r) tov 

4 epyov iv&iaLTarai. oD? vvv v/xeh fyXaxravTes 
teal to evSat/jLov to iXevOepov, to S' iXevOepov to 
ev^rv^ov tepivavTes, /jlt] irepiopdaQe tov<; TroXe/M- 

5 teous teivSvvovs. ov yap ol teateoTrpayovvTes hiteaio- 
Tepov d^etSolev av tov fSiov, oh iXrrh ov/c eGTiv 
dyaOov, dXX* oh rj ivavTta peTa/3oXrj iv tgo £r}v 
6tl KLvSvveveTai /cal iv oh fxdXtaTa pueydXa tcl 

6 Siacf)€povTa, r\v tl TTTaiawcnv. aXyeivoTepa yap 
dvSpi ye <j)p6vrj/j,a exovTi rj fxeTa tov x fiaXa- 
KiGOryvai tedtewais rj 6 pL€Ta pcofirjs teal teoivrj*; 
iXirihos cifxa yiyvopLevos dvaiaOrjTos OdvaTos. 

XLTV. " Al oirep teal tol'9 T&vhe vvv TOteeas, 
oaot irdpeaTE, ov : oXo^vpofiat fiaXXov r) jrapa- iv TroXvTpoTrois yap %vfi(p opals iiri- 
crTavTai TpacpevTes' to c7 evTv%e<;, 2 o'l av tt}? 
evirpeireaTaTrj^ Xdywaiv, coo-irep oiSe fiev vvv, 
TeXevTrjs, vfiels Se Xvrnis, teal oh ivevSai/iovfjaai 
T€ 6 ySto? 6/jLOico<; teal ivTeXevTr)crat ^vve/uieTptjOi]. 

1 iv t<£, iii some MSS. before, in others after, /tei-a tov, 
deleted by Bredow. 

2 Hude reads To5e euTux eJ > following Abresch. 

BOOK II. xliii. i-xliv. i 

their power to give. For they gave their lives for 
the common weal, and in so doing won for themselves 
the praise which grows not old and the most dis- 
tinguished of all sepulchres — not that in which they 
lie buried, but that in which their glory survives in 
everlasting remembrance, celebrated on every occa- 
sion which gives rise to word of eulogy or deed of 
emulation. For the whole world is the sepulchre of 
famous men, and it is not the epitaph upon monuments 
set up in their own land that alone commemorates 
them, but also in lands not their own there abides in 
each breast an unwritten memorial of them, planted 
in the heart rather than graven on stone. Do you ,, 
therefore, now make these men your examples , and 
judging freedom to be happiness and cou rage to be 
freedom, be not too anxious about the dangers of 
war. For it is not those that are in evil plight who 
have the best excuse for being unsparing of their 
lives, for they have no hope of better days, but 
rather those who run the risk, if they continue to 
live, of the opposite reversal of fortune, and those to 
whom it makes the greatest difference if they suffer 
a disaster. For to a manly spirit more bitter is 
humiliation associated with cowardice than death 
when it comes unperceived in close company with 
stalwart deeds and public hopes. 

XLIV. " Wherefore, I do not commiserate the 
parents of these men, as many of you as are present 
here, but will rather try to comfort them. For they 
know that their lives have been passed amid manifold 
vicissitudes ; and it is to be accounted good fortune 
when men win, even as these now, a most glorious 
death — and you a like grief — and when life has been 
meted out to them to be happy in no less than to 



2 ^aXeirbv /xev ovv olBa irdOeiv ov, o)v teal TroXXdtcis 
efere virofivTjfiara iv aXXwv evrv^iat^, aU rrore 
teal avrol rjydXXecrde' teal Xvttt) ov% oiv civ t£<? /zt) 
Treipaadfievos dyaOcov arepiatajrac, aA.V ov av 

3 iOd<; yevo/jLCvos d(f>aipe0fj. Kaprepelv Be XPV Kai 
aXXcov rraiBcDv eXiriBi oi? en rfXitcia retcveocnv 
rroielaOat' IBia re yap rcov ovk ovrcov XyjOt) oi 
eiriyiyvoyievol ricriv ecrovrai, teal rfj rroXet Bi^oOev, 
€K re rod /jLtj ipr^fiovaOai teal da-fyaXelq, %vvoicrei' 
ov yap olov re i'crov re rj BUaiov ftovXeveaOai oi 
av pLT] teal rralBas etc rod opboiov Trapa/SaXXo/ievoL 

4 tavSvvevG)o-iv. oaoi 8' av iraprj^rjicare, rbv re 
rrXeova tcepSos ov r/vrv%elre (Slov rjyelaOe teal 
rovBe fipa^vv eaeaOai, teal rfj roiivBe evicXeia 
tcov(f)i%€o~de. rb yap ^iXonfiov dyijpcov fiovov, 
teal ovk iv t<w d\pei(p rrj$ rjXiKLas rb tcepSalveiv, 
oiairep rcves (paai, /idXXov repirei, dXXd rb 

XLV. " Tlaicrl S' av ocroi rwvBe rrdpeare rj 
d$eX(p0L<; 6pa> peyav rbv dywva (rbv yap ovk 
ovra diras etwOev iiraivelv), teal /jloXis dv tca@' 
vTrepftoXrjv dperrjs ov^ o/jLoIol, a\V oXiyw ^eipovs 

1 No one could be a member of the Boule or Senate till he 
was thirty, when he was almost certain to be married ; and, 
according to Deinarchus (§ 71), no man was allowed to speak in 
the Assembly until he had legitimate male issue (Zimmern). 

2 e.g !Simonide3. cf. Plut. Moral. 786 b: 2tuwui5r)s e\eye 
irphs tovs iyK<x\ovvras avTcp tyiXapyvpiav, Zti twv 6.Wu>v a7re- 



die in. It will be difficult, I know, to persuade 
you of the truth of this, when you will constantly be 
reminded of your loss by seeing others in the enjoy- 
ment of blessings in which you too once took de- 
light ; and grief, I know, is felt, not for the want of 
the good things which a man has never known, but 
for what is taken away from him after he has once 
become accustomed to it. But those of you who are 
still of an age to have offspring should bear up in 
the hope of other children ; for not only to many o£ 
you individually will the children that are born here- 
after be a cause of forgetfulness of those who are gone, 
but the state also will reap a double advantage — it 
will not be left desolate and it will be secure. For 
they cannot possibly offer fair and impartial counsel 
who, having no children to hazard, 1 do not have an 
equal part in the risk. But as for you who have 
passed your prime, count as gain the greater portion 
of your life during which you were fortunate and re- 
member that the remainder will be short ; and be 
comforted by the fair fame of these your sons. For 
the love of honour alone is untouched by age, and 
when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is 
not 'gain' as some say,' J that gives the greater 
satisfaction, but honour. 

XLV. " But for such of you here present as are 
sons and brothers of these men, I see the greatness of 
the conflict that awaits you — for the dead are always 
praised — and even were you to attain to surpassing 
virtue, hardly would you be judged, I will not say 

(TTepTj/xeVos Sta rh y?ipas tjSovwv virb /j.t<is €T« yrjpodoffKe^Tai, rrjs 
airb tov KtpSalveiv, Simonide* replied to those tvho charged him 
with lore of money, that, deprived by old age of other pleasures, 
he is still comforted by one, that of gain. 



tcpiOelre. <f)96vo<; yap to£? ^coctl 7T/30? to dvrl- 
7ra\ov, 1 to Se fir) epurohcov dvavraycovLarw evvoia 

2 " Et 8i fjL€ Set Kal yvvaiKeias ti aperr)?, oaai 
vvv ev yr\peia eaovrai, fivqad-rjvai, ftpayeia 
irapaiveaei dirav ar)f±ava). tt)? re yap virap^ov- 
0-77? fyvcrecDS /at) yelpoai yeveaOai v/jllv fjLeyaXrj 77 
86i;a Kal 779 av eir eXdyioTOV dperf)<; irepi fj 
-^royov ev Tot? dpaeai KXeos 77. 

XL VI. " FjiptjTaL Kal efiol Xoyw Kara rov 
vofiov oaa el^ov irpoafyopa, Kal epyqy ol Oairro- 
fievoi ra fiev iforj lee/eoo-firjVTai, ra 8e avrwv tou? 
7rat5a? to curb rovSe Srj/jLoo-la 77 ttoXis P^XP 1 V&V? 
Opetyet,, a)(f)e\i/JLOV crrecpavov rolaBe re Kal Tot? 
XenrofAevois rcov roiwvhe ayoovcov irpoTiOelaa' 
a6Xa yap oh Kelrai dperr)^ fieyiara, roh he Kal 

2 av$pe<> apiaroi iroXirevovGiv. vvv Se airoXo- 
(pvpd/jievoi ov TTpoaijKei eKaarro airtre^ 

XLVII. Toioa&e fiev 6 rd(f)o<; eyevero ev tw 
yeificovi tovtm' Kal hieXOovros avrov Trpcorov 

2 eVo? rov TToXefiov tovtov ereXevra. rod Se 6e- 
pov<$ evQbs dpyopbkvov YleXoirovvrjaLOi Kal ol %vfi- 
\Layoi Tfl 8vo jxkpr\ wairep Kal rb irpwrov ecre- 
fiaXov e? tt)v ' *At7 1 kt]V (Jiyelro Se Wpxl8ap,o<; 6 
ZevfjiSd/jLov, AaKehaifiovLwv /3aaiXev<;), Kal Ka6e- 

3 ^bfievoL ehrjovv rrjv yi)v. Kal bvrcov avrcov ov 

1 irphs rb avTiiraXov, the reading of ABFM[G] ; rhv avrl- 
ira\ov CE. Hude reads twv avmrdKaiv, after Croiset. 



BOOK II. xlv. i-xlvii. 3 

their equals, but even a little inferior. For there is 
envy of the living on account of rivalry, but that 
which has been removed from our path is honoured 
with a good-will that knows no antagonism. 

" If I am to speak also of womanly virtues, re- 
ferring to those of you who will henceforth be in 
widowhood, I will sum up all in a brief admonition : 
Great is your glory if you fall not below the standard 
which nature has set for your sex, and great also is 
hers of whom there is least talk among men whether 
in praise or in blame. 

XLVI. " I have now spoken, in obedience to the 
law, such words as I had that were fitting, and those 
whom we are burying have already in part also 
received their tribute in our deeds ; l besides, the 
state will henceforth maintain their children at the 
public expense until they grow to manhood, thus 
offering both to the dead and to their survivors a 
crown of substantial worth as their prize in such con- 
tests. For where the prizes offered for virtue are 
greatest, there are found the best citizens. And 
now, when you have made due lament, each for his 

own dead, depart." "_ J n ' 

XLVII. Such were the funeral ceremonies that took 
place during this winter, the close of which brought 

the first year of this war to an end. At the very ^ 

beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their 430 b.o 
allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before, 2 in- 
vaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son 
of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and 
establishing themselves proceedecTTo ravage the 
country. And before they had been many days in 

1 i.e. the honours shown them throughout the rest of the 
ceremony, descrihed in ch. xxxiv, as contrasted with the 
words of the eulogist. 2 cf. ch. x. 2. 




iroXXds irco rj/iepas iv rr} 'Attikt} r/ voaos irpoirov 
ijp^aro yeveaOai to?? ' 'Adrjvaiois, Xeyo/mevov p.ev 
teal TTporepov iroXXaxbcre iycaracrKijyjrai teal irepl 


ye Xol/jLOS ovBe <f)dopa ovtcd? dvOpcoircov ovBa/iov 
4 ifjuvrj/xoveveTO yeveaOai. ovre yap larpol tfp/covv 
rb irpoiTOV OepairevovTes dyvolq, aW avrol fid- 
Xiara kOvrjatcov oaw teal /jbdXiara Trpocrfjcrav, 
ovre aXXr/ dv6 panrela Tkyyi) ovBepuLa' oaa re 
7rpo? iepols ttcerevcrav rj fiavreloi^ teal to?? tolov- 
to*.? e^prjaavro, iravra dva>(f)eXi} rjv, TeXevTcovres 
re avrcov direaTTjaav vtto rov tcatcov viKcofxevoi. 

XLYIII. "Hpfaro Be rb fiev irpodrov, <w? Xe- 
yerai, i£ AWioiTLa^ tt)? virep Alyvirrov, eireiTa 
Be teal e? Aly vtttov teal Ai$w\v tcare^Tj teal iq 

2 tt]v /3aoriXea)<; yijv ttjv iroXXrjv. e? Be tyjv 'AOtj- 
vaiwv itoKlv e^airivaicds iveireae, teal rb Trpco- 
rov iv Tft) Tleipatel rjyjraro rcov dv0pco7rcov, coare 
tcai iXi^Orj vtt avrcov &)? ol UeXorrovvijcnoi 
(j>dp/iafca iafteftXyj/coiev e? rd cppeara' fcprjvai 
yap ovtto) rjaav avrbOt. varepov Be /cal e? 
rr)v avco ttoXlv dfyifcero teal eOvrjatcov ttoXXw 

3 fidXXov rjBrj. Xeyerw fiev ovv irepl avrov &)? 
e/cao-TO? yiyi>(D(TK€L ical larpbs teal IBuorrjs dfi 
orov et/co? rjv l yeveoQai avrb, ical Ta? air las 
aariva? vo/nL^ec roaavrrfs pLerafSoXi)*; itcavds 
elvar 2 eyco Be olov re iyiyvero Xe^co ical d<p 

0)V dv T£? CTKOTTCJV, €L 7T0T6 KoX ai)6 1<$ ilTilTeaOL, 

1 i\v : Hude deletes. 

2 hvvaniv is rb ixeTacrrriffat (TX^v, in the MSS. after elvai, 
deleted by Gesner ; Hude deletes inavas thai and is rb 
neraaTTiaai, with F. Mueller. 


BOOK II. xlvii. 1-xlviii. t 

Attica, the plague 1 began for the first time to show 
itself among the Athenians. It is said, indeed, to 
have broken out before in many places, both in Lemnos 
and elsewhere, though no pestilence of such extent 
nor any scourge so destructive of human lives is on 
record anywhere. For neither were physicians able 
to cope with the disease, since they at first had to treat 
it without knowing its nature, the mortality among 
them being greatest because they were most exposed 
to it, nor did any other human art avail. And 
the supplications made at sanctuaries, or appeals to 
oracles and the like, were all futile, and at last men 
desisted from them, overcome by the calamity. 

XLVIII. The disease began, it is said, in Ethiopia 
beyond Egypt, arid then descended into Egypt and 
Libya and spread over the greater part of the 
King's territory. Then it suddenly fell upon the 
city of Athens, and attacked first the inhabitants ot 
the Peiraeus, so that the people there even said that 
the Peloponnesians had put poison in their cisterns ; 
for there were as yet no public fountains there. But 
afterwards it reached the upper city also, and from 
that time the mortality became much greater. Now 
any one, whether physician or layman, may, each 
according to his personal opinion, speak about its 
probable origin and state the causes which, in his 
view, were sufficient to have produced so great a 
departure from normal conditions ; but I shall de- 
scribe its actual course, explaining the symptoms, 
from the study of which a person should be best able, 

1 It is perhaps impossible to identify the plague of Athens 
with any known disease, (irote describes it as an eruptive 
typhoid fever. It has perhaps more symptoms in common 
with typhus than with any other disease. 



fid\i<TT dv eypi rt irpoeiBco^ fir) dyvoeiv, ravra 
BrfKcoaco civtos re voo~i]cra<; Kal avrbs IBcov aXXovs 

XLIX. To p,ev yap eVo?, oo? cofioXoyecro i/e 
irdvrcov, {idXiara Br) i/celvo dvoaov e? ras dXXas 
dadeveias ervyyavev ov el Be ris /ecu irpovKafive 

2 ti, e? rovro rrdvra direKpiOr), tou? Be aXXovs arc 
ovhejJLLas TTpofydaetos, dXX' e^aL(j)V7]<; vyiels 6Wa? 
rrpcorov pukv rrj? fce<pa\r}$ Oep/nat la^vpal real rcov 
6<f>0a\fi<0V epvOrjjjLCLTa Kal cpXoycoaLS iXd/jifiave, 
Kal rd ivros, r) re cpdpv^ teal rj yXcoaaa, evOix; 
alfiarcoBrj rjv Kal irvevfia droirov Kal BvcrcoBes 

3 rjepiet' eireira ef avrcov irrapfibs real fipdyxos 
erreylyvero, kclI ev ov itoXXw ^pbvco Kareflaivev e? 
rd arrjOij 6 ttovos fierd /3?;^o? layvpoir zeal birore 
e? rrjv KapBlav o~ry]piJ;eiev, dvearpecpe re avrr)v. 
Kal diroKaOdpcreis %o\t}? irdaai ocrac virb larpcov 

4 covopaapuevai elalv iirrjcrav, Kal aural puera raXat- 
TTtopLas /AeydXrjs, Xvyg re roi? irXeloaiv eveirirrre 
K6V7) airacr/ibv ivBtBovaa Itr'xypov, to?? fiev fierd 
ravra Xcocf)i]cravra, Tot? Be Kal 7ro\A.w varepov. 

5 Kal rep fiev e^coOev dirrofievw rb 1 acopta ovr 
dyav Oepfibv r)v ovre ^Xcopov, dXX' vrrepvOpov, 
ireXurvov, tpXvKraivais /xiKpais Kal eXKetriv etjrjv- 
Otjkos' rd Be evrbs ovrcos eKaiero ware p.r\re rcov 
rrdvv Xeirrcov Ip-arLcov Kal acvBovcov rd<; eV^/SoXa? 
firjB 1 aXXo ri r\ yvpbvol dvkyecrQai, i)Biard re dv e? 
vBcop -^rv)(pbv a<f>as avrovs pnrreiv (koI 7roXXol 
rovro rcov r)pLeXy]p,evcov dvdpcorrcov Kal eBpaaav e? 
eppeara) rfj Biyfrr) diravarco %vveyop.evoi' Kal ev rep 
bfioLfp KaOeLcrrrjKeL ro re irXeov Kal eXaaaov iro- 

i Added by Hude. 


BOOK II. xlviii. 3-xlix. 5 

having knowledge of it beforehand, to recognize it 
if it should ever break out again. For I had the 
disease myself and saw others sick of it. 

XLIX. That year, as was agreed by all, happened 
to be unusually free from disease so far as regards the 
other maladies ; but if anyone was already ill of any 
disease all terminated in this. In other cases from 
no obvious cause, but suddenly and while in good 
health, men were seized first with intense heat of the 
head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes, and 
the parts inside the mouth, both the throat and the 
tongue, immediately became blood-red and exhaled 
an unnatural and fetid breath. In the next stage 
sneezing and hoarseness came on, and in a short 
time the disorder descended to the chest, attended 
by severe coughing. And when it settled in the 
stomach, that was upset, and vomits of bile of every 
kind named by physicians ensued, these also attended 
by great distress ; and in most cases ineffectual 
retching followed producing violent convulsions, 
which sometimes abated directly, sometimes not 
until long afterwards. Externally, the body was not 
so very warm to the touch ; it was not pale, but 
reddish, livid, and breaking out in small blisters and 
ulcers. But internally it was consumed by such a 
heat that the patients could not bear to have on 
them the lightest coverings or linen sheets, but 
wanted to be quite uncovered and would have liked 
best to throw themselves into cold water — indeed 
many of those who were not looked after did throw 
themselves into cisterns — so tormented were they 
by thirst which could not be quenched ; and it was 
all the same whether they drank much or little. 



6 tov. /cal r) diropia tov fir] rjavxafeiv teal r) dypv- 
TTvia eireKeLTo hid ttclvtos. Kal to aco/ia, ocrovirep 
ypovov /cal r) vocros aK/id^oiy ovk e/iapaivero, aXX 
dvTelye irapa 86^av rrj TaXanrojpia, xocrre rj Sie- 
chdeipovTO ol irXelaTOL ivaraloL Kal e/38ofiaioi)u7rb 
rod eVro? tcav/jLCLTOSjeTi exovris ti Suvd/iem, rj el 
Biacpvyoiev, eiriKaTiovTOs tov voarjfiaTOS e? Trjv 
KOiXiav kcu 6\kooo-€(q<; tc avTrj la"xypa$ eyyiyvo- 
fjLevrjs koI hiappoias djia d/cpaTOV eiri7ri7TT0vari<$ 
ol iroXXol vGTepov Sid Trjv daOeveiav 8ie(f)6eipovTo. 

7 Bie^rjei yap Sid ttclvtos tov adtfiaTO^ dvcoOev dp£d- 
fievov to iv tt) KecpaXfj irpcoTov ISpvOev kclkov, teal 
eo T£? etc tcov fieyiaTcov irepiyevocTO, tcov ye d/epco- 

8 Trjpiwv dvTiXrjyjn^ clvtov iireai]fiaivev' KaTeaKi]iTTe 
yap koX e? alBola teal e? d/cpa? ^etyoa? teal 7roSa?, 
teal iroXXol aTepLo-KOfievoL tovtcov Siecpevyov, el at 
6" o'l /cal tow 6<p0aXficov. tov<; Be Kal XrjOrj eXa/3e 
to irapavTiKa dvacrTavTas irdvTcov 6fioico$ Kal 
r)yv6r)crav creeds Te avTovs Kal tov? i7riT7]8eiov<;. 

L. Tevofievov yap Kpelacrov Xoyov to eZSo? tt}? 
voctov t<x T6 dXXa %a\e7ra)T€/3co9 rj KaTa Trjv dv- 
Opcoireiav cpvaiv TrpoakiriTTTev eKaaTco Kal iv TcoBe 
iBrjXcoae pdXicrTa aXXo ti ov rj tcov gvvTpocpcov tl' 
Ta yap opvea Kal TeTpdiroha oaa dv6 pcoircov dizTe- 
Tai 7roXXa)i> uTacpcov yevo/ievcov i) ov irpocrrjei r) 
2 yevadfxeva BiefyOeLpeTO. TeKfirjpiov Be* tcov pev 


BOOK II. xlix. 5-l. 2 

They were also beset by restlessness and sleeplessness 
which never abated. And the body was not wasted 
while the disease was at its height, but resisted sur- 
prisingly the ravages of the disease, so that when the 
patients died, as most of them did on the seventh or 
ninth day from the internal heat, they still had some 
strength left; or, if they passed the crisis, the 
disease went down into the bowels, producing there 
a violent ulceration, and at the same time an acute 
diarrhoea set in, so that in this later stage most of 
them perished through weakness caused by it. For 
the malady, starting from the head where it was first 
seated, passed down until it spread through the 
whole body, and if one got over the worst, it seized 
upon the extremities at least and left its marks 
there ; for it attacked the privates and fingers and 
toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, though 
some lost their eyes also. 1 In some cases the sufferer 
was attacked immediately after recovery by loss of 
memory, which extended to every object alike, so 
that they failed to recognize either themselves or 
their friends. 

L. Indeed the character of the disease proved such 
that it baffles description, the violence of the attack 
being in each case too great for human nature to 
endure, while in one way in particular it showed 
plainly that it was different from any of the familiar 
diseases : the birds, namely, and the fourfooted 
animals, which usually feed upon human bodies, 
either would not now come near them, though many 
lay unburied, or died if they tasted of them. The 
evidence for this is that birds of this kind became 

1 Evidently as the result of gangrene, due to stoppage of 
circulation This after-effect of typhus was of common oc- 
currence in the outbreak in the Balkans in 1915. 



roiovrwv opvidcov errLXeLyfns crafy-qs eyevero, rcai 


ol Be /cvves /xaXXov aiaOi^aiv irapelx ov rod airo- 
(Baivovros Bid rb ^vvBiairdaQai. 

LI. To fxev ovv v6o~>ifia, 7roXXa teal aXXa irapa- 
\lttqvtl aTO-nias, go? eKaarw ervyx av ^ ti Biafye- 
pbvrcos erepco irpbs erepov yiyvopievov, roiovrov rjv 
errl irav rrjv IBeav. koi dXXo irapeXvirei fear 
i/celvov rbv XP® V0V °vBev rdv elcoOorcov o Be koX 

2 yevoiTo, e? rodro ereXevra. edvycncov Be ol fiev 
dfieXeia, ol Be /cal irdvv Qepairevbpbevoi. ev re 
ovBev KarecTTT] ia/ma co? eliretv 6 ri XPV v Trpoacpe- 
povras axfceXecv (to yap rw gvvevey/cbv dXXov 

3 rodro efSXairre), acb/jid re avrap/ces ov ovBev Bie- 
(f)dvr) 7T/30? avrb lo~xvos Ttepi rj do~0eveLa$, dXXa 
irdvra ^vvrjpei ical rd irdarj Biairr] Oepairevop^evaj 

4 Betvorarov Be iravrbs r)v rod fca/cod rj re dOv/xLa, 
oirore Tt? aicrOoiro /cd/jivcov (777)09 yap ib dveX- 
Tncrrov evOvs rpairb\ievoi rfj yvcopbrj ttoXXw fidX- 
Xov TTpoievro o-cpds avrovs /cal ov/c dvTelx ov )> Kai 
on erepov dcfi erepov Oepaireia avairnirrXdixevoi 
tbo-irep rd 7rp6j3ara eOvycr/cop' /cal rbv irXelarov 

5 (f)06pov rodro evenoUi. etre yap firj ''deXoiev Be- 
Stores a\\?jXo£9 irpocnevai, dirooXXvvro iprjfMOi, 
teal oifclai iroXXal etcevooOqaav diropia rod Oepa- 
irevaovro^' elre rrpoaioiev, Bie^Oeipovro, Kal /id- 


BOOK II. l. 2-li. 5 

noticeably scarce, and they were no longer to be 
seen either about the bodies or anywhere else ; 
while the dogs gave a still better opportunity to 
observe what happened, because they live with 

LI. Such, then, was the general nature of the 
disease ; for I pass over many of the unusual symp- 
toms, since it chanced to affect one man differently as 
compared with another. And while the plague lasted 
there were none of the usual complaints, though if 
any did occur it ended in this. Sometimes death 
was due to neglect, but sometimes it occurred in spite 
of careful nursing. And no one remedy was found, 
I may say, which was sure to bring relief to those 
applying it — for what helped one man hurt another 
— and no constitution, as it proved, was of itself 
sufficient against it, whether as regards physical 
strength or weakness, 1 but it carried off all without 
distinction, even those tended with all medical 
care. And the most dreadful thing about the 
whole malady was not only the despondency of 
the victims, when they once became aware that 
they were sick, for their minds straightway yielded 
to despair and they gave themselves up for lost 
instead of resisting, but also the fact that they 
became infected by nursing one another and died 
like sheep. And this caused the heaviest mor- 
tality ; for if, on the one hand, they were restrained 
by fear from visiting one another, the sick perished 
uncared for, so that many houses were left empty 
through lack of anyone to do the nursing ; or if, on 
the other hand, they visited the sick, they perished, 

1 i.e. "no constitution was of itself strong enough to 
resist or weak enough to escape the attacks" (Jowett). 



Xiara oi dperrjs ri fierajroLOVfievor alayyvrj yap 
r)(f)€iBovv acfrcov avrdv iaiovre^ rrapd tou? <£t\ou?, 
iirel teal rds b\o<\>vpcrei<$ rcpv aTroycyvo/ievcov re- 
Xevrcovres teal oi olfceloi i^eteafivov vtto rov 7ro\\ov 
6 kclkov viKoofievot. eVl ifkeov £' o/ao)? oi hiarre- 
(fievyore? rov re Ovyo-Kovra teal rbv irovov/xevov 
(oktL&vto hia to irpoeihevai re teal avrol 77877 iv 
ra> dapcraXio) elvar SU yap rbv avrov, ware ical 
tereiveiv, ovte i7re\dfi/3avev. teal i/jLateapL&vro re 
vtto rCov aXkvv teal avrol t&> 7rapaxpv/ ia trepi- 
%ao£fc Kal e ' ? T0V £' TreLTa XP° V0V ^7rt'8o? n elxov 
KOU(f)r]<; iir)K av vrr dXkov voatjfLaros rrore en 

III. 'Eirieae 8' avrovs fiaXXov irpbs rw vrrdp- 
yovri TTOV(p teal f) !;vytcofii8?i etc rcjv dypcov e? to 

2 aarv, teal ovx rjaaov tou? iireXOovra^. ouciwv 
yap ovx v7rapxovaa)V, aX)C iv teaXvfiais Trviyrjpah 
wpa 6TOU5 hiairwfievcdv 6 (f>06pos iyiyvero ovhevl 
KoafMp, dWa teal vetcpol eV aWrjXois dirodvrj- 
cr/eovres etceivro teal iv rat? 6Soh iteaXivhovvro teal 
-rrepl Ta? tcpr)va<$ aTrdaas f)fu0vf}re<; rov vBaros 

3 iiriOvfiLa. rd re iepd iv oh ia/eyjvrjvro vetepwv 
irXea rjv, avrov ivairodvrjafcovrcov virepfiia'C.o- 
fievov yap rov teaKov oi avdpwnoi, ovte expvres 
tl yevwvrai, e? oXiywpiav irpdirovro teal iepwv 

4 Aral baioov opLOicos. vbfioi re irdvres ^vverapd- 
y6i)aav oh ixp&vro rrpbiepov rrepl Ta? racpds, 


BOOK II. li. 5-lii. 4 

especially those who made any pretensions to good- 
ness. For these made it a point of honour to visit 
their friends without sparing themselves at a time 
when the very relatives of the dying, overwhelmed 
by the magnitude of the calamity, were growing 
weary even of making their lamentations. But still 
it was more often those who had recovered who had 
pity for the dying and the sick, because they had 
learnt what it meant and were themselves by this 
time confident of immunity ; for the disease never 
attacked the same man a second time, at least not 
with fatal results. And they were not only con- 
gratulated by everybody else, but themselves, in the 
excess of their joy at the moment, cherished also a 
fond fancy with regard to the rest of their lives that 
they would never be carried off by any other disease. 
LII. But in addition to the trouble under which 
they already laboured, the Athenians suffered further 
hardship owing to the crowding into the city of the 
people from the country districts ; and this affected 
the new arrivals especially. For since no houses 
were available for them and they had to live in huts 
that were stifling in the hot season, they perished in 
wild disorder. Bodies of dying men lay one upon 
another, and half-dead people rolled about in the 
streets and, in their longing for water, near all the 
fountains. The temples, too, in which they had 
quartered fliemselves were full of the corpses of those 
who had died in them ; for the calamity which 
weighed upon them was so overpowering that men, 
not knowing what was to become of them, became 
careless of all law, sacred as well as profane. And 
the customs which they had hitherto observed re- 
garding burial were all thrown into confusion, and 



Wcltttov Be a)? e/eaaro^ eBvvaro. /eal 7roXXol e? 
avaiayyvTOvs 6r]Km irpdirovro airdvec roiv eiri- 
rrjBeiwv Bca to avxyovs rjBrj irpoTeOvdvai acjiLcnv 
eirl 7rvpa<; yap aXXorpias (frOdaavTes tou? vrjaav- 
Ta? ol puev iiriOevTes rov eavrcov ve/epbv vefrrjirrov, 
oi Be Kaiofievou aXXov eTrtftaXovTes aveoOev ov 
cf>epoiev dirfjaav. 

LIII. Tlpcorov re rjp^e teal e? raXXa rfj iroXev 
eirl irXeov dvopLias rb voarjfxa. paov yap eroXfia 
Tf? a irpbrepov direiepviTTeTO pb-q /ea9' rjBovrjv 
iroielv, dy)(io~7po$ov ttjv p,era/3oXr]v opcovres rcov 
re evBaipbbvwv /eal alfyviBLws Ovtjgkovtwv /eal rcov 
ovBev irporepov /ee/err]/jLevcov, evdvs Be rdfeeLvcov 

2 exoPTcov. ware Ta^eta? Ta? eirav peered /eat 77730? 
to repirvov tj^lovv iroielaOai, e(j>7]p,epa rd re cgo- 

3 /iara iea\ ra xpV/ jLara o/jlolws rjyovfievoi. real rb 
fiev TrporaXanrcopeiv 1 ra> Bo^avri /eaXw ovBeh irpo- 
0v/j,o<; r)V y aBrjXov vofxi^wv el irplv eii ainb eXdelv 
8ia<f)6aprjo-eTai, 6 rt Be r]Brj re rjBv iravTayoQev re 
e? avrb /eepBaXeov, rovro /eal /eaXbv /eal , %P 1 'l ~ i l JLOV 

4 KareaTT], Oecov Be <p>6f3o<; rj dvOpaoircov vofios ov- 
Bels direcpye, rb p-ev /epivovres ev 6p,oiu> /eal aefteiv 
/eal /irj e/e rov irdvTas opav ev law diroXXv puevovs , 
roiv Be dp,apT7]pLdrwv ovBels eXirl^wv p^e\pi rov 

1 With CE, the Other MSS. irpo(XTa\anrwpuv. 

1 i.e. they concealed the fact that they were acting after 
their own pleasure (the ^ being induced by the negative 
idea in airfKpvwTtTo). 


BOOK II. lii. 4-liii. 4 

they buried their dead each one as he could. And 
many resorted to shameless modes of burial because 
so many members of their households had already 
died that they lacked the proper funeral materials. 
Resorting to other people's pyres, some, anticipating 
those who had raised them, would put on their own 
dead and kindle the fire ; others would throw the 
body they were carrying upon one which was already 
burning and go away. 

LI 1 1. In other respects also the plague first in- 
troduced into the city a greater lawlessness. For 
where men hitherto practised concealment, that 
they were not acting purely after their pleasure, 1 
they now showed a more careless daring. They 
saw how sudden was the change of fortune in the 
case both of those who were prosperous and sud- 
denly died, and of those who before had nothing 
but in a moment were in possession of the pro- 
perty of the others. And so they resolved to get 
out of life the pleasures which could be had 
speedily and would satisfy their lusts, regarding their 
bodies and their wealth alike as transitory. And 
no one was eager to practise self-denial in prospect 
of what w r as esteemed honour, 2 because everyone 
thought that it was doubtful whether he would live 
to attain it, but the pleasure of the moment and 
whatever was in any way conducive to it came to be 
regarded as at once honourable and expedient. No 
fear of gods or law of men restrained ; for, on the 
one hand, seeing that all men were perishing alike, 
they judged that piety and impiety came to the same 
thing, and, on the other, no one expected that he 

2 Or, reading TrpoaTaXanruptly, "to take trouble about what 
was esteemed honour." 



Blkt/v yeveaOai fiiovs av rrjv ri/iwplav dvriBovvai, 
ttoXv Se fjuei^co rr/v 7]8rj Kare^fr/fyicr /levr/v afycov 
eTTLKpe/xao-Qr/vai, r)v irplv e/xireaelv el/cos elvai rov 
(3iov to drroXavaai. 

LIV. Toiovrw fiev Tradei ol 'KOr/valoi irepLire- 
aovres eirce^ovro, dvOpcorrcov t evSov dvr.aKovrcov 

2 Kal yr)<$ €%(o Sr)0VfjL6P7}<;. ev Se ra> kcucu> ola el/cbs 
dve/ivr/aOr/aav Kal rovhe rov eirovs, (fydaKOvres ol 
nrpeafivrepoi irdXai aZeaOai " f/ Hf ei Acopia/cbs rro- 

3 Xe/xo? Kal Xot/ibs d/x aura)." iyevero fxev ovv ept? 
Tot? avOpcoTTOLS /xr) Xoi/xbv wvo/xdadai ev tc5 eirei 
vtto rcov rraXaitov, dXXa Xi/xbv, iviKr/ae Se iirl rov 
irapovros €lkotco<; Xoc/xbv elprjo~0ar ol yap avflpco- 
iroi 7T/30? a eiraayov rr/v /xvq/xr/v eirotovvro. rjv 
Se ye ol/xau irore a\Xo<; ir6\e/xo<z KaraXd/3r) Aoy- 
piKO? rovhe varepos Kal %v/x/3rj yeveaOai Xi/xov, 

4 Kara to €lko<; oi/to)? acrovrai. fivr]fnj he iyevero 
Kal rov AaKehac/xovlcov ^ptjcrrrjplov rots elSocriv, 
ore eTTepoor&cnv avrols rov Oebv el %pr] iroXe/xelv 
avelXe Kara Kpdro<; iroXe/xovcn vlktjv eaecrOai, Kal 

5 avrbs e<pr} %vXXi]y\rea6ai. ire pi /xev ovv rov XPV~ 
arr/piov ra yiy vb/xeva f/Ka^ov 6/xola elvar icrfte- 
f3Xr)/corcov he rwv HeXoTrovvrjaucov r) voao<; i'/p^aro 
eudv<;. Kal e? /xev YleXorrbvvi/aov ovk iar/XOev, o 
ri Kal d^tov elirelv, iTrevei/xaro he 'A#/;Va? /xev 

1 cf. I. cxviii. 3. 

BOOK II. liii. 4-liv. 5 

would live to be called to account and pay the penalty 
of his misdeeds. On the contrary, they believed that 
the penalty already decreed against them, and now 
hanging over their heads, was a far heavier one, and 
that before this fell it was only reasonable to get 
some enjoyment out of life. 

LIV. Such then was the calamity that had befallen 
them by which the Athenians were sore pressed, 
their people dying within the walls and their land 
being ravaged without. And in their distress they 
recalled, as was natural, the following verse which 
their older men said had long ago been uttered : 

"A Dorian war shall come and pestilence with it." 

A dispute arose, however, among the people, some 
contending that the word used in the verse by the 
ancients was not Xot/xo?, " pestilence," but At/td?, 
"famine," and the view prevailed at the time that 
" pestilence " was the original word ; and quite 
naturally, for men's recollections conformed to their 
sufferings. But if ever another Dorian war should 
visit them after the present war and a famine 
happen to come with it, they would probably, I fancy, 
recite the verse in that way. Those, too, who were 
familiar with it, recalled that other oracle given to the 
Lacedaemonians, when, in answer to their inquiry 
whether they should go to war, the god responded 
that if they "warred with all their might victory 
would be theirs," adding that he himself would 
assist them. 1 Now so far as the oracle is concerned, 
they surmised that what was then happening was 
its fulfilment, for the plague broke out immediately 
after the Peloponnesians had invaded Attica ; and 
though it did not enter the Peloponnesus to any 
extent, it devastated Athens most of all, and next 



pdXicrra, erreira Be Kal rcov aXXcov ^copicov ra 
iroXvavOpcorrorara. ravra pukv ra Kara rrjv voctov 

LV. Ol Be TleXoirovvrjaioi, iTreiBrj erepLov rb 
irehioVyiraprfkOov e? rrjvTldpaXov yrjv KaXovpevrjv 
l^expi Aavpeiov, ov ra dpyvpeia pueraXXd eanv 
'AOrjvaiois. real irptorov p,ev erepiov ravrrjv y 

7T/30? YieXoTTOVVTjaOV Opa, €7T€lTa Be TTjV 7TyOO? 

2 TLvfioidv re fcal "AvBpov rer pa p, pukvyv. UepifcXrjs 
Be o~rparr)yb<; cov ical Tore irepl piev rod pur) eire^L- 
evai rovs AQr\vaiov<$ rrjv avrrjv yvcopur/v el%ev 
coairep /cat ev rfj irporepa, eo-ftoXy. 

LYI. "Etj 5' avrcov ev tw ireBico ovrcov, irplv 
e? rrjv rrapaXiav eXOelv, ifcarbv vecov eirLirXovv 
rfj YieXoirovvrjcrcp Trapecr/ceud^ero, /cal eirei^r} 

2 erolpua yv, dvrjyero. rjye 8' errl rcov vecov oirXiras 
y AOr^vaicov rerpaKia-^iXiov^ Kal iirireas rpiaico- 
ctlovs ev vavalv iTnraycoyols rrpcorov rbre Ik rcov 
rraXaicov vecov rroiyOelaai^' gvvear parevovro Be 

3 Kal Xtcn Kal Aeafiioi irevrrjKOvra vavalv. ore Be 
dvrjyero rj arparid avrrj 'Adtjvalcov, UeXo7rov- 
vrjalov^ KareXtiTov rr)<; 'ArriKr)<; ovras ev rfj 

4 irapaXia. dcpiKopevoi Be e? ^KiriBavpov rr)<; IIeX.o- 
irovvijaov erepuov rfj<; 7779 rrjv iroXXrjv, Kal 77-/30? 
rrjv itoXiv irpoaftaXovres e'9 eXirlBa puev rjXOov 

5 rod eXeiv, ov puevroi irpovyooprjae ye. dvayayo- 
puevot Be eK rrjs 'ETriBavpov erepov rrjv re Tpotyj- 
vlBa yrjv Kal 'AXidBa Kal 'Fjpp.iovlBa' can Be 
ravra irdvra emQaXdaaia t>}? YleXorrovvi'jaov. 

6 apavres Be dir avrcov dcpLKOvro €? Upaacds, rrjs 


BOOK II. liv. s-lvi. 6 

to Athens the places which had the densest popula- 
tion. So much for the history of the plague. 

LV. The.Peloponnesians, after ravaging the pla"ifl7 
advanced into the district called Paralus 1 as far as 
Laurium, where are the silver mines of the Athe- 
nians. And first they ravaged that part of this 
district which looked towards the Peloponnesus, and 
afterwards the part facing Euboea and Andros. But 
Pericles, who was general, still held to the same 
policy as during the earlier invasion, insisting that 
the Athenians should not take the field against 

LVI. But before they had left the plain and entered 
the Paralus, Pericles had begun to equip a fleet of a 
hundred ships to sail against the Peloponnesus, and 
when all was ready he put to sea. He took with 
him on the ships four thousand Athenian hoplites 
and three hundred cavalry in horse-transports, then 
employed for the first time, which had been made 
out of the old galleys. The Chians and Lesbians 
also took part in the expedition with fifty ships. 
And when this armament of the Athenians put to 
sea, the Peloponnesians whom they left in Attica 
were already in the Paralian district. On reaching 
I^pidaurus in the Peloponnesus the Athenians ra- 
vaged most of that land ; they also attacked the city, 
but, though they at first had hopes of taking it, they 
did not succeed. Then, leaving Epidaurus, they went 
to sea again, and ravaged the territory of Troezen > 
Halieis, and Hermione, which are all on the Pelo- 
ponnesian coast. Sailing next from this region they 

1 The plain referred to was that about Athens, while the 
Paralian district was the sea-coast, or south-eastern part, 
terminating in the promontory of Sunium, 



AaKCDvi/cr)<; iroXtapa imQaXdaaiov, teal rrj? T€ 
7/79 ereyuov fcal avro rb rroXiapia elXov teal irrop- 
Orjcrav. ravra he rronqcravre^ eV olkov dveyd>- 
prjaav. tou? he HeXoTrovvqcriovs ouKert KareXaftov 
iv rfj 'ArTLfcf} ovras, a\)C dvaKeywpy)Kora^. 

LVII. "Oaov he y^povov oi re UeXoirovvrjcnoi 
fjcrav iv rfj yfj rfj ' 'Adrjvaicov teal oi *A07jvaioi 
iarpdrevov iirl roiv vecov, r) voo~o<; ev re rfj ar pa- 
ria tovs ' 'Adrjvaiovs eepOetpe teal iv rfj iroXei, tocrre 
Kal i\e)(6r) 7-01)9 YieXoirovvrjalov^ heieravras rb 
voa7]fjLa, &>? iirvvOdvovro roiv avropoXeov on iv 
rfj TroXet eirj Kal Odirrovra^ ci/xa jjerOdvovro, 

2 daaaov i/c t^9 yffc i^eXOelv. rfj he ierfioXfj ravrrj 
irXelerrov re j^povov ive\xeivav Kal rrjv yijv iraerav 
ere/iov i)i±epa<; yap reaaapaKovra fidXiara iv rfj 
yfj rfj 'Arrucf} iyevovro. 

LVIII. Tov h* avrov Oepovs " Ayvcov 6 Niklov 
Kal K\eo7ro/z7ro? Y^Xeiviov, ^varpdrrjyoi ovres 
TlepiKXeov?, \af36vres rrjv errpanav fj7rep iKeivos 
i^pjjeraro icrrpdrevcrav evOvs eVl Xc/X«:i8ea? toi)<>' 
iirl SpaKr]<; Kal Tlorelhaiav en iroXiopKov/jievyjv, 
dcpLKo/ievoi he firj^avd^ re rfj Tloreihaia, Trpocre- 

2 epepov Kal iravrl rpoireo iiTeipCdVTO eXelv. irpov- 
X^pet, he avrols ovre rj a r [peGi<; rrjs 7ro\ea)9 ovre 
raXXa rtj<; TrapadKevr)^ afta)?' i-TTLyevofxev^ yap 
77 vocros ivravOa hrj irdvv iirieae tou? ' A6r}- 
vaious, <p6eipovera rrjv err par Lav, eoerre Kal rovs 
irporepovs arpartcora^ voaijaat raiv 'AOrjvaleov 
curb tj/9 %vv " Ayvcov 1 errpana<; iv rep rrpb rod 

1 On the expedition against the Peloponnesian coasts, cj. 
ch. lvi. 3 cf. 1. lxiv. 


BOOK II. lvi. 6-lviii. 2 

came to Prasiae, ,a town on the coast of Laconia, 
where they not only ravaged parts of the country, 
but also captured the town itself and pillaged it. 
After they had completed these operations they went 
back home, where they found that the Peloponne- 
sians were no longer in Attica but had retired. 

LVII. During this entire period, while the Pelo- 
ponnesians were in Attica and the fleet of the Athe- 
nians was on the expedition, the plague was making 
havoc among the Athenians, both in their fleet and 
in the city. The statement was therefore made that 
the Peloponnesians left Attica in haste because they 
were afraid of the disease, since they not only heard 
from deserters that it was in the city, but also could 
see them burning their dead. In this invasion, how- 
ever, they remained in Attica longer than at any 
other time, and also ravaged the entire country ; 
indeed they were in Attica almost forty days. 

LVI II. In the same summer Hagnon son ot 
Nicias and Cleopompus son of Clinias, colleagues 
of Pericles, taking the armament which he had 
employed, 1 at once set out on an expedition 
against the Chalcidians in Thrace and against Poti- 
daea,' which was still under siege, 2 and on their 
arrival they brought siege -engines to bear upon 
Potidaea, and tried in every way to take it. But no 
success commensurate with the appointments of the 
expedition attended their efforts, either in their at- 
tempt to capture the city or otherwise ; for the 
plague broke out and sorely distressed the Athenians 
there, playing such havoc in the army that even the 
Athenian soldiers of the first expedition, 3 who had 
hitherto been in good health, caught the infection 

3 The 3,000 soldiers of the first expedition ; cf. ch. xxxi. 2 
and i. lxi. 4. 



y^povw vyiaivovra?. Qoppiwv he Kal oi e^aKoaioi 
3 koX yiXioi ovk6tc rjoav irepl XaXfftSea?. 6 p,ev 
ovv " Ayvcov dve^cop7](T€ rals vavalv e? ras *K6r)- 
vas, diro T€T pa/CMTXiXicov oirXirwv %Aiou? teal 
7T€VT7]Kovra rfj vocra) airoXecras ev TeacrapaKovra 
fidXiara rjfiipaw oi Be irporepoi aTpartcorai, 
Kara yoapav pevovres irroXiopKovv ttjv Uorei- 

LIX. Mera Be ttjv Bevrepav eo~{3oXr)v tcov 
TIeXoTrovvrjcriGdV ol ' AQ-qvaloi, a)? rj T€ yrj clvtcov 
ererp,r]TO to Bevrepov Kal r) v6o~o<; eVe/cetTO dp, a 

2 Kal 6 TroXepos, rjXXoiwvTO Ta? yvcop,a<;, Kal tov 
p,ev HepifcXea ev alrta elypv go? ireiaavTa a<f)d$ 
7ro\e/ue?v Kal Bl etcelvov rah i;vp.(f)opai<; irepi- 
7r67rTco/toT€9, 7T/00? Be tov? Aa/ce&aip,ovlov<; wp- 
p,rjvTO ^vy^wpelv Kal 7rpeo-/3ei<; Tivas irep,ylravTe<; 
a)? avTovs dirpaKTOi eyevovro. iravrayodev re 
TV yvcopur] diropoL Ka6eaTy]KOTe<; eveKeivTo rq> 

3 UepiKXet. 6 Be opcov avrovs 7rpo? rd irapovra 
yjaXeiraivovTas Kal irdvra 7rotovvra<; direp avrb? 
rfkin^e, gvXXoyov iroirjaa^ (eVi 8' earpar^yei) 
eftovXero Oapavvai re Kal array ay oav to opyi^o- 
p,ei>ov t^? yvdipLrjs 737)09 to rjiricorepov Kal dBe- 
earepov KaTaarrjaar rrapeXOcov Be eXe^e rotdBe. 

LX. " Kal TrpocrBexop>ev(p p,oi ra tT;? opyP/s 
vp,0)V e? pL€ yeyevrjrai (alaOdvopai yap ras atria*;) 
Kal eKKXtjalav tovtov eveKa %vvi]yayov, oVa)? 
vTTopvi]G(jd Kal fiep^cDpai el ti p.)] opOoos rj ifiol 


from Hagnon's troops. Phormio, however, and his 
sixteen hundred men, were no longer in Chalcidice. 1 
Accordingly Hagnon took his fleet back to Athens, 
having lost by the plague in about forty days one 
thousand and fifty out of a total of four thousand 
hoplites ; but the soldiers of the former expedition 
remained where they were and continued the siege 
of Potidaea. 

LIX. After the second invasion of the Peloponne- 
sians the Athenians underwent, a change of feeling, 
now that their land had been ravaged a second time 
while the plague and the war combined lay heavily 
upon them. They blamed Pericles for having per- 
suaded them to go to war and held him responsible 
for the misfortunes which had befallen them, and 
were eager to come to an agreement with the Lace- 
daemonians. They even sent envoys to them, but 
accomplished nothing. And now, being altogether 
at their wits' end, they assailed Pericles. And when 
he saw that they were exasperated by the present 
situation and were acting exactly as he had himself 
expected, he called a meeting of the assembly — for 
he was still general — wishing to reassure them, and 
by ridding their minds of resentment to bring them 
to a milder and less timorous mood. So he came 
forward and spoke as follows : 

LX. " I have been expecting these manifestations 
of your wrath against me, knowing as I do the causes 
of your anger, and my purpose in calling an assembly 
was that I might address to you certain reminders, 
and remonstrate if in any case you are either angry 

1 cf. i. lxiv. 2. Phormio's departure must have occurred 
before the events described in ch. xxxi. 2, but is nowhere 

VOL. I. 



2 ^aXeiraivere r) rah ^Vficpopal? elfcere. iya) yap 
r)yovfiai TTokiv TrXeiw ^vfiiraaav opdovfievrjv axfre- 
\eiv tovs IBuoTas r) kclO' eKacrrov rcov ttoKltwv 

3 evirpayovaav, dOpoav Be a<^aWofievr)v. kclXcos 
fiev yap (f>ep6fievo<; dvr)p to /cad* eavrbv Bia^>6eipo- 
fievrjs rrjs TrarpLBos ovBev r)acrov ^vvairoWvrai, 
KCLKOTvy^oiv Be ev evTvyovarf noWa) fiaXXov 

4 Biaaco^eTai. oTrore ovv ttoXis fiev ra$ IBLas 
%up,(f)apas oia re (frepeiv, el? Be eKaaros rd^ e/ceLvr}? 
dBvvaros, 7TW5 ov ^pr) ttclvtcls dfivveiv avrfj, teal 
fir) o vvv vfiels Bpare, ral$ tear ol/cov icaico- 
Trpayiais e kit eirXriy fiev ot rod kolvov tt}? awTrjpias 
a$>ieo~6e, Kal ifie re rov irapatveaavTa iroXefielv 
Kal vfias avrovs ol ^vveyvcore Bl alria? ^ere. 

5 Kairot ifiol tolovtw dvBpl opyi^eade 09 ovBevbs 
Tjcrcrcov oXofiau elvai yvoovai re ra Beovra Kal 
ep/irjvevo-ai, ravra, <j)iX67roXi<; re Kal xpr}fid r Twv 

6 Kpelaacov. 6 re yap yvovs Kal fir) o~a(f>cb<; BiBdgas 
ev t(T(p Kal el fir) eve6vfii]0r}' 6 re e\wv dfKporepa, 
rfi Be iroXei Bvavovs, ovk av 6fioico<; ri oIk€lo)<; 
<f>pd£or irpoaovTos Be Kal rovBe, yjufffiaai Be 
viKWfievov, ra ^vfiiravra rovrov evo<; av 7tcoXoito. 

7 coar et fiov Kal fieaa><; rjyovfievoi fidXXov erepcov 
irpoaelvai avrd iroXefielv eTreicrOrjTe, ovk av 
etVoTQ)? vvv rov ye dBiK€LV alriav <f)epolfir)v. 


BOOK II. lx. 1-7 

with me or are giving way to your misfortunes with- 
out reason. For in my j ud gment a state confers a 
greater benefit upon its private citizens when as 
a whole commonwealth it is successful, than when 
it prospers as regards the individual but fails as a 
community. For even though a man flourishes in 
his own private affairs, yet if his country goes to 
ruin he perishes with her all the same ; but if he is 
in evil fortune and his country in good fortune, he is 
far more likely to come through safely. Since, then, 
the state may bear the misfortunes of her private 
citizens but the individual cannot bear hers, surely 
all men ought to defend her, and not to do as you 
are now doing — proposing to sacrifice the safety of 
the commonwealth because you are dismayed by the 
hardships you suffer at home, and are blaming both 
me who advised you to make war and yourselves who 
voted with me for it. And yet I, with whom you 
are angry, am as competent as any man, I think, 
both to determine upon the right measures and to 
expound them, and as good a patriot and superior to 
the influence of money. For he who determines 
upon a policy, and fails to lay it clearly before others, 
is in the same case as if he never had a conception 
of it ; and he who has both gifts, but is disloyal to 
his country, cannot speak with the same unselfish 
devotion ; and if he have loyalty also, but a loyalty 
that cannot resist money, then for that alone every- 
thing will be on sale. If, therefore, when you al- 
lowed me to persuade you to go to war, you believed 
that I possessed these qualities even in a moderate 
degree more than other men, it is unreasonable that 
I should now bear the blame, at any rate, of wrong- 



LXI. " Kal yap oU p-ev appeal? yeyevijTai 
raXXa ev-rvyovat, 7roXXrj avoid iroXe/irjaar ei 6" 
avayxalov yjv rj el^avras evOv<; Tot? ireXas vira- 
Kovaai i) KivSwevaavra*; irepiyeveaQai, 6 (frvycov 


iya) /xev 6 avros elpa Kal ovk vp,eU Se 
/lera/SaXXere, iTrecSt] £vvi/3r) vpiv ireiaOi^vai \xkv 
cucepaiois, fierafieXeiv he KaKovp,ivoi<>, Kal tov 
6/jLov Xoyov iv tu> vfjuerepw daOevel t/}? yva)p,T]S purj 
bpOov (paiveo~6ai, hioTi to fiev Xvirovv eye 1 77877 
ri]V a'taOyjaiv €/cdarqj, t?}? Se oj^eXta? direaTiv 
en, f) SijXcocris aTraat,, Kal p,eTa/3oXri<; jxeydXr]^, 
Kal TavTT]? e'l oXiyov, i/jLireaovar]<; Taireivr) v/jlcdv 

3 1) hidvoia eyxaprepelv a eyvcore. SovXoi yap 
(frpovrjfia to alipvtBiov Kal airpoaBoKTjTov Kal to 
7rXeLo~T(p TrapaXoyco ^vfifialvov i)puv irpos to£? 
aXXois ov% r\KLGTa Kal Kara rrjv voaov yeyevijTac. 

A o/jLcds Be ttoXlv p,eydXyv oiKOvvras Kal iv i]0eaiv 
avTiiraXois avrfj reOpap/ievov<; XP e ^ v KCLl ? u / u '" 
<f)opals rals peyiarat^ iOeXeiv vcf)LcrTacr0ai Kal 
TrjV dtJLcocriv fir) d(pavL^€iv (iv law yap 01 dvOpwiroi 
BiKaiovcrL Trj? T€ virap-yovcri)^ 86^rj<; alriacrOai 
ocrTf? paXaKia iXXeirrei Kal rrfi fir] irpoar)KOvar)^ 
fiiaelv rbv Opaavrrjri 6peyop,evoi>), diraXyrja avTas 

1 Described by Pericles in the Funeral Oration, chs. 


BOOK II. lxi. 1-4 

LXI. u For though I admit that going to war is 
always sheer folly for men who are free to choose, 
and in general are enjoying good fortune, yet if the 
necessary choice was either to yield and forthwith 
submit to their neighbours' dictation, or by accepting 
the hazard of war to preserve their independence, 
then those who shrink from the hazard are more 
blameworthy than those who face it. For my part, 
I stand where I stood before, and do not recede from 
my position ; but it is you who have changed. For 
it has happened, now that you are suffering, that you 
repent of the consent you gave me when you were 
still unscathed, and in your infirmity of purpose my 
advice now appears to you wrong. The reason is 
that each one of you is already sensible of his 
hardships, whereas the proof of the advantages is 
still lacking to all, and now that a great reverse has 
come upon you without any warning, you are too 
dejected in mind to persevere in your former re- 
solutions. For the spirit is cowed by that which 
is sudden and unexpected and happens contrary 
to all calculation ; and this is precisely the experi- 
ence you have had, not only in other matters, but 
especially as regards the plague. Nevertheless, see- 
ing that you are citizens of a great city and have 
been reared amid customs which correspond to her 
greatness, 1 you should willingly endure even the 
greatest calamities and not mar your good fame. 
For as all men claim the right to detest him who 
through presumption tries to grasp a reputation to 
which he has no title, so they equally claim a right 
to censure him who through faintheartedness fails to 
live up to the reputation he already enjoys. You 
should, rather, put away your grief for private ills 



Be ra 'IBia rod kolvov rf}<; acorripias dvTiXap,/3d- 

LXII. "Tov Be TTOvov tov Kara tov Tr6Xep.ov, 
fir] yev?]rai re ttoXv? Kal ovBev pLaXXov irepiyevoa- 
fieda, dpKeiTco jxev vplv Kal eiceiva ev oh aXXore 
TroWd/ci? ye Br) direBeL^a ovk opOS)? avrbv vtto- 
nnevofievov, BrjX(oo-(o Be Kal r68e, 6 fioi Bo/celre 
ovr avTol 7ra)7rore evdvp,7]0r}vai virdpyov vplv 
pueyeOovs irepi e? ttjv dpyiiv °vt ^jcd ev rot? irplv 
Xoyow ovB* av vvv e^prjadpirjv KoparwBearepav 
e^ovTL ttjv irpocnroirjcjLv, el per) KaTaTreTTXrjypLevovs 

2 vpa$ irapa to etVo? ecopcov. oleoQe p\v yap tcov 
£v pp,dyaiv pLovcov ap%eiv, €70) Be dirofyaLva) Bvo 
fiepcov T(hv e? ^prjaiv (f>avepcbvj yf)$ teal OaXdaar)^, 
tov erepov vp,as iravrbs Kvpiwrdrovs ovras, ecj)' 
oaov re vvv vefieade teal rjv eVt irXeov ftovXrjOrjTe' 
teal ovk ear iv Saris rfj virap^ovar) irapaaKevf) 
tov vavTitcov TrXeovras u/xa? ovre ftacriXevs ovre 
aXXo ovBev e6vo$ twv ev tS> irapovrc KQ)Xvcret>* 

3 ware ov Kara tt)v twv ol/cioov Kal tt)<; yfjs %peiaVj) 
<bv fjieydXcov vopLL^eTe io-repr/adai, avrrj i) Bvvapus 
(fraLverar ovB 1 etVo? ^aXeiroi^ cfrepeiv avrcov fiaX- 
Xov i) ov ktjttlov Kal eyKaXXcoTuapLa ttXovtov 
7r/)0? ravrrjv vopLaavra? oXiyooprjaai, Kal yvwvai 
eXevOeplav p,ev, rjv avTiXapufiavopuevoi avrr)<; Bia- 
acoacopev, paBlcos Tavra dvaXrjy^opievrjv, dXXcov Be 

1 cf. ch. xiii and L cxl-cxliv. 


BOOK II. lxi. 4-lxii. 3 

and devote yourselves to the safety of the common- 

LXII. "As to the hardships involved in this war, 
and your misgivings lest they prove very great and 
we succumb after all, let those arguments suffice 
which T have advanced on many other occasions x in 
order to convince you that your fears are groundless. 
But there is one point I propose to lay before you 
on which, 1 think, you have never yourselves as yet 
reflected, in spite of the advantage it gives you as 
regards your empire and its greatness, and which I 
have never previously dealt with in my speeches, 
and should not have done so now — for it makes a 
somewhat boastful claim — had I not seen that you 
are unreasonably dejected. You think that it is only 
over your allies that your empire extends, but I 
declare that of two divisions of the world which lie 
open to man's use, the land and the sea, you hold 
the absolute mastery over the whole of one, not 
only to the extent to which you now exercise it, 
but also to whatever fuller extent you may choose; 
and there is no one, either the Great King or 
any nation of those now on the earth, who will 
block your path as you sail the seas with such a 
naval armament as you now possess. This power, 
therefore, is clearly not to be compared with the 
mere use of your houses and fields, things which you 
value highly because you have been dispossessed of 
them ; nor is it reasonable that you should fret about 
them, but you should make light of them, regarding 
them in comparison with this power as a mere flower- 
garden or ornament of a wealthy estate, and should 
recognize that freedom, if we hold fast to it and 
preserve it, will easily restore these losses, but let 



V7rafcovcra<Ti /cal rd Trpo/ce/crrjfieva 1 (faXelv ekaa- 
(TovaOac, Toyv re Trarepwv fir) j(eipovs kclt dfi(f)6- 
repa (fiavPjvcu, ol fierd ttovcov kcu ou ^ap' akkcov 
Be^dfievoi Karea\ov re /cal irpoairL Siaaaoaavres 
irapeBocrav vficv avrd {alayj,ov Be ey^ovra^ d§ai- 
pedrivai r) fcroofievovs drvyniaai), levai Be rols 
e)(dpoZ<; ofioae fir/ (ppovi]fiaTi fiovov, dXkd /cal 

4 /caTCUppovrj/jLciTij avyr\fia fiev yap /ecu duo dfia- 
6ias evTV^ovs kcu Seiko* tlvl eyyiyverai, /cara- 
$p6vr)(ji<z Be o? dv /cal yvoofirj TTiarevr) tcov ivavrlcov 

5 Trepie}>ew> o rjfilv virdpyei.^ /cat rr)v rokfiav dirb 
ti}? ofioias tu^?7? r) tjvveo-is e/c rod vireptypovos 
i^ypcoTepav irapeyeiai, ekTTiBi re rjacrov irurrevei, 
77? ev tQ> diropw 7) lady's, yvcofiy Be dirb rebv virap- 
^ovrcov, 77? {SeftaLOTepa r) irpbvoia, 

LXIII. " T779 re 7r6kea)s v/ia<z et/eo? tw rifiw- 
fievo) dirb rov dpyeiv, wirep diravre^ dydXkeade, 
fiorjOelv, /cal fir) fyevyeiv tou? itovovs rj fiJiBe rd? 
Tifids Sico/ceiv fir/Be vofiiaai irepl evbs fiovov, Bov- 
Aeta? dvr eXevOepias, dyu>vl%ea6ai, dXkd /cal 
dpx~)S o-Tepyjaecos /cal klvBvvov d)v ev rfj dpyjr) dirr)- 
2 ^OeaOe. 97? ovB* e/co~Tr)vai ert i/fitv eariv, eX tls 
/cal roSe ev T(p irapovn SeBiaos dirpayfiocrvvr) 

1 So most editors with Gmc 2 ; all other MSS. irpoveKTr)- 
/u.4va except M irpoaKeKTH]uiva. 


BOOK II. lxii. 3-LX111. 2 

men once submit to others and even what has been 
won in the past * has a way of being lessened. 
You must therefore show yourselves not inferior 
in either of these two respects to your fathers, who 
by their own labours, and not by inheritance, not 
only acquired but also preserved this empire and 
bequeathed it to you (and it is a greater disgrace 
to let a possession you have be taken away than 
it is to attempt to gain one and fail) ; and you 
must go to meet your enemies not only with con- 
fidence in yourselves, but with contempt for them. 
For even a coward, if his folly is attended with good 
luck, may boast, but contempt belongs only to the 
man who is convinced by his reason that he is superior 
to his opponents, as is the case with us. And, wher e 
fortune is impartial, the result of this feeling of con- 
tempt - is~t(T~render courage more effective through 
intelligence, that puts its trust not so much in 
hope, which is strongest in perplexity, as in reason 
supporter! by the facts, which gives a surer insight 
into the future. 

LXIII. " You may reasonably be expected, more- 
over, to support the dignity which the state has at- 
tained through empire — a dignity in which you all 
take pride — and not to avoid its burdens, unless you 
resign its honours also. Nor must you think that 
you are fighting for the simple issue of slavery or 
freedom ; on the contrary, loss of empire is also in- 
volved jjijjuI danger from the hatred incurred in your 
sway. iFrom this empire, however, it is too late for 
you even to withdraw, if any one at the present crisis, 
through fear and shrinking from action does indeed 

1 Or, reading to npo(reKTi]fj.iva t "freedom and all that 
freedom gives" (= irpbs rp 4\fvdfpla KewTij/xtVa, as Poppo 



dvBpayaOi^erar a>? 1 rvpavviBa yap i)Brj e^ere 
avrrrv, fjv XajSelv fiev oEikov Bokel rival, dcpelvai 
3 Be iirLKLvSwov. rdyiar dv re iroXiv ol roiovroi 
erepou? re irelaavre<; diroXecreiav teal eX rrov iirl 
(T<f)(iov avrSiv avrovofioi ol/cr>o-etav' rb yap airpay- 
jjlov ov aco^erac fir) fierd rod Bpaarrjpiov reray- 
fievov, ovBe iv apyovar) iroXei gv/yupepei, dXX y iv 
V7rr)fc6(p, dcrcfraXws BoyXeveiy. 

LXIV. " 'Tfiels Be fir]re biro rcov roiawBe ttoXi- 
rebv irapdyeaOe firjre ifie Bi' 6pyr)<; e^ere, a> teal 
avrol ^vvBUyvcore iroXefielv, el teal iireXOovres ol 
ivavrioi eBpacrav direp et/co? rjv fir) iOeXrjadvrwv 
vficov viraKOvetv, iinyeyevrirai re irepa wv irpocr- 
eBeyofieQa r) vocros rjBe, irpayfia fibvov Br) rebv 
irdvrwv iX7TLBo<; tcpelaaov yey evrjfievov. koX Bi 
avrrjv olB* on fiepos ri fiaXXov en fiiaovfiat, ol 
Bitcaucos, el fir) teal orav irapa Xoyov ri ev irpd^ijre 

2 e\iol dvaOijaere. (f>epeiv Be %pr) rd re Baifiovia 
dvayicaiws rd re dirb ru>v iroXefiicov dvBpeiw 
ravra yap iv edei rf)Be rfj iroXec irpbrepov re rjv 

3 vvv re fii] iv vp.iv Ku>Xv6fj. yvcore Be ovo/ia fieyc- 
arov avrrjv eyovaav iv diraaiv dvOpdnrot^ Bid rb 
Tat? %vp<f)opai<; fir) eiiceiv, irXelara Be aoofiara fcal 
irbvovs dvrjXwfcevai iroXifiw, ical Bvvafiiv fieyiarrjv 
Br) fieXP L fovBe fce/crrifievijv, i;? e? dlBiov rot? iiri- 

1 Dobree deletes, followed by Hude. 

BOOK II. lxiii. 2-lxiv. 3 

seek thus to play the honest man ; for by this time 
the empire you hold is a tyranny, which it may seem 
wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is 
dangerous to let g o. \M en like these would soon 
ruin a state, either here, if they should win others to 
their views, or if they should settle in some other 
land and have an independent state all to themselves ; 
for men of peace are not safe unless flanked by men 
of action ; nor is it expedient in an imperial state, 
but only in a vassal state, to seek safety by 
submission. r - v4 '** > 

LXIV. " Do not be led astray by such citizens as 
these, nor persist in your anger with me, — for you 
yourselves voted for the war the same as I — just be- 
cause the enemy has come and done exactly what he 
w r as certain to do the moment you refused to hearken 
to his demands, even though, beyond all our expec- 
tations, this plague has fallen upon us — the only thing 
which has happened that has transcended our fore- 
sight. I am well aware that your displeasure with 
me has been aggravated by the plague ; but there 
is no justice in that, unless you mean to give me also 
the credit whenever any unexpected good fortune 
falls to your lot. But the right course is to bear with 
resignation the afflictions sent hy^ heaven and with 
fortitude the hardships that come from the enemy; 
for such has been the practice of this city in the past, 
and let it find no impediment in yourselves. And 
realize that Athens has a mighty name among all 
mankind because she has never yielded to mis- 
fortunes, but more freely than any other city has 
lavished lives and labours upon war, and that she 
possesses to-day a power which is the greatest that 
ever existed down to our time. The memory of 



yiyvofievois, rjv /cal vvv vTrevBojfiev nrore (iravra 
yap rre(pvKe real ekaacroixjOai), fivrj/irj KaraXeXei- 
yjrerai, 'FjXXtJvcdp re on "EAA^e? irXeiaTwv Br) 
iip^afiev /cal iroXefioi^ f±eyio~TOL<; avTeayojiev 777)09 
re ^vfnravras /cal /caO' etedcrTovs, ttoXlv re Tot? 

4 iraaiv evTropcoTdrrjv /cal peyicrrr)v oj/cyjaafiev. tcai- 
toi ravra 6 /xev dirpdyjicov fie/xyfrair av, 6 Be Bpdv 
ri feal auTO? ftovXofievos ^jXcoaec el Be tj? /xr) 

5 /ceKTrjrai, $>6ovr)creL. to Be jJuaelcrOaL /cal Xwrrr)- 
pou? elvai ev ra> irapbvri ttcktl fiev virrjptje Br) 
octoi erepou erepcov r)%iwo~av dpyeiv oaris Be eirl 
lieyicrTois rb eirl^Bovov Xafi/3dvet, opOcos (3ov- 
Xeverat. fucros fjuev yap ou/c eirl iroXv avre-^ei, r) 
Be irapavTLfca re Xafjuirpbrr)^ koX e? to eireira B6%a 

6 alei/jLvr)o-ro<; /caraXeLTreraL. vfxels Be e'9 re to fieX- 
Xov /eaXbv TTpoyvovTes e? re rb avri/ca fir) alo-^pbv 
ra> t)Bt) TTpoOv/jLG) d/xeporepa /crrjcraaOe, teal Aa/ce- 
Bai/AovLOis /jLrjre eTTi/crjpv/ceveaOe /i7)~e evBrjXoi eare 
Tot? irapovGi irbvois ftapvvbfievoL, a><? o'trives Trpbs 
Ta? %vficf)opas yvco/JLr) fiev rjKLara Xvirovvrai, epyw 
Be fidXiara dvreyovaiv, ovroi /cal iroXewv /cal 
IBiootoov /cpdrcaroi elatv. 

LXV. Toiavra 6 Hepc/cXr}? Xeycop erreipdro 
tou? y A6r)vaLOV<; t?}$ re es avrbv 6py>)<; irapaXveiv 
teal drrb tgov Trapovrcov Beivcov drrdyeiv rr)v yvd)- 
2 p,r)v. 01 Be Bi)fjLoaia fiev Tot? Xoyou? dveirelQovro 
/cal ovre 7rpo? rovs Aa/ceBaifJiovlovs ere eirefxirov 
€? re rbv iroXefiov fiaXXov a>pfir)vro f IBia Be 

BOOK II. LXIV. 3-Lxv. 2 

this greatness, even should we now at last give 
way a little — for it is the nature of all things to 
decay as well as to grow — will be left to posterity 
forever, how that we of all Hellenes held sway over 
the greatest number of Hellenes, in the greatest 
wars held out against our foes whether united or 
single, and inhabited a city that was the richest 
in all things and the greatest. These things the 
man who shrinks from action may indeed dis- 
parage, but he who, like ourselves, wishes to accom- 
plish something will make them the goal of his 
endeavour, while every man who does not possess 
them will be envious. To be hated and obnoxious for 
the moment has always been the lot of those who 
have aspired to rule over others ; but he who, aim- 
ing at the highest ends, accepts the odium, is well 
advised. For hatred does not last long, but the 
splendour of the moment and the after-glory are 
left in everlasting remembrance. Do you, then, 
providently resolving that yours shall be honour in 
ages to come and no dishonour in the present, 
achieve both by prompt and zealous effort. Make 
no overtures to the Lacedaemonians and do not let 
them know that you are burdened by your present 
afflictions ; for those who in the face of calamities 
show least distress of spirit and in action make most 
vigorous resistance, these are the strongest, whether 
they be states or individuals." 

LXV. By such words Pericles endeavoured to cure 
the Athenians of their anger toward him, and to di- 
vert their minds from their present ills. And as 
regards public affairs they were won over by his 
arguments, sending no further envoys to the Lace- 
daemonians, and were more zealous for the war ; but 



to?? TraOrjixacTLv iXvwovvTo, 6 p,ev Br}fio<; on air 
iXacraovcov op/ico/ievo? eareprjro ical rovrcov, ol 
Be Buvarol icaXa KT^fiara Kara ttjv yoapav 1 
olfcoSo/jLLais re ical iroXvreXeac fcaraaicevals diro- 
\co\6kot6s, to Be fieycarov, iroXe/xov dvr elprjvr)*; 

3 e%ovre<;. ov fievroi irporepov ye ol tjvfnravres 
eiravaavTO ev opyfj €%ovTe<; avrbv irplv efrifilcocrav 

4 xpr]fia,o~iv. varepov B* av6i<; ov iroXXop, oirep (pi- 
\el ojullXos iroieiv, arparrjybv eiXovro teal irdvra 
rd irpdyfiara eirerpeijrav, cov fiev irepl ra ol/cela 
e/caaro^ rjXyet d/i^Xvrepoi i]Brj 6We<?, gov Be r\ 
gv/JLTTacra iroXi? irpoaeBelro irXeiarov d^iov vop,L- 

5 ^ovre^ elvai. oaov re yap ^pbvov irpovarrj t?}? 
iroXeco*; ev rfj elprjvy, fierplw^ e^rjyelro real ao~(f)a- 
\<w? BiecfivXa^ev avrrjv, ical eyevero eV ifceivov 
fieyiaTTj, eireiBi] re 6 iroXefios icarearr], 6 Be (fiai- 
verai teal ev tovto) wpoyvovs rrjv Bvva/iiv. 

6 'E7re/3ter> Be Bvo err] /cal ef firjva^' ical eireiBr} 
direOavev, eirl irXeov en iyvcoadrj rj irpovoia avrov 

7 v) €9 rbv TroXe/iov. 6 fiev yap ^Gvya^ovrd^ re 
ical to vavntcbv Oepairevovras /cal apyjqv firj 
iiri/CTco/Aevovs ev ra> iroXefxw /irjBe rrj iroXei klvBv- 
vevovras e(f>rj irepcecreaOar ol Be ravrd re irdvra 
e? rovvavriov eirpa^av ical aXXa etjco rov iroXe/xov 
BoKOVvra elvai Kara ra? IBlas (fyiXoTL/jiias ical 
tBia KepBrj ica/cco? e? re a<f>a<; avrovs ical toi>? 

1 Hude inserts eV with Madvig. 

1 Eighty talents, according to Diod. xn. xlv. ; but accord- 
ing to Plut. Per. xxxv. estimates varied from fifteen to ritty 


BOOK II. lxv. 2-7 

in private they were distressed by their sufferings; 
for the commons, having less to start with, had been 
deprived even of this, while the upper classes had 
lost their beautiful estates in the country, both 
buildings and costly furniture, and above all they 
had war instead of peace. Indeed one and all they 
did not g^ve over their resentment against him until 
they had imposed a fine l upon him. But not long 
afterwards, as is the way with the multitude, they 
chose him again as general and entrusted him with 
the whole conduct of affairs ; for they were now be- 
coming individually less keenly sensible of their 
private griefs, and as to the needs of the state as a 
whole they esteemed him invaluable. For so long 
as he presided over the affairs of the state in time of 
peace he pursued a moderate policy and kept the 
city in safety, and it was under him that Athens 
reached the height of her greatness ; and, after the 
war began, here too he appears to have made a far- 
sighted estimate of her strength. 

Pericles lived two years and six months beyond the 
beginning of the war; and after his death his fore- 
sight as to the war was still more fully recognized. 
For he had told the Athenians that if they would 
maintain a defensive policy, attend to their navy, and 
not seek to extend their sway during the war, or do 
anything to imperil the existence of the state, they 
would prove superior. But they not only acted con- 
trary to his advice in all these things, but also in 
matters that apparently had no connection with the 
war they were led by private ambition and private 
greed to adopt policies which proved injurious both 

talents. The charge was embezzlement, according to Plato, 
Oorg. 576 a. 




gvfi/jLdxovs eTroXiTevaav, a KaTOpQovpeva pev tois 
IBicoTats Tip}] Kal axfrekia pdXXov r)V, acpaXivra 
Be rff Trokei e? tov 7roXep,ov /3Xd/3r} KaOiaraTO. 

8 aiTiov 5' rjv oti ifcelvos pev Svvaros cl)v t<o re 
d^icopaTi teal ry yvcopy ^prjixdrwv re Biafyavws 
dBcoporaro^ yevop,evo<; teareixe to ttXtjOo^ eXevOe- 

/DO)?, Kal OVK 7]y€TO pdXXoV V7T CIVTOV Yj avTo<; 

9776, Bid to fir) fcrcofievos i£ ov TrpoarjKovTcov ttjv 
Bvvap.iv 7rpo? rjBovrjV ti Xeyeiv, dX~)C ^X wv ** 

9 d^icoaei Kal 7roo? opyrjv ti dvTenrelv. ottotc yovv 
aiaOoiro ti auTOU? vrapd Kaipov vftpei dapaovv- 
ras, Xeycov KareTrXrjaaev iirl to (j)o/3eia6ai, Kal 
BeBcoras av dXoyco? dvTifca0io~Tr) irdXiv enrl to 
Oapaelv. iyiyvero re Xoy(p p,ev Byj/xo/cparua, 

10 epya) Be xjito tov Trpcorou dvBpbs apx^h ol Be 
varepov lo~oi pdXXov avTol 7roo? dXXrjXow; 6Vt6? 
Kal opeyopevot tov 7rpcoT09 eKao~TO<; yiyveaOai 
eTpdirovTO Ka6* rjBovds tu> B-qpw Kal Ta irpdypaTa 

11 evBiBovai. e% o)v aXXa T€ 7ro\\a, co? ev p^eydXy 

TroXel Kal dpxh v ^X°^ a V' Vf ia P T V^ r J Kai ° e ? 
^iKeXlav irXovs, 0? ov too-ovtov yvcoprjs dp,dp- 
Trjpa tjv 7rpo? 01)? eirfjaav, oaov ol eKirepLy^ravTes 
ov Ta 7rpocr(popa toU olxopevois €7riyiyvojaK0VT€<;, 
dXXd KaTa Ta? I8la$ BiafioXas irepl tt?9 tov 

1 The reference is especially to the Sicilian expedition ; 
the pernicious results were seen in the Decelean war. 


BOOK II. lxv. 7-1 1 

as to themselves and their allies ; for these policies, so 
long as they were successful, merely brought honour 
or profit to individual citizens, but when they failed 
proved detrimental to the state in the conduct of 
the war. 1 And the reason for this was that Pericles, 

who owed his influence to Lis recognized standing and 

ability, and had proved himself clearly incorruptible 
in the highest degree, restrained the multitude while 
respecting their liberties, and led them rather than 
was led by themj because he did not resort to flattery, ! 
seeking power by dishonest means, but was able 
on the strength of his high reputation to oppose 
them and even provoke their wrath. At any rate, 
whenever he saw them unwarrantably confident and 
arrogant, his words would cow them into fear ; and, 
on the other hand, when he saw them unreasonably 
afraid, he, would restore them to confidence again. 
And so \Athens, though in name a democracy, 
gradually became in fact a government ruled by its 
foremost citizen. ' But the successors of Pericles, 
being more on an equality with one another and yet 
striving each to be first, were ready to surrender 
to the people even the conduct of public affairs 
to suit their whims. And from this, since it hap- 
pened in a great and imperial state, there resulted 
many blunders, especially the Sicilian expeditio n, 2 
which was not so much an error of judgment, when 
we consider the enemy they went against, as of 
management ; for those who were responsible for it, 
instead of taking additional measures for the proper 
support of the first troops which were sent out, gave 
themselves over to personal intrigues for the sake of 

1 For the history of this expedition, see Books vi and vu. 



Bl)/J.OV TTpOfTTCKTiaS T(l T€ €V TCO GTpai OTTeBw dfl- 

fiXvTepa iiroiovv Kal ra irepl ttjv ttoXlv irpwrov 

12 iv aXXr/XoL? eTapd^Orjaav. crcpaXevres Be iv 
SifC€\la aXXrj re irapaaicevfi Kal tov vclvtikov tg> 
irXeovi p,opi(p Kal Kara ttjv 778*7 iv ardaei 
ovres 0/10)9 BeKa l fiev errj avTelyov tol<; re irpo- 
repov inrdpyovGi iroXeyiloi^ Kal Tot? curb XlkeXlck; 
fxer avjwv Kal tcov %v\x\JLdywv en Tot? nXeoo-Lv 
acfreo-TrjKocTL, K.vpq> re varepov ySacrtXea)? irathX 
7rpocryevofiev(p, 09 irapelye ^p7]/iara UeXoirov- 
vqcrloLS e9 to vclvtikov, Kal ov irporepov iveBoaav 
7) avrol iv 2 Gcbiaiv avTols Kara rd<; IBia? Bia- 

13 4>opa<; TrepLTreo-ovres io-(pdXr)crav. togovtov tc5 
UepiKXel iirepiacrevae rore ac/>' wv avrb<; irpoeyvw 
Kal irdvv dv paBico? irepLjeveaOaL ttjv ttoXlv 
UeXoTTOvvrjo-Lcov avrwv ra> iroXefiw. 

LXVL O/ Be AaKeBaL/aovLoi Kal oi ^vfi/ia^oL 
rod avrov depovs iarpdrevcrav vavalv eKarbv e'9 
ZaKvvOov r-qv vrjaov, rj KelraL dvrnrepa^ "HX,f8o9* 
elal Be 'A%aicov rwv eV HeXoTrovvijaov diroiKOL 
2 Kal ' AQr\vaiOL<s ^vvefxayovv. iireirXeov Be AaKe- 
Bat/novioyv ^lXlol onrXlraL Kal Kvyjfios ^TrapridrT}^ 
vavapyo<$. diro(SdvTe<; Be e'9 t//i> yf]V eBr/cocrav rd 
TroXXd. Kal eVetSr) ov T^vveydypovv, direTrXevaav 

iw OLKOV. 

LXVII. Kal tov avTov Oepov? reXevT(ovTO<; 
'ApicTTevs Kopivdtos Kal AaKeBaLfxovlwv 7rpecr/3et9 
'AvrjpiaTos Kal NiKoXaos Kal UpaTo8a/jLO<; Kal 

1 MSS. read rpla, but Hude follows Haacke in reading 
5fVa. So also van H., CI., Stahl, F. Mueller, Croiset, 
Marchant. oktw is preferred by Shilleto, Aem. Mueller. 

* Deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude. 


BOOK II. lxv. ii-lxvii. i 

gaining the popular leadership and consequently not 
only conducted the military operations with less 
rigour, but also brought about, for the first time, civil 
discord at home. And yet, after they had met with 
disaster in Sicily, where they lost not only their army 
but also the greater part of their fleet, and by this 
time had come to be in a state of sedition at home, 
they neverthless held out ten years not only against 
the enemies they had before, but also against the 
Sicilians, who were now combined with them, and, 
besides, against most of their allies, who were now 
in revolt, and later on, against Cyrus son of the 
King, who joined the Peloponnesians and furnished 
them with money for their fleet ; and they did not 
finally succumb until they had in their private 
quarrels fallen upon one another and been brought 
to ruin. Such abundant grounds had Pericles at that 
time for his own forecast that Athens might quite 
easily have triumphed in this war over the Pelopon- 
nesians alone. 

LXVI. During the same summer the Lacedae- 
monians and their allies made an expedition with a 
hundred ships to the island of Zacynthus, which lies 
over against Elis. The Zacynthians are colonists 
of the Achaeans in the Peloponnesus and were in 
alliance with the Athenians. On board the ships 
were one thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, and 
Cnemus a Spartan was admiral. And making a 
descent upon the land they ravaged most of it ; but 
as the inhabitants would not come to terms they 
sailed back home. 

LXVI I. And at the end of the same summer 
Aristeus a Corinthian, ttaae Lacedaemonian envoys, 
Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodamus, also Timagoras 




r teyedrri<; Ti/xayopas zeal 'Apyetos iSla lIoXXis, 
TTopev6}xevoi e? rrjv ' Aalav w? ftacnXea, el 7ra>9 
rreiaeiav avrbv ^prjp-ard re rrapao"^elv Kal ^v/i- 
TToXefielv, cufiiKvovvrai &)9 ^irdXKt)v rrpoyrov rov 
Tijpeco e'9 Spatcijv, /3ov\6/jl€vol rrelaai re avrbv, el 
hvvaivro, fieraardvra rrjs WOrjvalcov %v p,\±ayia<; 
arparevaai iirl rrjv HoreiEaiav, ov rjv arpdrevpa 


ifceivov iropevOrjvai irepav rov 'QXXrjcnrbvrov a>9 
Qapvd/crjv rbv <£>apva(Sd%ov t 09 avrovs efieXXev 

2 w? ftacnXea dvairepb-^reiv. iraparv^ovres he 
'A07)vaL(Di> Trpecr(3ei<; Aeap^os K.aXXipd^ov Kal 

K/xeLVidhrj^ QiXSjfAovos irapd tw XcrdXKrj irei- 
Qovai rbv %dhoKov rbv yeyevrj/xevov \\0}]vatov, 
^irdX/cov vlbv, toi>9 avSpas ey^eipicrai acpLcnv, 
07TO)9 fir) hia/3dvre<; &>9 (3aatXea n)v eiceivov iroXiv 

3 to /xe/?09 /3Xd\jro)(Tiv. 6 he ireicrOels iropevofxevov^ 
avrovs hia rr}<; OpaKTjs iirl to irXolov g5 efieXXov 
rbv 'EXXrjo-TTOvrov irepaiooaeiv, irp\v ea/3aiveiv 
^uXXa/j,/3dv€i, aXXovs hrj ^v/jL7re/xyfra<; fierd rov 
Aedp)(ov Kal ' Afieividhov, Kal e/ceXevcrev e/celvoLS 
irapahovvai' ol he Xafiovres eKO/xicrav e'9 Ta9 

4 'AOtjvas. d(f)iKOfievcov Be aurcov helcravres ol 
y A07]va,Lot, rov 'Apiarea pbrj ai/Ois <r<f>a<; en irXeiw 
Kcucovpyf) hia^vyaiv, on Kal irpb rovrcov ra rrjs 
Uoreihalas Kal rwv iirl SpaK^s rrdvra e^aivero 
7rpd]~as, aKpirovs Kal (BovXofievovs ecrriv a elirelv 
avOrj/jiepbv direKreivav rrdvra^ Kal 69 (pdpayya 

1 Because Argos was a neutral state ; cf. ch. ix. 2. 

2 Then satrap of Dascylium ; cf. 1. exxix. 1. 

3 cf. ch. xxix. 5. 


BOOK II. lxvii. 1-4 

of Tegea and Pollis of Argos, the last acting in a 
private capacity, 1 set out for Asia to the King's court 
to see if they might persuade him to furnish money 
and join in the Mar. On their way they came first 
to Sitalces son of Teres in Thrace, their desire being 
to persuade him, if possible, to forsake the Athenian 
alliance and send a force to relieve Potidaea, where 
an Athenian army was conducting the siege ; and 
also, in pursuance of their object, with his help to 
cross the Hellespont to Pharnaces 2 son of Pharna- 
bazus, who was to escort them up the country to the 
King. But two Athenian envoys, Learchus son of 
Callimachus and Ameiniades son of Philemon, who 
chanced to be visiting Sitalces, urged Sadocus son of 
Sitalces, who had been made an Athenian citizen, 3 
to deliver the men into their hands, that they might 
not cross over to the King and do such injury as 
might be to his adopted city. 4 To this Sadocus 
agreed, and sending some troops to accompany 
Learchus and Ameiniades, seized them as they 
journeyed through Thrace before they embarked on 
the boat by which they were to cross the Hellespont. 
They were then, in accordance with his orders, 
delivered to the Athenian envoys, who took them 
and brought them to Athens. When they arrived, 
the Athenians, in fear that Aristeus might escape 
and do them still more harm, because he had evi- 
dently been the prime mover in all the earlier 
intrigues at Potidaea and along the coast of 
Thrace, put them all to death on that very day 
without a trial, though they wished to say something 
in their own defence, and threw their bodies into a 

4 Possibly rr)v intivov *6\iv rb pepos means "a city in a 
measure his own," 



iaefiaXov, Bi/caiovvres to?9 clvtols afjivveadai 
oiairep kcu oi AarceSai/iovioi, vTrrjp^av, tou? ifi- 
iropovs oi><; eXaftov 'AQrjvaLow kcu rcov fv jJLfid^cov 
iv oXtcdai irepl TleXoirowqcrov '/rXiovras diroKrei- 
vavres real e? (f)dpayya<; iafiaXovres. Trdvras 
yap Br) kclt dpX a< > T °v iroXepov Aa/ceBai/AOVioi 
oaovs Xd/3oiev iv ttj OaXdaay &>? 7ro\ep,LOV<; Bie- 
cpOeipov, zeal rovs fiera 'AOrjvaicov tjv/jL7roXe/jLOvvTa<; 
/cal toi>? p,7jBe fieO* erepwv. 

LXVIII. KaTa Be tov<z avrovs XP° V0V< >> rov 
Oepovs T€\evTO)VTO<;, koi ' ' AyuirpaKiwiai avrou T€ 
koI lav j3ap/3dpcDV ttoXXovs dvaar^aavre^ iarpd- 
revaav iir "A07O? to ^A/jl^lXox^ov icai rrjv 

2 aXXrjv 'AjLL(f)i\oxLav. ex^pa Be 7T/30? tou? 'Ao- 
yeiov<z diro rovSe clvtoIs rjpgaTO irponov yeveadai. 

3 "Apyos to 'Afi<f)iXoxi>cbv kol ' Afi^Ckoxiav rrjv 
aXXrjv e/cTLcre fiev fiera ret, Tpcoi/cd otfcaBe ava- 
X(opy']cra<; ko\ ouk dpeafcoftevos rfj iv "Apyei /cara- 
ard(T€L 'A/x(/)t\o%o9 6 'AfMpidpeoo iv ra> 'Afnrpa- 


4 ovofidaas (/cat r)v r) ttoXls avrrj fMeylcrrr} t?}<? 
'AfupiXoxLas fcal toi)? SwaTcoraTOvs eZ%e^ ol/crj- 

5 ropas), vtto l^vficfropcov Be iroWals yeveals varepov 
7rie^6p.evoL ' ^AinrpciKKJdTCis ofiopov? ovras rfj 'Ap.- 
(friXoxiKJ) %vvolk:ov<; iir^ydyovro, kol i)XXr)via6r)- 


1 Alcmaeon, the elder brother of Amphilochus, had slain 
their mother Eriphyle (c/. ch. cii. 5). The foundation of 


BOOK II. lxvii. 4-Lxviii. 5 

pit, thinking it justifiable to employ for their own 
protection the same measures as had in the first 
instance been used by the Lacedaemonians when 
they killed and cast into pits the traders of the 
Athenians and their allies whom they caught on 
board merchantmen on the coast of the Pelopon- 
nesus. For at the beginning of the war all persons 
whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea they 
destroyed as enemies, whether they were fighting 
on the side of the Athenians or not even taking 
part on either side. y 

LXVIII. About the same time, as the summer 
was ending, the Ambraciots themselves, with many 
of the barbarians whom they had summoned to their 
standard, made an expedition against the Amphi- 
lochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia. And 
enmity between them and the Argives first began 
from the following circumstance. Amphilochus son 
of Amphiaraus, when he returned home after the 
Trojan war, was dissatisfied with the state of affairs 
at Argos, 1 and therefore founded Amphilochian 
Argos on the Ambracian gulf, and occupied the 
country of Amphilochia, calling the town Argos 
after the name of his own fatherland. And this 
city was the largest in Amphilochia and had the 
wealthiest inhabitants. But many generations later 
the Amphilochians, under the stress of misfor- 
tunes, invited in the Ambraciots, who bordered 
on Amphilochia, to share the place with them, 
and these first became Hellenes and adopted their 
present dialect in consequence of their union with 

Amphilochian Argos is ascribed by other authors (Strabo, 
vii. 326 c ; Apollod. in. 7) to Alcmaeon or to his son 




Kicorcov ^vvoLKTjadvrcov ol Be aXXoi ApcjaXo^oi 

6 /3dp/3apol da iv. eteftaXXovaiv ovv tou? 'Apyelov? 
ol 'ApLTTparciwrai XP° V( P KCLi avT ° l "<rX 0V<Tl r ty 

7 rroXiv. ol o° 'ApfaXoxoi yevopuevov rovrov BlBo- 
acnv eavrov? 'Atcapvaai, teal Trpoo-TrapateaXeaav- 
re? dpcporepoi 'AdrjvaLOVS, ol avrols QoppLwvd 
Te arpar^yov etre^av teal vavs rpid/eovra, 
d(pLKO/jL€VOV Br) rov <£>opp,LQ)vo<; alpovai Kara tepd- 
to? "Ap7o? teal tou? 'ApuTrpateicora^ rjvBpairoBicrav, 
KOivfj re (pteiaav avrb 'A/z<f t\o%oi teal 'Ateapvaves. 

8 perd Be tovto i) ^vp.pxnyia irp&rov iyevero 'AOrj- 

9 vatois teal 'Ateapvdaiv. ol Be ^ Apnrpateiiorai rrjv 
p,ev exOpav e? T °vs 'Apyeuovs dirb rov dvBpa- 
iroBiafxov acjycov avrcov rrpcorov iiroirjaavrOy vcrre- 
pov Be iv rep rroXepLW rrjvoe rrjv errpareiav 
TToiovvrai eavrcov re teal Xaovcov teal aXXeov 
rivtov rcov Tr\r)crLox(*>pQ)V ftapftdpcov iX66vre<; Be 
7r/)05 to "A/oyo? rr)? fiev X^P a ^ e/epdrovv, rrjv Be 
ttoXiv cl)9 ov/e iBvvavro eXelv irpoerfSaXovres, 
direxd>pW av ^ olteov teal BieXvOrjcrav Kara eOvrj. 
roaavra p,ev iv rep Qepei iyevero. 

LXIX. Tov B' irtiyiyvopukvov %€*/xo)i>o? 'AOr}- 
valoi vavs eerreCXav etteoo-L pev rrepl UeXoTrovvrjcrov 
/cal Qopplcova arparrjyov, o? oppicopevos etc Nau- 
Trdfcrov cf)v\aKr]v eZ%e pLr]r iteirXelv ite KoplvOov 
real rov Kpicraiov koXttov purfBeva pbrjr ierirXelv, 
erepa<; Be e% itrl Kaplan teal Avrelas teal MeXrj- 
aavBpov errparrjyov, oVw? ravrd re dpyvpoXoytocn 
teal to XrjcrriKov rcov YleXoirovvrjo-icov pr) icocriv 
avroOev oppLcopLevov ffXairreiv rov rrXovv rcov 
oXtedBcov rcov d-rro QaarjXiBos teal <&olvUt)<; teal 


BOOK II. lxviii. 5-Lxix. 1 

the Ambraciots ; but the rest of the Amphilochians 
are still barbarians. Now in course of time the 
Ambraciots expelled the ArgiveV and themselves 
seized the city. But the Amphilochians, when this 
happened, placed themselves under the protection of 
the Acarnanians, and together they called in the 
Athenians, who sent to them Phormio as general 
with thirty ships. On the arrival of Phormio they 
took Argos by storm and reduced the Ambraciots to 
slavery, and Amphilochians and Acarnanians settled 
there together. It was after this that the alliance 
between the Athenians and the Acarnanians was 
first established. The Ambraciots first conceived 
their enmity toward the Argives from this enslave- 
ment of their own countrymen ; and afterwards in 
the course of the war they made this expedition, 
which consisted, besides themselves, of Chaonians 
and some of the other barbarian tribes of the neigh- 
bourhood. And when they came to Argos, although 
they dominated the country, they were unable to 
take the city by assault ; they therefore went home 
and the several tribes disbanded. Such were the 
events of the summer. 

LXIX. During the ensuing winter the Athenians 
sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus under the 
command of Phormio, who, making Naupactus his 
base, kept watch there, so that no one might sail 
either out of Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf or in ; 
and six other ships were sent to Caria and Lycia, 
under Melesander as general, to collect arrears of 
tribute in these places and to prevent the Pelopon- 
nesian privateers from establishing a base in these 
regions and molesting the merchantmen sailing from 
Phaselis and Phoenicia and the mainland in that 



2 ttJ? e/ceWev rjireipov. avafta? Be Arpanet, 'AOrj- 
valwv re rcov airb rcov vecov koX rcov ^vfjLfid^cdv e? 
rijv Av/ciav 6 MeXtfcravBpos diroOvrjaKei /cal t?}? 
<TTparia<; p-ipos n Bie'(j)0eipe vifcrjOel? p-uXV- 

LXX. Tov £>' avrov ^e^wz/o? ol UoreiBedrac 
iireL&r} ov/cerc iBvvavro iroXtopKOvpLevou dvre^iv, 
aX)C a'L re ecrftoXal e? rrjv 'Arn/crjv UeXorrovvT)- 
alcov ovBev pbdWov drravlcrraaav tov? 'AOrjvai- 
ovs, 6 re aero? irreXeXoLirec, ical a\Xa re iroXkd 
eireyeyevr^TO avroQi tjBtj /3pcoaeco<; rrepl dvay/calas 
/cat, rives /cal dXkifkcov iyeyevvro, ovrco Br) \6yovs 
7rpocr(f)€pov(Ti irepl %vpi[3acreco<; rot? err parr)yol<$ 
rcov 'AOrjvabcov rol<$ eirl crcpLcrt, reraypuevois, 
Cevocpcovrl re rco ^vpariBov /cal 'ILerrioBcopco rco 
'Apicrro/ckeLBov /cal Qavop^aya T< p KaWifidxov. 

2 ol he irpocrehe^avro, opcovre? fiev rrjs arpands 
rr)v rakairrwp'iav ev %coplcp %eipLepiV(p, dvrfkeo- 
/cvias Be 7]8r) tt}? 7ro\eco<; Bio~xi\ia rdXavra es rr)v 

3 TrdXtopfciav. eirl rolaBe ovv %vve/3r)crav, e%e\6elv 
avrovs /cal iralBas kclL yvvai/cas /cal tou? eiri/cov- 
povs %vv evl IpLariw, yvvaltcas Be %vv Bvolv, /cal 

4 cipyvpiov ri pvrbv e%ovra$ icpoBcov. teal ol fiev 
virocnrovBoi i%r)\6ov e? re rr)v Xa\/ciBt/cr)v /cal tj 
efcacrro? eBvvaro' ' * AQr\valoi Be rovs re errparr)- 
yovs eTrrjTtdaavro on dvev avrcov %vve/3r]o~av 
(ivopLL^ov yap av /cparrjaai ri)<; 7ro\6co? 77 ejSov- 
Xovro), koX varepov eiroifcovs errepuyfrav eavrcov e? 

5 rrjv UoreiBaiav /cal /carco/cicrav. ravra fiev ev rco 

BOOK II. lxix. i-lxx. 5 

quarter. But Melesander, going inland into Lycia 
with a force of Athenians from the ships and of 
allied troops, was defeated in battle and slain, losing 
a number of his troops. 

LXX. During the same winter the Potidaeans 

found themselves no longer able to endure the 
siege ; and the raids which the Peloponnesians made 
into Attica did not cause the Athenians to raise the 
siege any more than before. 1 Their grain had given 
out, and in addition to many other things which by 
this time had befallen them in their efforts to 
get bare subsistence some had even eaten their 
fellows. In this extremity they made proposals for a 
capitulation to the Athenian generals who were in 
charge of the operations against them, namely 
Xenophon son of Euripides, Hestiodorus son of Aris- 
tocleides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus. And 
the generals accepted their proposals, seeing the 
distress which the army was suffering in an exposed 
place, and taking into consideration that Athens had 
already spent two thousand talents 2 on the siege. 
So a capitulation was made on the following terms, 
that the Potidaeans, with their children and wives 
and the mercenary troops, 3 were to leave the city 
with one garment apiece — the women, however, with 
two — retaining a fixed sum of money for the journey. 
So they left Potidaea under a truce and went into 
Chalcidice or wherever each was able to go. The 
Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting 
terms without consulting them — for they thought 
they could have become masters of the place on their 
own terms ; and afterwards sent settlers of their 
own into Potidaea and colonized it. These things 

1 cf. i. lviii. 1. * £400,000, $1,9-4-4,000. « c/. I. lx. 1. 



yeiyboivi iyevero, teal Bevrepov * eVo? rco iroXepLO) 
ereXevra rcoBe bv (-)ov/cvBbBr)$ ^vveypa\jrev. 

LXXI. ToO S' emybyvojievov 6epov$ ol ITeXo- 
irovvrjGLOi teal ol ^viifjua^oi e? /xev rrjv 'ArTb/cr/v 
oxjk etreBaXov, icrrpdrevaav Be irrl TlXdracav 
ip/elro Be WpxtSctfios 6 Zev^iBd/xov, AatceBai- 
fxuvLwv fiacriXevs' teal tcaObcras rbv arparbv epbeXXe 
Bycoaeiv rrjv yrjv ol Be. HXarabrj<; evOvs TrpeajBeis 
Tre/jbyfravres i:ap avrbv eXeyov roidBe' 

2 "'ApxlBajie teal AafceBaifiovioL, ov Biicaia 
7roLelre oi)8' d%ia ovre vpcov ovre rrarepcov cbv 
iare, €9 yrjv rrjv TlXarabcov crrparevovre^. Uav- 
aavias yap 6 l&Xeo p,(3 porov , AatceBaipbSvios, iXev- 
Oeptoaas ryv 'EXXdBa dirb rcov MrjBcov puerd 
'EiXXrjvcov rcov ideXyadvrcov ^vvdpacrOai tov tclv- 
Bvvov rrjs pdyr)^ ?) Trap rjpblv iyevero, dvcras iv 
rfj TlXaraicov dyopa lepd Ad iXevOeplco teal 
^vy/caXeaas rrdvras rov<; ^viipbd^ov^ direBLBov 
YlXaracevaL yrjv teal iroXtv riiv acperepav k)(Ovra<; 
avTOvofiovs ol/celv, arparevcrab re fir/Beva 7rore 
dBbtccos €7r* avrov? pbrjb^ iirl BovXelq,' el Be pur], 
djivveiv rovs rrapovras ^vpbpbdxov? tcard Bvvap.iv. 

3 rciBe pbev r)puv irarepes ol v/ierepot eBoaav dperrjs 
eveica koX irpo6vp.las T/79 iv itcebvois t<h9 tcivBv- 
vobs yevopbevi]^, vp.el<; Be rdvavrla Bpdre' p,erd 
yap (drjftabcov tcov r\plv e^dlarcov eVl BovXeia rfj 

4 rj/ierepa, ijfcere. iidprvpas Be 6eoi><; tou? re 
optclovs Tore yevofievovs iroiovpievob teal tou9 vfie- 
repov? Trarpcoovs teal r)perepov<; iy^copbov^, Xe- 
yopbev vfilv yrjv rr)v TiXaradha fir) dBbfcelv firjBe 

1 rb 8cvrepov in the MSS.; rb deleted by Poppo. 

BOOK II. lxx. 5-lxxi. 4 

happened in the winter, and so ended the second 
year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the 

LXXI. In the ensuing summer the Peloponnesians 
and their allies did not invade Attica, but made an 
expedition against Plataea. Their leader was Archi- 
damus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedae- 
monians, and when he had encamped his army he 
was about to ravage the land ; but the Plataeans 
straightway sent envoys to him, who spoke as 
follows : 

"Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, you are acting 
unjustly, and in a manner unworthy either of your- 
selves or of the fathers from whom you are sprung, 
when you invade the territory of the Plataeans. 
For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedae- 
'monian, when he had freed Hellas from the Persians, 
together with such of the Hellenes as chose to share 
the danger of the battle 1 that took place in our 
territory, offered sacrifice in the market-place of the 
Plataeans to Zeus Eleutherius, and calling together 
all the allies restored to the Plataeans their land and 
city to hold and inhabit in independence, and no 
one was ever to march against them unjustly or for 
their enslavement; but in that case the allies then 
present were to defend them with all their might. 
These privileges your fathers granted to us on 
account of the valour and zeal we displayed amid 
those dangers, but you do the very contrary ; for 
with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, you are 
come to enslave us. But calling to witness the gods 
in whose names we then swore and the gods of your 
fathers and of our country, we say to you, wrong not 
the land of Plataea nor violate your oaths, but suffer 

1 The battle of Plataea, 479 B.C. 

3 8 9 


rrapa/3aiV€iv tov? op/covs, eav Be ol/celv avrovo- 
fjiovs rcaOdirep Ylavcravia? eBi/caicocrev" 

LXXIL Toaavra elirovroov to)v YiXaraLwv 
' ApxlSa/jLos v7To\a/3(ov elirev 

" Ai/caca Xeyere, a) avBpes HXarair)*;, rjv iroir)re 
6/JLoca rot? Xoyois. KaOdirep yap Uavcravias v/xlv 
TrapeBco/cev, avroi re avrovojielaOe teal tou? aX- 
Xov$ ^vveXevOepovre oaoi fjLeraa-^ovre^ twv rore 
kiv&vvcov v/jlIv re ^vvciifioaav /cal elcrl vvv vtt 
*A6tivaioi<;, Trapaa/cevr) Be roarjBe /cal iroXe/MO^ 
yeyevrjrai avrcov eve/ca teal t&v aXXcov iXevdepco- 
o-eco?. ?7? /idXtara /xev fieraa^ovre^ ical avrol 
ififieivare Tot? op/cow el Be fir], dizep /cal irpo- 
repov rjBrj irpov/caXeo-dfieOa, r)avylav dyere vefio- 
fjuevoi tcl v/xerepa avroiv, /cal ecrre firjBe fie8' 
erepwv, Beyeade Be dfifyorepovs cfriXovs, eVl iroXe- 
fiw Be fJLTjBeTepovs. /cal rdBe r)fjuv dp/cecrei," 

2 'O fiev ' ApxiSafios roaavra elirev ol Be 
UXaraicov 7rpeo-j3ei<; d/covcravTes ravra ecrrjXQov 
e? rrjv ttoXlv, /cal rq> irXrjdei rd pt]9evra /cowd)- 
cravres dire/cpLvavro avTw l on dBvvara crfyiaiv 
elrj iroielv a irpo/caXelrat dvev * AOrjvalcov (*7ratSe? 
yap o~(f)d)v /cal yvval/ces irap e/celvois elev), BeBievai 
Be /cal irepl rfj irdar] iroXei fir) ' iceivcov diroyoipr}- 
advTcov 'AOrji'aloi eXOovres o~<f>Laiv ov/c eirLrpe- 
Trcoaiv, rj %rjftaloi, &>? evop/coi ovres /card to 
d/i(f)orepov<; Bex^o-dat, avOcs atycov rr)v ttoXlv 

3 Treipdacocri /caraXaftelv. 6 Be Oapavvwv avrovs 
7T/DO? TauTa e<pr)' 

"'T/jLets Be ttoXlv fiev /cal Oi/a'a? r)fiiv TrapdBore 

1 Omitted by Hade, with Lex. Vindob. 

BOOK II. lxxi. 4-lxxii. 3 

us to live independent, according as Pausanias granted 
that to us as our right." 

LXX1I. When the Plataeans had so spoken, Archi- 
damus answered and said : 

" What you say is just, men of Plataea, if what 
you do is consistent with your words. For according 
as Pausanias bestowed that privilege upon you, so 
do you assert your own independence and help us to 
set free the others also who, having shared in the 
dangers of that time, swore the same oaths with you, 
and are now in subjection to the Athenians ; for it is 
to recover their freedom and that of the rest that 
these great preparations for war have been made. 
Therein you should take part, if possible, and your- 
selves abide by the oaths ; otherwise keep quiet, as 
we have already proposed, continuing to enjoy your 
own possessions ; take part with neither side, receive 
both sides as friends but for hostile purposes neither. 
And this will be satisfactory to us." 

Thus spoke Archidamus ; and the Plataean envoys, 
on hearing him, went into the city, and after reporting 
to the people what had been said, answered him, that 
it was impossible for them to do what he proposed 
without the consent of the Athenians — for their 
children and wives were in Athens 1 — adding that 
they feared for the very existence of the state ; for 
after the departure of the Lacedaemonians the 
Athenians would come and veto the plan, or else 
the Thebans, claiming that they were included in 
the stipulations about receiving both sides, would try 
again to seize their city. But he, endeavouring to 
reassure them with regard to these matters, said : 

" You need only consign the city and your houses 

1 cf. ch. vi. 4. 

39 * 


Tot? AaKeBaipoviois Kal 7779 opovs airohel^are 
Kal BevBpa api6[i(p ra v/ierepa Kal dXXo el 77 
Bvvarbv e? dpidfibv eXOeiv avrol Be ixeiayodpr)- 
aare 01:01 ftovXeade, ecos av 6 TroXe/jLOs r)' eireiBdv 
Be irapekOr), aTroBcoaofiev vfilv a av irapaXd- 
ftco/jLCV. P>£XP l ^ T °vBe e^op,ev irapaKaTaOi'iK^v, 
epya&fievoi Kal (tbopciv <f)ipovre<; fj dv vplv fieXXj) 
iKavi] eo-eaOat." 

LXXIII. 01 B* aKovaavre^ eo~r\\6ov avOts e? 
rr)v ttoKlv, Kal {3ov\evo~d/j.evoL fiera rod 7rXij6ov<; 
eXefjav on f3ovXovrat, a irpoKaXelrai ' AOrjvalois 
Koivcocrai irptoTOV fcai s r)v ireiQwaiv avrovs, iroielv 
ravra' pey^pi Be tovtov aireiaacrOai acplaiv eVe- 
Xevov Kal ri]v yr)v fir) Brjovv. 6 Be rjfiepas re 
ianeio-aro ev ah elfcb<; rjv KopLiaOiivai Kal rr)v yrjv 
ouk ere/ivev. eXOovres Be ol UXaTatrjs TrpeafteLS 
co? tou? 'AOrjvaiov? Kal ^ovXevad/nevot fier av- 
ra)v irdXiv r)X0ov dirayyeXXovTes tols ev rfj irbXei 
ToidBe' " Out' ev t<u irpb rod %p6vw, co dvBpe<; 
UXaratrjs, defy ov ^vfifxaxoi eyevbfieOa, 'AOrjvaloi 
(fyacrtv ev ovBevl vfid<$ irpoeaQai dBiKov/ievovs ovre 
vvv irepib^reaQai, f&or\dr\Geiv Be Kara Bvvafiiv. 
eirio-Ki'-jirTOval re v/mv 7rpo9 tcov opKcov 01)9 ol 
irarepes cofioaav fitjBev vecorepl^eiv irepl rr)v 

LXXIV. Toiavra rcov irpea^ewv dirayyeiXdv- 
tcov ol UXarairjs eflovXevaavTO *A0t]valov$ fir) 
irpoBtBovat, dXX! dvexevQai Kal yr)v re/xvofievyv, 
el Bel, opcovras Kal aXXo Trdaxovras o tl av 


BOOK II. lxxii. 3-lxxiv. i 

to us, the Lacedaemonians, pointing out to us the 
boundaries of your land and telling us the number 
of your trees and whatever else can be numbered ; 
then as for yourselves migrate to whatever place you 
please, remaining there while the war lasts ; but as 
soon as the war is over we will give back to you 
whatever we have received ; until then we will hold 
it all in trust, working the land and paying you 
whatever rent will satisfy you." 

LXXII I. With this answer the Plataean envoys 
went again into the city, and after they had conferred 
with the people replied that they wished first to 
communicate his proposals to the Athenians, and if 
they could gain their consent would do what he 
proposed ; but meanwhile they requested him to 
grant them a truce and not to ravage the land. And 
so he made a truce for the number of days within 
which their representatives could be expected to go 
and return, and did not lay waste their land. But 
the Plataean envoys went to the Athenians and after 
consulting with them returned with the following 
message to the people at home : " The Athenians as- 
sure you, Plataeans, that as in times past, since you 
became their allies, 1 they have never on any occasion 
deserted you when you were being wronged, so now 
they will not suffer you to be wronged, but will assist 
you with all their might. They therefore adjure 
you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to 
break off the alliance." 

LXXIV. When the envoys reported this answer, 

the Plataeans determined not to betray the Athenians, 

but to endure even to see their lands laid waste, if 

need be, and to suffer whatever else might happen ; 

1 About 520 B.C. cf. in. lxviii. 5. 

vol. I. n 393 


^vfJLpaivr]' e^eXOelv re fir)Beva en, dXX* airo rov 
Tet^ou? airoKpLvacrdcu otl dBvvara crfyiai iroielv 

2 ea-riv a AaKeBai/jLovioi TrpofcaXovvrcu. &)9 Be 
aireKpivavTo, evrevOev Brj irpSirov /iev e<? iKi/iap- 
Tvplav k<xi Oeoov real r/pcocov twv eyywpimv 'Ap^t- 

3 Bafios 6 ffacnXevs Karecrrr] Xeycov wBej " 0eol 
ocroi yrjv ttjv HXaraitSa ey^ere teal rjooje?, %vv- 
LcTTOph eare on ovre rrjv dpyr}v dBiicws, etcXLirov- 
tcov Be TCJvSe Trporepcov rb Ijvvgo/jLOtov, eVl yrjv 
rrjvBe rjXOofiev, ev fj oi Trcnepes 7]fxo3V ev^dfievoi 
v/jlIv ^IijBcov i/epdrTjerav ical irapeayeTe avrrjv 
ev/ievi] evaywviaacrOai Tot? "RXXrjaiv, ovre vvv, 
7]v ti ttol&iasv, dBiicr]o-o}±ev TrpofcaXecrdfievoL yap 
7roXXa teal el/cora ov jvyydvojiev. %vyyv cofioves 
Be eare tt}? fiep dBiKLa^ tcoXa^eaOai Tot? virdp- 
yovcri Trporipois, ttjs Be TipLwpias rvyydveiv rot? 
€7n(j)epovai voiilijlws" 

LXXY. Toaavra eirL6eidaa<; KaOiarrj e? 7ro\e- 
fiov rov arparov. teal irpajrov /nev Trepiearavpco- 
crav avrovs tol<; BevBpeaiv a e/coyfrav, rov firjoeva 
enetjievai, eireiTa %coyu<x eyovv 777)0? ttjv ttoXlv, 
eXirl^ovTes rayiaT^v rrjv 1 aipeaiv eaeadai av- 
2 tcov (TTpaTevpLaTos roaovrov epya^o/ievov. tjvXa 
fiev ovv re/jLVovres etc tov KiOaipcovo? irapfpKoBo- 
fiovv e/carepcoOev, <f}opfir)Bbv dvrl roiycov TiOevre^, 
07TO)? fit] Bcax^oLTO eirl ttoXv to %ft>/ta. e(popovp 

1 Added by Classen. 


further, that no one should thereafter leave the city, 
but that the answer should be given from the walls 
that they found it impossible to do what the Lace- 
daemonians proposed. And when they had made 
answer, thereupon king Archidamus first stood forth 
calling the gods and heroes of the country to witness 
in the following words : " Ye gods and heroes who 
protect the land of Plataea, be our witnesses that 
we did no wrong in the beginning, but only after the 
Plataeans first abandoned the oath we all swore did 
we come against this land, where our fathers, in- 
voking you in their prayers, conquered the Persians, 
and which you made auspicious for the Hellenes 
to fight in, and that now also, if we take any 
measures, we shall be guilty of no wrong ; for though 
we have made them many reasonable proposals we 
have failed. Grant therefore your consent, that 
those be punished for the wrong who first began it, 
and that those obtain their revenue who are seeking 
to exact it lawfully." 

LXXV. After this appeal to the gods he began 
hostilities. In the first place the Lacedaemonians, 
using the trees which they had cut down, built a 
stockade round Plataea, that in future no one might 
leave the place ; then they began raising a mound 
against the town, hoping that with so large an army 
at work this would be the speediest way of taking it. 
So they cut timber on Cithaeron and built a structure 
alongside the mound on either side of it, laying the 
logs like lattice-work l to form a sort of wall, that 
the mound might not spread too much. Then they 

1 A frame was made like lattice-work or mat-work, the 
timbers crossing each other at right angles (4£). 



Be vXrjv e? avro teal Xl0ov<; icai yrjv koI el ri ctXXo 

3 avvreiv pueXXoi e7rt/3a\X6fievov. r)pLepa<; Be exovv 
efiSo/Arj/covTa teal vvktcl? fwe^co?, Siyprj/ievoi 
/car dvairavXas, ware tou? fiev cfrepeiv, tou? Be 
vttvov re teal ctItov alpelaOai' Aa/ceBaipLovlcov 
re ol Ijevayol €Kdart]<; TroXeco? ^vvecpecrTcoTes 1 

4 rjvdy/cafrv e? to epyov. ol Be HXarair)? opebvres 
to %o)/ia alpofievov, ^vXivov relyos %vv9evre<; kcl\ 
€7rio-T7]cravT€<; ra> eavrcov Telyei f] irpoaeyovjo, 
eao)KoB6/novv e? avrb irXivdovs etc rcov iyyvs ol- 

5 Kioiv KaOaipovvre?. %vvBeo~pLO<; B" rjv avrois ra 
%vXa, tov fir] v^ijXbv yiyvofievov daOevh elvai to 
OLKoSofirj/jLa, teal TrpoKaXv/i/jbara elye Bepcreis real 
BccpOepas, ware tov? epya^opevovs /cal tcl i;vXa 
firjre 7rvpcf)6poi<; otcrTOi? fiaXXeadai ev dafyaXeia 

6 re elvai. fjpero Be to in/ro? toO Tez/^of? fieya, /cal 
to X^p-d ov ayoXairepov dvTavrjet, avrw. /cal ol 
HXarcur}? TotovBe tl eirivoovcnv' BieXbvres tov 
Tet^ov? fj irpoo-eiTLTTTe to %co/za icrecfropovv tt)v 

LXXVI. Ol Be YleXoirovvrjaioi alaObpevoi ev 
Tapcrols KaXdpbov TrriXbv eviXXovTes iaeftaXXov t ? 9 
to BirjprjpLevov, 07TO)9 fir) Biax^bpievov cbairep r) yi) 
2 cj)opoLTO. ol Be TavTrj diroKX^bp.evoi tovto fiev 
iireaxov, virovopbov Be e/c tt)? TroXecos 6pv%avTe<; 
/cal %WTe/c/j,tipd{ievoL virb to x^ > / jLCL vfyelkicov ai>0is 
irapd o~(pa<; tov x°^ v ' KaL iXdvOavov eirl iroXv 

1 With ABEFM and Suid. Hude reads, with CG, oi 
Zevayol Kal eK-iar-qs iroAcws <o/> i<pcaTWTes. 



brought and threw into the space wood and stones 
and earth and anything else which when thrown on 
would serve to build up the mound. And for seventy 
days and nights continuously they kept on raising 
the mound, divided into relays, so that while some 
were carrying others might take sleep and food ; and 
the Lacedaemonian commanders of auxiliaries to- 
gether with the officers in charge of the contingents 
from the several cities kept them at their task. But 
the Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, put together 
a framework of wood which they set on top of their 
own wall at the point' where the mound was being 
constructed, and inside this frame they put bricks 
which they took from the neighbouring houses. The 
timbers served to hold the bricks together, pre- 
venting the structure from becoming weak as it 
attained height, and they were protected by coverings 
of skins and hides, so that the workmen and wood- 
work might be safe and shielded from incendiary 
arrows. The wall was mounting to a great height, 
and the opposing mound was rising with equal speed, 
when the Plataeans thought of a new expedient. 
They made an opening in that part of the city wall 
where the mound came into contact with it, and 
began to draw the earth in. 

LXXVI. But the Peloponnesians became aware of 
this, and threw into the breach clay packed in reed- 
mats that it might not filter through like the loose 
earth and be carried away. But the besieged, 
thwarted in this direction, gave up that plan and 
dug a mine from the town, and, guessing when they 
had got beneath the mound, once more began to 
draw away the earth to their side, this time from 
underneath ; and for a long time they worked 



toia eijco, ware eTCi(BaWovTa<; rjacrov avvreiv vira- 
yop,evov avroLS /cdrcoOev tov ^co/iaTCx; Kal l^dvov- 

3 tos alel eVl to Kevovfxevov. BeBioTe? Be fir) ovS* 
ovtco Bvvwvrai bXiyoi 7T/30? 7roXXov<; awkyeiv, 
irpoaeire^vpov ToBe* to fiev /jbiya OLKoBopLrj/jia 
enraiHTavTO epya^ofievov to kcltcl to %w/ta, evOev 
Be Kal evQev avTod dp^d/ievoi dirb tov ftpaxeo? 
T€i%of5 £k tov evTO$ fj,7]voeiBe<; e? ttjv ttoXlv ecrw- 
koBo/xovv, 07T&)?, el to fiiya ret^o? o\\igkoito, 
tovt dvTeyoi, teal Beoi tov? evavTiovs av0t<; 777509 
avTo X ovv > KaL r ^pox w P OVVTa ^ ^ aco BcirXdaiov re 
irovov exeiv teal ev d/j,(f)L/36X(p fidXXov ytyveadai. 

4 dfia Be T7) ^aSo-et Kal fii]x ava< > Trpoarp/ov ol IleXo- 
irovvr)Gioi Ty iroXei, puiav fiev rj tov p,eydXov ol/co- 
BofjLijfiaTOS KCLTci to %co/*a TTpoaaxOelaa eirl fieya 
Te KaTeaeiae /cal tov<; IlXarata? efyoftrjaev, aXXas 
Be aXXy tov Tet^ou?, a? /3poxov<; Te TrepiftdXXov- 
re? dvi/cXcov ol IlXaTcurjs, /cal Bo/cov<; fieydXas 
dpTfjo-avTes dXvaeai fia/cpal? criBypah dirb 7-779 
Top,rj$ e/caTepcoOev dirb icepaitov Bvo eir iKeKXipukvwv 
Kal virepTeivovGOiv virep tov Tet^ou? dveXKvaav- 
re? iy/capala^y oiroTe irpoaireaelo-Qal Try fieXXot, rj 
fjL7]Xav7], dfyieaav Tyv Bokov %aA,a/oai9 tou9 dXv- 
aeai Kal ov Bid X ei P 0< * €X 0VTe<i > V Se pvpy ifiirl- 
TTTOvaa dire/cavXi^e to irpovxov t>}? €fjb/3oXrj<;. 

LXXVII. MeTa Be tovto ol UeXo7rovv7J<jiot,, 
a>? a'L Te p,T)yaval ohBev w<f>eXovv Kal tco x (J */ jLaTt 



unnoticed by those outside, so that in spite of what 
they heaped on these made less progress, because 
their mound, as it was sapped from below, constantly 
kept settling down into the hollow space. But fear- 
ing that even so they would not be able to hold out, 
few as they were against a multitude, they devised 
this further expedient : they stopped working on the 
high structure opposite the mound, and starting at 
the low part of the wall on either side of it they 
began building a crescent-shaped rampart on the 
inward or city side of it, in order that, if the high 
wall should be taken, this might offer resistance ; the 
enemy would thus have to raise a second mound to 
oppose the new rampart, and as they advanced and 
came inside the crescent they would not only have 
their labour twice over, but would also be more 
exposed to attack on both sides. But the Pelopon- 
nesians, while going on with their mound, also brought 
up engines against the city : one was moved forward 
over the mound, and shook down a great part of 
the high structure, terrifying the Plataeans, while 
others were brought to bear at different parts of 
the wall. But the Plataeans threw nooses over these 
and pulled them up. They also suspended great 
beams by long iron chains attached at either end to 
two poles which rested on the wall and extended 
over it ; then they hauled up the beams at right 
angles l to the battering-ram and when it was about 
to strike anywhere let go the beam by allowing the 
chains to run slack and not keeping hold of them ; 
whereupon the beam would fall with a rush and 
break off the head of the battering-ram. 

LXXVI I. After this, the Peloponnesians, seeing 
that their engines were doing no good and that the 

1 i.e. parallel to the walL 



to avTiTeiyjLcryua eyiyveTO, vofiiaavTes airopov el- 
vat, diro roiv irapovTcov Beivcov eXelv rrjv ttoXlv 

2 irpo<$ TTjv irepiTeiyiGiv irapea/cevd^ovro. irpoTe- 
pov Be TTvpl eBo^ev avrois ireipaaai el BvvaivTO 
TrvevfiaTO^ yevofjuevov eirifyXe^ai ttjv ttoXlv ovaav 
ou fjLejdXrjv iraaav yap Br] IBeav eirevoovv, el 7ra)? 
g<\>igiv avev Bairdvr)<$ /cal 7roXiop/cia<; Trpoaa^Oelrj. 

3 (popovvres Be vXr]<; tyatceXovs irapefiaXov diro 
tov ^w/zaTo? e? to fiera^v irpwrov tov Tet%oi>? 
teal rr)<; it poayw crews, ra%v Se irXi'ipovs yevopuevov 
Bia iroXv-^etpiav eiTLirapevrjaav ical tt)? aXXr)? tto- 
Xecos oaov eBvvavTO diro tov fierecopov irXelcrTov 
iirMTxetv, ififiaXovTes Se irvp £vv Oeico koX TTio-arj 

4 rjyjrav ttjv vXtiv. /cal eyevero <fiXb£ rocravrr) oariv 
ovBel<; 7ra) e? 76 e/celvov tov y^pbvov yeipoiroii)Tov 
elBev iiBr) yap iv opecriv vXtf TpL^Oelaa vir ave- 
pcov Trpbs avTrjv a.7r6 TavTOfiaTov irvp real <f)Xoya 

5 air avTOV dvfj/cev. tovto Be fieya t€ tjv koX tov<; 
TlXaTaias TaXXa BiafyvyovTas eXa^icrTov eBerjcre 
Bia<pOelpac eWo9 yap ttoXXov ywpiov tt)? iroXeoa^ 
oufc tjv ireXdaai, irvevfid Te el eireyeveTo avrfj 
€7TL(f)opov, oirep teal rfXin^ov oi evavTLoi, ov/c av 

6 Bi6(pvyov. vuv Be teal ToBe XeyeTai £v/if3rjvai, 
v&wp iroXv teal ftpovras yevo/ievas o-(3ecrai ttjv 
<f)Xoya teal ovtcos 7rava0f]vac tov klvBvvov. 


BOOK II. lxxvii. 1-6 

counter-wall was keeping pace with the mound, 
and concluding that it was impracticable without 
more formidable means of attack to take the city, 
began to make preparations for throwing a wall 
about it. But before doing that they decided to 
try fire, in the hope that, if a wind should spring 
up, they might be able to set the city on fire, as 
it was not large ; indeed, there was no expedient 
they did not consider, that they might if possible 
reduce the city without the expense of a siege. 
Accordingly they brought faggots of brushwood and 
threw them down from the mound, first into the 
space between the wall and the mound ; and then, 
since the space was soon filled up by the multi- 
tude of workers, they heaped faggots also as far 
into the city as they could reach from the height, 
<md finally threw fire together with sulphur and 
pitch upon the wood and set it afire. And a 
conflagration arose greater than any one had ever 
seen up to that time, kindled, I mean, by the 
hand of man ; for in times past in the moun- 
tains when dry branches have been rubbed against 
each other a forest has caught fire spontaneously 
therefrom and produced a conflagration. And this 
fire was not only a great one, but also very nearly 
destroyed the Plataeans after they had escaped all 
earlier perils ; for in a large part of the city it was 
not possible to get near the fire, and if on top of 
that a breeze had sprung up blowing toward the city, 
which was precisely what the enemy were hoping 
for, the Plataeans would not have escaped. But as 
it was, this also is said to have happened — a heavy 
thunder-shower came on and quenched the flames, 
-ind so the danger was checked. 



LXXVIII. 0/ Be He\oiTovvr}(TLOL CTretBi) real 
rovrov Suj/jLaprov, fiepos fiev re reaTaXiTrovrfs rod 
arparou, to Be irXeov depevres Trepierei^L^ov rriv 
ttoXlv rcvreXcp BieXofxevot reara TroXets to ywplow 
rdeppos Be ivros re tjv real encoder ef 97? eirXivdev- 

2 cravTO. real iireiBrj irav e^elpyaaro irepl dprerov- 
pov eViroXa?, KaraXiirovTe? cpvXareds rod r)/ALcreo<; 
rel\ov<; (to Be rjpaau BolcotoI eejyvXacraov) dvey^co- 
prjaav rco crrparcp real BieXvOrjaav Kara TroXeis. 

3 nXarat?}? Be iralBas fiev teal yvvatrcas teal tov$ 
irpeaj3vTdrov<i re real ttXtjOo? to a^pelov tcov 
avOpcoircov irporepov irereereofiio-fAevoi rjaav es ra? 
y A07]va<;, avrol Be eiroXLopreovvro iytearaXeXeifU,- 
fievoL Terparcoo-Loi, 'AOijvaLcov Be 6yBoj]reovra, yv- 

4 valrees Be Betea real etcarbv gitottoioL roaovroi 
r)<rav 01 ^vfnravTes ore e? rrjv iroXioprelav rcadi- 
aravro, real aXXos ovBels r)v ev rco rei\ei oure 
BovXos ovr eXevflepos. TOiavrr) p,ev 7) YlXaraccbv 
TToXioprcia rcaTecrrceudaOr). 

LXXIX. Tov 5' avrov Oepov? real apa rfj 
tcov UXaraccbv eir car par eta, 'AOijvaloi Bia^tXioL? 
OTrXirais eaurtov teal lirirevcn BiarcocrLois eTrearpd- 
revaav eVl XaXrccBeas rovs iirl Sparer)? real 
BoTT^atOf? arcfid^ovTos tov ctltov iarparrj-yei Be 
2 lEievocpcov 6 EvpnriBov Tpiros avTo?. eXOovre? Be 
viro ^irdprcoXov Tr/v T$ottikt)v top ctItov Biecpdec- 
pav. eBoreet Be teal irpoa^coprjcreLV rj itoXis xjtto 



LXXVIII. When the Peloponnesians had failed in 
this attempt also, they dismissed the larger part of 
their army, leaving only a portion of it, and proceeded 
to throw a wall around the city, apportioning the 
space to the several cities ; and there were ditches 
both inside and outside the wall, out of which they 
had taken the clay for the bricks. And when the 
wall was entirely finished about the time of the 
rising of Arcturus, 1 they left a guard to watch one 
half of the wall (the Thebans guarded the other 
half), and withdrew the main army, the troops dis- 
persing to their several cities. But the Plataeans 
had previously had their children and wives, as well 
as the oldest men and the unserviceable part of the 
population, removed to Athens, and the men left be- 
hind to undergo the siege were only four hundred of 
their own number and eighty Athenians, besides one 
hundred and ten women to prepare the food. This 
was the number all told when the siege began, and 
there was no one else within the walls, slave or free- 
man. Such were the conditions under which the 
siege of the Plataeans was established. 

LXXIX. During the same summer, when the corn 
was in full ear, 2 while the expedition against Plataea 
was in progress, the Athenians with two thousand 
hoplites of their own and two hundred cavalry 
marched against the Chalcidians in Thrace and the 
Bottiaeans, under the command of Xenophon son of 
Euripides and two others. And coming to Spartolus 
in Bottice they destroyed the grain. It was be- 
lieved, moreover, that the city would be delivered 
over to them by a party inside the town which was 

About the middle of September. 
In the month of May. 



Tivcov evBoOev irpaaaovTcov it poire fi^rdvTcov Be e? 
"OXvvdov tcov ov ravra /3ovXofievcov oirXlrai re 
rjXOov /cal o-rpcvTia e? c\>vXa/cr)V f)$ eire^eXO ovo"q<; 
i/c tt}? ^irapTcoXov e? yud^v KaOiaravraL ol 'A6rj- 

3 valoi vtt aurfj rjj 7r6Xei, /cal ol fiev ottXitcu tcov 
XaX/ciBecov /cal eiri/covpoi, rives fier avTcov vi/ccov- 
rai viro tcov 'AOrjvalcov /cal dva^copovcriv e? ttjv 
XirdprcoXov, ol Be Itttttj^ tcov XaX/cihecov koX ^Ckol 
vi/ccoai tou? tcov ' AQ-qvaicov i7T7rea? /cal yjriXovs. 

4 elxpv Be Tivas ov ttoXXov? 7re\rao-rd<; i/c t?)? 
KpovaiBos 7% /caXov/ievrj^. dpri Be tt}<? /ia%^79 
yeyevrffievr)? eTTijBo^Oovaiv aXXoi TreXraaral etc 

5 tt)? 'OXvvOov. /cal ol i/c rfjs %irapTcoXov yfnXol 
a)? elBov, Oapcnjo-avres rots re Trpoo-ycyvo/jLevois 
/cat on irporepov ov% rjaarjvTO, iiriTiQevTai avOts 
fjbera tcov XaXtaBecov lirirecov /cal tcov Trpocr/3o7]- 
6r)crdvTcov Tot? ' AOrjvaLow /cal ava^copovai 777)05 
Ta? Buo Ta^ei^ a? /caTeXnrov irapd Tot? cr/cevo- 

6 cfiopoLS. /cal oirore fiev iirloiev ol 'AOijvalot,, ive- 
BLBocrav, dva^copovat Be ive/ceivTO /cal earj/covTi^ov. 
01 T€ iTTTrrjs tcov X.aXtaSecov irpocwrTrevovTes fj 
doKolrj iaefiaXXov, /cal ov% rj/ciaTa cpo/3i]cravTe<; 
eTpeijrav tou? 'A07)i>aiov<; /cal erreBico^av iirl ttoXv. 

7 /cal ol fiev AOrjvaloi e? ttjv UoTelBaiav /caTacpev- 
yoven, /cal vaTepov tovs ve/cpov$ viroairovBovs 
k fiia dfiev 01 e? Ta? ' A6r)va<; dvaywpovcri tg3 irepi- 
ovti tov cTTpaTov' direOavov Be ai/Tcov rpid/covra 


BOOK II. lxxix. 2-7 

negotiating with them ; but the opposite faction 
forestalled this by sending word to Olynthus, and 
some hoplites and other troops arrived to garrison the 
place. Now when these made a sally from Spartolus, 
the Athenians were drawn into a battle with them 
under the very walls of the city, and although the 
hoplites of the Chalcidians and some mercenaries 
with them were defeated by the Athenians and re- 
treated into Spartolus, the cavalry of the Chalcidians 
and the light-armed troops defeated the Athenian 
cavalry and light-troops; for the Athenians had a few 
targeteers from the land called Crousis, 1 and just after 
the battle was over another force of targeteers came 
from Olynthus to the help of the garrison. And when 
the light-armed troops in Spartolus saw them, em- 
boldened by these accessions and because they had 
not been worsted before, they again, assisted by the 
Chalcidian cavalry and those who had newly come to 
their support, attacked the Athenians, who now fell 
back upon the two companies which they had left 
with their baggage. And whenever the Athenians 
advanced, they gave way, but when the Athenians 
retreated they kept close at their heels, hurling 
javelins at them. Then the Chalcidian cavalry, riding 
up, kept charging the Athenians wherever opportu- 
nity offered, and throwing them into utter panic 
routed them and pursued them to a great distance. 
The Athenians took refuge in Potidaea, and after- 
wards, having recovered their dead under a truce, 
returned to Athens with what remained of their 
army ; and they had lost three hundred and thirty 

1 This is evidently a remark in explanation of the presence 
of light-troops with the Athenians, for there had come from 
Athens only heavy-armed infantry and cavalry ; cf. § 1 above. 



Kal TerpcLKoaioi Kal ol arparrjyol iravre^. ol Be 
XaX/^tS/}"? Kal BoTTiatot rpoiralov re ecrrrjaav Kal 
tow? veKpovs tou9 clvtqiv dpeXojjLevoi BieXvOrjaav 
Kara 7roXet?. 

LXXX. Tov B* avrov Oepovs, ov ttoXXw vo~re- 
pov tovtcdv, ' ApbirpaKLOirat Kal Xaoi^e?, fiovXo- 
fjuevoi ^AfcapvavLav ttjv iracrav KaraaTpe^aaOai 
Kal 'Adrjvalcov aTTOCTTrjcrai, ireiOovai, AaKeBat- 
fjLoviovs vavTiKov T€ irapaa Kevdaai €K T% %V/jL- 
yLta^tSo? Kal oirXira^ %lXlov<; irkji^ai eV * AKap- 
vaviav, Xeyovre? on, rjV vaval Kal ire^w d/ia 
fierd crcjxuv eXOwcnv, dBvvdrcov ovrcov ^vfi^oi-jOelv 
t6)V airo OaXdaarj^ 'Atcapvavoov paBiws ' * Aicap- 
vavlav ayovres Kal t?}? ZatcvvOou Kal Kecf>aX- 
Xrjvias Kparj'jcrovori, Kal o irepiirXovs ovketl 
eaoiro ' * AOrjvaloL? o/iolco? irepl lieXoirowTjcrov' 

2 eXiriBa^ S' elvai Kal NaviraKrov Xaftelv. ol Be 
AaKeSuL/iovioi TreiaOevres Kvrj/iov fxev vavapypv 
en ovra Kal tovs onrXiras eirl vavalv bXiyais 
evOus irifjLTrovcTL, tw Be vavrtKu> irepiijyyeiXav 
irapaa Kevaaafxevcc &)? rd^iara irXelv e? AevKaBa. 

3 rjcrav Be Kopivdtot %v /jot po6v pbov /xevoi fidXtara 
roU WfiTrpaKicoTais diroiKoi^ ovcriv. Kal to fxev 
vavriKov eK re KoplvOov Kal ^ckvoovos Kal rcov 
ravrr] ywpiwv ev irapaaKevfi rjv, to 5' ck AeuKa- 
Bos Kal WvaKTopuov Kal ' A/ait paKia? irporepov 

4 dcpLKO/nevov ev AevKaBt Trepte/xevev. Kvfj/xos Be 
Kal ol /jl€t avrov ylXioi oirXlrai eireiBy-) eirepaLco- 
Orjcrav XaOovres Qopn'iwva, 09 VPX e T & v cikocti 

BOOK II. lxxix. 7-Lxxx. 4 

men and all their generals. The Chalcidians and 
Bottiaeans set up a trophy, and then, after they had 
taken up their own dead, dispersed to their several 

LXXX. During the same summer, not long after 
these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, wishing 
to subdue the whole of Acarnania and detach it 
from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit 
out a fleet from the countries of the Doric alliance 
and to send a thousand hoplites against Acarnania, 
saying that, if they joined forces with them, bringing 
ships and infantry, it would be an easy matter first 
to occupy Acarnania since the Acarnanians on 1 the 
seacoast would be unable to aid those inland, and 
then to make themselves masters of Zacynthus and 
Cephallenia also : after that the Athenians would no 
longer be able to sail round the Peloponnesus in the 
same way as before ; and there was a chance of taking 
Naupactus also. The Lacedaemonians agreed and at 
once despatched Cnemus, who was still admiral, 2 and 
the hoplites on a few ships, and sent round orders to 
the allied fleet to make their preparations and sail as 
soon as possible to Leucas. And the Corinthians were 
especially eager to support the enterprise of the 
Ambraciots, who were colonists of theirs. The con- 
tingent of the fleet to come from Corinth and Sic von 
and the places in that quarter was still under pre- 
paration, but that from Leucas and Anactorium and 
Ambracia, arriving first, waited at Leucas. As for 
Cnemus and the thousand hoplites, as soon as they 
had succeeded in crossing over without being de- 
tected by Phormio, who was in command of the 

1 i.e. because of the presence of the Peloponnesian fleet 
along their coast. 2 cf. ch. lxvi. 2. 



vecov roov * Attikwv at Trepi Nclvttclktov i(f>pov- 
povv, ev@i)<; 7TapecrK€vd^ovTO rrjv Kara, yrjv 

5 arpareiav. fcal avru* iraprjaav ^XXrjvwv fiev 
'AfjUTrpaKiwrai, real ' * Avcucropioi kcu AevKaStoi 
koX 01)? avTO<; e%cov rjXde yiXtoL TLeXoirovvijcricov, 
fidpftapoi, Be Xaoves %tXiot afiaaiXevToi, <av 
rjjovvro eTreTTjaiw irpoGTareiq i/c rov dpyiKov 
yevov? <J>o)T£o? koX NtKavwp. ^vvearparevovTo 
Be fierd Xaovcov kcu QeairpcoTol dftaauXevTot. 

6 Mo\ocr<xoi>? Be rjye kcu J Arivrdva<; XafivXivOos 
6TTiTpoiTO<; oiv %dpviro<$ tov /3aa"A,eo)? en 7T£ue$o? 
ovtos, kcu Uapavcdovs "OpoiBos /SaaiXevoov. 
*0 pea-rat, Be %iXioi, wv eftaalXevev 'Aj/t/o^o?, 
fiera Hapavaucov ^vvearparevovro 'OpoiBco ' Av- 

7 r rio n )(ov eTrLTpe-^ravTOS. erre/A^e Be kcu, UepBiKKas 
Kpvcfra T(bv AOrjvaiwv ^tXlov^ M.aKeB6vcov, ol 

8 varepov rjXOov. tovtw ra> arparw eiropeveTO 
Kvtj/jlos ov TTepipLeiva? rb airb KopuvOov vclvtikov, 
kclI Bid t??? 'Apyeta? toure? AtpLvalav, kco/jltjv 
dTel%iGTOV, eiropdrjaav. dcpLKvovvrat re eVl 
Xrpdrov, ttoXiv pLeyiGTqv rr}<; ' 'AKapvavias, vo- 
/jLifrvTes, el ravrrjv 7rpd)T7]v Xdftoiev, paBucos 
<T(picn raXXa Trpoa^wprjaeLv. 

LXXXI. ' ' AKapvaves Be alaOo/xevoi Kara re 
yr/v iroXXi-jv arpanav ea/3e/3X7]Kv2av e/c re 
6aXdcrcrr}<; vavcrlv d/xa tou? iroXe/jbiov^ irapeao- 
fievov?, ovre gvvefioijOovv icpuXaaaov re rd avrcov 
eKCKJTOt, irapd re <£>opfi£wva eire/JLirov KeXevovres 
d/jLvveiv 6 Be dBvvaros e(j>rj elvai vclvtikov Ik 
KopivOov /jLeXXovros eKirXelv NavrraKrov epij/jL7)v 
2 diroXLiTelv. ol Be TLeXoTropvtjaLoi koX ol %vfifxa- 


BOOK II. lxxx. 4-Lxxxi. 2 

twenty Athenian ships that were on guard off Nau- 
pactus, 1 they began at once to prepare for the ex- 
pedition by land. He had with him, of Hellenic 
troops, some Ambraciots, Anactorians and Leuca- 
dians, and the thousand Peloponnesians whom he 
himself brought ; of barbarians, a thousand Chao- 
nians, who, having no king, were led by Photius and 
Nicanor of the ruling clan who had the annual presi- 
dency. With the Chaonian contingent were also some 
Thesprotians, who likewise have no king. A force 
of Molossians and Atintanians were led by Saby- 
linthus, the guardian of king Tharyps, who was still 
a boy, and of Paravaeans by their king, Oroedus. 
With the Paravaeans were a thousand Orestians 
whose king, Antiochus, had entrusted them to 
Oroedus. And Perdiccas also sent, without the 
knowledge of the Athenians, a thousand Macedo- 
nians, who arrived too late. With this army Cnemus 
set out, not waiting for the fleet from Corinth ; and 
as they passed through the territory of Argos 2 they 
sacked Limnaea, an unwalled village. Finally they 
arrived at Stratus, the largest city of Acarnania, 
thinking that if they could take this first, the other 
places would readily come over to them. 

LXXX I. Now when the Acarnanians perceived 
that a large army had invaded them by land and 
that the enemy would soon be at hand with a fleet 
by sea as well, they did not attempt combined re- 
sistance, but guarding severally their own possessions 
they sent to Phormio urging him to aid them. But 
he said that he could not leave Naupactus unpro- 
tected, as a hostile fleet was about to sail from 
Corinth. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians and their 
1 cf. ch. Lxix. 1. a Amphilochian Argos; cf. ch. lxviii. 1. 



yoi rpia reXrj irot^cravTe^ acpcov avrcov eyjiipovv 
irpos ri]v rcov ^rpaTLGov ttoXiv, 07T&)? iyyvs arpa- 
TOTTehevo-afxevoL, el pr\ \6ycp ireidoiev, epyco irei- 

3 pcovro rod Tet^of?. Kal to fxeaov fiev e^ovre^ 
irpocrfiaav Xaoz^e? Kal oi aWoi ftdpftapoi, eV 
Sefta? 5* avrcov AevKaBioc Kal ' 'Avarcropioi /ecu 
ol fiera tovtcov, ev dpcarepa Be Kyrj/xo? KaX oi 
Ile\o7rovv7]arLOL /cal ' ' A/jLirpaKicorai' Biel^ov Be 

7TO\v dlT d\\j]\cOV KCLl 6CTTLV OT€ OvBe kcopCOVTO. 

4 Kal oi fA€P r/ JLWr]V€<i reray/mevoL re irpoafjcrav /ecu 
Sid (fiv\afcf)<; exovres, ew? iaTparoireBevcravTO ev 
iimiiheiw' oi Be Xaoves acpicrt, re avrois irLcrrev- 
ovres Kal d^iov/ievot iiiro rcov eKeivrj rjireipcoTcov 
ILayjuiorrcvToi e\vai ovre eireayov rod arparoireBov 
KaraXaffelv, ywpi]aavTk^ re pvpur) fierd rcov a\- 
Xcov fiapftdp'ov evo/uuerav avro/3oel av ttjv irokiv 

5 ekelv /cal avrcov to epyov yeveaOat.^ yvovre<; t¥ 
avTous oi ^rpdnoL eri irpoGiovra^ Kal rjyrjcrd- 
fjuevoi, fiefjiovco/jjvcov el /cparrfaeiav, ov/c av en 
acpLCTL toi/? ''EXXrjvas ofioicos TrpoaeXdelv, irpoXo- 
yi^ovai Br) rd irepl rrjv ttoXlv eveBpais, /cal eireiBr) 
iyyvs rjcrav, e/c re t»}s 7roA,ea)? o/ioae y^copi]aavTe<; 

6 Kal i/c rcov iveBpcov irpocnriirrovcTLv. /cal e? 
cpoftov /caraardvrcov BiacpOetpovrai re noWol rcov 
Xaovcov, /cal oi aWoi ftdpftapoi, ft>? elBov avrovs 
iv$6vra<z, ovKeri virepbeivav, aAA,' €? <f>vyr)v Kare- 

7 orrjaav. rcov Be 'EWrjviKcov arparoireBcov ovBe- 
repov fjaOero rrjs yua^?, Bid to 7roXu irpoeXOelv 
avrovs Kal arparoireBov olrjdfjrai KaraXrjyjro/jLe- 


BOOK II. lxxxi. 2-7 

allies, dividing their troops into three divisions, 
advanced towards the city of the Stratians, their 
purpose being to encamp near by, and then, if they 
could not prevail upon them by parleying, to assault 
the wall. As they advanced, the centre was held by 
the Chaonians and the other barbarians, while on 
their right were the Leucadians and Anactorians 
and those who accompanied them, and on the left 
Cnemus with his Peloponnesians and the Ambraciots ; 
and the divisions were far apart from each other, 
sometimes, not even in sight. And the Hellenic 
troops as they advanced maintained their ranks and 
were on their guard until they encamped in a suit- 
able place ; but the Chaonians, who were not only 
confident of themselves but were also recognised as 
very excellent fighting men by the inhabitants of 
that part of the mainland, did not halt to make 
camp, but advanced with a rush along with the other 
barbarians, thinking that they could take the town 
at the first assault, and thus gain the glory for them- 
selves. But the Stratians noticed that they were 
still advancing, and thinking that, if they could 
overcome them while isolated, the Hellenes would 
no longer be as ready to attack them, set ambushes 
in the outskirts of the town, and as soon as the 
barbarians were close at hand, closed in upon them 
from the city and from the ambushes and fell upon 
them. Thrown into a panic, many of the Chaonians 
were slain, and the other barbarians, seeing them 
give way, no longer held their ground, but took to 
flight. But neither of the Hellenic divisions was 
aware of the battle, because their allies had gone far 
ahead of them, and they thought that they were 



8 vovs irreiyeaOat. iirel 6" ive/ceivro cfrevyovre? ol 
/3dp/3apoL, dveXapuftavov re avrovs /cal gvvaya- 
ybvre? rd arparbweSa rjav^a^ov avrov rriv r)p,e- 
pav, 6? ^elpa? /iev ov/c lovrcov acpicTL twv Srparlcov 
Std to fL?]7rcD tou? aXXov? 'A/capvavas %vpLJ3eftor)- 
Orj/cevaiJ drrcoOev Be acpevSovcovrcov /ecu e? dnroplav 
/caOiardvrcov ov <ydp r)v dvev ottXcov /civr)0r)vai. 
So/covcri Be ol * A/capvave? /cpdriGroi elvai rovro 
ttoi,6lv. LXXXII. iireihr) Be vv£ iyevero, dva- 
ywp^aa? o Kvrjfjios rfj arparia Kara rdyo? iirl 
top "Avarrov irorapibv, o? drreyei crraBiov? bySorj- 
Kovra Xrpdrov, rov? re ve/cpov? KOfxi^erai rfj 
varepaia viroairovhov? koX OlviaBcov ^vpLirapa- 
yevopevcov Kara fyiXiav dva^copel Trap avrov? 
irplv rr)v %vpL(3or)6eiav iXOelv. rcdiceWev irr' 
oikov aTT7J\6ov €/caaTOL. ol he ^Tpdrioc rpoiralov 
earrjerav rr)? y^a%^5 rr)? rrpb? rov? ftapj3dpov<;. 

LXXXIII. To o° etc rrj? Koplvdov teal rcov 
aXXcov tjufifidxcov rcov i/c rod Kpicra[ov koXttov 
vavrtKoVy b ehec irapayevecrdai rco Kvyj/xco, oirco? 
fir) i;v/i/3oi]6coo-iv ol dirb OaXdaarj? dvco ^Aicapvd- 
ve?, ov irapayiyverai, dXX* r/vay/cdaOiicrav rrepl 
rd? auras rjfiepa? rfj iv Hrpdrco fid^r) vavpa^r)- 
crat rrpb? Qopfiicova Kal rd? elfcoai, vav? rcov 

2 'AOrjvaicov at icppovpovv iv NavTrd/crcp. 6 yap 
Qoppicov irapanrXeovra? avrov? e^co rod koXttov 
€T)]pei, /3ovXbfievo? iv rfj evpvywpia iiriOkaQai. 

3 ol he Y^opivQioi fcal ol ^vpfiayoi etrXeov fiev oi>x 
a)? irri vavfia^ta, dXXd ar paricoriKcorepov irape- 
aKevaafievoi i? rrjv W/capvavlav /cal ovk dv olb- 
fievot irpb? eirrd /cal reaaapd/covra vav? rd? 
crcperepa? roXfirjaac rov? ' AOrjvai'ov? eiKOcri rat? 

4 I2 

BOOK II. lxxxi. 7-LXXX111. 3 

pressing on in order to find a camp. But when the 
barbarians in their flight broke in upon them, they 
took them in and uniting their two divisions kept 
quiet there during the day, the Stratians not coming 
to close quarters with them, because the rest of the 
Acarnanians had not yet come to their support, but 
using their slings against them from a distance and 
distressing them ; for it was not possible for them to 
stir without armour ; and indeed the Acarnanians are 
famous for their excellence in the use of the sling. 
LXXXI I. But when night came on, Cnemus hastily 
retreated with his army to the river Anapus, which 
is eighty stadia distant from Stratus, and on the 
following day took up his dead under a truce ; and 
since the Oeniadae had joined his expedition in token 
of their friendly feelings, he withdrew to their 
country before the combined forces of the Acar- 
nanians had arrived, and from there they returned 
severally to their homes. As for the Stratians, they 
set up a trophy of their battle with the barbarians. 

LXXXI 1 1. Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and 
from the other allies on the Crisaean Gulf, which 
was to have joined Cnemus in order to prevent the 
Acarnanians on the sea-coast from aiding those in the 
interior, did not arrive, but was obliged, about the 
day of the battle at Stratus, to fight with Phormio 
and the twenty Athenian ships which were on guard 
at Naupactus. For Phormio was watching them as 
they sailed along the coast out of the gulf, pre- 
ferring to attack them in the open water. Now the 
Corinthians and their allies on their way to Acarnania 
were not equipped for fighting at sea, but rather for 
operations on land, and they had no idea that the 
Athenians with their twenty ships would dare to 



eavrojv vavpayiav irot^cracrOaL' CTreiBr) /xevroi 
avTLirapaiTXeovTds re iwpcov au-rou?, irapd yrjv 
a(f)(OV ko/ju%o/a€voov, /cal itc TLarpcou t?}? 'A^aia? 
7T/30? rr)v avTiirepas rjireipov BtaftaXXovres eV 
' A/capvavlas fcarelBov rov? 'AOjjvcllow; cltto rrj<i 
Xa\/a'8o9 real rod Evijvov irorapLOV 7rpocr7rXeovTa<; 
aerial teal ovk eXaOov vvktos d^oppnadpevoi} 
ovtco Br) dvayfcd^ovTCU vavp,ayeiv /card /xeaov rov 

4 iropOpLov. arpar^yoX Be fjcrav fiev kclL Kara 
iroXet^ eicdaTcov ot irapeaKevd^ovro, KopivOicov 
Be Ma^acoy koX 'laoKpdrr)^ kclX ' 'AyaOap-^lBa^. 

5 teal oi piev UeXoTrovvrjaioi erd^avro kvkXov raiv 
vecbv a>? /jl€jl(ttov oloL t rjaav pr) BlB6vt€<; Bietc- 
ttXovv, Ta? irpwpas piev e£co, eaw Be ras rrpv- 
fivas, /cal rd re Xeirra irXola a ^vveirXei eWo? 
ttolovvtcu koX irevre vavs ra9 dpLcrra irXeovaas, 
07T&)? e/cTrXeoiev Bid /3pa)(eo<; irapayiyvopevai,, el 
7T7j irpoairiTTTQiev oi evavrioi. 

LXXXIV. Ot B' *A6r)valoi Kara piav vavv 
Terayp.kvoi irepikirXeov avrovs kvkXw /cal %vvr)- 
yov e? oXiyov, ev XPV a ^ ei v*"* 1 pMrh-zovTes Kal 
BotcrjGiv irape\ovTe^ avriKa ep,(3aXelv Trpoeip-qro 
S' aurot? virb <£>oppicDvos prj eiTL^eipelv irplv av 
2 auTo? ar\pn)vr). rfXin^e yap avrcov ov fieielv tt)v 

1 Bloomfield's correction for {xpopfiiaafievoi of the MSS. 

1 Or, retaining ixpop/xiaduevoi, "they had tried to anchor 
under cover of night, but had been detected." 


BOOK II. lxxxiii. 3— LXXXIV. 2 

bring on an engagement with their own forty-seven. 
When, however, they saw that the Athenians kept 
sailing along the opposite coast as long as they them- 
selves continued to skirt the southern shore, and 
when, as they attempted to cross from Patrae in 
Achaia to the mainland opposite, making for Acar- 
nania, they observed that the Athenians were bearing 
down upon them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, 
and finally when, during the night, they had tried to 
slip their moorings l and get away but had been 
detected, under these circumstances they were forced 
to fight in the middle of the channel. 2 Their fleet 
was commanded by generals from the several states 
which contributed contingents, the Corinthian squad- 
ron by Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The 
Peloponnesians drew up their ships in as large a 
circle as they could without allowing the enemy an 
opportunity to break through, 3 prows outward, sterns 
inward ; and inside the circle they placed the light 
boats which accompanied them, and also five of their 
swiftest ships, in order that they might have only a 
short distance to sail out and bring support at any 
point where the enemy attacked. 

LXXXIV. As for the Athenians, drawn up in 
single column they kept sailing round the Pelopon- 
nesian fleet in a circle, hemming it into a narrower 
and narrower space, always just grazing by and 
giving the impression that they would charge at any 
moment. But orders had been given by Phormio 
not to attack until he should give the signal ; for he 
hoped that the enemy's ships would not k'eep in line, 

2 i.e. in the open water between Patrae and the mouth of 
the Evenus, as opposed to the regions along the shore of the 
Gulf, where their fleet might run into a harbour. 

• See note on 1. xlix. 3. 



tcl^iv, cocrirep ev yfj iref'rjv, dXXa, ^VfJureaeloQai 
777)09 dXXi]Xa<; to.? vavs Kal ra irXola Tapaxv v 
irapk^eiv, ei r eKirvevaecev Ik tov koXttov to 
irvevfia, oirep avafievcov re rrrepieirXei /cal elcodei 
yiyveaOai eirl tt)v eon, ovBeva y^pbvov riavyaaeiv 
auTOU?* Kal tt)v liriyelp^Giv e<$ avTw re evopu&v 
elvai, oirorav $ovXr\Tai, tcov vecov apueivov irXeov- 

3 acov, teal tot€ KaXXiGTrjv yiyveaOai. to? Be to Te 
TTvevfia tcarrjei Kal at vrjes ev oXiyqp rjBr] ovaai 
vir a/JL(f)OTep(ov, tov tc dvepuov tcov re irXoicov, 
ap,a irpoaKeipievcov eTapdaaovTO, /ecu vavs re vrfl 

TTpOdeTTlTTTe KOI T069 KOVTOl? BiewOoVVTO, f3oj] T6 

/ ^pcop,evoi Kal 7:7209 dXXijXovs dvTKpvXaKTJ tc Kal 
XoiBopia ovBev KdTrjtcovov ovt€ tcov irapayyeXXo- 
fievoov ovTe tcov KeXevaTcov, Kal ra? Kcoiras dBvva- 
tol 6Vt69 ev kXvBcovl dvacpepeiv avOpcoiroi aireipoi 
Tot? KvftepviJTais direiOeaTepa^ ra9 vavs irapel- 
ypv, tots Br) kcltcX tov KCLipov tovtov arjpLalvei, 
Kal ol ' Adrjraioi TrpoGirecrovTes irpooTov piev kcitci- 
Bvovai tcov ot paT7]ylBwv vecov piav, errre.IT a Be Kal 
ra9 oWo? 77 ywp^aeiav Bte(f)6eipov, Kal KaTecrTrj- 
aav 69 clXk7]v p.ev firjBeva TpeireaOai avTCov virb 
ttjs rapax^f (pevyetv Be €9 IlaT/oa? teal Avfirjv 

4 ttjs 'A%aia9. ol Be 'Adrjvaioi KaTaBioo^avTes Kal 
vavs BooBeKa Xa/36vT€<; tovs tc avBpas e% avTcov 
tou9 TrXeicrTOVs dveXopievoi es MoXvKpeiov dire- 
irXeov, Kal Tpoiralov aTrjcravTes irrrl tw 'Pico Kal 
vavv dvaOevTes tg> UoaeiBcovi dvex^P r l a ' av e ' ? 

5 y^ainraKTcv. TrapeirXevaav Be Kal ol YleXoirov- 


BOOK II. lxxxiv. 2-5 

like infantry on land, but would fall foul of one 
another, and also be thrown into confusion by the 
small boats, and then if the breeze for which he was 
waiting while he sailed round, which usually blew 
from the gulf towards dawn, should spring up, they 
would not remain steady for any length of time. As 
for the attack, he thought that was in his power 
whenever he chose, since his ships were better 
sailers, and that then was the most favourable 
moment for it. So when the wind began to come 
up, and the ships, already hemmed in a narrow 
space, were being thrown into confusion both by the 
violence of the wind and the pressure of the small 
boats, when ship was dashing against ship and the 
crews were trying to push them apart with poles, all 
the while keeping up such shouts and warning 
cries and abuse of one another that they could not 
hear either the word of command or the coxswains' 
calls, and, finally, when the inexperienced rowers, 
unable to get their oars clear of the water in a heavy 
sea, were rendering the ships less obedient to the 
helmsmen, then at this critical moment Phormio 
gave the signal. Thereupon the Athenians fell upon 
them; first they sank one of the admirals' ships, 
and then destroyed the rest as well wherever they 
came upon them, reducing them to such straits that 
in their confusion no one turned for defence, but 
all fled to Patrae and Dyme in Achaia. But the 
Athenians gave chase, and after they had captured 
twelve ships and had taken on board most of their 
crews sailed away to Molycreum ; then they set up a 
trophy on Rhium, dedicated a ship to Poseidon, and 
returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also 



vnGLOi evdiis rat? irepiko'nroLS rcov vewv etc tt)? 
Av/j.r)$ /cal Tlarpoiv e? K.v\\i]vr}v to 'RXclwv eVt- 
veiov teal airo AevK(i8o<; KvPffAO? /cal al e/ceivwv 
vijes, a 9 e&et, ravrais tjvfi/jLei^at,, a$iKvovvrai jiera 
rrjv ev ^-pdrcp p>d%r]v e? rrjv K.vXXiiviiv . 

LXXXV. HepLirovai Be /cal ol Aa/ceSaiuovioi 
tw KvijfMp ^uyu,/3ouXou? eirl Ta? vavs TipLO/cpaTT) 
/cal BpacrL&av /cal Avfco<f)pova, /ceXevovTes aXXrjv 
vavpuayiav fieXnov Trapacncevd^eaQai /cal /jlt) vir' 

2 oXtycov vewv elpyeaOai rrjs 6aXdaarj<;. iSo/cec yap 
avrols aXXcos re koX irpcorov vavpiayjas ireipacra- 
fievois ttoXvs o irapaXoyos elvai teal ov toctovtco 
wovto dfycov to vavTiKov XeiireaOai, yeyevfjaOai 
Be Ttva fiaXa/clap, ov/c dvTiTiQkvTes ti)V 'AO-rjvaicov 
etc iroXXov epureipiav t?}? cr^ereyoa? Bi oXiyov 

3 fieXeTTjs. opyfj ovv aireo~TeWov. ol Be d<$>uc6- 
fievoi /i€Ta tov Kvrj/jLov vavs re Trpocnvepi^yyeCkav 
Kara iroXeis /cal tcls irpovTrapyovaas e^-qprvovTo 

4 &)? eVt vaup,a^Lav. ireparei Be /cal 6 QoppLLoov e? 
Tas 'AOrjvas ti']v T€ irapacFKeviiv avTcov dyyeXovv- 
Ta? zeal irepl tt)s vavpiayias r)v ivi/ajaav (fcpdcrov- 
Ta? /cal /ceXevcov avTu> vav<; oti irXeiaTas Bed 
ra^ou? aTTocTTeiXai, a>? /caO^ rjpepav e/cdo~Tr)v iX- 

5 7rt'So? ovarii alel vavpba^i'iaeLV. ol Be diroTrepL- 
ttovglv eX/coai vavs avTco, T<p Be ko/jll^ovtl avTas 
TrpocreireaTeiXav €? Kp/)Tr)v 7rpcoTov d<f>i/ce'a0cu. 
Nt/a'a? yap Kp;;? TopruvLos irpo^evos wv ireiOei 


BOOK II. lxxxiv. 5— lxxxv. 5 

sailed away immediately with the ships that were 
left, proceeding from Dyme and Patrae along the 
coast to Cyllene, the shipyard of the Eleans ; and 
Cnemus likewise, coming from Leucas together with 
the ships from that quarter 1 which were to have 
joined the Corinthian fleet, came to Cyllene after the 
battle at Stratus. 

LXXXV. The Lacedaemonians now sent to the 
fleet Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron as ad- 
visers to Cnemus, directing them to make better 
preparation for another sea-fight, and not to be 
driven off the sea by a few ships. For the issue of 
the recent battle seemed to them utterly incompre- 
hensible, especially since this was their first attempt 
at a sea-fight, and they could not believe that their 
fleet was so greatly inferior, but thought that there 
had been cowardice somewhere, failing to take into 
account the long experience of the Athenians as 
compared with their own brief practice. In a rage, 
then, they dispatched the advisers. And these on 
their arrival, acting in conjunction with Cnemus, 
sent round a call to the allied cities for additional 
ships, and set about equipping those already at hand, 
with a view to a sea-fight. And Phormio on his 
part sent messengers to Athens to give information 
of the enemy's preparations and to tell about the 
battle which they had won, urging them also to send 
to him speedily as many ships as possible, since 
there was always a prospect that a battle might be 
fought any day. So they sent him twenty ships, 
but gave the commander in charge of them special 
orders to sail first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of 
Gortys, who was a proxenus 2 of theirs, persuaded 

1 The contingents from Leuoas, Anactorium, and Am- 
bracia, eh. lxxx. 2, 3. 2 See ch. xxix. 1, note. 



avrovs iirl KvBcovlav irXevaai, cf)da/ccov irpoa- 
TroiTjaeiv clvttjv ovaav irokefilav eTrfjye Be TLo- 
Xi'XyiTaL^ %api%6fi€vo<; Ofiopocs tcov KvBcoviaTwv. 
6 /cal 6 pev Xaftoov to.? vav$ a>x €T0 e ' ? KpV T V v * a * 
/xera tcov IT oXi^ytrcov iBrjov ttjv yrjv tmv K.vBco- 
viaicov, /cal vir dvepuwv /cal dirXoias evhierpi^rev 
ovk 6\iyov xpovov. 

LXXXVI. Ol S' iv rfj K.vXXr/vr} YleXoirovv^a 101 
iv tovtw, iv a* ol ' ' KOrjveuoL irepl Kprjrrjv /carei- 
Xovro, Trapecrfcevacr/jLevoL a>? iirl vavp^ayiav irape- 
irXevaav e? Udvopfiov tov 'A^al/cov, ovirep avrols 
6 /card yr)v arparo^ roiv TleXoirovvrjaicov irpoa- 

2 e/3ef3o7]6rjfC€i. irapeirXevae Be /cal 6 Qoppccov iirl 
to ( Plov to MoXv/cpi/cov real copfxlaaro e^co aurov 

3 vavalv el/coai, alairep /cal ivavpidx^aev. rjv Be 

TOVTO {lev TO *¥l()V (friXlOV TOl$ 'AtfllVCtLOl?, TO £' 

erepov 'Viov earlv avTiirepa^ to iv Tjj TieXoirov- 
vrjacp' 8ie)£eT0v Be aTr dXXtfXcDV aTaBlov? pudXiaTa 
67TTa Trjs OaXaaarjs, tov Be Kpiaalov koXttov 

4 GTOfia tovto io~Tiv. iirl ovv tg> f Pt&) tw 'A^at/ea) 
ol TleXoTTovvyjcrtoL direxovTi ov iroXv tov TLavop- 
/jlov, iv w avTols o 7re£o? rjv, ooppiiaavTO /cal clvtoX 
vavalv eiTTa teal eftBopLij/covTa, 1 iireiBr) /cal tovs 

5 'AOrjvaiovs elBov. teal iirl p,ev ef r) eirTa r)jiepa<; 
dvOooppLOvv dXXifkoLs fieXerGovTes t€ teal irapa- 
a/eeva%6p,evoi ttjv vavpa^iav, yvcofirjv k'xovTes ol 
pev pui] i/cirXelv e£co tcov 'Picov e? ttjv eispv^coplav, 
<f)o/3ovp,evoi to irpoTepov irdQo<$, ol Be p,r) iairXelv 
e? Ta o~Tevd, vop,i£ovT6$ Trphs i/celvcov elvai ttjv iv 

6 oXiyw vavp,a)(Lav. eiretTa 6 Kvfjp,o<; /cal 6 J$paal- 
Sa? /cal ol aXXoi twv UeXo7rovvr}aicov aTpaTrfyol, 
/3ovXopievoi iv Ta^et ttjv vavpuayiav iroir)aai irpiv 

4 2 ° * Hude reads 7T€vt^kovto, with 0. 

BOOK II. lxxxv. 5-Lxxxvi. 6 

them to sail against Cydonia, a hostile town, promis- 
ing to bring it over to the Athenians ; but he was 
really asking them to intervene to gratify the people 
of Polichne, who are neighbours of the Cydonians. 
So the officer in charge took the ships, went to 
Crete, and helped the Polichnitans to ravage the 
lands of the Cydonians, and by reason of winds and 
stress of weather wasted not a little time. 

LXXXVI. Meantime, while the Athenians were 
detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, 
equipped and ready for a battle, sailed along the 
coast to Panormus in Achaia, where the land-forces 
of the Peloponnesians had come to their support. 
And Phormio also sailed along the coast to the 
Molycrian Rhium and anchored outside with the 
twenty ships with which he had fought before. 
This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians, and 
opposite is the other Rhium, that in the Pelopon- 
nesus ; and the distance between them is about 
seven stadia by sea, constituting the mouth of the 
Crisaean Gulf. Accordingly the Peloponnesians, 
when they saw the Athenians come to anchor, like- 
wise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Achaian 
Rhium, which is not far from Panormus, where their 
land-forces were. And for six or seven days they 
lay at anchor opposite one another, practising and 
preparing for battle, the one side resolved not to 
sail outside the two Rhia into the open water, fear- 
ing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to 
sail into the straits, thinking that fighting in a 
narrow space was in the enemy's favour. At last 
Cnemus and Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian 
commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement 



ri teal arro rcov 'Adrjvacoov eirifSor)Qr)crai, i;W€rcd- 
Xecrav tou<? arparioora^ Trpcorov, /cat opwvres 
avrcov rovs iroXXovs hid rr)v irporepav fjaaav 
(froflovfievovs teal ov irpoOvfiovs ovras irapefceXev- 
(jclvto kclL eXe^av roidhe. 

LXXXVII. " f H fiev yevopuevrj vavpLa-^La, go 
avhpe<; HeXoTTovvrjaioi, eX Tt? dpa hi avrrjv vpifov 
(fyoftelrai rrjv pueXXovaav, ov)(l hiicaiav eyei re/e- 

2 pLapaiv to €K(j)o/3r}o-ai. rfj re yap Trapaa/cevfj 
evher)<; iyevero, toairep care, zeal ov)(\ e? vavpua- 
yiav fioXXov rj eirl arpareiav eirXeopbev %vvet3r) 
he ical ra drro rr)<; tu^>/9 ovk bXiya evavricoOrjvai, 
tcai ttov re real r) direipia rrpwrov vavp^ayovvras 

3 ecr(py]Xev. ware ov Kara rr)v rj/jLerepav natc'iav rb 
rjaadadai irpoaeyevero, ovhe hUaiov ti}s yvcoprjs 
rb fir] Kara fepdros viK7]6ev, fyov he rtva ev avrw 
dvriXoyiav, tt}? ye %vp.$opd<; tgo airofiavn dfi- 
(BXvveadai, vopulaai he rah fiev rvy^ais evhexeaOai 
ccfxiXXeaOat, toi>? dvOpcoTrovs, rah he yvoo/jLaiS 
tol>? avrovs alel 6pda)<; 1 avhpeiovs elvai, zeal firj 
airetpiav rod dvhpeiov irapbvros it poftaXXopevovs 

4 ei/coTft)? dv ev nvi KaKovs yeveaOai. vficov he ovh' 
i) direipia rocrovrov Xeiirerai oaov rdXpbr) irpov- 
X €T€ ' rcovhe he r) eiriari'ipir], iiv pidXiara <f>o- 
ftelcrOe, dvhpeiav piev eyovua real pivyjpirjv e%ei ev 
too heivu* eirneXelv a epiaOev, avev he evyjrvxia? 
ovhepiia re^y 7 ) irpos toi/? Kivhvvovs iV^uet. (\>6fSo<; 
yap p.V7]pL7)v eKirXrjaaei, re^y?) he avev dX/c^s ov- 

1 Hude writes opdovs and deletes avtpelovs (with Badham). 

BOOK II. lxxxvi. 6-Lxxwn. 4 

soon, before reinforcements came from Athens, first 
called their soldiers together, and seeing that most 
of them were frightened on account of their previous 
defeat and not eager for battle, encouraged them 
and spoke as follows : 

LXXXVII. "The recent sea-fight, Peloponne- 
sians, if possibly it has caused any man among 
you to be afraid of the one before us, affords no 
just grounds for your alarm. For our preparation 
was deficient, as you know, and the object of our 
voyage was not so much to fight at sea as operations 
on land ; and it happened, furthermore, that not a 
few of the chances of war were against us, and 
doubtless also our inexperience had something to do 
with our failure in the first sea-fight. It was not 
then our cowardice that brought about defeat, nor 
is it right that the spirit, which force cannot con- 
quer, but which has in it something defiant, should 
be dulled and blunted by the outcome of mere 
chance ; rather you ought to reflect that although 
men may suffer reverse in their fortunes, yet in 
their spirit brave men are rightly considered always 
brave, and when courage is present no inexperience 
can properly be urged as an excuse for being cowards 
under any circumstances. And, after all, your inex- 
perience is more than counterbalanced by your 
superiority in daring ; and though the enemy's skill, 
which you particularly dread, will indeed, so long as 
bravery goes with it, have the presence of mind in 
the moment of danger to put into effect the lessons 
it has learned, yet without valour no amount of 
proficiency avails against such dangers. For fear 
drives presence of mind away, and skill without 



5 Bev cocpeXel. irpbs puev ovv to epuireipbiepov avrcov 
to roXp,r)p6repov dvrird^aaOe, irpb? Se to Bid 
tt)v rjaaav BeSievac to dirapdaKevoi rbre Tvyetv. 

6 irepiyiyveiai Be ?)fjL?v irXrjObs re veojv teal 77-/50? rfj 
yfj olteela ovarj birXiichv irapovrcov vavpayelv rd 
Be iroXXa rcov irXeovcov teal afxetvov irapeateevacr- 

7 fievcov to tepdios iarlv. coare ovBe KatT ev evpi- 
o-KOfiev et/coTO)? dv ?5/xa? o-^aXXofxevov^' teal ocra 
r)/jidpTo/j,€V irpbiepov, vvv avrd ravia irpocryevb- 

8 (leva BiBaateaXiav irape^ei. Oapaovvies ovv teal 
KvftepvrjTai teal vavrac to tcaO' eavrbv €teao~TO<; 
eirecrOe, ywpav /xtj irpoXeiirovres fj dv Tt? irpoa- 

9 ra^dfj. rcov Be irpbiepov rjyefjLovcov ov yelpov rrjv 
eiri^eip^atv r)/jL€L<; irapacrteevdo-ofxev teal ovte ivCco- 
aofiev 7rp6cf)ao~iv ovBevl teateco yeveaOav rjv Be tj? 
dpa teal /3ov\7]0jj, teoXacrOijaerai rfj irpeirovcrr) 
&]/JLia, ol Be dyaOol TifiijcrovTai tois irpocr?]/eovcriv 
a9Xoi$ rr/s aperr}?" 

LXX XVIII. Toiavra /iev to?9 UeXoirovvr)crioi<; 
ol dp^ovre<; irapeKeXevaavro. 6 Be Qopp-icov 
BeBtcos teal avibs tj)i> tgjz; arpaTicoTcov bppcoBc'av 
teal alaOofMevos on to irXf)6o<; rcov vecov teard 
o-(j)ds avrovs ^vviardfjuevoi icfioftovvTO, eftovXero 
gvyteaXecras Oapavvai re teal irapalveaiv ev rco 
2 irapbvri irotrjcraaOaL. irporepov fiev yap alel 
avTots eXeye teal irpoirapeateeva^e Ta? yvcbfias &>? 
ovSev aviois irXrjOos vecov toctovtov, r\v eir mXey , 
o n ov-% virofxevereov icrrL, teal ol arpancoiai ete 
iroXXov ev acplacv avrol? i?jv dtjicoaiv ravirjv 

BOOK II. lxxxvii. 4-Lxxxvm. 2 

intrepidity is of no avail. Therefore, against their 
greater experience set your greater daring, and 
against the fear caused by your defeat set the 
accident of your being at the moment unprepared. 
You have the advantage, both in number of ships 
and in fighting close to the land, which is friendly 
to us, and you are supported by hoplites ; and victory 
is generally on the side of those who are the more 
numerous and better prepared. There is accordingly 
not a single reason that we can find why we should 
fail ; and as to our earlier mistakes, the very fact 
that they were made will teach us a lesson. Be of 
good courage, then, and let each man, both helms- 
man and sailor, follow our lead as best he can, not 
leaving the post to which he may be assigned. We 
shall prepare for the attack at least as well as your 
former commanders, and shall give no one an excuse 
to act like a coward ; but if anyone should be in- 
clined that way, he shall be punished with the pen- 
alty he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured 
with rewards such as befit their valour." 

LXXXVIJI. With such words the Peloponnesian 
commanders encouraged their men. But Phormio, 
being himself also uneasy about the apprehension 
felt by his troops, and observing that they were 
gathering in knots amongst themselves in alarm at 
the superior number of the enemy's ships, wished 
to call thein together in order to hearten them and 
make an exhortation to suit the present emergency. 
For in the past he had always told them, by way of 
bracing their minds, that there was no number of 
ships, however great, whose attack men such as they 
could not withstand ; and his sailors had long since 
held among themselves the conviction that they, 

vol. 1. p 4-5 


etXrjcpeaav firjBeva o%\ov *A6rjvaloL ovres TleXo- 
3 7rovv7]alcov veoov vrro^oopelv rore Be 77730? rrjv 
irapovaav oyjriv opcov avrov<i dOv/JLovvra? iftov- 
Xero VTTOfAvrjcriv iroirjaaaOai rov Oapaelv, teal 
^vyKaXeaas tovs 'AOrjvaiovs eXeye rotdBe. 

LXXXIX. M 'Opcov vp,as, co avBpe? crpariwrai, 
7T€(j)o/37]fi6Vov<; to 7rXfjdo<; rcov ivavricov %vvefca- 
Xeora, ovk dgicov rd /lit) Beivd iv oppcoBla eyeiv. 

2 ovtol yap irpcorov fiev Bid to TrpovevLtcrjcrOai /cal 
fjLr)& avrol oteadac o/jlolol r)\xlv elvai to ttXtjOo? 
twv vecov koX ovk airb rod icov irapeaKevdaavro' 
eiretra co pLaXiara iriarevovres 7rpoaepxovrai, a>? 
rrpoo~r\KOv <j$L<jiv dvBpeiois elvai, ov oY aXXo tl 
Qapcrovcnv rj Bid ttjv iv ra> 7re£a5 ifXTreipiav rd 
irXeico fcaropOovvres iea\ oXovrai a<fil<ri teal iv tw 

3 vavriKco TroiTjcreiv to at»To. to £' ite rov Bitcaiov 
rjfitv fiaXXov vvv rrepiearai, elirep teal tovtol? iv 
etceivw, inel ev^jrv^ia ye ovBev jrpocpipovai, rep Be 
e/edrepoi, ri elvai ifnreiporepoi dpaavrepol icr/iev. 

4 KaKeBai/iovLoi re rjyovfievoi avrcov Bid rrjv o~<f>e- 
repav Bo^av dteovras irpoadyovai row ttoXXov*; 
€9 rov klvBvvov, eVel ovk civ irore ive^iprjcrav 

5 7]aar]6evre^ rrapd ttoXv avdis vavpuayelv. p,rj Btj 
avrcov rrjv roX/iav Beiarjre. 7roXv Be v/jl€L<; e/cel- 
vois irXeico cj)6/3ov rrape^ere ical marorepov Kara 

BOOK II. lxxxviii. 2-lxxxix. 5 

being Athenians, must never give ground before any 
number of Peloponnesian ships. But at this time, 
seeing that they were dispirited by what they saw 
before their eyes, and wishing to remind them of 
their old-time confidence, he called them together 
and spoke as follows : 

LXXXIX. "Observing that you have become 
alarmed, soldiers, at the numbers of the enemy, I 
have called you together, because I do not want you 
to be in dread of imaginary dangers. For, in the 
first place, it is just because these men have been 
beaten before, and do not even themselves believe 
that they are a match for us, that they have provided 
themselves with this large and disproportionate num- 
ber of ships ; then, too, as regards their courage, — 
the thing on which they chiefly rely when they 
come against us, as if it were their peculiar pro- 
vince to be brave, — the only reasonable ground 
they have for confidence is that their experience in 
fighting on land has generally brought them success, 
and so they think this will achieve the same result 
for them at sea as well. But in all reason the ad- 
vantage to-day will rather be ours, if they on their 
side have it on land ; for in valour assuredly they 
are nowise superior, but we are both more confident 
just as in any way we have more experience. 
Besides, since the Lacedaemonians lead their allies 
for their own glory, the majority of them have to 
be dragged into battle against their will, for other- 
wise they would never, after their decisive defeat, 
have attempted to fight a second time at sea. 
Hence you need not fear their daring. On the 
contrary, you inspire in them a dread far greater 
and better justified, both because you have already 



re rb 7rpov€Vifcr)K€vai feat cm ovk av rjyovvrai /xrj 
fieXXovrds ri cl^lov rov irapd ttoXv rrpd^eiv avui- 

6 araadai v/JLas. dvriiraXoi /xev yap oi l irXeiow;, 
wcnrep ovroi, rfj Bwdfieu rb nrXeov ttIctvvol rj rfj 
yvco/irj errepx^vrai' 6l Be i/c rroXXa) viroBeecrepoav 
/cal d/na ovk dvayKa^opbevoi, p,eya ri t% Biavoias 
to fieftaiov e%oi/T£9 dvriroXp,wcriv. a Xoyu^opevot 
ovtoi tw ovk €lk6tl TrXeov Tre$b$r)vrai rjpas r) rf) 

7 Kara Xoyov irapaaKevfj. rroXXa Be koX arparo- 
ireBa IjBt} eirecrev vir eXacraovcav rfj aireipla, eari 
Be a koI rfj aroX/jLLa' &v ovBerepov r)fiels vvv 

8 pL€Te^o/jL€V. rbv Be dycova ovk iv tco koXttg) ckgov 
elvai Trocyaofiac ov8* iairXevaofiaL e? avrov> op<a 
yap on 7T/30? 7ro\Xa? vavs dveiricrri) floras oXtyai? 
vavalv epireipois koX apueivov TrXeovaai? r) crrevo- 
ywpla ov jjv/Licfrepei. ovre yap av iTwrXevaeie 
Tf? co? XPV €9 ipfioXrjv pur) ex^v t*1 v Trpoao-^nv 
rcov iroXepiwv eK iroXXov, ovr av aTroxcoprjcreiev 
iv Beovri Tne^opevos' BieKirXoi re ovk elalv ovB* 
avaarpofyai, airep vecov ap.eivov rrXeovG&v epya 
earlv, dXXa dvdyKt) av ecrj rrjv vavpaxiav 7re?o- 
pax}av Kadlo-raaOai, koX iv rovrcp al irXeiovs 

9 vfj€<; Kpeiaaovs yiyvovrai. rovrwv puev ovv iyco 

1 Hude adopts Madvig's conjecture ij for oU 

BOOK II. lxxxix. 5-9 

defeated them and because they think that you 
would not be facing them at all unless you ex- 
pected to achieve a result commensurate with the 
very great odds. For most men, when, like our 
present opponents, they are equal to their foes, rely 
more upon their strength when they advance to the 
attack than upon their resolution ; whereas those 
who dare oppose them with greatly inferior num- 
bers, and at the same time without being compelled 
to do so, must possess in a high degree the quality 
of unwavering resolution. Taking all these things 
into consideration, our enemies have come to fear 
us more on account of what is amazing in our con- 
duct than they would if our preparations were less 
out of proportion to their own. Furthermore many 
an army has before now been overthrown by smaller 
numbers through its own want of experience, and 
some too through a deficiency of daring, and at this 
moment we can be charged with neither. As for 
the contest, I will not risk it in the gulf if I can 
help it, nor will I sail into the gulf. For I am 
aware that a confined space is not an advantage to a 
fleet of a few ships which are better sailers and 
have experienced crews, when it is opposed to a 
large number of ships which are badly managed. 
For one cannot charge properly upon an enemy ship 
to ram her side, through not having a clear view of 
her a long way off, nor can one retire at need when 
hard pressed ; and there is no chance for such 
manoeuvres as breaking through the line or whirl- 
ing around to ram, though these are precisely the 
proper tactics of fast sailing ships, but the sea-fight 
would have to be turned into a land-battle, and in 
that case it is the larger fleet that wins. For these 




evTdKTOL rrapa rah vaval /jLevovres rd re irapay- 
yeXXofieva of ew? Be-^ecrOe, aXXco<; re teal Bi oXlyov 
t?}? e$opp,i]o~eco<; ovarjs, ica\ ev rep epyco koo-jjlov 
teal aiyrjv irepl irXeicrTOV rjyeicrde, b e? Te ret, 
ttoXXcl rcov TroXe/AifCMv l ^vfji(f)ep6C tcav vavfia)(la 
oi>x rjfcio'Ta, a/xvveade re rovaBe af;Lco<; rcov irpo- 

10 eipyaafjbevwv. 6 Be ay gov fieyas vfuv, r\ KaraXv- 
aai UeXonovvrjalcov rrjv i\,7rlBa tov vclvtlkov t) 
iyyvrepco KaTaarijaai ' A.6r]vaLoi<s tov cpoftov 

11 irepl rrj<s OaXdcro-rjs. dvafJUL/JLvrja-Kco £' av v/aci? 
on vevLKrjKare avTtov tovs ttoXXov^' rjaarj/nevcov 
Be dvBpcov ovk iOeXovcnv al yvco/j,ai 7T/509 tou? 
civtovs klvBvvovs ofiolai, elvai" 

XC. Toiavra Be kol 6 ^opfxlcov irapeKeXevaaTO. 
ol Be UeXoTTOVvijaiot, eTreiBrj auTOt? ol 'AOrjvaioi 
ovk eireirXeov e? tov koXttov kol tcl arevd, fiovXo- 
fievoi a/copra? eaco irpoayayelv avTOvs, dvayayo- 
fievoi a/ia ecp eirXeov, eirl Teaadpcov ra^dfievoi 
ra<; mu?, irapa 2 rrjv eavTcov yi)v eaco eirl 3 tov 
koXttov Bejjicp tcepa rjyov/ievcp, coairep kcu, copfiovv 
2 eirl 8' avrcp eXKoai era^av ra? apiara TrXeovaa,*;, 
07r&)9, el dpa vo/jLLcras eirl ttjv Navirafcrov avrovs 
irXelv 6 tpopfiicov /cal avrbs eiri$oT)Qcov ravrrj 

1 Hude reads iro\efila>v, with C. 

2 With CG ; the other MSS. and the Schol. iwi. 
8 Hude deletes iiri, after Kriiger. 

x In the first sea-fight the Peloponnesians had forty- 
seven ships (ch. lxxxiii. 3) against Phormio's twenty (ch. 
lxxxiii. 1) ; in the second battle the Peloponnesians had 
seventy-seven ships (ch. lxxxvi. 4). Since the Pelopon- 
nesians lost twelve ships in the first battle (ch. lxxxiv. 4), 
the expression " most of them " is not quite exact here. 


BOOK II. lxxxix. 9-xc. 2 

matters, however, I shall make provision to the best 
of my ability. As for you, keep good order, stay 
near your ships, give heed sharply to the word of 
command, especially since the two fleets are at 
watch so near one another ; and when it comes to 
action, regard discipline and silence, which are 
generally advantageous in warfare, but especially 
so at sea, as all important, and ward off the enemy 
yonder in a manner worthy of your past exploits. 
The contest is a momentous one for you — whether 
you are to shatter the hopes which the Peloponnesians 
have in their fleet, or to bring closer home to the 
Athenians their fear about the sea. Once more I 
remind you that you have beaten most of them 1 
already ; and when men have once suffered defeat, 
their spirit is never the same as before if they are 
called upon to face the same dangers." 

XC. Such were the words with which Phormio 
also encouraged his men. And the Peloponnesians, 
when the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and 
the narrows to meet them, wished to draw them 
in against their will ; so they put out to sea at 
dawn, and, after lining up their ships four deep, 2 
sailed along their own shore towards the inner part 
of the gulf, in the same order as they had lain at 
anchor, 3 their right wing leading the way. 4 Upon 
their right wing they had placed their twenty 
best sailing ships, in order that, if Phormio got 
the impression that their objective was Naupactus 

3 Or, as some take it, n in a column four abreast." 

3 Only now the four ships which had lain at anchor one 
behind the other sailed, after the turn to the right, abreast. 

4 Or, retaining ln\ instead of irapck, "after lining up their 
ships four deep against their own shore {i.e. with it at their 
backs), sailed toward the inner part of the gulf . . ." 



TrapairXeoi, fj,r) Biacfrvyoiev irXeovres rov €7TL7rXovv 
a<f)cov ol ^AOrjvaloi e^co rov eavrcov tcep(o<;, dXX* 

3 avrai al vrjes TrepLfcXrjo-eiav. 6 Be, oirep eicelvoi 
TTpoaeSixovro, <£o/3>?#e!? irepl ra> ywpiw eprjfMp 
ovtl, go? ed>pa avayofievovs avrov<;, a/ccov teal Kara 
airovhrjv ifi/3L^daa<; eirXei irapd rr)v yrjv real 6 

4 7re£o? a/jLa rwv Neo~ar)viwv 7rape/3o7]0ei. IBovre? 
Be ol TleXoirovv^cnoL Kara piav ewl /eepoos irapa- 
TrXeovras teal rjhri ovras eWo? rov koXttov re 
teal 7T/DO? rf) yfj, birep e/3ovXovro fidXiara, diro 
arjiieiov eVo? acfrvco eiriarpeyjravre^ Ta? vavs per- 
(i)7T7]8bv eirXeov co? et^e Ta^oy? eteao~To$ eirl tou? 
' AOrjvaLOvs, teal i)Xttl^ov irdcras Ta? vavs diroXij- 

5 ^reaOaL. rcov Be evBerea fiev rives aiirep r^yovvro 
VTre/ccpevyovcn to teepa? rcov TieXoirovvrjaicov teal 
rrjv einarpocprjv e? rrjv evpvywpiav ra? 8' ciXXas 
eirLfearaXa/36vr€s etjecoadv re irpb? rrjv yfjv viro- 
cpevyovcras teal BiecpOeipav, avBpa? re rcov *A6i]- 

6 vaicov diretereivav ocroi p,rj e^evevaav avrcov. teal 
rcov vecov riva<; dvaBovfievoc elX/cov teevds (filav 
Be clvtols dvBpdaiv eiyov tfBr)), Ta? Be rivas ol 
ISleaarjVLOL irapafforjOtfaavres teal eirecr(3aivovTe<; 
Ijvv tch? oirXois e? rrjv OdXacraav teal eiri/3dvT€<; 
diro rcov Karaarpay/idrcov pba^opLevoi dcpeiXovro 
eXteopiivas rjBr). 

XCI. Tavrrj fiev ovv ol UeXoirovvijcrioi etepd- 
tovv re teal Bie<f>6eipav Ta? 'Att^atA? vav<f al Be 
el/coai vrjes avrcov al diro rov Beijiov teepco<; iSl- 
coteov Ta? evBetea vav$ rcov 'AO-qvalcov aiirep 


BOOK II. xc. 2-xci. i 

and should, following the coast, sail in that direc- 
tion to its aid, the Athenians might not be able 
to escape their attack by sailing outside their wing, 
but might be enveloped by these ships. Now he 
did just what they expected him to do; when he 
saw them put to sea, fearing for the safety of the 
place, which was unprotected, he reluctantly and 
in haste embarked his crews and sailed along the 
coast, the Messenian army moving along the shore 
to support him. And when the Peloponnesians 
saw that they were skirting the coast in single 
file and were already inside the gulf and clost; to 
shore, which was just what they most desired, at 
one signal they suddenly veered about, bore down 
with ships in line as fast as each could upon the 
Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships. But 
eleven of these, which were in the lead, got past the 
Peloponnesian wing, as it swung round, and escaped 
into the open water ; but the rest were overtaken, 
driven ashore as they attempted to escape, and dis- 
abled, and all the Athenians on them who did not 
succeed in swimming ashore were slain. Some of 
the ships they made fast to their own and proceeded to 
tow away empty — though they had already captured 
one with its crew — but some others, which were 
already in tow, were taken from them by the Mes- 
senians, who came to the rescue, rushed armed as 
they were into the sea, boarded the ships, and fought 
from their decks. 

XCI. In this quarter, then, the Peloponnesians 
were victorious and had disabled the Athenian ships ; 
but the twenty ships covering their right wing were 
pursuing the eleven Athenian ships which had got 



vire%e$vyov tt]V liricrpo^v e? rrjv evpvx^p^av. 
teal cf)0dvovcnv avrovs 7rXr]V pud? veax; irpoKara- 
(bvyovaai 77730? ttjv NaviraKTOV, kcu g^ovgcu 
avriirpwpoL Kara rb ' Air oXXcoviov irapecKevd- 
fyvTO d/uLvvovfievoi, rjv e? rrjv yrjv eirl a<pa<; 

2 irXecoaiv. oi Be irapayevopbevoi varepov eiraid- 
vi^ov re dfia TrXeovres cb? vevircr) /cores, /ecu ttjv 
llLclv vavv rcov 'AdrjvaLcov rr)v vttoXolttov eBlcoice 

3 AevKaBia vavs fiia iroXv irpb rcov dXXoov. €tu%€ 
Be oX/cds oppbovaa fjLerecopos, irepl fjv r) 'ArTi/cr) 
vavs (f)0d(raaa teal TrepnrXevcraaa rfj Aev/caBla 

4 BiwKOvarj ififtdXkeL fiearj ical KaraBvec. toU fiev 
ovv He\oTTOWiiaLois yevopuevov tovtov dirpoaBo- 
kyjtov re icai irapd Xoyov (f)6{3os epLTTiinei, /cat, 
dfia aTa/CTft)? BtcoKovres Bid rb Kparelv ai pbev 
rives to)V vedv tcaOelaai rds Kcorras eirecrrrjaav 
rov ttXov, d^vfM(j)opov Bpcovres rrpbs rrjv ef oXiyov 
dvre^oppurjaiv, fiovXopievoi rds irXelovs Trepifielvai, 
ai Be real is /3/oa%ea direipla ywplwv &fceikav. 

XCII. Tou? 5' 'AOrjvaiovs IBovras ravra yiyvo- 
ueva Odpaos re eXafte real curb evbs /ceXevcrp^aros 
ififiotfaavres eir avrovs copfirjaav. oi Be Bid rd 
'jirdpxovTa djiaprrjpara teal rrjv rrapovaav ara- 
%Lav oXiyov fiev XP° V0V v-n-epeivav, erreira Bk 
erpdrrovro is top Udvop/iov, oOevrrep dvrjydyovro. 
2 iiriBuo/covres Be oi *A6r)valoi ra? re €771;? ovaas 
fidXio~ra vavs eXafiov ef kcu Ta? eavrwv d(f)ei- 
Xovro as ifcelvoi irpbs rrj yrj Biacpdeipavres to 


BOOK II. xcr. i-xcii. 2 

past them as they swung round and had escaped 
into the open water. And all the eleven except one 
reached Naupactus ahead of them, and riding at 
anchor off the Temple of Apollo, prows outward, 
made ready to defend themselves if the enemy put 
in toward the shore to attack them. When the 
Peloponnesians came up they were singing the paean 
as they rowed as if they were victorious already, and 
one Leucadian ship, far ahead of the rest, was chasing 
the single Athenian ship which lagged behind. But, 
as it chanced, a merchantman was lying at anchor in 
deep water and this the Athenian ship succeeded in 
reaching first and, sailing round it, rammed the 
pursuing Leucadian vessel amidships and sank her. 
At this unexpected and amazing feat consternation 
fell upon the Peloponnesians, who were, moreover, 
pursuing in disorder because they had the upper 
hand ; on some of their ships the rowers sank their 
oars into the water and checked the headway of 
their vessels, intending to await the main body of 
their fleet— a serious mistake to make in the face of 
an enemy lying near and ready for the charge — 
while others, unfamiliar with the waters there, ran 
aground in the shallows. 

XCII. As for the Athenians, when they saw what 
was happening, they took courage, and at a single 
word of command gave a shout and dashed at them. 
But the Peloponnesians had made so many mistakes 
and were at present in such disorder, that, although 
they resisted a little while, they soon turned and 
fled to Panormus, whence they had put to sea. The 
Athenians gave chase, and not only captured the six 
ships that were nearest, but also recovered their own 
ships which the enemy had disabled in the beginning 



irpodTOV dveSrjaavro' avBpa<; re tov? fiev aireicT6L- 

3 vav, Tivas Be teal ifayprjerav. iitl Be Trj? Aevfca- 
Blas veox;, r) irepl rrjv oKfcdBa tcarehv, TifiOKparr]^ 
6 AaKeBaifiovio? irXecov, &>9 rj vav<; Bce(j)0eip€To, 
e<T(f)af;€V eavTOV, Kal e^eireaev e? tov NaviraKTLcov 

4 Xijxeva. avaxcopi](TavT€<; Be ol 'AOiivacoc Tpoiralov 
earrjaav oOev dvayaybpuevoi eKparrjaav, Kal tovs 
veicpovs Kal ra vavdyia oaa 777)09 rj) eavTcov r\v 
dveiXovio, Kal Tot? ivavrlois ra i/ceivcov viro- 

5 airovBa direBoaav. earrjerav Be Kal UeXoirov- 
vrjaioi Tpoiralov &>? vevifcrj/coTes fffc rpoirijs, a? 
7T/0O9 t?7 yfj Bt,e(f)6eipav vav$' Kal r\virep eXafiov 
vavv, dveOeaav eirl to 'Viov to ' A^aiKov irapa to 

6 Tpoiralov. /jlctcl Be TavTa fyoftovfievoi ttjv dirb 
tcjv 'AOrjvaicov fio/jdeiav virb vvKTa eaeirXevaav 
€9 tov koXitov tov Kpiaalov /cal KoptvOov airavTes 

7 irXrjv AevicaBiwv. Kal ol etc 7-779 K.piJTTjs 'AOrj- 
valov Tat9 eZ/coo-i vavaiv, ah eBei irpb tt)? vav- 
fjiaxlas tu> <f?opfALcovi irapayeveadai, ov iroXXa> 
vaTepov t?)? avaywpr)aew<$ twv veoiv afyucvovvTai 
e? ty]V Navna/cTov. Kal to Oepos eTeXevTa. 

XCIII. Uplv Be BiaXvaai to e? K.6piv06v tc 
Kal tov Kpio-alov koXitov avaywp^vav vavTi/cov, 
6 Ki>t}/zo9 Kal 6 BpaalBas Kal ol aXXoL ap^ovTes 


iBovXovTO BiBa^dvTcov tcov Meyapecov diroirei- 
paaai tov Ueipaiws tov Xi/xevo^ twv ' AOrjvaLcov 
r\v Be d(f>vXaKTO$ Kal aKXrjaTO^ eiKOTO)? Bid to 

43 6 

BOOK II. xcn. 2-xcm. i 

of the fight near the shore and taken in tow ; and 
of the men they killed some and took others alive. 
But Timocrates the Lacedaemonian, who was on 
board the Leucadian ship which was sunk near the 
merchantmen, slew himself when he saw that his 
ship was lost, and his body was washed up in the 
harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians now withdrew 
and set up a trophy at the place 1 from which they 
had set out and won the victory ; and they took up 
their dead and such of the wrecked ships as were 
close to their own shore, giving back to the enemy 
under a truce those which belonged to them. But 
the Peloponnesians also set up, in token of victory, a 
trophy for the defeat of the ships which had been 
disabled near the shore. And the ships which they 
had taken they dedicated on the Achaean Rhium by 
the side of the trophy. And after this, fearing the 
reinforcements expected from Athens, 2 they sailed 
under cover of night into the Crisaean Gulf and 
to Corinth, all except the Leucadians. And not long 
after their retreat the twenty Athenian ships from 
Crete/ which were to have joined Phormio in time 
for the battle, arrived at Naupactus. And so the 
summer ended. 

XC1II. However, before dispersing the fleet which 
had retired to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf, at the 
beginning of the winter Cnemus and Brasidas and 
the other Peloponnesian commanders, instigated by 
the Megarians, wished to make an attempt upon the 
Peiraeus, the port of Athens ; for it was unguarded 
and unclosed, and quite naturally, since the Athen- 

1 The point is not certain ; either near the Molycrian 
Rhium (ch. lxxxvi. 2), or olf the Apollonium (ch. xci. 1). 
a cf. ch. lxxxvi. 6. * cf. ch. lxxxv. 5. 



3 €7riKpar€LV 7roXv too vavrt/cq*. iBo/cei 8e Xaftovra 
t&v vavrwv €/caarov rrjv kojtttjv Kal to virrjpeaiov 

Kal TOV TpOTrQ)T7}pa TTS^fj Uvai €K KopLV0OV €7rl 

ttjv irpb? 'AOrjvas OdXaacrav, /ecu dfyiKOfievovs 
Kara rayps e'9 Miyapa KaOeXfevaavras i/c Ni- 
aalas tov vecopiov avrcov recraapaKovra vavs, at 
ervyov avroOc ovaai, irXevaai evQvs iirl tov Ucl- 

3 paid' ovre yap vavri/cbv r)v irpocfrvXdo-o-ov iv 
avrcp ovSev ovre irpocrhoKia ovSe/xia jjlt) dv irore 
ol iroXepuoL i^airivalw^ ovtcos iirnrXevaeLav, iirel 
out' dirb tov 7rpo<f)avov<; ToX/jbrjaai av, /ca0 y t]gv- 
%iav S' 1 el SiavooLPTO, fir) ovk av irpoaiadkcrOai. 

4 d)? he eho^ev avrols, Kal iycopovv evOv?' Kal d(f)i- 
KOfievot vvktos Kal KadeXKvaavres eK rrjs Nicralas 
Ta? vavs eirXeov iirl fiev tov Ueipaid ovk£ti, 
toairep BievoovvTO, KaTaheLcravres tov Kivhvvov 
(Kal Tt? Kal ave/ios avrovs Xeyerai KcoXvcrat), iirl 
Be tt}? ^aXafilvo? to aKpwr^pLOv to irpbs Meyapa 
opcov Kal <f>povpiov 2 in avrov r)v Kal vecbv 
rpiwv (frvXaKr) tov fir) icnrXecv Wleyapevai fir)he 
eKirXelv firjhev. too re <$povpl(p TrpocrefiaXov Kal 
Ta? rpirjpei? d^elXKvaav Kevd<$, rrjv re dXXrjv 
Z^aXapuva diTpoahoKr)TOL<s eTnirecrovTes iiropOovv. 

XCIV. 'E? he Ta? 'AOrjvas (ppvKTol re rjpovro 
iroXe/JLLOi Kal eKTrXrjgi? iyevero ovSe/iid? tcov Kara 
rbv TroXe/jLov iXdaacov. ol fiev yap iv ra> do-ret 
€9 tov Ueipaid ojovto tol»9 iroXefiiov^ iaireTrXev- 
Kevai r]8r], ol h* iv rep Tietpaiel rrjv re "SaXa/icva 
r}pr)o~dai Kal irapd o~(f)d<; oaov ovk icnrXelv avrov<;' 

1 So Hude, adopting Madvig's conjecture 5' (for ovS') and 
punctuating after roXfxriaai &i>. 

2 Hude inserts yap after <ppovpiov, with van Herwerden, 
and includes in parentheses <poovoiov . . . /ttTjSeV. 


BOOK II. xcm. i-xciv. i 

ians were decidedly superior at sea. And it was 
determined that each sailor, taking his oar and 
cushion and oar-loop, should go on foot from Corinth 
to the sea on the Athenian side and hastening to 
Megara should launch from the docks at Nisaea forty 
ships of theirs which chanced to be there, and then 
sail straight for the Peiraeus. For there was no 
fleet on guard in the harbour, nor was there any ex- 
pectation that the enemy would ever suddenly attack 
it in this way, since they would not dare such a 
thing openly, and if they should plan it secretly 
they would not fail to be detected in time. But 
once they had determined upon the scheme they set 
to work immediately. Reaching Nisaea at night 
they launched the ships and sailed, not now to the 
Peiraeus as they had intended, since they were ap- 
palled by the risk — and a wind, too, is said to have 
prevented them — but to the promontory of Salamis 
that looks towards Megara. There was a fort here 
and a guard of three ships to prevent anything from 
entering or leaving the harbour of the Megarians. 
This fort they assaulted, towed away the triremes 
without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis, 
falling on the inhabitants unawares. 

XCIV. Meanwhile fire-signals indicating a hostile 
attack were flashed to Athens, where a panic was 
caused as great as any in this war. 1 For the 
inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy 
had already entered the Peiraeus, and those of 
the Peiraeus that they had taken Salamis and 
were all but sailing into their own harbour — as 

1 This must refer to the so-called Decelean War (or last ten 
years of the reloponnesian War), for in vni. xcvi. 1 we 
read that a panic occurred greater than any before (roh 
'AOrivaiots . . . (kttXtj^is jx^ylfm] 5?) tuv -np\v napearr]). 



oirep av, el iftovXrjOrjcrav p,i] /caro/cur/crai, paSto)? 

2 iyevero' /cal ov/c av avepos e/ccoXvaev. j3or)07]- 
o~avre<; Be dp rjpepa, 7ravBi]p,el ol y K6r)valoi €? rbv 
Ueipata vavs re /caOelX/cov /cal ea/3dvT€<; Kara 
airovBrjv /cal ttoXXu* Oopv^w Tat? p,ev vavalv eirl 
tt)v HaXapuva eirXeov, tw 7refo5 Be (f>vXa/cd<; rov 

3 Tleipaicos kclO'uttclvto. ol Be TleXoTrovvrjo-ioi a>? 
ycrOdvovTO rrjv fioijOeiav, /caraBpapovre? tt)? 2a- 
Xa/jLivo? ra woXXd /cal dvOpGDirov? real Xelav 
Xaftovres /cal Ta? rpeis vavs i/c rov TSovBopov rov 
(f>povpiov /cara, rdyos * 7 ™ T *7*> Ntcrata? aireirXeov 
eaTi yap 6 tl /cal ai vrjes avrovs Blo, ypovov 
/cadeX/cvaOelo-ai /cal ovBev cneyovaai effioftovv. 
afyi/cofievoL Be e? Meya/)a irdXiv eirl rf)<; KoplvOov 

4 awe)(cbpr)crav Tre^f}' ol 8' 'AOrjvaloi ov/ceri rcara- 
Xa/36vre<; 7r/?o? rrj ^aXaplvi direTrXevcrav /cal 
avroL' /cal fjiera tovto cj>vXafcr]V 77877 rod UeipaLcos 
jiaXXov to Xolttov eirotovvTO Xcpevcov re /cXyaei 
Kal rfj aXXrj einixeXeia. 

XCV. c T7to Be toi>? avrovs xpovov?, rov ye i ~ 
pLOivo? tovtov dp^ppuevov, %LTdX/cr)<; 6 Ttfpea) 
*OBpvo~r)<;, %paK(bv ftacriXevs, earpdrevo-ev eirl 
UepBi/c/cav rbv 'AXe^dvBpov, Ma/ceBovla? (Saci- 
Xea, /cal inl Xa\/a8ea? tou? eni <dpdtcr)<;, Bvo 
u7roo"%ecre£? ttjv p,ev /3ovXop,evo<; dvairpa^ai, ttjv 
2 Be auTO? airoBovvai. 6 re yap HepBl/c/cas avrw 
* viToaxopevos, el ^Adrjvaiois re BiaXXd^eiev eavrbv 
/car dpxas T<p iroXepw irie%6p,evov /cal QIXittttov 

BOOK II. xciv. i-xcv. 2 

indeed might easily have happened if the enemy 
had resolved that there should be no flinching; 
and no mere wind would have prevented them. 
But at dawn the Athenians hastened down to 
the Peiraeus with all their forces, launched ships, 
and embarking in haste and with much confusion 
sailed with the fleet to Salamis, setting their land- 
forces to guard the Peiraeus. The Peloponnesians 
had already overrun most of Salamis and had taken 
prisoners and booty and the three ships at the fort 
of Budorum, when they saw the relief expedition 
coming, whereupon they sailed in haste toward 
Nisaea ; to some extent too there was apprehension 
about their own ships, which had not been drawn 
down into the sea for a long time and were anything 
but water-tight. On reaching Megara they with- 
drew on foot to Corinth, and the Athenians, finding 
them no longer at Salamis, likewise sailed back. 
After this they kept stricter guard over the Peiraeus, 
closing up the harbour 1 as well as taking other 

XCV. About the same time, at the beginning of 
this winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, a son of Teres, king 
of theThracians, made an expedition against Perdiccas 
son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and against the 
Chalcidians of Thrace, wishing to exact fulfilment of 
one promise and to make good another. For when 
Perdiccas was being hard pressed at the beginning 
of the war he had made Sitalces a promise on condition 
that he should reconcile him to the Athenians and 
should not bring back his brother Philip, who was 

1 i.e. by prolonging the walla at the entrance so as to leave 
only a narrow passage in the centre, which could be closed 
by a chain. 


vol. I. 



rbv a&e\(f)bv avrov iroXejivov ovra fir) tearaydyoc 
eirl (Saaikeiq, a vireSe^aro ovtc eTrereXer to!? re 
' AOrjvaioL^ avTO<; cb/ioXoyrj/eei ore ttjv ^v/jL/ia^Lav 
eTToielro rbv errl ®pdier)<$ XaX/eiSitebv iroXefiov 
3 tearaXvo-eiv. dficporepcov ovv eve/ea rrjv ecpoSov 
eiroielro teal rov re ^lXlttttov vlbv ' Afivvrav go? 
eVl fiaaiXela rcov Matee&ovcov rjye teal rcov ^ A6r)- 
vaicov irpetrfieLS, oc erv%ov irapbvre^ rovrcov evetea, 
teal fjye/jLova " Ay vcov a- eBei yap teal tou? 'AOrj- 
vaiovs vavai re teal arparia go? TrXelarrj eVt tou? 
XaX/aSea? rrapayevecrOai. 

XC\ 7 I. 'AvLarrjcriv ovv ete rcov 'OBpvacov op/ico- 

fl€VO<i ITpCOrOV (JL6V TOl>9 eWo? TOV A'l/JLOV T€ SpOVS 

teal tt)<z f PoSo7T?;9 ®patea<; ocrcov rjpx e ^XP L @ a ~ 
Xdaar]^ e? rbv JLv^eivov re irovrov teal rbv 

'RXXlJcnTOVrOV, 1 €TT€iTa TOU? V7T€p/3aVTL AlfAOV 

Vera? teal oaa dXXa p,epr) ivrb? rov "\o~rpov ito- 
rafjiov 7rpo? ddXacrcrav [aciXXov rrjv rov Euf eivov 
irovrov tearcptet]ro' elal S' ol Yerai teal ol ravrrj 
o/iopoL re rot? ^tevQais teal ofiocrteevoL, irdvres 

2 liriroro^brat. irapeKaXeL Be teal rcov bpetvcov 
(dpatecov ttoXXovs rcov avrovo/xcov teal ixayaipo- 
<j>6pcov, ol Atot teaXovvrai, rr)v 'PoBoTrrjv ol irXel- 
cttoi oltcovvres' teal rov? fiev fiicrOcp eireiQev, ol B* 

3 edeXovral ijvvrjteoXovOovv. dviarrj Be teal 'Aypia- 

1 is . . . 'EWyairovTov deleted by Hude and others as not 
read by the Schol. (fxexpi 6a\dff(TT)t, fws rov Ev^ivov wSvrov 
icdl rov 'EW-no-trSvrov). Classen understands the Schol. to 
support the text reading. 


BOOK II. xcv. 2-xcvi. 3 

hostile, to make him king ; but Perdiccas would not 
fulfil his promise. On the other hand, Sitalces had 
made an agreement with the Athenians, 1 at the 
time he entered into the alliance with them, to bring 
to an end their war with the Chalcidians in Thrace. 
For both these reasons, then, he now began the in- 
vasion, and he took with him Philip's son, Amyntas, 2 
with a view to making him king of the Macedonians, 
as well as some Athenian envoys who had come to 
see him on this business, and Hagnon as com- 
mander 3 ; for the Athenians were to furnish a fleet 
and as large an army as possible 4 for the war against 
the Chalcidians. 

XCVI. Sitalces, accordingly, beginning with the 
Odrysians, summoned to his standard, first the 
Thracians under his sway between the mountains 
Haemus 5 and Rhodope 6 and the sea, — as far as 
the shores of the Euxine and the Hellespont, — 
then, beyond Haemus, the Getae, and all the other 
tribes that are settled south of the river Ister 7 
in the general direction of the seaboard of the 
Euxine sea ; and the Getae and the people of 
that region are not only neighbours of the Scythians 
but are also equipped like them, all of them 
being mounted archers. And he summoned also 
many of the mountain Thracians who are independ- 
ent and wear short swords, who are called Dii, most 
of them inhabiting Rhodope ; and some of these 
were won to his service by pay, while others came 
along as volunteers. He called out, further, the 

1 cf. ch. xxix. 4. 2 Philip died meanwhile. 

3 As commander of expected Athenian troops, which 
however failed to come (ch. ci. 1) 
* cf. ch. ci. 1. 6 The modern Balkans. 

6 Now Despotodagh. ' Danube. 



vas teal Aatatou? teal aXXa oaa Wvt) UaioviKa, 
cov rjpx 6 ' Ka l evX aT0L T ^ 9 upX 1 !* ovtol rjaav 
fJ^XP 1 y^P kaial&v Uaiovcov teal rov Xt/OU/xoVo? 
iroTcifiov, 09 etc rod %te6fi/3pov opovs Bl 'Aypid- 
vwv teal Aaiaicov pel, 1 dipL^ero rj apxh tcl irpos 
4 Uaiovas avTovofiov? 77S77. tcl Be 7rpb<; Tpif3a\- 
X,ou?, teal tovtovs avrovofiov^, Tpr/pes copL^ov 
teal TtXaralor olteovaL 8' ovtol 7t/jo? fiopkav rov 
%tc6/ji/3pov opovs teal Tcapr)Kovai 777)0? rjXiov Bvaw 
p&XP 1 T °v 'Oavaou irorafiov. pel 6" ovtos i/e tov 
opov? odevirep teal Neoro? teal 6 "EyS/jo?* earv Be 
eprjfxov to opos teal fieya, exo^evov t^9 'PoSo-my;. 

XCVII. 'E7e^eTO Be rj dpxv V ^OBpvawv fie- 
yeOos eVl puev OdXaaaav KaOiqteovaa dirb 'A/3- 
Brjpcov 7roX.ect)9 e? rov Ev^eivov ttovtov ^XP l 
"larpov TTorafiov' avrrj irepiirXov<; iarlv rj jfj 
tcl tjvvTOficoTara, rjv alel Kara irpv/xvav larrjraL 
to Trvevfia, vrjl arpoyyvXrj reaadpeov rj/xepcov teal 
tacov vvfcrcov 6B5> Be tcl ^vvro/xcorara ef 'A/3- 
Bi]pwv 6? "Icrrpov avrjp ev^covo^ evBe/earalo^ reXel. 

2 rd fjiev 777)0? OdXaaaav roaavrrj rjv, e? rjireLpov 
Be airo T$v£avTLov e? Aaialovs teal eirl tov 
"Erpv/iova (ravrrj yap Blo, irXelarov airo Oa- 
Xdaaijs dvco eyiyvero) rjfiepcov dvBpl ev^covto rpLwv 

3 teal Be/ea dvvaaL. <j)6po$ re etc irdaris tt?? fiap- 
(3dpov teal tcov 'EXXrjvlBcov iroXewv oawvirep 

1 ov, in the MSS. before wpi&To, deleted by Arnold. 

1 Paeonian tribes that dwelt in the mountain regions 
bordering on Macedonia, watered by the Upper Strymon 
and the Axius ; most of them were afterwards subject to 


BOOK II. xcvi. 3-xcvn. 3 

Agrianians and Laeaeans, and all the other Paeonian 
tribes which were under his sway. 1 These peoples 
were at the outer limits of his empire ; for the bounds 
of his empire extended, on the side towards the 
Paeonians, who are independent, as far as the 
Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, 2 which 
flows from mount Scombrus through the country of 
the Agrianians and the Laeaeans. On the side to- 
ward the Triballi, who also are independent, the 
boundary is formed by the Treres and Tilataeans ; 
and these dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and 
extend toward the west as far as the river Oscius. 3 
This river has its source in the same mountains as 
the Nestus 4 and the Hebrus 5 — a mountain range of 
great extent and uninhabited that is adjacent to 

XCVII. Now the empire of the Odrysians 6 in 
respect to its size extended along the sea-coast from 
the city of Abdera to the Euxine Sea as far as the 
river Ister. This stretch of coast constitutes a 
voyage for a merchant-vessel, if the shortest course 
is taken and the wind keeps steady astern, of four 
days and as many nights ; but the journey by land 
from Abdera to the Ister can be accomplished by an 
active man, taking the shortest route, in eleven 
days. Such was its extent on its seaboard ; but 
inland the distance from Byzantium to the Laeaeans 
and the river Strymon — for this was its inland point 
farthest distant from the sea — it is possible for an 
active man to cover in thirteen days. As for the 
tribute which came in from the barbarian territory 
and from all the Hellenic cities over which the 

3 Now Struma. 8 Now Isker. 

4 Now Masta. * Now Maritza. 

6 Coinciding in the main with modern Bulgaria. 



r)p£av eirl XevOov, 09 varepov HirdXKOV /Scujl- 
Xevaas ifkelarov Br) errolrjcre, rerpaKoaicov ra- 
Xdvrcov dpyvpiov fidXiara Bvva/nis, a %pvcr6<z 
Kai apyvpos fjer Kai Bcopa ovk eXdaaco rovrcov 
Xpvaov re teai dpyvpov irpoae^epero, %g>/h? Be 
oaa vcpavrd re Kai Xela Kai rj aXXr) Karaatcevr), 
teal ov ijlovov avrw, dXXd Kai rol<; rrapaBvva- 

4 arevovcrl re Kai yevvaiois 'OBpvacov. Karearrj- 
aavro yap rovvavrlov rrjs Uepacov fiaaiXeias 
rbv vofjiov ovra /lev Kai rois aXXoi? ®pa£l 
Xafiftdveiv fidXXov rj BtBovai (Kai aXayiov rjv 
alrrjOevra fir) Bovvav rj alrrjcravra fir) rv^elv), 
o/jLcds Be Kara rb Bvvaadat eirl irXeov avrw ixP 7 ]- 
aavro' ov yap r)v irpd^au ovBev fir) BiBovra Bcopa. 

5 ware cttI fieya r) (SaaiXeia rjXOev la^yo?. rwv 
yap ev rfj ^vpaoirrj oaai fiera^v rod 'Iovlov 
koXttov Kai rod Eu«faVou irovrov fieyiarrj eyevero 
Xprjfidrcov irpocroBw Kai rfj aXXrj evBai \10vla, 
iayyi Be fid^r)^ Kai err par ov nXyjOei ttoXv Bevrepa 

6 fierd rrjv ^kvOcov. ravrrj Be dBvvara e%iaova6at, 
ov% ore rd ev rfj Kvpcoirrj, dXX y ou8' ev rfj 'Acr/a 
Wvos ev 7T/30? ev ovk eariv 6 ri Bvvarbv *%Kv6ai<; 
opoyvco/iovovai iracnv avricrrrjvai. ov firjv ovB' 

1 Nephew and successor of Sitalces ; cf. ch. ci. 5, 6 ; lv. ci. 5. 

2 £81,000, $388,800. 

3 Among the Persians the monarch gave rather than re- 
ceived presents : cf. Xen. Cyrop. Vlll. ii. 7, Sic^ueVei %ti Kai vvv 
toIs &aari\ev<riv 77 no\v5j.pia. 


BOOK II. xcvn. 3-6 

Odrysians acquired sway in the time of Seuthes * — 
who, succeeding Sitalces on the throne, brought 
the revenues to their maximum — its value was about 
four hundred talents 2 in coin, and was paid in gold 
and silver ; and gifts equal in value to the tribute, 
not only of gold and silver, but besides these all 
manner of stuffs, both embroidered and plain, and 
other articles for household use, were brought as 
offerings to the king, and not for him only, but also 
for the subordinate princes and nobles of the Odry- 
sians. For these kings had established a custom 
which was just the opposite of that prevailing in the 
kingdom of the Persians, 3 namely, to take rather 
than to give ; indeed it was more disgraceful for a 
man not to give when asked than to ask and be 
refused. This custom was observed among the 
other Thracians also ; but the Odrysian kings, as 
they were more powerful, followed it more exten- 
sively ; indeed it was not possible to accomplish 
anything without giving gifts. Consequently the 
kingdom attained to a great degree of power. For 
of all the kingdoms in Europe between the Ionian 
Gulf and the Euxine Sea it was the greatest in 
revenue of money and in general prosperity ; but 
as regards the strength and size of its army, it was 
distinctly inferior to the Scythian kingdom. 4 With 
that not only are the nations of Europe unable to 
compete, but even in Asia, nation against nation, 
there is none which can make a stand against the 
Scythians if they all act in concert. However, with 

* Contradicting Hdt. v. hi.: &r>r)li<wv 8e tQvos ixiyiarSv iart 
fifTa ye 'i^Soi/i itolvtcov avdpunrusv et 8f un' evhs &p\oiTO f) (ppovtoi 
Kara tu>vt6, 6,/j.axov T* av dr) na\ iroKAy Kpanarov ■ko.vtu.v 
IQviwv Karh. yv(jj\xt\v r)]V 4/j.i)y. 



e<? ttjv aXXrjv evffovXiav /ecu tjvvecriv ir€p\ ra)v 
rrrapovTcov e? rbv {3iov aXXocs o/xoLovvrai. 

XCVIII. StraX/c?;? fiev ovv yd>pa$ rocravTTjs 
ftaaiXevwv nr a pea Kevd^ero rbv arparov. Kai 
eireiBr) avra> irotfia rjv, apa? iiropevero eVi ttjv 
MaKeBovLav irpcorov fiev Bia tt/9 avrov «o^^?, 
eireira Bia Kep/ciVTjs ipi]/jLov opovs, o icrri fiedo- 
ptov Xcvtcov teal Uaiovcov. iiropevero Be 6Y 
avrov rrj 6Ba> r/v irporepov auTO? erronqcraro 
re/Awv Tr)V vXrjv, ore €7rl Tiaiovas ecrrpdrevaev. 

2 to Be opos ef 'OBpvcrcov Buovres iv Be^id fiev 
el^ov Tlalovas, iv dpcarepa Be I^ivtovs teal 
Mat,Bov<;. BieXOovres Be avrb d<j>iKovro e? Ao- 

3 firjpov ttjv TiaiovLK-qv. 7ropevop,evo) Be avrw dire- 
ylyvero puev ovBev rod crrparov el pur) re voo~(p, 
rrpoaeyiyvero Be. iroXXol yap ra>v avTOvofiwv 
Spa/ccov dirapd/cXTjroL eft dpiray^v tjkoXovOovv, 
ware to izav ttXtjOos Xeyerai ovk eXaaaov irevre 

4 ical Be/ca fivpcdBcov yevecrOar /cal rovrov to fiev 
TrXeov ire^bv rjv, rpcrrjfiopLov Be fidXiara Iitttlkov. 


irapeiypvTO koX fier avrovs Ferae, rod Be ire^oii 
ol fiay^aipofyopoi fiayifioararoi fiev rjaav ol etc rr}% 
'PoBottt]^ abrbvofioi Karaftdvres, o Be aXXo<; opu- 
Xo? %vpLp,€LKTo<; TvXrjOeL (poflepooraro*; rjtcoXovdei. 

XCIX. 'EvvrjOpoi^ovTO ovv iv rrj Aofiijpa) real 
irapeo-fcevd^ovro ottcd<; Kara Kopvcf^rjv eaftaXovcnv 
€9 rrjv Karco MaKeBoviav, ^9 TlepBiKKa? rfp^ev. 

BOOK II. xcvii. 6-xcix. i 

reference to wise counsel and intelligence about the 
things that belong to the enrichment of life the 
Scythians are not to be compared with other nations. 

XCVIII. Such then was the extent of the country 
over which Sitalces ruled at the time when he was 
preparing his army. But when everything was 
ready, he set out for Macedonia, proceeding first 
through his own territory, then through the deso- 
late range of Cercine, which lies between the Sinti 
and Paeonians. And he passed over this mountain 
by the road which he himself had constructed before, 
when he made an expedition against the Paeonians, 
cutting a path through the forest. As his army 
crossed the mountain, leaving the country of the 
Odrysians, they had the Paeonians on the right 
and on the left the Sinti and Maedi ; and when 
they came out on the other side they arrived at 
Doberus in Paeonia. On the march his army 
suffered no loss, except from sickness, but rather 
was augmented ; for many of the independent 
Thracians joined the expedition unsummoned, in 
the hope of plunder, so that the whole number is 
said to have been not less than a hundred and fifty 
thousand, the greater part being infantry, about one- 
third cavalry. Of the cavalry the Odrysians them- 
selves furnished the largest contingent, and next to 
them the Getae ; while of the infantry the sword- 
wearers, independent tribes that came down from 
Mount Rhodope, were the best fighters, the rest ol 
the army that followed, a miscellaneous horde, being 
formidable chiefly on account of its numbers. 

XCIX. So Sitalces' army was being mustered at 
Doberus and preparing to pass over the mountain 
crest and descend upon lower Macedonia, of which 



2 tojv yap Ma/ceBovcov elcrl /cal Avy/crjaral /cal 
'EXi/jucorai teal aXXa edvrj eirdvcoOev, a %vpp,aya 
fjLev iarc tovtols koX viri'i/coa, (BaaiXeLas S' e^ei 

3 /caO' avrd. rriv Be irapa OdXaaaav vvv Ma/ce- 
Bovc'av ' AXe^avBpos 6 UepBL/c/cov irarr^p /cal ol 
irpoyovoi avrov Trj/xeviSai, rb apyalov 6We? ef 
"A/ryof? TrpcjTOi €KTi](TavTO /cal e/3aalXevaav 
dvaarrjaavre^ /M*>XV 6K l JLev Hiepia? ULepas, ol 
varepov virb rb Yldyyaiov rrepav ^rpvpiovos 
w/ciiaav Qdyprjra /cal aXXa ^copla (/cal en real 
vvv Uiepifcbs koXitos /caXelrat, t) vrrb tm Yiayyaiw 
7rpo? OdXaaaav yrjj), etc Be ttj? BorTia? /caXov/ne- 
vtjs BoTTtatou?, ol vvv ofiopoL XaX/ciBecov ol/cov- 

4 aiv tt}? Be Tlatovias irapa rbv "A^lov irorap^bv 
arevjjv riva tcaOtjKOvaav dvcoOev p.e\pi TUXXrjs 
/cal OaXdaarjS e/crrjaavro, /cal rrepav 'A^tof pe\pi 
'Erpv/iovos rrjv Mvy&oviav /caXov/ievrjv 'H Scorn? 

5 e%eXdaavre$ vefiovrai. dvearr]aav Be /cal e/c rrj<; 
vvv 'Eo^Sta? KaXovfievijs 'Eo^Sou?, a>v ol p,ev 
rroXXol e<f>0dp7]o~av, /3pa%v Be ri avrcov rrepl 
<£>vatcav /caTcp/crjTai, /cal ef ' AXp,<oirias" AXpLtorras. 

6 i/epdrrjaav Be /cal rcov aXXcov eOvcov ol Ma/ceBoves 
ovtol a /cal vvv en e^ovai, rbv re 'AvOe/jtovvra 
/cal Tprjarcoviav /cal HiaaXrlav ical Ala/ceBovcov 
avrcov iroXXrjv. to Be ^vp/nav ^la/ceBovla /caXel- 
rai /cal UepBi/c/cas 'AXe^dvBpov /SaaiXevs avrcov 
yjv ore XiTdXfcrjs dirgei. 


BOOK II. xcix. 2-6 

Perdiccas was ruler. For the Macedonian race 
includes also the Lyncestians, Elimiotes, and other 
tribes of the upper country, which, though in alli- 
ance with the nearer Macedonians and subject to 
them, have kings of their own ; but the country by 
the sea which is now called Macedonia, was first 
acquired and made their kingdom by Alexander, the 
father of Perdiccas, and his forefathers, who were 
originally Temenidae from Argos. They defeated 
and expelled from Pieria the Pierians, who after- 
wards took up their abode in Phagres and other 
places at the foot of Mount Pangaeus beyond the 
Strymon (and even to this day the district at the 
foot of Mount Pangaeus toward the sea is called 
the Pierian Valley), and also, from the country 
called Bottia, the Bottiaeans, who now dwell on the 
borders of the Chalcidians ; they acquired, further, 
a narrow strip of Paeonia extending along the 
river Axius 1 from the interior to Pella and the sea ; 
and beyond the Axius they possess the district as 
far as the Strymon which is called Mygdonia, 
having driven out the Edonians. Moreover, they 
expelled from the district now called Eordia the 
Eordians, most of whom were destroyed, but a small 
portion is settled in the neighbourhood of Physca ; 
and also from Almopia the Almopians. These 
Macedonians also made themselves masters ot 
certain places, which they still hold, belonging to 
the other tribes, namely, of Anthemus, Grestonia, 
Bisaltia, as well as of a large part of Macedonia 
proper. But the whole is now called Macedonia, 
and Perdiccas son of Alexander was king when 
Sitalces made his invasion. 

1 Now Vardar. 

45 1 


C. Kal ol fiev Ma/eeSoye? ovtol emovros ttoX- 
Xov arparov dBvvarot, ovres dfxvveaOai e? re ra 
tcapTepa Kal rd tclxv oaa rjv iv rfj xcopa iaeKO- 

2 /jil<T07)o-av' rjv Be ov 7roXkd, dXXd varepov 'A/r^e- 
Xao? 6 YiepBtKKOV wo? ftacriXevs <yev6fJLevo<$ rd 
vvv ovra iv tt} X^P? (pKoBofirjcre Kal oBovs 
evOeias ere/xe Kal rdXXa BieKoafirjae rd 1 Kara tov 
iroXe/iov 'ittttols Kal ottXols Kal rfj dXXrj irapa- 
(TKevfi KpeiGdovi tj ^vLnravres ol aXkoi /3ao-i\r)s 

3 oktco ol irpb avrov yevbiievoi. 6 Be aTparbs tcov 
(dpaKcov Ik t>}? &o(3r)pov iaeftaXe rrpcoiov /lev es 
rrjv QiXlttttov irporepov ovaav dpxi'jv, Kal elXev 
WiBoLievr)V fxev Kara Kpdros, Toprvviav Be Kal 
' AraXdvTTjv Kal aXXa arra ywpia 6/j.oXoyia Bia 
Tijv 'Afivvrov cpiXiav 7rpoo-X(opovvTa, tov <t>i\iir- 
ttov vleos, irapovios' Rvpoorrbv Be iiroXiopK^aav 

4 p.ev, eXeiv Be oxjk iBvvavro. eireiia Be Kal e? rrjv 
aXXrjv MaKeBoviav irpovx^p^ rrjv iv dpLarepa 
UeXXr)? Kal Kvppov. eaco Be tovtcov e? rrjv 
Horriaiav Kal Uiepiav ovk d(f)Uovro, dXXa ri]v 
re ^.IvyBovlav Kal Tp^arcovbav Kal 'Avde/iovvra 

5 iBrjovv. ol Be MaKeBoves 7re£a> /xev ovBe Bcevoovv- 
to dp^vvecrOai, Xttttovs Be it poa LieTaireLi-^dpbevoi 
dirb tcov dvco ^vfifidxcov, otttj Bokolt], oXiyoi irp6<; 
iroXXovs iaeftaXXov e? to crrpdrevLLa tcov Spa- 

8 kcov. Kal fi fjbev rrpoaireaoLev, ovBel<s virefievev 
avBpas lirirea^ re dyadovs Kal TeOcopaKia/jLevovs, 
vtto Be 7rXr)6ov<; irepLKXrjofJLevoi avTOV<; iroXXa- 

1 t€, in the MSS. after ret, deleted by Haacke. 

BOOK II c. 1-6 

C. The Macedonians of this region, unable to 
defend themselves against so great an invading 
army, betook themselves to the strong places and 
fortresses that were in the country. These were 
not many ; but subsequently Archelaus son of 
Perdiccas, when he became king, 1 built those that 
are now in the country, and cut straight roads, and 
in general organized his country for war by provid- 
ing cavalry, arms and other equipment beyond any- 
thing achieved by all the eight kings who preceded 
him. But the Thracian army, advancing from 
Doberus, invaded first the province which before 
had belonged to Philip, and took Idomene by storm ; 
but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places 
capitulated voluntarily out of friendship for Amyntas 
son of Philip, who accompanied Sitalces ; moreover 
they laid siege to Europus, but were unable to take 
it. Next they advanced into the other part of 
Macedonia, which is to the west of Pella and Cyr- 
rhus. Beyond these places, however, into Bottiaea 
and Pieria, they did not penetrate, but ravaged 
Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Mace- 
donians, on the other hand, did not even think of 
defending themselves with infantry, but calling upon 
their allies in the interior for additional cavalry, 
though few against many, they dashed in among 
the Thracian army wherever they chose. And 
wherever they charged no one could withstand 
them, for they were good horsemen and protected 
by cuirasses ; but since they were constantly being 
hemmed in by superior numbers and found themselves 

1 413-399 B.C. He was as famous for the splendour and 
success of his reign as for the crime* by which he obtained 
the throne. 



irXaaiw tw 6/jLlXq) e? kivBvvov Kadiaraaav ware 
TeXo? rjavxiav rjyov, ov vo/j,l£ovt€<; l/cavol elvat 
7T/90? to irXeov KivBvveveiv. 

CI. 'O Be %iTd\/cr)<; irpos re rbv UepSiKtcav 
\6yovs e7roi6iTO &v hvefca ecrrpdrevae, Kal eneiBr] 
oi 'AOrjvaloi ov TTapr\aav rats vavalv diriGTOvvTe? 
avrbv firj tj^slv (Bwpa Be Kal irpea(3eL<; eirefju^rav 
clvtw), e? re rovs Xa\/aBea<; Kal BoTTtatou? 
fiepos ti tov arparov ire/arei, /ecu rei^rjpei^ iroirj- 

2 act? iBrjov rrjv yr}v. Kadrj/ievov S' avrov irepl 


SeaaaXol Kal May^re? Kal 01 aXXot virrjKOOL 
SeaaaXcbv Kal oi ^XP L ®€pfi07rv\&v "EXX^e? 
e$o$r]6i]Gav /at) Kal eirl cr</>a9 arparov ^coprjarj, 

3 Kal ev Trapaaicevf) rjcrav. i(j)of3i]0r)o~av Be Kal oi 
Tvepav ^Tpvjxbvos 7rpo? fiopeav ®pdfce<; ocroi rreBia 
eiyov, TLavuloi Kal 'OB6p.avroL Kal Apwot, kcu 

1 Aepaalor civtovojjlol 8' elal Trdvres. irapeaye Be 
Xoyov KaX eirl tou? tg5i> W.07jvaicov iroXefiiov^ 
" EXXTjvas pr) vtt avrcbv ayofievoi Kara rb %vjjl- 

5 fiaxiKov Kal tVl a(pa<; ^coprjacvaiv. 6 Be rrjV re 
XaXKiBiKrjv Kal ^ottlktjv Kal MaKebovlav a/xa 
eVe^a)^ ecpOeipe, Kal e7reiBr) avrw ovBev eTrpdcr- 
aero osv eveKa eaeftaXe, Kal rj arparia alrbv re 
ovk elxev avrw Kal inrb %e^uoyo9 eraXatTTaopec, 
avaireideTai vnb %ev0ov rod SirapaBoKov, dBeX- 


BOOK II. c. 6-ci. 5 

imperilled by the horde that was many times 
their own number, they finally desisted, thinking 
that they were not strong enough to fight with the 
larger force. 

CI. Sitalces now began to hold parleys with 
Perdiccas about the matters for which he had under- 
taken the expedition ; and since the Athenians 
(who did not believe that Sitalces would come, 
though they sent gifts and envoys to him) had not 
arrived with their promised fleet, he despatched 
part of his army into the territory of the Chalcidians 
and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up within their 
walls ravaged their lands. But while he was staying 
in the neighbourhood of these places, the peoples 
which dwell to the south — the Thessalians, the 
Magnesians and other subjects of the Thessalians, 
and the Hellenes as far south as Thermopylae — 
became frightened lest the host should come against 
them also, and so were making preparations. The 
same alarm was felt also by the Thracians who 
inhabit the plain beyond the Strymon to the north, 
that is, the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and 
Dersaeans, independent tribes. He gave occasion 
also to a rumour which spread even to the Hellenes 
hostile to Athens, that the Thracians might be led 
on by the Athenians in accordance with the terms 
of their alliance and come against them too. But 
meanwhile Sitalces kept on ravaging at one and the 
same time Chalcidice, Bottice, and xMacedonia ; and 
then, since none of the original objects of his in- 
vasion was being accomplished, and his army was 
without food and was suffering from the winter, he 
was persuaded by Seuthes son of Sparadocus, a 



cj)iBov 6Vto? Kal fJLeyiaTov /jbetT eavTov Bvvap,evov, 
coctt iv Tayei direXOelv. tov Be Xevdrjv Kpvcpa 
TlepBiKKas viroo-xo/JLevos dBeXcprjv kavrov Bwcreiv 

6 fcal j^prjfiara far avTrj irpoairoLelrai. Kal 6 puev 
Treicruels teal fieLva*; rpiaKOvra tcl<; Trdaas r)p,epa<z, 
tovtcov Be oktco iv ~Ka\/aSevcriv, avexcoprjae tcc 
a-rparq) Kara, Tayps eir olkov UepBiKKa? Be 
varepov ^rparoviKr)v tt)V eavrov dBeXcjirjv BiBcoai 
XevOy, coairep vireayeTO. ra fiev ovv Kara ttjv 
%ird\fcov arpareiav ovtcos iyevero. 

CII. Ot Be iv Navirafercd 'AOtjvclloi tov avrov 
%eip<covo<;, iirecBr) to tcov TieXoirovvrjaicov vav- 
tlkov BieXvdrj, <&opfiicovo<; rjyov/ievov io-rpdrevcrav, 
irapaTrXevcravTes eV 'Kgtclkov Kal airo[3dvTe<; 
6*5 ttjv fieaoyeiav Trj<; ' ' AKapvavias TeTpaKocriois 
fiev ottXLtclis 'AOrjvaicov tcov cltto tcov vecov, re- 
TpafcoaloLS Be Mecrcrrjvicov, teal etc re Xrpdrov Kal 
Kopovrcov Kal aXXcov ycopicov dvBpa<; ov Botcovvra? 
f3e/3aiov<; e\vai i%7]Xao~av, Kal Kvvyra rbv ®eo- 
Xvrov 6? Kopovra Karayay6vre<; dveycop^crav 

2 irdXiv iirl Ta? vavs. e? yap OivtdBas alei irore 
7roXefjiLov<; ovra? /xovovs 'AKapvdvcov ovk eBoKei 
Bvvarbv elvai yeip,covo<$ ovtos cTTpareveiv 6 yap 
WyeXcoos irorafib^ pecov i/c UlvBov opov? Bed 
AoX,07rta? Kal 'Aypaicov Kal ' AficpLXoycov Kal Bed 
tov y AKapvaviKov ireBiov, dvcoOev puev irapd Xrpd- 
tov ttoXiv, 6? OdXacraav 5' i£iel<; Trap' QlvidBas 
Kal TrjV ttoXiv avroh TrepiXipivd^cov, airopov iroiei 

BOOK II. ci. 5-cn. 2 

nephew and next to him in power, 1 to go back home 
at once. Now Seuthes had been secretly won over 
by Perdiccas, who had promised to give him his 
sister in marriage and a dowry with her. So 
Sitalces yielded, and after a stay of only thirty days 
in all, eight of which had been spent among the 
Chalcidians, returned home with his army with all 
speed. And Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister 
Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such, 
then, is the history of the expedition of Sitalces. 

CII. During the same winter the Athenians in 
Naupactus, after the Peloponnesian fleet had been 
disbanded, made an expedition under the command 
of Phormio. They first skirted the coast in the 
direction of Astacus, and then, disembarking, in- 
vaded the interior of Acarnania with four hundred 
Athenian hoplites from the ships and four hundred 
Messenian. And after they had expelled from 
Stratus, Coronta, and other places such men as were 
regarded as disloyal, and had restored Cynes son of 
Theolytus to Coronta, they returned again to their 
ships. For it seemed impracticable in winter to 
make a campaign against Oeniadae, whose inhabi- 
tants alone of the Acarnanians were always hostile ; 
for the river Achelous, which rises in Mount Pindus 
and flows through the country of the Dolopians, 
Agraeans, and Amphilochians and then through the 
Acarnanian plain, passes by the city of Stratus high 
up the stream, but by Oeniadae empties into the 
sea, where it surrounds the city with marshes, thus 
rendering military operations there impossible in 

1 Sadocus, Sitalces' own son, who had been received into 
Athenian citizenship (ch. xxix. 5 ; lxvii. 2), must have died 
before this time. The nephew Seuthes succeeded to the 
throne in 424 b.o. (iv. ci. 4). 



3 virb tov v&aro<; ev ^eifxcovi arparevetv. Kelvrai 
Be teal tcov vr/crcov tcov 'Fi%ivdBcov ai ttoWclI 
tcaravTifepv OlviaBcov tov 'A^eXcoov tcov Ik^oXcov 
obBev direyovcrai, ware fieyas cov 6 ttotcl/jlos 
irpocryol alel teal elal tcov vrjacov at r)ireipcovTai, 
eXirl^ Be teal irdaas ovk ev 7roXXco tivi av %p6vcp 

4 tovto iradetv to re yap pedfid iarc fieya teal 
ttoXv Kal OoXepov, ai re vrjaoi irvKval, teal dXXrj- 
Xat? t?)? irpoa^coaeco^ to /irj aKeBdvvvaOai 1 ^vv- 
Beafioi yiyvovraiy irapaXXa^ Kal ov Kara aTolyov 
Keijxevai, ov% eyovaai ev6eia<$ BioBovs tov vSaros 

5 e? to ireXayos. eprj/ioi 8' elal Kal ov fieydXat. 
Xeyerai Be Kal 'AXk/jl€covi, tco 'ApLcpidpeco, ore Brj 
dXaaQai avrbv /lera tov cpovov t?}? firjTpo^, tov 
'AttoXXco TavTTjv tt]v yrjv y^p^aai oiKelv, virei- 
TrovTa ovk elvai Xvaiv tcov Bei/xaTcov rrplv av 
evpcov ev Tavrrj ttj %w/3a KaTOiKLarjTat, tjtis ore 
eKTeive ttjv firjrepa imtjitco vtto rjXiov ecoparo jJLrjBe 

6 yr) r)v, a)<? ttj? 76 a\\r)<; aitTCp pLepuao fievr)<; . 6 £' 
diropcov, go? cpaai, /jloXl<; Karevoijae ttjv Trpbay^co- 
glv TavTrjv tov ^A^eXcoov, Kal iBoKei avrco LKavrj 
av KeyjoaOai BLaiTa tco acop,aTi d</>' ovirep KTeLvas 
ttjv fjurjTepa ovk bXiyov \pbvov eirXavuTO. Ka\ 
KaTOLKiaOeU e? tow? irepl OividBa? tottovs eBvvd- 
arevae Te Kal ciirb \\Kapvavo? iraiBbs eavTOv Ttjs 
%a>/oa9 T^t> eTTcovv/ibav eyKaT&Xnrev. tcl /jlcv ovv 
Trepl 'AXK/iecova Toiavra Xeyo/xeva TrapeXaftofiev. 

1 Hude brackets rh /*$) <TKe8a.yvve9ai, following Stahl. 

BOOK II. on. 2-6 

winter by reason of the water. Besides, most of the 
Echinades islands lie opposite to Oeniadae at no great 
distance from the mouths of the Achelous, so that 
the river, which is large, keeps making fresh deposits 
of silt, and some of the islands have already become 
part of the mainland, and probably this will happen 
to all of them in no great while. For the stream is 
wide and deep and turbid, and the islands are close 
together and serve to bind to one another the bars 
as they are formed, preventing them from being 
broken up, since the islands lie, not in line, but 
irregularly, and do not allow straight channels for 
the water into the open sea. These islands are 
uninhabited and not large. There is a story that 
when Alcmaeon son of Amphiaraus was a wanderer 
after the murder of his mother, 1 Apollo directed him 
by oracle to inhabit this land, intimating that he 
would have no release from his fears until he should 
find and settle in a country which at the time he 
killed his mother had not yet been seen by the 
sun, and was not even land then, for rA\ the rest 
of the earth had been polluted by him. And he, 
in his perplexity, at last, as the story goes, ob- 
served this sand-bar formed by the Achelous, and 
he surmised that during the long time he had been 
wandering since he had slain his mother enough 
land would have been silted up to support life in. 
So he settled there in the region of Oeniadae, 
founded a principality, and left to the country its 
name Acarnania, after that of his son Acarnan. 
Such is the tradition which we have received 
concerning Alcmaeon. 

1 Eriphyle. 



CIII. 01 Se y A07]vatoL ical 6 Qopplwv apavre*; 
£k T?)? 'AfcapvavLas tcaX afyiicofievoL e? rrjv Nav- 
ttcl/ctov afia rjpi KareirXevaav e? Ta? 'AOrjvas, 
tovs re i\ev6epov<s rcov al^fiaXaorcov etc twv 
vav^ayj-wv ayovres, o'l dvijp avr avhpos i\v- 
2 Oriaav, ical Ta? rat)? a? el\ov. /cal 6 'xeifMcov 
ireXevra outo?, /cal rpirov Ito? ra> iroke^KD 
ireXevra TcoSe bv ©ov/cvBlStjs ijvviypaijrev. 


BOOK II. cm. 1-2 

CIII. The Athenians and Phormio set out from 
Acarnania and arrived at Naupactus, and later, at 
the beginning of spring, sailed back to Athens, 
bringing with them the captured ships and also the 
prisoners of free birth whom they had taken in the 
sea-fights. These were exchanged man for man. 
And this winter ended, concluding the third year of 
this war of which Thucydides wrote the history. 


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Demosthenes IV-V1 ; Private Orations and In Neaeram. 

A. T. Murray. (Vol. IV. 2nd Imp.) 
Demosthenes VII : Funeral Speech, Erotic Essay, Exordia 

and Letters. N. W. and N. J. DeWbt. 
Dio Cassius : Roman History. E. Cary. 9 Vols. (Vols. 1. 

and II. 3rd Imp., Vols. III. -IX. 2nd Imp.) 
Dio Chrysostom. J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. 5 Vols. 

Vols. I.-IV. 2nd Imp.) 
Diodorus Siculus. 12 Vols. Vols. l.-VI. C. H. Oldfather. 

Vol. VII. C. L. Sherman. Vols. IX. and X. R. M. Geer. 

(Vols. I.-IV. 2nd Imp.) 
Diogenes Laertius. R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp. 

Vol. II. 3rd Imp.) 
Dionysids of Halicarnassus : Roman Antiquities. Spel 

man's translation revised by E. Cary. 7 Vols. (Vols. I.-V 

2nd Imp.) 
Epictetus. W. A. Oldiather. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., II. 2nd 

Euripides. A. S. Way. 4 Vols. (Vols. I. and II. 1th Imp., 

III. and IV. 6th Imp.) Verse trans. 
Eusebius : Ecclesiastical History. Kirsopp Lake and 

J. E. L. Oulton. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 4th Imp.) 
Galen: On the Natural Faculties. A. J. Brock. (4th Imp.) 
The Greek Anthology. W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. (Vols. I. and 

II. 5th Imp., Vol. III. 4th Imp., Vols. IV. and V. 3rd Imp.) 
Greek Elegy and Iambus with the Anacreontea. J. M. 

Edmonds. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.) 
The Greek Bucolic Poets (Theocritus, Bion, Moschus). 

J. M. Edmonds. (1th imp. revised.) 
Greek Mathematical Works. Ivor Thomas 2 Vols. (2nd 

Herodes Cf. Theophrastus : Characters 

Herodotus. A. D. Godley. 4 Vols. (Vols. I.-III. ±th Imp., 

Vol. IV. 3rd Imp.) 
Hesiod and The Homeric Hymns. H. G. Evelyn White. 

(1th Imp. revised and enlarged.) 
Hippocrates and the Fragments of Heracleitus. W. H. S. 

Jones and E. T. Withington. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.) 
Homer : Iliad. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 1th Imp., 

Vol. II. 6th Imp.) 
Homer: Odyssey. A.T.Murray. 2 Vols. (8th Imp.) 
Isaeus. E. W. Forster. {3rd Imp.) 
Isocrates. George Norlin and LaRue Van Hook. 3 Vols. (2nd 

St. John Damascene : Barlaam and Ioasaph. Rev. G. R. 

"Woodward and Harold Mattingly. (3rd Imp. revised.) 
JosEPHUS. H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. 9 Vols. 

Vols. I.-VII. (Vol. V. 3rd Imp., Vols. I.-IV., VI. and VII. 

2nd Imp.) 
Julian. Wihner Cave Wright. 3 Vols. (Vols. 1. and II. 3rd 

Imp., Vol. III. 2nd Imp.) 
Lucian. A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. I.-V. (Vols. I. and 

II. ±th Imp., Vol. III. 3rd Imp., Vols. IV. and V. 2nd Imp.) 
Lycophron. Cf. Callimachus. 
Lyra Graeca. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. 1. ±th Imp.. 

Vol. II. revised and enlarged, and III. 3rd Imp.) 
Lysias. W. R. M. Lamb. (2nd Imp.) 
Manetho. W. G. Waddell : Ptolemy : Tetrabiblos. F. E. 

Robbins. (3rd Imp.) 
Marcus Aurelius. C. R. Haines. (4* Imp. revised.) 
Menander. F. G. Allinson. (3rd Imp. revised.) 
Minor Attic Orators (Antiphon, Andocides, Lycurgus, 

Demades, Dlnarchus, Hypereides). K. J. Maidment and 

J. O. Burrt. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) 
Nonnos : Dionysiaca. W. H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Oppian, Colluthus, Tryphiodorus. A. W. Mair. (2nd Imp.) 
Papyri. Non -Literary Selections. A. S. Hunt and C. C. 

Edgar. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp. ) Literary Selections. 

Vol. I. (Poetry). D. L. Page. (3rd Imp.) 
Parthenius. Cf. Daphnis and Chloe. 
Pausanias : Description of Greece. W. H. S. Jones. 5 

Vols, and Companion Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley. 

(Vols. I. and III. 3rd Imp., Vols. II., IV. and V. 2nd Imp.) 
Phllo. 10 Vols. Vols. I.-V. ; F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H. 

Whitaker. Vols. VI.-IX. ; F. H. Colson. (Vols. II.-III. 

V.-IX. 2nd Imp., Vols. I. and IV., 3rd Imp.) 
Phllo : two supplementary Vols. (Translation only.) Ralph 

Philostratus : The Life of Appollonius of Tyana. F. C. 

Conybeare. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. ±th Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp.) 
Philostratus : Imagines ; Callistratus : Descriptions. 

A. Fairbanks. 
Fhilostratus and Eunapius : Lives of the Sophists. 

Wilmer Cave Wright. (2nd Imp.) 

Pindar. Sir J. E. Sandys. (1th Imp. revised.) 

Plato : Charmides, Alcibiades, Hipparchus, The Lovers, 

Theaoes, Minos and Epinomis. W. R. M. Lamb. (2nd 

Imp. ) 
Plato : Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser 

Hippias. H. N. Fowler. (\th Imp.) 
Plato : Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus. 

H. N. Fowler, (llth Imp.) 
Plato : Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus. W. R. M. 

Lamb. (3rd Imp. revised.) 
Plato : Laws. Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.) 
Plato : Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. W. R. M. Lamb. (5th 

Imp. revised.) 
Plato : Republic. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 5th Imp., 

Vol. II. Oh Imp.) 
Plato: Statesman, Philebus. H.N. Fowler; Ion. W. R. M. 

Lamb. (4th Imp.) 
Plato : Theaetetus and Sophist. H. N. Fowler. (4th Imp.) 
Plato : Timaeus, Critias, Clitopho, Menexenus, Epistulae. 

Rev. R. G. Bury. (3rd Imp.) 
Plutarch: Moralia. 14 Vols. Vols. l.-V. F. C. Babbitt; 

Vol. VI. W. C. Helmbold; Vol. X. H. N. Fowler. (Vols. 

I.-VI. and X. 2nd Imp.) 
Plutarch : The Parallel Lives. B. Perrin. 11 Vols. 

(Vols. L. II., VI., VII., and XL 3rd Imp. Vols. III.-V. and 

VIII.-X. 2nd Imp.) 
Polybius. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Procopius : History of the Wars. H. B. Dewing. 7 Vols. 

(Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. II.-VII. 2nd Imp.) 
Ptolemy : Tetrabiblos. Cf. Manetho. 

Quintus Smyrnaeus. A. S. Way. Verse trans. (3rd Imp.) 
Sextus Empiricus. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd 

Imp., Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.) 
Sophocles. F. Storr 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 10th Imp. Vol. II. 6th 

Imp.) Verse trans. 
Strabo : Geography. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. (Vols. I., V., 

and VIII. 3rd Imp., Vols. II., III., IV., VI., and VII. 2nd Imp.) 
Theophrastus : Characters. J. M. Edmonds. Herodes, 

etc. A. D. Knox. (3rd Imp.) 
Theophrastus : Enquiry into Plants. Sir Arthur Hort, 

Bart. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.) 
Thucydides. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 5th Imp., Vols. 

II., III., and IV. 3rd Imp. revised.) 
Tryphiodorus. Cf. Oppian. 
Xenophon : Cyropaedia. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th 

Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp.) 
Xenophon : Hellenica, Anabasis, Apology, and Symposium. 

C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. (Vols. I. and III. 

3rd Imp., Vol. II. 4th Imp.) 
Xenophon : Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. E. C. Marchant. 

(3rd Imp.) 
Xenophon : Scripta Minora. E. C. Marchant. (3rd Imp.) 


Greek Authors 

Aelian : On the Nature of Animals. A. F. Scholfield. 
Aristotle : History of Animals. A. L. Peck. 
Callimachus : Fragments. C. A. Trypanis. 
Plotlnus : A. H. Armstrong. 

Latin Authors 

St. Augustine : City of God. 

Cicero : Pro Sestio, In Vatinium. J. H. Freese and R. Gardner. 

Cicero: Pro Caelio, De Provlnciis Consularibus, Pro 

Balbo. J. H. Freese and R. Gardner. 
Phaedrus. Ben E. Perry. 






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